

Detecting Broad Length Algorithmically Generated Domains

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Abstract. Domain generation algorithm (DGA) represents a safe haven for modern botnets, as it enables them to escape detection. Due to the fact that DGA domains are generated randomly, they tend to be unusually long, which can be leveraged toward detecting them. Shorter DGA domains, in contrast, are more difficult to detect, as most legitimate domains are relatively short. We introduce in this paper, a new detection model that uses information theoretic features, and leverage the notion of domain length threshold to detect dynamically and transparently DGA domains regardless of their lengths. Experimental evaluation of the approach using public datasets yields detection rate (DR) of 98.96% and false positive rate (FPR) of 2.1%, when using random forests classification technique.

Keywords: HTTP botnet · Botnet detection · Machine learning · Passive DNS · DGA domains · Malicious fast flux DNS · Domain length

1 Introduction

Botnets are considered to be one of the biggest online threats today [11]. Cyber criminals are controlling malware infected networks through command-and-control servers (C&C). It is quite challenging to capture bot behaviour due to its dynamic nature and fluxing IP addresses [12].

To evade blacklisting, modern botnets, such as HTTP botnets, are taking advantage of various Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs). The DGAs embedded in the malware generate on a regular basis large amounts of pseudo-random domain names in a short period of time. The domains are generated based on seeds known only by the bots and the C&C servers, while the bot-master will typically register and activate only one or a handful of these domains. Reverse engineering such large volumes of non-existent algorithmically generated domain names is extremely time-consuming, resource intensive with low success rates, making detection harder.

A key characteristic of Algorithmically Generated Domains (AGD) is their length, which is unusually greater than Human Generated Domains (HGD). As a result, most

existing DGA detection schemes have been centered around length detection [4, 10]. However, several recent DGA strains have been using shorter domains lengths, which are indistinguishable in length from legitimate domains, making their detection much harder.

We study in this work the impact of length on DGA domains detection performance, and propose a simple adaptive model, which uses different feature models based on length threshold value. Our approach involves studying significant features from domain names that can help correctly distinguish between AGDs and HGDs. The features are extracted based on lexical and linguistic characteristics of the domain names. Information theoretic measures of domain characteristics are computed and used to detect broad range of DGAs regardless of the domain length. The extracted features are classified using machine learning. We investigated two different classification techniques, namely, Random Forests and Decision Tree. Experimental evaluation on public DGA datasets and (legitimate) Alexa top domains, yields for random forests, the best performing of both algorithms, detection rate (DR) of 98.96% and false positive rate (FPR) of 2.1%.

The remaining sections are structured as follows. Section 2 is a review of related works. Section 3 introduces our proposed approach and models. Section 4 presents the experiments conducted to study the impact of length on performance, and evaluates our proposed detection scheme. Section 5 makes concluding remarks and discusses future work.

2 Related Works

Several works have been published in the literature on DGA detection. We review and discuss a sample of closely related work in the following.

Antonakakis *et al.* [1] developed Pleiades, a DGA-detection system that uses few important statistical features to translate DNS NXDomains subsets to feature vectors. Such features include splitting domain name into various levels and distribution of n-grams. Few structural features like number of domain levels, length of domains and number of unique top-level domains are calculated. They also discuss character entropy calculation across various domain levels as a feature. The approach was evaluated experimentally using a dataset consisting of 30,000 DGA domains from the malware families Conficker, Murofet, Bobax and Sinowal. Also, 20,000 normal domain names from Alexa were used for training and testing of the DGA Classifier. The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) was used for classification and the results obtained were fairly good, with TPR around 91% and FPR of 3%.

Ma *et al.* [2] introduced a lightweight approach to classify URLs using lexical as well as host-based features. They consider lexical features of the URL such as length, number of dots, special characters in the URL path, etc., and label them as tokens. These tokens are collected and preserved for different categories like hostname, URL path and Top-level-domains (TLD). The extracted features are processed using machine learning classification. Three different classifiers were studied including Naïve Bayes, Logistic regression and Support Vector machine (SVM). Experimental

evaluation was conducted across 20,000 to 30,000 URLs drawn from different sources, achieving prediction accuracy of 95–99%.

Wang and Shirley proposed in [9] an approach to detect malicious domains using word segmentation to derive tokens from domain names. The proposed feature space includes the number of characters, digits, and hyphens. Each set of features were calculated for 291,623 domains from a dataset collected over cellular network. Experimentally they were able to compile a list of 30 most referenced words and created a probability model for the words based on the Google N corpus by Norvig [5]. This is an interesting approach as it helps understand what words in the malicious domain can attract users. Hence this system can be used to monitor and analyse new words being used by malicious domains. Classification was done using logistic regression models, providing more meaningful associations between the features and domain maliciousness, thus improving prediction accuracy.

