Cyberdefender challenge DumpMe

1

The first question is linear, as soon as you download the file and unzip it with the password provided, run this command:

```
sha1sum Triage-Memory.mem
```

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ sha1sum Triage-Memory.mem
c95e8cc8c946f95a109ea8e47a6800de10a27abd  Triage-Memory.mem
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
```

2

For the second question you can use imageinfo, and it'll output its suggestions, for a more accurate results use kdbgscan.
Imageinfo is usually enough because as soon as you try one profile, and the plugin doesn;t work or gives some strange characters, you must need to try an other profile suggested by Imageinfo

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem imageinfo
```

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ sha1sum Triage-Memory.mem
c95e8cc8c946f95a109ea8e47a6800de10a27abd  Triage-Memory.mem
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO    : volatility.debug    : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
          Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win200
8R2SP1x64_24000, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_24000, Win7S
P1x64_23418
                     AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/home/sansforensics/Triage-Me
mory.mem)
                      PAE type : No PAE
                           DTB : 0x187000L
                          KDBG : 0xf800029f80a0L
          Number of Processors : 2
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff800029f9d00L
```

3 & 4

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree
```



In This picture we can see multiple things:

- In the (1), the PID of notepad can be seen, that is 3032
- In the (2), the child process of wscript.exe, which is UWkpjFjDzM.exe, which is un unusual one probably malicious and abusing wscript.exe
- In the (3), the FTK Imager can be seen, which probably was the program used to capture the Ram on that machine to create the challenge

5

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan
```



6

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan
```

```
0x13e431820     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:49154           0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       820     svchost.exe
0x13e57e010     TCPv4   10.0.0.101:139          0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       4       System
0x13e71cef0     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:135             0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       672     svchost.exe
0x13e720660     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:135             0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       672     svchost.exe
0x13e720660     TCPv6   :::135                  :::0            LISTENING       672     svchost.exe
0x13e72f010     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:49152           0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       380     wininit.exe
0x13e72f6e0     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:49152           0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       380     wininit.exe
0x13e72f6e0     TCPv6   :::49152                :::0            LISTENING       380     wininit.exe
0x13e770240     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:49153           0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       764     svchost.exe
0x13e772980     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:49153           0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       764     svchost.exe
0x13e772980     TCPv6   :::49153                :::0            LISTENING       764     svchost.exe
0x13ebb3010     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:49156           0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       476     services.exe
0x13ebb3010     TCPv6   :::49156                :::0            LISTENING       476     services.exe
0x13ebcdef0     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:80              0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       3952    hfs.exe
0x13e2348a0     TCPv4   -:49366                 192.168.206.181:389     CLOSED          504
0x13e397190     TCPv4   10.0.0.101:49217        10.0.0.106:4444 ESTABLISHED     3496    UWkpjFjDzM.exe
0x13e3986d0     TCPv4   -:49378                 213.209.1.129:25        CLOSED          504
0x13e3abae0     TCPv4   -:49226                 72.51.60.132:443        CLOSED          4048    POWERPNT.EXE
0x13e3e7010     TCPv6   -:0                     38db:7705:80fa:ffff:38db:7705:80fa:ffff:0 CLOSED        1136    OfficeClickToR
0x13e441830     TCPv6   -:0                     382b:c703:80fa:ffff:382b:c703:80fa:ffff:0 CLOSED        1       ?RK????
0x13e4e4910     TCPv4   10.0.0.101:49208        52.109.12.6:443         CLOSED          504
0x13e55fae0     TCPv4   10.0.0.101:49209        52.96.44.162:443        CLOSED          504
0x13e71b540     TCPv4   -:0                     104.208.112.5:0         CLOSED          1       ?RK????
0x13e73b560     TCPv4   -:49266                 35.190.69.156:443       CLOSED          504
0x13e7c6010     TCPv4   10.0.0.101:49204        172.217.6.195:443       CLOSED          1816    chrome.exe
0x13ead7cf0     TCPv4   10.0.0.101:49202        172.217.10.68:443       CLOSED          1816    chrome.exe
0x13f5898a0     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:49156           0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       476     services.exe
0x13f5899c0     TCPv4   0.0.0.0:445             0.0.0.0:0       LISTENING       4       System
0x13f5899c0     TCPv6   :::445                  :::0            LISTENING       4       System
0x13f4facf0     TCPv4   10.0.0.101:49262        52.109.12.6:443         ESTABLISHED     3688    OUTLOOK.EXE
0x13f50a010     TCPv4   -:49265                 213.186.33.3:443        CLOSED          504
0x13f5289f0     TCPv4   -:49234                 72.51.60.133:80         CLOSED          3688    OUTLOOK.EXE
0x13f7b4ec0     UDPv4   0.0.0.0:55707           *:*                             232     svchost.exe     2019-03-22 05:45:44 UTC+0000
0x13f7e8670     UDPv4   127.0.0.1:59411         *:*                             3576    iexplore.exe    2019-03-22 05:34:49 UTC+0000
```

