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The Philanthropic Turn of Religions in Post-Mao China: Bureaucratization, Professionalization, and the Making of a Moral Subject

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Abstract

Religious philanthropy has grown steadily as a social force in post-Mao China. This article explores the interactions between religious policy and religious philanthropy to understand the transformations at the levels of the state, religious groups, and individuals. State policy toward religion has shifted significantly since the 1980s; however, religious groups initiated philanthropic practices in various forms long before state policies were in place. Recent regulations calling on the "religion sector" to contribute to the larger society have not only aimed at shedding the burdens of the socialist state but also demanded more transparency and accountability of religious groups. Based on fieldwork in Jiangsu province from 2006 to 2014, this article argues that religious groups have experienced increasing bureaucratization and professionalization with this turn to philanthropy, and these same processes have led individuals to participate in new forms of religious moral subject-making that draw on and go beyond "doing good deeds."

Keywords

religious philanthropy, bureaucratization, professionalization, moral subject, China

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Religious philanthropy in post-Mao China has received increasing international and academic attention (see Laliberté, 2004; Laliberté, 2015; Chau, 2006; Weller, 2006a; Qin, 2008; Yao and He, 2012; McCarthy, 2013; Kuah-Pearce, 2014; Feener and Wu, 2015).[1] This article explores recent changes in the policy of the Chinese government toward religious philanthropy and the impact those changes have had on religious groups and individuals. How has the attitude of the Chinese state toward religious organizations' involvement in philanthropy changed since the 1980s?[2] How have religious groups adjusted and redefined themselves when philanthropy has been increasingly highlighted by the state as a "positive function that contributes to society"? And what kind of religious subjects does participation in philanthropy create? Based on fieldwork in Jiangsu province from 2006 to 2014, I argue that despite seemingly more relaxed policies on religious philanthropy, the state has also imposed more regulations on religious groups, which in turn have responded positively, transforming themselves and their followers in the process. In contrast to previous studies that largely offer a "resistance model" of religions in China (see, for instance, Weller, 1994; Chau, 2006; McCarthy, 2013), this article argues for an interactional perspective that reveals how both the state and religious organizations have been transformed in this process. Using Buddhist and Protestant case studies, I show how the state's increasing use of legal and financial means of asserting its authority has led to greater bureaucratization and professionalization of religious groups. These changes have also encouraged new forms of moral subject-making among the laity, which has grown out of the same push for a universalized and rationalized form of charity.

I draw on two major concepts to help understand interactions between state policies and religious philanthropy in contemporary China. The first is "adaptive governance," discussed by Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry (2011) in their historical-institutional analysis of the Chinese state's ability to maintain the status quo. Heilmann and Perry argue that the Chinese Communist Party's flexible policy-making process is the key to the resilience of China's authoritarian state. Through local experimentation, the government is able to find the most effective solutions, which can then be replicated in other regions. Perry identifies similarities between Hu Jintao's "Socialist Countryside Program" and Maoist mass campaigns in that both utilized "test points" and local initiatives to disseminate propaganda (2011). If "adaptive governance" is "seeing like a state," "blind-eye governance," to borrow Robert Weller's term, is a bottom-up approach. Weller argues that since 1989 the Chinese state has adopted "a 'don't ask, don't tell' attitude toward many social forms that lie outside the law but are nevertheless mostly tolerated" (2012: 83). Both religious and environmental groups have expanded their spaces as a result of "the

state choosing to accept a convenient fiction by ignoring inconvenient details" (91). Drawing a link between the "responsive authoritarian regime" and a "responsive religious field," this article asks how religious groups and individuals are affected when the state increasingly encourages and regulates religious philanthropy at the same time. These two concepts are helpful in clarifying the transformations in both religion and the state.

Since the 1980s, Chinese religious groups have tried to find ways to survive, revive, and thrive. An interesting feature of this is that religious groups hitchhike on various other developmental projects such as those involving medicine (Palmer, 2007), tourism (Oakes and Sutton, 2010), cultural heritage (Liang, 2013), and the "Chinese classics movement" 国学运动 (Billioud and Thoraval, 2015), and so forth. Philanthropy is another important strategy religious groups have adopted to create room for their development under the current regime.

As discussed below, religious groups in post-Mao China had already initiated philanthropic activities twenty years before the government responded with policy changes. Despite the transformations in the religious policies of the Chinese state and the increasing visibility of religious philanthropy, state control over religious groups has not loosened. Instead, what has changed is only the method of control: from direct oppression to co-optation and regulation via finance and accounting. This change, nonetheless, has been important and has contributed to the bureaucratization and professionalization of religious philanthropy, as discussed later in the article. Furthermore, lay people who engage in religious philanthropy construct moral selves that are based on universal ideas of love, reflect admiration of rationalized organization, and draw on and go beyond earlier socialist moral discourses of "doing good deeds."

Religious-Group-Initiated Philanthropy

In 2006, an official in the Religious Affairs Bureau (hereafter, the RAB) in Jiangsu province commented on my inquiries about religious philanthropy: "Our government should be the sole provider of social welfare in China. We need to be cautious of other social groups, NGOs and religious groups [that try to replace the state by sharing the responsibility for philanthropy]." Another official went on to explain that ideologically NGOs and religious groups were incompatible with the socialist notion of development and therefore they were intrinsically dangerous to socialist nation-building. However, things changed dramatically in just a couple of years.

In May 2008, a 7.9 magnitude earthquake struck Sichuan and metaphorically shook all of China. Suddenly disaster relief efforts of religious groups

and NGOs were reported even in the mainstream media, including the state news provider *China Daily* (Pu, 2012). The "religion sector" 宗教界 alone reportedly donated over 200 million RMB (around US$32.5 million) to the Sichuan earthquake relief work (see Chau, n.d.). In February 2012, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued "Advice on Encouraging and Regulating the Religion Sector's Participation in Philanthropic and Charitable Activities" 关于鼓励和规范宗教界从事公益慈善活动的意见 ("Advice" hereafter; see State Administration of Religious Affairs, 2012).[3] This was the first state regulation on religious charity by the current regime. In March 2012, SARA launched an annual nationwide "Religious Charity Week" campaign, with mandatory participation by the five official religions—Buddhism, Islam, Daoism, Catholicism, and Christianity (Protestantism).[4] Supervised by provincial and municipal RAB officials, the five official religions are expected to join hands in public funding-raising events and offer social services collectively.

These changes suggest that the political environment for religious groups to participate publicly in philanthropy is becoming more open. The officials I spoke with in 2006 clearly demonstrated that the position of the state was defensive, but by 2012 the subject had received much more positive attention from above. Nevertheless, the year 2012 definitely should not be regarded as the beginning of religious philanthropy in post-Mao China. During the 1991 flood in the southeastern provinces, religious groups' involvement in disaster relief first became visible to the public. This was the first time the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called for international aid in disaster relief. The Taiwan-based NGO Buddhist Compassion Relief Ciji (Tzu Chi) Foundation (hereafter, Ciji) entered Mainland China for the first time and established an office there in 1992.[5] In the religion sector, the Buddhist Association of China alone donated 5 million RMB (Xu, 2009) to the government bureau for disaster relief.

