

Driftwood Self-Regulating Access to Natural Resources

Modeling and Simulation of Complex Systems

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Introduction



Problem Statement

- Resource competition for driftwood collection on coastal shores
- Ownership marked by stone placement
- Theft possible when unobserved
- Need for effective self-regulation

Key Research Question

- Is it possible to achieve a stable resource management system through:
 - Peer pressure regulation
 - External enforcement
 - Group dynamics

Mechanisms - Environment




Spatial Organization

- Deep Sea Zone (20% width)
- Tidal Zone (20-65%)
- Sandy Beach Zone (65-100%)

Dynamic Systems

- 24-hour day/night cycle
- Synchronized tidal system
 - Rising: 0:00–6:00 and 12:00–18:00
 - Falling: 6:00–12:00 and 18:00–24:00
- Wave dynamics with parametric control
- Water depth calculations and beach topography



Mechanisms - Environment



Driftwood

• 3 sizes:


• Large: 5

• Medium: 3

• Small: 1

• Tide influenced movement

• Wave influenced movement



Extension 1: Self-Regulation and Pile Ownership



Collector Behavior

• Speed: 0-8 km/h

• Carrying capacity: 10 units

• Field of view: 100 degrees, 10m range


Greediness factor: 0.3-0.8

Theft Mechanics

Initial steal chance: 10%


Maximum: 20%


• Success-based increase: 1%



Ext1: Self-Regulation and Pile Ownership – Analysis









Ext1: Self-Regulation and Pile Ownership – Analysis







Extension 2: External Enforcement




Enforcement Mechanisms

- Authority agents with enhanced FOV
- Security cameras
- Active pursuit system
- Punishment mechanics

Impact Analysis


- Catch rates
- System stability
- Resource security
- Theft deterrence




Ext2: External Enforcement – Analysis




Secured Resources = 0 (0%)






Ext2: External Enforcement – Analysis







- Average Carried Value - Maximum Pile Value - Average Pile Value



Extension 3: Group Dynamics



Group Formation

• Size: 2-4 members


Formation chance: 30%

• Breakup chance: 10%

• Cooperation bonus: 20%

System Resilience

- Perturbation testing
- Recovery analysis
- Group vs. individual performance
- Stability metrics




Ext3: Group Dynamics – Analysis



1,200


1,400


Grouped Collectors = 6 (55%)



Ext3: Group Dynamics – Analysis







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System Stability

Conclusion



System Stability Achieved Through:

- Peer pressure mechanisms
- External enforcement
- Group cooperation

Key Contributions

- Demonstrated emergence of stable resource management
- Identified optimal enforcement strategies
- Validated group-based resilience



Thank you!