It's possible to see that that strange process, has an **ESTABLISHED** connection to a remote ip on port **4444**, this port is an infamous port since it's what a lazy attacker will put on a metasploit meterpreter attack, deliver that payload and he'll put that port on listening with 'nc -lvnp 4444' to get a reverse shell/exfiltrate some data

7

The method to obtain which dll are run and by which process is linear, using the plugin dlllist will provide that information along with the cmdline for that process

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dlllist
```

```
690ea20bc3bdfb328e23005d9a80c290  executable.3496.exe
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dlllist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
************************************************************************
System pid:      4
Unable to read PEB for task.
************************************************************************
smss.exe pid:    252
Command line : \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe


Base                             Size          LoadCount LoadTime                       Path
-------------------- ---------- ---------- ------------------------------ ----
0x0000000048430000           0x20000            0xffff 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000   \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
0x0000000077260000          0x1a9000            0xffff 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
************************************************************************
csrss.exe pid:    332
Command line : %SystemRoot%\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows SharedSection=1024,20480,768 Windows=On SubSystemType=Windows
DllInitialization,3 ServerDll=winsrv:ConServerDllInitialization,2 ServerDll=sxssrv,4 ProfileControl=Off MaxRequestThreads=16
Service Pack 1

Base                             Size          LoadCount LoadTime                       Path
-------------------- ---------- ---------- ------------------------------ ----
0x0000000049dc0000            0x6000            0xffff 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\csrss.exe
0x0000000077260000          0x1a9000            0xffff 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
0x000007fefd230000           0x13000            0xffff 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\CSRSRV.dll
0x000007fefd210000           0x11000               0x4 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\basesrv.DLL
0x000007fefd1d0000           0x38000               0x2 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\winsrv.DLL
0x0000000077160000           0xfa000               0xb 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\USER32.dll
0x000007fefef60000           0x67000               0xc 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\GDI32.dll
0x0000000077040000          0x11f000              0x63 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\kernel32.dll
0x000007fefd380000           0x6c000             0x132 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll
0x000007feff150000            0xe000               0x3 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\LPK.dll
0x000007fefe5e0000           0xc9000               0x3 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\USP10.dll
0x000007fefd6b0000           0x9f000               0x5 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\msvcrt.dll
0x000007fefd1c0000            0xc000               0x1 2019-03-22 05:31:58 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\sxssrv.DLL
0x000007fefd0b0000           0x91000               0x1 2019-03-22 05:31:59 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\sxs.dll
0x000007fefe7a0000          0x12d000               0x3 2019-03-22 05:31:59 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\RPCRT4.dll
0x000007fefd0a0000            0xf000               0x2 2019-03-22 05:31:59 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\CRYPTBASE.dll
0x000007fefe970000           0xdb000               0x1 2019-03-22 05:32:13 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x000007feff160000           0x1f000               0x4 2019-03-22 05:32:13 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\sechost.dll
************************************************************************
```

A grep in the output will be enough to count how many process have loaded that dll

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dlllist | grep VCRUNTIME140
```

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dlllist | grep VCRUNTIME140
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
0x000007fefa5c0000           0x16000           0xffff 2019-03-22 05:32:05 UTC+0000   C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\VCRUNTIME140.dll
0x00000000745f0000           0x15000           0xffff 2019-03-22 05:33:49 UTC+0000   C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\VCRUNTIME140.dll
0x00000000745f0000           0x15000           0xffff 2019-03-22 05:34:37 UTC+0000   C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\VCRUNTIME140.dll
0x00000000745f0000           0x15000              0x3 2019-03-22 05:34:49 UTC+0000   C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\VCRUNTIME140.dll
0x00000000745f0000           0x15000           0xffff 2019-03-22 05:35:09 UTC+0000   C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\VCRUNTIME140.dll
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
```

8

For this flag, we must dump the process, using the following command will exactly do that:

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump --pid 3496 --dump-dir .
```

As soon as that process finishes, it'll tell you how the file was named and you can md5sum it

```
ansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump --pid 3496 --dump-dir .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Process(V)         ImageBase          Name                 Result
------------------ ------------------ -------------------- ------
0xfffffa8005a1d9e0 0x0000000000400000 UWkpjFjDzM.exe       OK: executable.3496.exe
ansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ md5sum executable.3496.exe
690ea20bc3bdfb328e23005d9a80c290  executable.3496.exe
```