Since the 1980s, long before top-down political policies toward religious philanthropy opened up, individual religious leaders had already been engaged in sporadic philanthropic activities. For instance, the former abbot of the Jade Buddha Temple in Shanghai, Master Zhenchan 真禅, had been donating to the Children's Welfare Association since 1984. In 1988 he became the honorary head of the association and founded the Master Zhenchan Children's Welfare Foundation. The lay associates in the temple's charity program told me, "Before 2008, a temple could not do charity in the name of the temple. So the old abbot had to do it under his own personal name. After 2008, things could be done in the name of the temple." This was not entirely accurate on the policy level but other religious leaders also noted the significant transition the 2008 earthquake brought. In June 2008, the Jade Buddha Temple established

a charitable foundation, the Juequn ci'ai gongdehui 觉群慈爱功德会, to handle all of its charitable affairs. Now it accepts donations in all major foreign currencies. After the 2012 "Advice" was published, many more religious groups all across China established philanthropic foundations.

Since the founding of the first Protestant-initiated NGO, the Amity Foundation, in 1985 and the first legally registered Buddhist nonprofit social organization 非营利社会团体, the Shaolin Charity and Welfare Foundation 少林慈善福利基金会 in 1994, religious philanthropy in post-Mao China has come a long way.[6] What is certain is that the state's pro-philanthropy policies are twenty years behind religious groups' initiative in providing social services. It also shows that the engagement in philanthropy was not a top-down process, but rather a result of interaction between top-down policies and bottom-up grassroots efforts by religious groups and individuals who had been pushing the boundaries all along. These non-state-directed philanthropic engagements were either motivated by individual religious figures or propelled by theological concerns. However, this was only possible when the state has "one eye open and one eye closed" to such matters. The success of early experiments with religious philanthropy by innovative religious actors should be partly attributed to blind-eye governance.

The Chinese state, on the other hand, has also been transformed significantly since the 1980s, especially in terms of its attitude toward religious philanthropy. Typical of "adaptive governance," it uses important events such as the flood in 1991 and the earthquake in 2008 as "test points," and when local responses are positive, it makes relevant policy changes accordingly, but slowly. Highlighting the social function and contribution of religions has been a major policy anchor for the post-2008 Chinese state. The following section examines these policy changes in detail.

Religious Policy Changes in Post-Mao China

To some extent the Chinese state still considers religions as competitors of socialist ideology. That religions will be tolerated until they "naturally dissolve" in the course of social evolution is clearly stated in the Chinese constitution. Under this guiding principle, however, the "adaptive governance" of the CCP can be seen in a series of religious policies since the 1980s. In "Document 19" promulgated in 1982, which has often been regarded as the first statement of religious freedom in post-Mao China, the state mainly guarded its territory against the expansion of religious groups (Central Committee, 1982). The document specifically states that freedom of religion means not only the freedom to believe in certain religions but also the freedom not to believe in any religion. The aim is to prevent proselytization.

In 1994, three years after the active participation of religious groups in disaster relief during the flood in southeast China and two years after Ciji was legally registered with the Chinese government, the document on the "Regulation on Governing Venues for Religious Activities" provided guidance on "voluntary offerings of alms, donations, and contributions" (Article 6) for the first time. It also required that the property and income of each religious venue be subject to "the venue's management team" (Article 8) (State Council, 1994). However, it further limited religious activities strictly to certain physical sites of monasteries, temples, mosques and churches, and so on (Article 2).

Though religious groups were used as "test points" of philanthropy during the 1991 flood, it was not until the 2004 "Regulations on Religious Affairs" that religious groups' positive contribution to the public good was mentioned for the first time, though the point of protecting the rights of the nonreligious was reiterated (State Council, 2004). During my fieldwork in 2006, RAB officials at the municipal and county levels mentioned to me multiple times that "religious freedom" meant that atheists' freedom should not be violated. Religious groups, on the other hand, obviously interpret "religious freedom" differently. In the eyes of the government, religious groups should stay within the boundaries the state has carved out for them. Any spilling out is dangerous and subject to containment. And the Chinese government has evolved in its methods of containment—from tactless crushing to legal regulations and financial accountability.

This view of religious groups as competitors explains the slogan "Loving the nation, loving one's religion" 爱国爱教, the principal guideline and requirement for religious groups and individuals. "Loving the nation" in the PRC context largely means a pledge of allegiance to the party-state and it comes before "loving religion." That sets the parameters for members of religious groups. As a result, religious leaders have to engage in a constant "demonstration of their positions" 表态 in public utterances and writing.[7] For instance, right after the new slogan "China Dream" was introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013, the leaders of the five official religions were compelled to demonstrate in the overseas edition of *China Daily* how their religions can contribute to the building of the "China Dream" to collectively show the "compatibility of religious tradition and Chinese modernity" (McCarthy, 2013: 56). Most people think of this as empty performance,[8] but such public expressions allow religious groups to frame their participation in philanthropy as a form of patriotism. It is a clever way of turning political control into opportunities. In China, slogans are often used by religions as a shield from political suspicion or persecution. Susan McCarthy, in discussing the Catholic Jinde Foundation and the Buddhist Ren'ai Charitable Foundation, argues that

faith-based organizations (FBOs)—organizations with a religious background that offer social services—in China "repurpose" the state and expand the space for "spiritual practices" through philanthropic activities. However, this kind of "repurposing" is limited. As will be discussed below, the state only sanctions a limited number of "social services." Other services, especially those with political content, are often forbidden. For instance, religious groups can organize garbage recycling but cannot support demonstrations.[9]

Furthermore, the government tries to make sure that the credit goes to the state, instead of religious leaders, organizations, or the deities they espouse, though the services are delivered by religious groups. A lower-level public security official in charge of religious affairs thus cautioned me in 2010:

> Although our government now encourages religious groups to contribute—they have so much wealth anyway, otherwise they get corrupted—it's not good if religions do too much. [That way,] they are winning the hearts of the people who may look up to gods made of mud or religious leaders, who are only human, as the providers! Because people are simple-minded, they don't realize that our government is making it possible for them to live the lives they have now. And we work so hard in order to make sure they are safe and provided for!

The Chinese government clearly regulates what kinds of services religious philanthropies can provide. In a speech delivered at the "Workshop on Religions' Roles in the Construction of Harmonious Society in Jiangsu Province" (2007), an RAB official recognized religious groups' participation in the areas of "disaster relief, education (helping children return to school or building "Hope Schools"), [assisting] the socially weak (such as socially marginalized groups, the elderly, and disabled people)." Specifically, he encouraged religious groups to play a larger role in caring for ethnic minorities in the province and providing "correct moral guidance especially during times of crisis such as SARS" (Gu, 2007). In a conference organized by the Chinese Philanthropy Research Institute at Beijing Normal University, Jiao Ziwei, the associate chief of the Policy and Regulations Department in SARA, was quoted as saying, "Religions are not floods or monsters. We don't have to be afraid of them, but they are also not [innocent] youth. They are complicated and we need to harness them" ("Zongjiao cishan chuangxin," 2012).[10] This is a sign that the Chinese government was opening up to religious philanthropy. However, it also suggests that "harnessing" was still the main attitude of the regime toward religion.

In the 2012 "Religious Charity Week" campaign launched by SARA, all levels of religious associations and organizations were required to contribute to philanthropic causes. All five religions raised 260 million RMB during one week, making this the largest donation from the "religion sector" since the

Sichuan earthquake in 2008. This was very state-regulated and some of the religious groups I talked with complained profusely about the so-called charity week campaign. To them, it was merely a show and a channel through which the government extracted funds from religious groups. Other religious personnel regarded it as a sign that the state had begun to allow more room for a public role for religious groups and they were excited that this gesture signified a positive turn in the public presentation of religions in China: from feudal superstition to a modern partnership. No matter how mixed the feelings are, one thing is certain: the state now commands the "religion sector" to play a more active role in social service delivery.