Schiavoni *et al.* [7] proposed the Phoenix model, which attempts to discover previously unknown DGAs and helps tracking DGA-based command-and-control centers over time, using linguistic features like meaningful character ratio and n-gram normality score. The Phoenix model was evaluated on 1,153,516 domains and resulted in prediction accuracy of about 94.8%.

McGrath and Gupta highlighted in [3] that Phishing URLs and domains possess different characteristics than normal domains and URLs. They found, for instance, that phishing domains used fewer vowels and fewer unique characters compared to normal ones. They proposed a detection model for malicious domains focused on comparison based on domain lengths (excluding Top-level-domains) and character frequencies of English language alphabets. The proposed model was studied experimentally using a dataset consisting of over 9 million unique URLs and 2.7 million unique effective second-level domain names. The focus of the work was essentially on identifying the characteristics of phishing. No concrete detection model was proposed. However, the characteristics can serve as useful basis for constructing adequate feature space for DGA domains detection.

Yadav *et al.* [8] have developed their detection methodology by studying patterns of lexical characteristics of domain names. Their study involves analysing distribution of alphanumeric characters to distinguish between normal and malicious domains. They believe unigram or single characters are not enough, hence bigrams are taken into account. They employ statistical measures like KL-divergence, Jaccard index and Levenshtein edit distance for classifying a group of domains. These domains included a set of legitimate domain names obtained via a crawl of IPv4 address space as well as DNS traffic from a Tier-1 ISP in Asia. They used malicious dataset consisting of domain names generated by recent botnets and domains generated by a tool, that produces English pronounceable words not present in the dictionary. The main contribution of their work is to have shown empirically that in detecting AGDs, metrics such as Jaccard index performs best, followed by Edit distance metrics, and then KL divergence.

Mowbray and Hagen [4] designed a procedure to detect unusual length distribution of second-level domains (2LDs). Features used by their approach are counts of individual character, character n-grams, dots, hyphens, digits, uppercase, lowercase and length. The paper also addresses the need to identify newer DGAs than just using

machine learning to classify based on pre-existing malicious samples. By running the proposed model on DNS query dataset collected over 5 days at an enterprise network, they were able to detect 19 different Domain Generation Algorithms, including nine new ones.

Sharifnya and Abadi [6] developed a reputation system to classify hosts as malicious or non malicious. They built a system that can be used for real-time analysis of hosts producing large number of suspicious domain names or numerous failed DNS queries. These characteristics help build a suspicious matrix and assign a reputation score. Hosts with higher negative score are considered malicious. Evaluation using DNS query data indicate improving detection and false positive rates, over time.

While length was considered in one way or another in the existing literature, there has not been a systematic focus on how to alleviate its impact on DGA domains detection accuracy. Our work tackles this challenge.

3 Proposed Approach and Models

3.1 Approach Overview

Every domain name hierarchy is composed of a Top level domain (TLD) and a Second level domain (SLD) directly below it. TLD is the part of the domain name located to the right of the dot (“.”). The most common TLDs are .com, .net, .org, .gov, .biz, .info and .ws. A domain name is a sequence of labels separated by dots. For example, in the domain www.isot.ece.uvic.ca, .ca is the TLD, uvic is the second-level domain (SLD) of the .ca TLD, while isot is a third-level domain (3LD).

The essence of domain names, originally, include memorability and friendliness. As such, the overwhelming majority of legitimate domain names convey specific information, which makes sense to humans, and makes it easy for them to grasp or remember the underlying concept. In contrast, AGDs are generated for the sole purpose of evading detection. As they are used for the consumption of bots, which are automated processes, the aforementioned (human) expectations are irrelevant. As such the conveyance of any meaningful information, beyond hosts referencing, is unnecessary. As a result, not only typical AGDs lack friendliness, the amount of information involved tend to be minimal. Our approach consists of measuring the amount of information carried by the name, and then treating the lack of meaningful information as suspicious. We measure the amount of information conveyed by the domain by analyzing character n-grams and computing the corresponding entropy. At the same, we leverage basic lexical and linguistic characteristics of the domain names which have proven effective at detecting DGAs, and are also a by-product of the underlying random structure. One such characteristic which has proven effective, while at some time being elusive is the domain length. We study the impact of length on detection accuracy, and leverage such knowledge to develop a simple detection model that uses the notion of length threshold to alleviate its impact on accuracy.