Flag: 690ea20bc3bdfb328e23005d9a80c290

9

This is asking for the hashes of Bob's password, having access to that system, you could mount it and then using this command

```
sudo grep 'Bob' /etc/shadow | cut -d':' -f 2
```

Having the memory and already using volatility, a simple hashdump was enough to get the flag

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 hashdump
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Bob:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$
```

Flag: aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee

10 & 11

Realizing this and the next question was about VAD informations, it was easier to run the same command once and the grepping onto that two times

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 vadinfo > vadfiles.txt
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
```

For the first a simple grep on that file is enough (I've used the -C flag to output the 20 lines before and after the match, because I didn't remember exactly where the information resided)

```
cat vadfiles.txt | grep -C 20  0xfffffa800577ba10
```



For the second one, since the information requested operates on two parameters, Start and End, it is needed multiple grep commands, therefore the command was:

```
cat vadfiles.txt | grep -C 20  0x00000000033c0000 | grep -C 20 0x00000000033dffff
```

```
VAD node @ 0xfffffa80052652b0 Start 0x00000000033c0000 End 0x00000000033dffff Tag VadS
Flags: CommitCharge: 32, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 24
Protection: PAGE_NOACCESS
Vad Type: VadNone
```

12

The cmdline action would give the answer away:

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 cmdline
```

There could be another way, but since the question was "There was a VBS script that ran on the machine. What is the name of the script? (submit without file extension)".
I find it likely to be about the malicious files, but there;s no reference to it so using all the output of 'cmdline' should be necessary

However since the pids of the malicous processes are already known, we could use cmdline's option '--pid'.

- hsfs.exe (wscript.exe's parent process)
- wscript.exe (vhjReUDEuumrX.exe's parent process)
- vhjReUDEuumrX.exe (The malious file itself)

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 cmdline --pid 5116,3952,3496
```



If this had no answer, removing the '--pid' option and running cmdline again will get us the cmdline on every process.

```
**********************************************************************
chrome.exe pid:   4232
Command line : "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=renderer --field-trial-handle=924,2132560186875629139,181
token=16174022435611898554 --lang=en-US --enable-offline-auto-reload --enable-offline-auto-reload-visible-only --device-scale-factor=1 --num-
el-token=16174022435611898554 --renderer-client-id=8 --no-v8-untrusted-code-mitigations --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2528 /prefetch:1
**********************************************************************
chrome.exe pid:   4240
Command line : "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=renderer --field-trial-handle=924,2132560186875629139,181
token=6187966837059053897 --lang=en-US --extension-process --enable-offline-auto-reload --enable-offline-auto-reload-visible-only --device-sc
rvice-request-channel-token=6187966837059053897 --renderer-client-id=4 --no-v8-untrusted-code-mitigations --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2536
**********************************************************************
chrome.exe pid:   4520
Command line :
**********************************************************************
chrome.exe pid:   4688
Command line : "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=renderer --field-trial-handle=924,2132560186875629139,181
ompositing --service-pipe-token=2094820586012107996 --lang=en-US --enable-offline-auto-reload --enable-offline-auto-reload-visible-only --dev
1 --service-request-channel-token=2094820586012107996 --renderer-client-id=13 --no-v8-untrusted-code-mitigations --mojo-platform-channel-hand
**********************************************************************
wscript.exe pid:   5116
Command line : "C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe" //B //NOLOGO %TEMP%\vhjReUDEuumrX.vbs
**********************************************************************
UWkpjFjDzM.exe pid:   3496
Command line : "C:\Users\Bob\AppData\Local\Temp\rad93398.tmp\UWkpjFjDzM.exe"
**********************************************************************
cmd.exe pid:   4660
Command line : C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
**********************************************************************
conhost.exe pid:   4656
Command line : \??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe "-2105419398-1914772985-1870609020-898984210-362940684623073995-430731961-49370805
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 cmdline
```

13

The command to find the flag was taking so much time that I started writing this notes, the process was still alive so I looked if if it was writing anything

So at first I checked if it did write something and if the process was alive, stopped it and then relaunched