Besides periodic campaigns like these, the Chinese government further regulates religious groups on two fronts: legal and financial. The 2004 "Regulations on Religious Affairs" clearly state that RABs at the county level and above have legal and administrative rights over the management of religious affairs (Article 5). All of Chapter VI (Articles 38–46) is devoted to the legal liabilities of religious sites. Article 46 specifically points out that the RAB can stop any religious activities or donations taking place in nonreligious sites and confiscate any gains. This significantly limits the range of venues for philanthropic donations.

Every year the legal representative 法人代表 of each registered venue of religious activities is required to participate in study sessions in which they are tutored in religious policies and regulations. Starting from 2012, SARA made the month of June "Religious Policies and Regulations Study Month," focusing on "building religious ethics" 教风建设.[11] "Why should monks attend study sessions on empty rules that don't mean anything in the religion?" a Buddhist monk complained. In fact, the same monk lamented that the *Sangha* (the Sanskrit term for the monastic community of ordained Buddhist monks or nuns) needed to better implement its *Dharma* and *Vinaya* (doctrine and discipline), citing some monks' bad public behavior as an example of how Buddhism needs to be rescued from its current state of corruption. Nonetheless, in his view, this needs to come from inside religious groups, instead of from government regulations. That government agencies are promoting a "correct code of behavior" for religious specialists demonstrates that the state continues to exercise political control over religious groups.

In order to engage in philanthropy, a religious group needs to have a good source of income. The financial strength of a religious group often indicates its level of public support or mobilizing power. In the eyes of the state, this may pose a threat to state power. Therefore, religious philanthropy has been a thorny issue for the Chinese government. It is not surprising that religious leaders reacted strongly in different ways to the 2012 "Advice" regulating religious philanthropy. Some of them regarded the policy as giving a green

light to the forming of religious charitable foundations. Others chafed under the new, stricter legal, accounting, and auditing constraints.

As early as 2005, the Ministry of Finance issued "Regulations on the Accounting System of Nongovernmental Nonprofit Organizations." The regulations apply to all registered social organizations, foundations, nongovernmental non-businesses, as well as Buddhist and Daoist temples, mosques, and churches (Article 2). But my research in 2006 showed that very few religious venues were using an accounting system that followed these regulations. The famous Lingyan Shan Temple in Suzhou was proud of the fact that the abbot did the accounts himself. Master Mingxue (b. 1921) is probably the only first-generation religious leader who still oversees the daily affairs of a religious institution. Most of them have either passed away or retired. My field notes thus recorded:

> When I went to see him, Master Mingxue was keeping the books. . . . He laid out a small exercise book on the table. It contained all the information about donations made to the temple, arranged by date. He handwrote each receipt carefully, stroke by stroke, addressed to each individual, and put them in envelopes that were going to be mailed back to the donors.

Abbot Mingxue was old-fashioned, but religious sites of this scale rarely had a specialized person in charge of the financial aspects of the organization. Retired schoolteachers often serve as volunteer bookkeepers for small churches and temples. Many small churches once posted income and expenses statements on the blackboard at the entrance of the worship hall for all members to see. This old level of transparency by posting numbers on blackboards or based on trust out of respect for the old abbot is no longer satisfactory because it accounts only internally to the members of the religious groups. The state instead demands "transparency" as in modern accounting systems that can be audited. This means that religious groups would be upwardly responsible to the government instead of downwardly responsible to their followers.

In 2008, the vice-chair of the RAB in Jiangsu urged religious venues to implement the "Regulations on the Accounting System of Nongovernmental Nonprofit Organizations" during a policy briefing:

> By May 2008, thirty-nine religious venues in Nanjing, such as temples and churches, have implemented the new accounting system, except for the Shigu Catholic Church, Doushuai Buddhist Temple in Pukou, [and] Hongjue Buddhist Temple in Jiangning. . . . In the Regulation on Religious Affairs, an entire chapter (8 articles) is devoted to regulating the property of religious organizations and venues. It both increases the protection of such property, and

> strengthens the regulations. It clearly states that religious organizations and venues need to regulate their financial affairs. . . . Nonprofit organizations throughout the world are required to use at least fifty percent of their income on philanthropic enterprises. Religious groups in developed countries, including those in Hong Kong and Taiwan, also spend more than half of their income on philanthropy. . . . To better regulate the accounting system is to better manage funds, guard against extravagance, promote frugality, and accumulate more funds for social charitable and philanthropic enterprises. ("Zai tuijin," 2008)

These comments reveal the increasingly top-down demand for religious groups to be "accountable" financially. As Dillon (2011) notes in her study of the voluntary sector in China, the implementation of the regulations is more important than the regulations themselves in shaping religious organizations. Of the ten fresh graduates recruited by the HR Department in SARA in September 2013, two were accounting majors; one was to work for the Buddhist Association of China and the other for the Daoist Association (State Administration of Religious Affairs, 2013). This shows that the state is successfully enforcing its policy of accountability by pressing religious groups to hire experts or professionals to be in charge of their finances.

The Chinese state is not an unchanging entity that is solely repressive. Encouraging religious philanthropy is both a smart way of outsourcing the government's responsibility and a dangerous business of playing with floods and monsters. On the other hand, religious groups have also developed adaptive strategies to fine-tune their organization and outreach. In this dialectic process, one of the outcomes is increasing bureaucratization and professionalization.

Religious Philanthropy, Bureaucratization, and Professionalization

What is the impact on religious groups of state policies and regulations on religious philanthropy? Since religious sites are tax exempt, the state has little control over temple property. However, the regulation of philanthropy has become an entry point for the state to gain some access to the economic power of religious groups. Not only can the state demand accounting books, financial reports, written briefs, and the like, it can also impose a system that relies on (secular) professional bookkeepers and accountants by embedding a new institution within religious structures.

The demand for bureaucratization and professionalization also comes from within religious philanthropies that are expanding their operations. When charitable acts are sporadic, there is little need for bureaucracy, but when millions of dollars are involved in multiple and cross-regional (and in

recent years international)[12] projects, a more organized and professional team becomes necessary. Through bureaucratization and professionalization, religious groups can become more effective and win the trust of devotees who contribute money and services. This goes hand in hand with an increase in the scale of operations. There is nothing new in the institutionalization of religious groups when they expand. What is new is that their involvement in philanthropy propels bureaucratization and professionalization due to both state policy pressure and internal demand.

According to Weber, the characteristics of modern bureaucracy include "rules, laws and administrative regulations," an "office hierarchy," and the need for "written documents" (1978 [1956]: 956). My fieldwork revealed that religious groups with the most active philanthropy programs have the most elaborate rules and regulations, and are most likely to establish an office hierarchy and create a large number of written documents such as monthly reports and financial reports, or virtual documents such as Weibo and WeChat, and other social media material that require a professional team of volunteers to create and monitor. Furthermore, bureaucracy often goes hand in hand with specialization and the education of experts (Weber, 1978 [1956]: 998–1001). A senior member of the Buddhist Association in Suzhou commented on the urgent need for a more "professionalized" *Sangha* in an interview in 2008:

> We are in dire need of talent within the *Sangha*. We need to train our monks to be accountants, human resources experts 公关人才, art historians, temple managers, environmentalists. Without this modern professionalism 现代专业知识, we have gigantic temples that are built without any sense of aesthetics. Or sometimes we may have very bad management of a temple, in which capable monks are not well placed 不能任人唯贤, but relatives of the abbots may occupy powerful positions. As a result, decision-making cannot optimize the outcome. . . . In a word, we need to work on raising the quality of the *Sangha*, by improving their educational level, their knowledge about all aspects of Buddhism, including art and culture, as well as innovative abilities.

