

Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Are they really secure ?


Attacks

1. Steal a Device Programmer

- Need for Reverse Engineering, Modifications
- Easy to get root mode
- Problem : difficult to set up



2. Build your own Device Programmer !



USRP board

- Total cost : 800 \$



Antenna

~10 cm

3. Eavesdropping on private Information

- What kind ? => Implanting physician, Diagnosis, Hospital, Device state, patient name, date of birth, serial N°, etc...
- The future holds some promises : devices more sophisticated ergo a lot more data to be divulged ?



4. Sniff Vital Signs

- Get the vital signs that the ICD emits
- Need to have an Eavesdropping setup



5. Drain energy

- Send multiple radio signals to the ICD
- => Battery lifetime decrease
- Simple : transmit-only




6. Turn off therapies ⚠

- "Stop detecting fibrillation"
- Problem : change of the device state


7. Affect patient's physiology ⚠

- Induce fibrillation, flood with drugs
- Problem : patient's safety at great risk



regulate

ICD



control



Device Programmer



Defense



Solutions ?

- Authenticate device programmers ?
- Encryption ? Passwords ?

Problems


- Need emergency access !
- Patient's health : top priority

Prototypes defenses VS some of the attacks


- Idea : defend without using battery
- External parties pays for power

Example of prototype : **WISP** = RFID + computation
WISPer = WISP + code

The WISP




Experimentation : acoustic notification for the patient



WISPer emits a sound when it detects an access to the ICD
=> hearable withing 1m range (further than distance between ICD and patient's ears)

The Solution



- 1: External party authenticate through **WISPer**
- 2: If successful **WISPer** says to ICD "Ok you can use radio"
- 3: Then the External party can control the ICD

The patient is notified **acoustically** during the whole time.