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ ^C
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ ^C
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 timeliner > timeline
bash: timeline: cannot overwrite existing file
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 timeliner > timeline2
V                                  ation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
```

Show Applications

it was still taking so much time so I've started looking at what was writing, it seemed stucked at Bob's ntuser.dat but luckily for us, the flag was beyond that time so it must already be on that file

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ tail -f timeline2
2019-03-22 05:42:25 UTC+0000|[_HBASE_BLOCK TimeStamp]| \??\C:\Windows\ServicePro
files\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT|
2019-03-22 04:23:30 UTC+0000|[_CMHIVE LastWriteTime]| \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProf
iles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT|
2019-03-22 05:43:11 UTC+0000|[_HBASE_BLOCK TimeStamp]| \??\C:\Users\Bob\AppData\
Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat|
2019-03-22 04:23:26 UTC+0000|[_CMHIVE LastWriteTime]| \??\C:\Users\Bob\AppData\L
ocal\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat|
1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000|[_HBASE_BLOCK TimeStamp]| [no name]|
1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000|[_CMHIVE LastWriteTime]| [no name]|
2019-03-22 05:44:16 UTC+0000|[_HBASE_BLOCK TimeStamp]| \SystemRoot\System32\Conf
ig\SOFTWARE|
2019-03-22 04:23:30 UTC+0000|[_CMHIVE LastWriteTime]| \SystemRoot\System32\Confi
g\SOFTWARE|
2019-03-22 05:46:12 UTC+0000|[_HBASE_BLOCK TimeStamp]| \??\C:\Users\Bob\ntuser.d
at|
2019-03-22 04:23:26 UTC+0000|[_CMHIVE LastWriteTime]| \??\C:\Users\Bob\ntuser.da
t|
```

A grep on patter given, which was the time would give away the flag

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ grep "2019-03-07 23:06:58" timeline2
2019-03-07 23:06:58 UTC+0000|[SHIMCACHE]| \??\C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\S
kype for Desktop\Skype.exe|
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$
```

14

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump --pid 3032 --dump-dir .
```

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem --profile=Win7SP1x64 memdump --pid 3032 --dump-dir .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
************************************************************************
Writing notepad.exe [  3032] to 3032.dmp
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$
```

`strings -e l 3032.dmp | grep -i flag`

will give away so many result that it'll be mostly just noise. The flag is first and a simple `| head` would suffice but I did not know that, instead I enahnced the grep based on what cyberdefenders format would expect:



Therefore I grepped as the following command and

`strings -e l 3032.dmp | grep -i 'flag<'`

and reduced the results from 374 to 5

```
[Roaming::CNoThrowMruItem::GetOpenFlags]
Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompat
outlook.flags
~-1-5-21-1497316740-357279761-3945674337-1000\Software
SppNotificationFlags
flag<TheK>
flag<TheK>
flag
flag@
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~
$ strings -e l 3032.dmp | grep -i 'flag<'
flag<REDBULL_IS_LIFE>
flag<Th>
flag<Th>
flag<TheK>
flag<TheK>
```

15

```
vol.py -f Triage-Memory.mem mftparser > mft.txt && grep -C 20 '59045' mft.txt | grep -iC 20
'record number'
```

```
$DATA


$OBJECT_ID
Object ID: 40000000-0000-0000-0010-000000000000
Birth Volume ID: 19050000-0000-0000-1905-000000000000
Birth Object ID: 31015ed0-1900-ffff-ffff-ffff82794711
Birth Domain ID: ffffffff-8279-4711-0000-000000000000

**************************************************************************
**************************************************************************
MFT entry found at offset 0x2193d400
Attribute: In Use & File
Record Number: 59045
Link count: 2


$STANDARD_INFORMATION
Creation                       Modified                       MFT Altered                    Access Date                    Type
------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------ ----
2019-03-17 06:50:07 UTC+0000 2019-03-17 07:04:43 UTC+0000   2019-03-17 07:04:43 UTC+0000   2019-03-17 07:04:42 UTC+0000   Archive

$FILE_NAME
Creation                       Modified                       MFT Altered                    Access Date                    Name/Path
------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------ ---------
2019-03-17 06:50:07 UTC+0000 2019-03-17 07:04:43 UTC+0000   2019-03-17 07:04:43 UTC+0000   2019-03-17 07:04:42 UTC+0000   Users\Bob\DOCUME~1\EMPLOY~1\EMPLOY~1.XLS

$FILE_NAME
Creation                       Modified                       MFT Altered                    Access Date                    Name/Path
------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------ ---------
2019-03-17 06:50:07 UTC+0000 2019-03-17 07:04:43 UTC+0000   2019-03-17 07:04:43 UTC+0000   2019-03-17 07:04:42 UTC+0000   Users\Bob\DOCUME~1\EMPLOY~1\EmployeeInformation.xlsx

$OBJECT_ID
Object ID: 00fe50d2-4841-e911-8751-000c2958bc5f
```

16

I think this one as the bonus question, because it's already kinda knwon the malicious PID, 3496 the UWkpjFjDzM.exe process. The "4444", as previously mentioned is a dead giveaway of a metasploit payload, is the default listener port for its meterpreter staging and payloads.