This rationalized way of managing temples is increasingly held up as a trait of modern Chinese Buddhism. The two most famous Buddhist philanthropies in Jiangsu, the Hehe Cultural Foundation 和合文化基金会 of Hanshan Temple in Suzhou and the Lingshan Charitable Foundation (LSCF) 灵山慈善基金会 in Wuxi,[13] have both undergone bureaucratization and professionalization. Both are registered with the Civil Affairs Bureau of Jiangsu. Both have clearly stated rules, an office hierarchy, and a professional team in charge of various departments within the organization.

Before the founding of Hehe Cultural Foundation in 2011, the Hanshan Temple Charity Center 寒山寺慈善中心 had become the most notable success story of a local Buddhist philanthropy attached to a temple in Jiangsu province. Venerable Master Xingkong 性空 (b. 1922) became the deputy abbot of Hanshan Temple in 1963, only to be sent to a labor camp in 1969 during the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, he was asked by the United Front Department to rebuild the temple when Japanese tourists started flooding into the temple. Master Xingkong became the abbot in 1984 and started donating to orphans and the elderly in the city as a personal act of charity. In 1996 he established a Hanshan Scholarship for poor students at the local university. He also conceived of the idea of a charitable supermarket, which was turned into a reality by his successor, Master Qiushuang 秋爽 (b. 1967), who became abbot in 2004.

The first of its kind, the Charitable Supermarket 慈善超市 initially gave 200 low-income households in Suzhou monthly coupons (worth 60 RMB each) with which they could purchase daily necessities in the 250-square-meter supermarket behind Hanshan Temple. In five years, it expanded to multiple locations in three districts (Jinchang, Canglang, and Gaoxin) and one prefectural-level city (Taizhou), serving 402 low-income families. It was registered with the Suzhou Civil Affairs Bureau and under the supervision of the Suzhou Religious Affairs Bureau. As early as its founding in 2004, the Charity Center had drafted a "constitution" detailing the scope of services and organizational structure, but up to this point the management of the Charitable Supermarket resembled that of a family workshop—the patriarch (the abbot in this case) made most of the decisions regarding the project and the allocation of funds, and family members (here a handful of volunteers) executed the project. Other monks and regular temple laity did not participate. There was not much need for an office hierarchy due to the small scale of things. The only hierarchy was between the abbot, who made the decisions, and the volunteers, who distributed the goods. Nonetheless, a nominal office hierarchy was established. Under a management board were six offices: the general office, treasury, project office, media office, collaboration office, and membership office. However, when I visited in 2006, the "offices" existed in name only. One person was in charge of multiple offices and the division of labor was unclear. Theoretically, the temple and the Charity Center had separate accounts, which in practice only meant that there were two separate donation boxes in front of each Buddhist statue: one for the temple and the other for the Charity Center. What was in the Charity Center donation box could only be used for philanthropic projects, but this was far from enough. The temple ended up heavily subsidizing the Charity Center. The "accounting" for the Charity Center was done by volunteers in an

exercise book. When the scale of operations increased, however, this family workshop model could not be sustained.

In 2009, the Charitable Supermarket changed its operation model. It collaborated with a major supermarket chain (Darunfa) and established Hanshan Temple Charity Center Supply Bases in their branches. In 2010, according to its official website, Hanshan Temple spent a total of 289,440 RMB on this project alone (Hanshan Cishan zhongxin, n.d.). The volunteers applauded this shift, because they had met difficulties in delivering coupons to some families who felt a loss of face in shopping at a "charity" supermarket. With this new arrangement, the beneficiaries could shop in a regular market, just as other people do. At this time, more regulations were implemented to guarantee smooth transactions and collaboration. For instance, though the "constitution" indicated that there would be members who regularly contributed to the charitable fund, no members were enlisted until this stage. Many entrepreneurs and their businesses joined the supermarket to become important members that contribute monthly or annually to the charitable fund. These members receive not only regular reports on current and future charitable actitivites but also fiscal reports detailing how the money is spent. To prepare these reports requires an office bureaucracy made up of decision-makers, administrators, writers, editors, and accountants. In short, the demand for an office hierarchy and more formal accounting systems has come from both the state and the membership.

With the establishment of Hehe Cultural Foundation in 2011, bureaucratization became much more elaborate. Not only was there a clearer office hierarchy and regulations on how things should be done, there also were elaborate documents regarding donors, projects, and how money was to be spent. The foundation is able to draw in much larger donations and implement better-rounded philanthropic projects in the areas of disaster relief, education, old-age care, and so on. During the 2015 Nepal earthquake, the board members of the Hehe Foundation alone donated 461,600 RMB (approximately US$74,000) in response to the first call for contributions. Interestingly, the *Sangha* has become more involved in comparison with the original Charity Center. A monk was appointed to head the foundation and a layperson acts as the general secretary. They both report directly to Master Qiushuang. What is also worth pointing out is that the leadership of Master Qiushuang has not decreased in the process of bureaucratization. On the contrary, he still makes most decisions about the future development of the foundation and the temple. This is very similar to the case of the Taiwanese Buddhist charitable organization Ciji. The charismatic leadership of the venerable master Cheng Yen was sustained, if not augmented, by the bureaucratization of the group (Huang, 2009).

The way Hanshan Temple has expanded demonstrates a process of bureaucratization that resembles what goes on in large corporations. Since 2003, Hanshan Temple has acquired Chongyuan Temple as a subordinate temple and made it into its education and training center after its completion in 2007. Since the founding of the Hehe Cultural Foundation, Hanshan Temple has acquired another temple, Baihe, in the Industrial Park zone outside the city center of Suzhou and stationed its old-age home 和合安养院 as well as a female Buddhist college there in 2012.

If Hanshan Temple provides a clear case of bureaucratization, professionalization is even clearer in the case of the Lingshan Charitable Foundation (LSCF). The current Wuxi Lingshan Tourism Co. Ltd started as part of a state economic development plan in the early 1990s to build a lakeside resort around Xiangfu Temple, in the peninsular town of Mashan, around 40 kilometers outside of Wuxi.[14] Zhao Puchu, then the lay Buddhist head of the Buddhist Association of China, endorsed a decision to build an 88-meter-high statue of Buddha on the site. The Wuxi Tourism Board appointed the entrepreneur Wu Guoping to be in charge of the construction of the resort and added the statue to draw more tourists. After the construction, Lingshan Dafo (Lingshan Big Buddha) became a hugely successful tourist site, charging a high entrance fee.[15] Besides admiring the Buddha statue, most tourists also burn incense in the Xiangfu Temple enclosed inside the 300,000-square-meter (74-acre) compound. The company and the temple have separate finances. All the income from the entrance tickets goes to the company and the money in the donation boxes in the temple belongs to the temple.[16] However, the company helps with the renovation and maintenance of the temple structure. Wu converted to 皈依 Buddhism only years after he was in charge of the construction of the Lingshan Buddhist resort. As the president of the Lingshan Group, he is also now a representative in the National People's Congress and deputy secretary general of the Buddhist Association of China. Like Master Xingkong of Hanshan Temple, the abbot of Xiangfu Temple, Master Wuxiang, also began disaster and poverty relief as a personal mission much earlier on. He was especially known for the schools he built in poor western regions of China. However, with the founding of the Lingshan Charitable Foundation in 2004, what was the personal calling of a renowned Buddhist master was transformed into a nationwide NGO. From its very start, the LSCF recruited university graduates from departments of philosophy and religious studies to take part in program design, publications, and organizational matters. For projects that involved close collaboration with the state or commercial companies, they also recruited students from sociology, business management, and administrative management. The Lingshan Group now is a gigantic enterprise with seven subsidiary companies and fourteen administrative units, including the LSCF office, a

financial administration office, an actuary office, a party administrative office, and a human resources office, as well as others ("Zoujin Lingshan," n.d.).

