

# Driftwood Self-Regulating Access to Natural Resources

Modeling and Simulation of Complex Systems

Lecturer: Prof Alexis Drogoul, Arnaud Grinard, Athur Bulgiere

By: Phạm Gia Phúc

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### Introduction



#### **Problem Statement**

- Resource competition for driftwood collection on coastal shores
- Ownership marked by stone placement
- Theft possible when unobserved
- Need for effective self-regulation

#### **Key Research Question**

- Is it possible to achieve a stable resource management system through:
  - Peer pressure regulation
  - External enforcement
  - Group dynamics

### Mechanisms - Environment




#### **Spatial Organization**

- Deep Sea Zone (20% width)
- Tidal Zone (20-65%)
- Sandy Beach Zone (65-100%)

#### **Dynamic Systems**

- 24-hour day/night cycle
- Synchronized tidal system
  - Rising: 0:00–6:00 and 12:00–18:00
  - Falling: 6:00–12:00 and 18:00–24:00
- Wave dynamics with parametric control
- Water depth calculations and beach topography



### Mechanisms - Environment



#### **Driftwood**

• 3 sizes:


• Large: 5

• Medium: 3

• Small: 1

• Tide influenced movement

• Wave influenced movement



### Extension 1: Self-Regulation and Pile Ownership



#### **Collector Behavior**

• Speed: 0-8 km/h

• Carrying capacity: 10 units

• Field of view: 100 degrees, 10m range


Greediness factor: 0.3-0.8

#### **Theft Mechanics**

Initial steal chance: 10%


Maximum: 20%


• Success-based increase: 1%



### Ext1: Self-Regulation and Pile Ownership – Analysis









### Ext1: Self-Regulation and Pile Ownership – Analysis







### **Extension 2: External Enforcement**




#### **Enforcement Mechanisms**

- Authority agents with enhanced FOV
- Security cameras
- Active pursuit system
- Punishment mechanics

#### **Impact Analysis**


- Catch rates
- System stability
- Resource security
- Theft deterrence




### Ext2: External Enforcement – Analysis




Secured Resources = 0 (0%)





### Ext2: External Enforcement – Analysis








#### 

- Average Carried Value - Maximum Pile Value - Average Pile Value



### Extension 3: Group Dynamics



#### **Group Formation**

• Size: 2-4 members


Formation chance: 30%

• Breakup chance: 10%

• Cooperation bonus: 20%

#### **System Resilience**

- Regular system disruptions (every 500 cycles)
- 20% impact strength
- Recovery period: 500 cycles
- Affects speed, capacity, and efficiency




### Ext3: Group Dynamics – Analysis



1,200


1,400


Grouped Collectors = 6 (55%)



### Ext3: Group Dynamics – Analysis







January 25

System Stability

### Conclusion



#### **System Stability Achieved Through:**

- Peer pressure mechanisms
- External enforcement
- Group cooperation

#### **Key Contributions**

- Demonstrated emergence of stable resource management
- Identified optimal enforcement strategies
- Validated group-based resilience



## Thank you!