

# Nash Equilibrium in Hotelling's Game with Weighted Cost Function on a Line Segment

Jianan Lin

linj21@rpi.edu

April 8th, 2022

# Model

An infinite number of customers are uniformly distributed on a line segment. Some facilities are also distributed on this segment.

Each customer chooses a facility. The cost is the ratio of distance and function  $f(n')$  where  $n'$  is the number of facilities at that coordinate. The simplest is  $f(x) = x$ . Also we consider  $f(x) = x^p$ , where  $p > 0$ .

The utility of a facility is the ratio of number of customers choosing this coordinate and the number of facilities at this coordinate. A case is Nash Equilibrium if no facility can increase its utility by moving to another candidate.



Figure 1: Example of 4 facilities on a unit line segment

# Example of Nash Equilibrium

Figure 2 is always Nash equilibrium for all  $p \geq 1$ .

But figure 3 is always Nash equilibrium only for

$1 \leq p \leq \log_3(2 + \sqrt{5}) \approx 1.314$  (If  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , then  $p \leq 2$ ).

If  $p < 1$  or all the facilities choose different coordinate, then there is no Nash equilibrium.




Figure 2: All facilities on the midpoint




Figure 3: Half facilities on 0.25 and the other half on 0.75

# Bubble

## Definition

*Bubble: If there exists a facility stack with discontinuous control regions on the line segment, then it is called a bubble.*




**Figure 4:** Example of a bubble, the red region is controlled by stack 1 and green region by stack 2

# Existence of Bubble

## Lemma

*If  $p = 1$ , there exists bubble with Nash equilibrium.*



**Figure 5:** Example of a bubble with Nash equilibrium, the bubble is on the leftmost with size very tiny, such as 0.01

# Conclusions about Bubble for 2-Stack

Suppose that the numbers of the two stacks are  $n_1, n_2$  ( $n_1 \leq n_2$ ) and the length of the line segment is 1. Then we have the following results.

## Lemma

*If  $p \geq 2$ , then there is no bubble with Nash equilibrium.*

## Lemma

*When  $p = 1$ , the largest size of the bubble with Nash equilibrium is about 0.02 with  $n_1 = 2, n_2 \in [20, 25]$ .*

## Lemma

*When  $p = 1$ , if  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , then the largest size of the bubble with Nash equilibrium is about  $1/(2n)$ , where  $n = n_1 + n_2$  and  $2 \leq n_1 \leq O(\sqrt{n})$ .*