The LSCF's operations are program-based, with three main sections of work: youth, community service, and nationwide service. The youth program includes scholarship programs for high school and university students throughout China. The Chunhui Youth Charity Development Forum 春晖青年公益发展论坛 holds volunteer-training programs for hand-picked young people by the most active philanthropic actors and NGOs in China and internationally, such as the Liren Rural Cultural Development Center 立人乡村文化发展中心 and the Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society at Stanford University. The community service focuses on providing social-service programs such as poverty relief, environmental preservation campaigns, and free medical check-ups in the neighborhoods of Wuxi. Nationwide services include three funds. The Aiyi Fund 爱艺基金 helps disabled people engage in handicraft making; the De Fund 德基金 aims to propagate ideas of philanthropy through Chinese classics education 公益国学 to big corporations, families, schools, and communities; the Smile Fund 微笑基金 is mainly concerned with building libraries for children and youth across China.

The China Philanthropy and Charity website conducted a study in 2014 on the transparency of philanthropy foundations throughout China. According to them, only 33 public foundations (2.4% of all public foundations) post their donation records online in a timely fashion. When the LSCF reported this, it stated the following along with this information:

> The LSCF creates its team, research, and operations of projects around the word "professionalism." We strictly follow "Policies on Management of Foundations." . . . [Abiding by the] regulations, transparency, and professionalism are three guiding principles that have contributed to the rapid development of LSCF in 2013 and will also be an important component of our future work. (Lingshan Cishan Jijinhui, 2014)

Since my discussion has thus far focused on Buddhist cases, it might lead to the impression that Buddhist groups are special. A look at Protestant groups will show that they greatly resemble the Buddhist cases. The Amity Foundation, which was initiated by Protestant elites in China to serve people's needs and to "glorify the name of Jesus," started with Bible printing and sending native English teachers to China. Today, it is the largest and only legally registered publicly funded NGO with a Protestant background and remains the only legal Bible printing organization in China (and the largest one in the world). The founder, Bishop K. H. Ting, who died in November 2012, remained the chairman of the board of the Amity Foundation until his death. The general secretary, Qiu Zhonghui, a former university professor,

has also become a standing member of the Christian Association in China and vice-chair of the Christian Association of Jiangsu Province, as well as a standing committee member of the National Political Consultative Council since his baptism around 2008.

The Amity Foundation works in many areas, such as rural development, blindness projects, migrant workers, orphans, the environment, education, disaster relief, rehabilitation, clinics for the poor and mentally challenged, and so on. Furthermore, it has provided training and resources for smaller and grassroots NGOs and religious philanthropies through the years. In November 2015, it founded a Training Center on Religion and Philanthropy in Jiangsu 江苏省宗教公益培训基地, the first of its kind in China. In terms of its sources of income, it used to be heavily (99%) dependent on international Christian organizations, but according to the general secretary, domestic and local fund-raising projects have been successful enough to make the organization less and less reliant on international funding.

In its daily operations the Amity Foundation is like any secular NGO. It has a very specialized bureaucracy—under the general secretary are five departments, in charge of fund-raising, programs, research and development, social services, and administrative management. My interviews with Amity volunteers from universities in Nanjing revealed that most of them did not know that the foundation had a Protestant background. Most of the program officers are also not baptized. As a matter of fact, a former Amity Foundation Protestant employee complained that he felt the organization was increasingly "secularized" (meaning, not explicit enough about its Protestant message and not rigorous enough in proselytization), which made him leave the foundation. However, according to the head of the research and development office, Ms. She, the transformation mainly lies in the increasingly rationalized organizational structure in order to meet more specialized and professional needs of today's society, especially various collaborating agencies, government offices, and international donors. What is secularization for the Protestant members is the bureaucratization of the nonreligious employees.

One of the program officers spoke of her experience working in a Muslim community on women's health issues. "We need professional knowledge," she declared,

> not only medical expertise but also professional social scientists who can help us understand women's situation in a Muslim community, which is different from our previous work on women's health in a Han community. Therefore, specialization and professionalism are increasingly important to us. . . . Of course there is the report-writing stage. We also need a certain understanding of Western donors' expectations so as to write reports that make sense to them [in a professional manner]!

The cases of Amity and the LSCF suggest that Buddhist and Protestant organizations end up looking similar if they go through this route. Sometimes their "religious messages" get diluted in exchange for the professionalization of philanthropy.

This demand for professionalism from the donor's side is even more crucial to smaller organizations that try to deliver social services. A very successful Xuzhou Protestant nursing home illustrates this point. Founded by a retired pastor, Ms. Wang, and a few lay members of Xuzhou churches, this nursing home was independent from any church. Ms. Wang explained:

> We started with 6,000 RMB in donations from Protestant brothers and sisters. The churches refused to support us because they said that spiritual life and worship 属灵生活 were more important than taking care of old people. So we sought funding from the Amity Foundation, which gave us 50,000 RMB, and the Social Service Department of the joint committees of the China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Christian Churches 基督教两会 helped us a bit.[17] Later we connected with the United Christian Nethersole Community Health Service in Hong Kong through the joint committees. They paid us a visit and donated medical devices since most of our elderly need in-house medical assistance. We were very appreciative of them for paying us a visit since we don't know how to write applications for funding. And they were very lenient with us in the report since we don't have the personnel to do it properly. But with other foundations, they all require reports on personnel, especially medical personnel and the training of the nurses. All of our twenty-some nurses came from very poor Protestant families in rural Jiangsu. They were extremely devoted and it was hard enough to train them to take care of the elderly properly. It is their faith and love of God that support their work, not expert medical knowledge. Only three of us work here full time as administrators, but we are all volunteers. We have three doctors—also volunteers—who can use medical equipment. It's very hard for us to take care of over seventy elderly people, write reports, and conduct training for the volunteers.

Thus, for this small Protestant nursing home, the inability to meet the modern demand for professionalization in philanthropic enterprises is a major impediment to their work. All small-scale religious groups I have talked to face the same problems.

Religious groups that cannot meet the demand for bureaucratization and professionalization used to be able to engage in philanthropy in the gray zone between legal and illegal practices (Wu, 2015). However, with more state regulations on religious philanthropy, it has become hard for them to meet the standards for transparency and accountability. Two Buddhist temples and one Protestant church I studied have had difficulties obtaining a license for their

old-age homes. They are all small community-based entities, unable to meet professional management and auditing criteria.

To sum up, we see deepening bureaucratization and professionalization once religious groups respond to the state's call for philanthropy. Bureaucratization takes place in all religious organizations when they expand, but engaging in philanthropy accelerates this process due to both state pressure to be more accountable and an internal push to be more efficient. Since the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, philanthropy has become one of the legitimate ways (including health, the classics movement, tourism, and cultural heritage-making) through which religious groups can claim a public presence without being stigmatized as superstitious or corrupt. As a result, there has been an increasing number of religious philanthropic foundations and NGOs. However, this does not mean that they can expand without limit. Aside from meeting the demand for auditing and various regulations governing accounting, public foundations are also required to spend over 80% of their annual income and private foundations are required to spend at least 8% of their annual income. Both of them have to keep their operational costs below 10% of their total income. The Hehe Cultural Foundation, for instance, has to rely on Hanshan Temple to subsidize its operations. Otherwise it would not be able to meet these requirements.

Moreover, local governments often pressure religious foundations to take on certain projects, in order to share the burden of providing social welfare, regardless of the capacity or focus of those foundations. Sometimes the interference comes with monetary benefits. For example, a local RAB, the Civil Affairs Bureau, or even the United Front Work Department wanting to collaborate with a religious group to provide old-age care, might offer inducements such as land or subsidies, but in exchange, the management of the old-age home will have to conform to state requirements. As a result, the state's "favorable" religious policies are not always beneficial for religious groups.

From "Doing Good Deeds" to "Love Conquers All": The Construction of Moral Subjects through Religious Philanthropy

While religious groups undergo bureaucratization and professionalization by engaging in philanthropy under the state's current policies, the volunteers in these groups who are active participants in religious philanthropy construct themselves as moral subjects through embodied actions of charity. I suggest such moral subjects are the result of the socialist moral imperative of doing

good deeds, rationalized bureaucratization, and the universalizing notion of love that has swept across religious and political realms.

Yan Yunxiang in his discussion of immorality in China points out that "a widely shared perception of a moral crisis reinforces negative moral sentiments that lead to moral insensitivity, indifference, and immoral acts, but it may also inspire a soul-searching process at the societal level and thus eventually lead to moral reform" (Yan, 2014: 483). Many volunteers resort to such discourse of moral crisis to answer the question of their motives for religious philanthropy. "Today's society is so corrupt. People believe in nothing but money, which is the top priority in one's life." A volunteer in the LSCF told me, "the LSCF is different. Out slogan is 'Spread Charity Culture, Purify the World and Human Hearts' 弘扬慈善文化, 净化世道人心. . . . Volunteering here is life-changing for me." This "purifying human hearts" is exactly a reaction to the moral crisis discourse.

Interestingly, the first tool or reference point for volunteers is socialist morality. For instance, there is a large number of former government employees among religious volunteers. A retired village head of women's affairs 妇女主任 who was in charge of the one-child policy has run a temple with an old-age home in Changzhou, a city adjacent to Wuxi, for over a decade. She said,

> I'm not a party member, but Chairman Mao's teachings are still relevant for us today. We need to serve the people! . . . To believe in Buddhism, burning incense and prostrating in front of statues of the Buddha are not enough; the Buddhist teaching of cultivating a compassionate heart 善心 and "Learning from Lei Feng, Doing Good Deeds" 学雷锋做好事 is the same.

Lei Feng is the famous socialist role model of selflessly serving the people—by helping others he showed his devotion to Chairman Mao. By the same token, by participating in philanthropy, one shows one's personal religious devotion. Every year on March 5, the day Chairman Mao designated as Learning from Lei Feng Day 学雷锋日, the LSCF organizes philanthropic activities, such as free clinics, toy-drives among school students, and so on. This kind of "convolution" of moral reasoning (Zigon, 2008; Yan, 2014) is a common feature of religious philanthropy in contemporary China.

Related to this reference to socialist morality is a rationalized way of being religious in contrast to being "superstitious." A volunteer at Hanshan Temple told me, "So many people come to the temple and beg for things from the Buddha. That's not the correct way of being a Buddhist. That's superstition! Buddhism is about compassion and learning to be a good person." Therefore, studying Buddhism 学佛 is emphasized over worshipping the Buddha 求神

拜佛. This newly emphasized (but by no means new) way of being religious is related to the bureaucratization invested in rationality. As Weber has it, bureaucracy is not only a different social order, it also creates a certain type of person.

> Bureaucratic rationalization . . . has been a major revolutionary force, with regard to tradition. But it revolutionizes with technical means, in principle, as does every economic organization, "from without": It first changes the material and social order, and through them the people, by changing the condition of adaptation, and perhaps the opportunities for adaptation, through a rational determination of means and ends. (Weber, 1978 [1956]: 1116)

One of the volunteers for Ciji in Suzhou was a former member of the PLA (People's Liberation Army). In her early 70s, Auntie Xu looked especially graceful with a full head of silver hair, a very straight back, and an air of confidence. She spent her entire career in the military, which contributed to her good posture and physique.

> After retirement, I was looking for something to do with all my free time. I can't stand sitting at home, but I also can't stand those old ladies playing mahjong all day long. I joined a dance troupe for a while, but it became quite gossipy. People were bickering with one another all the time. It was no longer fun. On top of that, I felt [my life was] meaningless. I need to do something to help people! You know, doing good deeds and making a contribution in my final years 发挥余热! Someone introduced me to Ciji and I was immediately attracted to it. I've been volunteering here ever since. Unlike other places, this place is very institutionalized 制度化 and organized. There are very clear rules. . . . And everybody is dressed very neatly and nicely. Each uniform speaks of the person's role. Judging from this alone, you know this is a trustworthy organization . . . very professional.

It is ironic that a person who is a former member of the ultra-secular PLA would become a devoted volunteer of a Taiwanese Buddhist charitable organization, but the similarity in terms of rules, dress code, and hierarchy between the two is uncanny. Auntie Xu's military background makes her very comfortable with the organizational culture of Ciji. More importantly, her self-identification as an educated and "rational" person that sets her apart from typical retired women who are disorganized and gossipy draws her closer to the organization. Thus, the bureaucratization and professionalization of religious groups can also lead to a particular moral subject that favors rational behavior.

Moreover, this rationality is to be embodied in how one presents oneself physically. A Taiwanese Ciji leader complained to me about mainlander volunteers:

> Some of the local volunteers really lack training. We have to remind them to always smile whenever we're educating or serving the community. Every time a Ciji volunteer appears, we represent what Ciji embodies and we need to have certain ways of carrying ourselves. We shouldn't be too loud, and we should always remember it's a public presentation of who we are as Buddhists.

Auntie Yao, a retired civil servant who lives in Suzhou, switched to Ciji after volunteering at a different Buddhist charity for a while. She said the volunteer team in the other temple was plagued by gossip and resentment. There was, as she put it, a lack of "civilized" 文明 behavior. Instead, she found being a "Ciji person" 慈济人—a certain way of walking, sitting, talking, smiling, nodding, and so on—more civilized, respectable, and acceptable.[18]

This civilized and rational morality is also noted in Protestant philanthropy. A former Amity administrator told me:

> Sometimes older people in the neighborhood hear about volunteering opportunities in Amity and they want to participate. However, they don't take it seriously and don't behave in a professional way. They're loud and noisy and ignore orders. Later on some of our Protestant volunteers have to come and re-do some simple tasks they were assigned to do. . . . I find it much easier to work with brothers and sisters within the faith. They understand that it's out of God's love that they're doing this. Therefore, they listen to orders much more carefully and perform their tasks as directed.

This remark not only refers to rational professionalism but also identifies "love" as an important component of this moral subjectivity. The Protestant theologian K. H. Ting made "love" a central concern for Chinese Protestants in order to coexist harmoniously not only with Confucianism but also Communism (Wielander, 2011: 133). If for Christians love is nothing new, for the Buddhists in mainland China "love" is more of a recent invention. A lay Buddhist old-age home in southern Jiangsu once invited a lay disciple of Master Jingkong to speak on compassion. The female lay teacher, of Taiwanese origin but a resident of California, concluded her teaching by inviting all members of the audience (mostly females over 50 years of age) to loudly repeat "I love you" after her, in order to drive home the point that love is the basis of Buddhist compassion and charity. The disciples, who probably had never uttered these three words in their entire lives, were blushing and giggling but gradually joined in. The lay leader of the temple, a retired female

cadre, scolded some of the giggling participants and led the collective with the same sort of zeal as if she were propagating the party's policies.

This narrative of love, therefore, has taken over as the dominant voice of religious philanthropy. As Wielander points out, nothing can cut cross religious, political, and cultural boundaries like love (Wielander, 2011). I would add to this observation by pointing out that love can transcend these boundaries precisely because it is a vague concept that is interpreted differently by different communities. For Buddhists, it is similar to universal compassion without being overtly Buddhist, thus expanding its appeal. For party leaders, it can reflect the same sentiment as patriotism, or, in Chinese, "love for the country."

The emphasis on "love" is another way to distance oneself from superstitious others. Auntie Yao, mentioned above, also tried to distinguish herself from her "superstitious" (her own term) peers in their approach to Buddhism in other temples: "In Ciji, we perform Big Love 大爱. Shangren [Venerable Cheng Yen] has lots of love. Before I came to Ciji, I had a very limited understanding of Buddhism and Big Love. Now I find myself on the right track." She took refuge under three Buddhist masters around Suzhou and was an active volunteer in quite a few temples before settling on Ciji. However, it was the talk of love and right behavior that is consistent with one's inner heart 内心 that further determines Auntie Yao's commitment to Ciji.

In another case illustrating the power of Big Love, in 2010 I met Joy (as she called herself), the wife of a successful businessman in Suzhou, whose only son had just graduated from college. She used to pray in any temple she could find for her son's well-being and for the success of her husband's business. When I first met her, in the bookshop of Ciji Foundation's Suzhou branch, she was dressed very stylishly and was buying a large quantity of Buddhist teaching books, tea, and vegetarian cookies that were beautifully wrapped but outrageously expensive for regular Chinese. We started talking and she expressed her interest in Buddhism. She came into contact with Pure Land Buddhism through Master Jingkong's booklets.[19] In her visits to the Ciji bookstore, she asked about volunteering but was put off by the "arrogance" of the Taiwanese volunteers. Later, Joy took refuge at a Buddhist temple outside of Suzhou. There, she acquainted herself with other lay Buddhists and started participating in sutra chanting and animal releasing rituals. Soon she began to volunteer as a facilitator of ritual services in that temple and gradually abandoned the teachings of Master Jingkong. In 2012, a fellow Buddhist brought her to the Mother's Day Charitable Contribution event at Ciji. She was very moved and told me, "I joined the big family of Ciji. You should come too! We practice Big Love here and I have never known love can be so powerful!" Since then, she became actively involved in almost all of Ciji's programs: its hospital,

vegetarian cooking, library committee, child-care during summer camps, and environmental education. She was very proud that ever since volunteering in Ciji, she showed more love for her son and less resentment of her husband. All this was because she "came to know the power of love."

Joy's experience is typical of many lay Buddhists I encountered in urban southeast China. They often start with a quest for prosperity and protection for their families, and then gradually become interested in Buddhist teachings and become further involved in ritual communities. Sometimes they become permanently associated with a volunteer identity that is phrased around the concept of universal love. Many volunteers in Ciji have taken this journey that has often made them feel "powerful" and "loved."

However, not everybody feels the same level of comfort with this narrative of love and consistent bodily conduct. Two female laid-off workers in their early 50s who were new to the Ciji volunteer team complained about the hierarchy within the organization:

> There is only one Suzhou woman who wears a blue dress [a sign of status as a higher-level volunteer]. Everyone else in blue dresses is Taiwanese. The local Suzhou volunteers are sometimes scolded by the Taiwanese. They think they're superior to us, but they're all housewives! We mainland Chinese women work all our lives to support our families and contribute to society. They talk about love but they don't even have to work!

What they imply is that they find the discourse of love to be empty if the basic responsibility of contributing to the family is ignored. Indeed, there is a sense of occupying a moral high ground (see Cao, 2009) in love-centered religiosity in comparison to rural and less membership-based, less theologically concerned individuals and communities. For instance, the legal representative (in this case, a Zhengyi Daoist) of a rural temple in Changzhou was very annoyed when I asked him if his temple was involved in any charitable deeds. He answered,

> Oh you are one of those! What is a temple? A temple is provided for by its people and in turn the temple protects them. You ask for charity. Does protecting the well-being of a region 保一方平安 count? The Religious Bureau comes and asks me for a donation, but we can't donate as much as the big famous temples. But that's just fulfilling a responsibility 完成任务. We perform rituals for the dead and living; people come and get their wishes granted. Why is this superstition and getting all the money from people and donating it to the government charity?

Certainly he is not so "loving" in this speech, but he speaks for many smaller religious groups. In the state-initiated campaigns for religious philanthropy,

those groups that cannot donate to the philanthropic cause are often at the risk of being branded as backward, corrupt, or superstitious.

Though it is beyond the scope of this article, a universalizing discourse of love and the consequent bodily discipline of religious subjects in the process of doing philanthropy may marginalize other types of religiosities in China, especially those that are geared toward the well-being of immediate communities, such as kinsmen, fellow villagers, or members of the same church.

The dominance of "love" religiosity is related to the bureaucratization and professionalization of religious philanthropy. On the one hand, religious philanthropies that try to appeal to a larger public instead of their own communities alone need to find a message that is easily accepted by all. The discourse of love points toward a universalism that appeals to recipients who may not be religious or follow the particular religion that gives the aid. On the other hand, love religiosity allows a vague cover term to create an apparent narrative unity that may paper over internal differences among religious denominations and levels of governments. Furthermore, love even creates a vague discourse fully compatible with the state and its propaganda programs centered on the love for the country and the party 爱国爱党. The Daoist quoted above obviously did not see the necessity for religious groups to embrace philanthropy and a religiosity centered on a universalizing discourse of love. However, for many religious subjects, love not only bridges the gap between different stakeholders but also connects their religious cultivation and volunteering experience in a vague but convincing way.

Conclusion: Philanthropy and the Reshaping of Chinese Religiosities

Religious groups' involvement in philanthropic activities is nothing new. Throughout history, religious groups in China have provided social services to communities both internally, to their own members, and externally, to people who are completely unrelated. Moreover, the state has never been completely absent from this—it has collaborated with, co-opted, and monitored philanthropic activities run by religious associations. In post-Mao China religious philanthropy has grown in an unprecedented way. This is the result both of religious groups' efforts and ability to provide more services and of state policies on religious philanthropy. Thanks to "blind-eye governance," grassroots religious charities already began to appear in the 1980s, but in a sporadic and ad hoc manner. Since the 1990s, the state has encouraged religious philanthropy during disasters through its "adaptive governance," culminating in the 2012 "Advice on Encouraging and Regulating the Religion

Sector's Participation in Philanthropic and Charitable Activities." As the name suggests, this policy is a landmark in the Chinese state's "encouragement and regulation" of religious philanthropies to fit its overall developmental plan for the entire country.

The state's policies and campaigns have called for bureaucratization and professionalization of religious groups and prompted the rise of a moral religious subject who embraces a universalizing discourse of love, which draws on and goes beyond the state narrative of "doing good deeds." As McCarthy notes, "By conspicuously partnering with the state and by modeling civic behavior and ideals alongside religious ones, FBOs demonstrate the compatibility of religious traditions and Chinese modernity, the complementarity of faith and Chinese national identity" (McCarthy, 2013: 55). The discourse of love has not only bridged the state and the civic sector but also lent bureaucratized and professionalized philanthropies a religious aura that dispels the magic of secularization usually brought by bureaucratization. Therefore, bureaucratized and professionalized religious philanthropies rely more on this vague and yet universalizing concept of love to create moral subjects as motivated volunteers.

There have been two generations of religious leaders at work in post-Mao China. The first generation (born in the pre-1949 years) made it their main task to rebuild churches and temples, reclaim lost properties, and fight for their legitimacy. The second generation (mostly born in the 1960s) has tried to survive by taking on various state-promoted projects such as tourism, cultural heritage-making, the classics movement, and philanthropy. By becoming a modern philanthropic enterprise, religious associations often face the top-down demand for accountability that results in increasing structural and managerial rationalization, a fundamental transformation in the nature of Chinese religiosity, both institutionally and personally. But as shown above, neither philanthropy nor love has exhausted the varieties of religiosity in China. What this article has described is but one dimension, though its consequences are far-reaching.

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Notes

1. By religious philanthropy, I mean both monetary grants and delivery of social services by religious groups and organizations. Sometimes observers distinguish between charity, philanthropy, welfare, public goods, and so on. In this article, I use "philanthropy" as a general term for any kind of giving (money or service) to the needy without expecting anything in return. Only when the specific words "charity" 慈善 and "welfare" 福利 are used by informants will I use those terms. Sometimes formal institutions are set up in association with or under a religious organization, such as the FBOs (faith-based organizations) mentioned in McCarthy's study (2013). Sometimes they are independent of any particular religious group but receive most of their funding from religious sources, such as the Amity Foundation mentioned below. In other cases, a religious group might provide ad hoc social services without having a formal institution.
2. The Chinese state is a multifarious rather than a homogenous entity. I use "Chinese state" to mean the policy-issuing entity that makes up the regulations that govern religious groups and activities.
3. Six state agencies participated in the making of this policy: the State Administration for Religious Affairs, the United Front Work Department, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Administration of Taxation.
4. The Chinese government uses "Christianity" to mean Protestant Christianity and treats Catholicism and "Christianity" as two separate religions.

5. The Buddhist Compassion Relief Ciji (Tzu Chi) Foundation is a Taiwan-based global Buddhist NGO founded by the Venerable Cheng Yen. It has branches in 41 countries (as of December 2013) and its mainland China headquarters is in Suzhou. It was the first of very few international NGOs to be legally registered with the Chinese government. For a detailed study of the Ciji, see Huang, 2009.
6. Historically, religious and nonreligious grassroots organizations in China were active in offering social services and engaging in various charitable activities. For a detailed historical study of benevolent halls, see Fuma, 2005; and on charitable organizations in the Ming and Qing dynasties, see Liang, 2001; and Smith, 2007. Founded by Bishop K. H. Ting, the Amity Foundation started as a *minjian tuanti* (民间团体, civil organization) printing Bibles and sending English teachers to China. Though not officially a Protestant organization, it is deeply influenced by Christian values and does most of its fund-raising among Christian organizations and individuals overseas and inside China. The Shaolin Charity and Welfare Foundation was founded by Shi Yongxin, the abbot of the Shaolin Temple.
7. *Biaotai* 表态 literally means expressing one's attitude. It is a heavily politically loaded term, often used by Chinese political actors to mean declaring their political position.
8. It is precisely on this point that underground churches differentiate themselves from the official churches. They claim that the official churches are not spiritual because they pledge allegiance to a government that ideologically condemns religion in general. But most official churches regard this as merely showmanship and their public *biaotai* does not connote a preference for Communist ideology over Christian theology. See Vala, 2013.
9. This is in contrast to a case in Taiwan, as discussed by Robert Weller (2006b: 105), where a spirit medium gets possessed by Guanyin to openly object to the construction of an oil refinery in the neighborhood.
10. Jiao's words, "Religions are not floods or monsters" 宗教不是洪水猛兽, ironically reveal that religion was indeed "floods or monsters" in the minds of many government officials.
11. The word *feng*, literally meaning "wind," has become a very loaded term in the CCP's political campaigns to mean correct behavior or ethos. It is closely related in the minds of the Chinese to the "rectification campaigns" 整风运动 in the Communist Party's history. In 1942, Mao launched the first rectification campaign, in which he secured his ruling position within the party and made sure that arts and letters would buttress Communist ideology. From then on, the party has undertaken many rounds of rectification campaigns. Moreover, *feng* has often been used to refer to various kinds of "correct" or state-sanctioned conduct and attitude, such as *changfeng* 厂风 (the code of behavior in a factory), *xiaofeng* 校风 (the code of behavior for schools), *xuefeng* 学风 (the right attitude in studying), *dangfeng* 党风 (the code of behavior for party members), and *wenfeng* 文风 (the correct style of writing). The use of *jiaofeng* 教风 (the correct way of adhering to a religion), therefore, in the

party's vocabulary mainly means a religious person must abide by the state's laws and regulations.

12. For instance, the Lingshan Charitable Foundation 灵山慈善基金会 and the Suzhou Buddhist Proselytizing Society 苏州弘化社 joined hands in disaster relief in the wake of the Nepal earthquake in April 2015.
13. When I interviewed staff members at the Lingshan Charitable Foundation in early 2006, it was called Lingshan Ciji Foundation 灵山慈济基金会, explicitly modeling itself after the Taiwan-based Ciji Buddhist Foundation. The Hanshan Temple Charity Center, founded in 2004, is part of the temple itself and therefore under the leadership of the RAB. It is membership-based and mostly in charge of a "charitable supermarket" and other, smaller-scale charitable activities. The Hehe Cultural Foundation, founded in 2011, is a public-funding agency that allows the temple to collect donations throughout Jiangsu. It is registered with the Civil Affairs Bureau of Jiangsu province.
14. The company has a multimillion-dollar business that includes construction, real estate, resorts, hotels, publications, a vegetarian food brand, a souvenir and religious goods brand, and so forth.
15. As of 2013, the entrance fee was 210 RMB/person, around UD$34.50 per person.
16. This did not include the funding of LSCF.
17. The China Christian Council (CCC) and TSPM (Three-Self Patriotic Movement) often have overlapping personnel and are referred to as the "the two associations" 两会. They often hold joint conferences.
18. Though Ciji was already bureaucratized and professionalized before it entered China, this case study illustrates the relationship between bureaucratization and a specific subjectivity. Furthermore, the state push for all religious philanthropies to be accountable makes Ciji the logical model to follow, at least organizationally.
19. Master Jingkong 净空法师 of the Pure Land School was originally from Taiwan, but his booklets and DVDs have been widely circulated in China among lay Buddhists since the 1990s.

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