3.2 Basic Features Model

A common characteristic of early AGDs was their length. According to Weymes [10], in general, legitimate domain names are below 12 characters long, while AGDs are often much longer. In this perspective, the *Length* can be considered as a key feature in identifying DGA domains. However, as shown in Table 1, some of the recent malware have started generated shorter DGA domain names, which makes it difficult to distinguish them from legitimate domains (see Table 2 for samples).

Table 1. Sample DGA domain names with corresponding malware

Short DGA domains (length 5–7)	Long DGA domains (length 12–30)
jaorw.com - Cryptolocker	lhxmfmkhpww.com - Tinba
conxyb.cc - Zeus	uocwkscmkwwmkomc.org - Ramdo
klvupgfm.biz - Conficker	gmacsmsgecquasam.org - Ramdo
azrvtgf.net - Cryptolocker	mcgakswwegmeuwma.org - Ramdo
jltyg.com - Cryptolocker	stabetiredflowerwardisappointed.com - Matsnu
pbfxmi.biz - Cryptolocker	herequiresassembledcircumstances.com - Rovnix
bfuqnb.info - Zeus	thatunanimoushiswarcorrespondence.com - Rovnix
dvlrnl.ws - Zeus	nzzhyhemzswcyrwpzjztdmbypttk.ru - GameOver Zeus
vkdjisc.com - Conficker	uvgxmjieucrkeqcmayuokzganjjbvo.ru - GameOver Zeus
uhbqolxf.org - Conficker	eminpvkskrdygqphyhypfahm.ru - GameOver Zeus

Table 2. Sample legitimate domain names from [Alexa.com](#)

Legitimate Domain Names
google.com baidu.com wikipedia.org stackoverflow.com taobao.com sina.com.cn bing.com yandex.ru hao123.com instagram.com 9gag.com americanexpress.com adnetworkperformance.com

Likewise, the primary primitive feature in our model is the **Length** for a given domain. This is calculated by counting all the characters in the domain name excluding the TLD. Additional primitive features that capture linguistic and structural characteristics of the domain name, considered in our model include the following:

- **Vowels:** This feature is calculated by counting the number of vowels in the second level domain name (SLD) only.
- **Consonants:** Similarly, as above, this is the count of the consonants present in the second level domain name.
- **Digits:** The count of digits in the second level domain name.

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the basic features from a dataset consisting of 20,000 domain names, with 10,000 DGA and 10,000 normal domain names. The distributions indicate strong capability of these basic features to discriminate legitimate domains from malicious DGA domains. Therefore, using the aforementioned basic features model, and simple statistical techniques, we can achieve encouraging detection capability.




Fig. 1. Basic features distributions based on 50:50 mix of legitimate and DGA data; the blue represents the legitimate domains subset while the red is the DGA subset. (Color figure online)

3.3 Domain Name N-gram Entropy

The aforementioned basic features capture the idiosyncrasies of DGA domains names. But as mentioned earlier, an important characteristic of DGA domains is the lack of meaningful information involved. The amount of information can be calculated by the entropy.

By analyzing sample domain names, we found out that the entropy can be sensitive to the domain length. It is effective mainly for longer domains, and tend to struggle for shorter ones. Such sensitivity can be alleviated, by analyzing domain n-gram frequency subject to the length, in other words, the conditional probability with respect to the domain length.

Therefore, our feature model involves 6 features: the aforementioned 4 primitive features, and two advanced features consisting of the domain n-gram entropy and conditional probability. Analysis of different kinds of n-grams on sample data showed that $n = 3$ yields better results. So, we analyze and use trigrams in our feature model.

We compute the domain trigram entropy using word segmentation. First, we extract the SLD of domain d , and for each SLD we compute the entropy of the domain based on the trigram frequency. We derive trigram frequencies from the Google n-corpus. Google n-corpus is a large database created to help machine learning initiatives across the world [5]. It has English language words and their respective n-gram counts, such as two, three, four or five-letter word sequences.

Let $trigram(d)$ denote the set of all trigrams involved in SLD of domain d , and $Trigram(n-corpus)$ be the set of all trigrams involved in the n-corpus.

Given trigram $t_r \in trigram(d)$, let $count(t_r, n-corpus)$ denote its occurrence count based on the (Google) n-corpus.

The occurrence probability for trigram t_r for domain d is calculated as follows:

$$P(t_r) = \frac{count(t_r, n-corpus)}{\sum_{x_r \in Trigram(n-corpus)} count(x_r, n-corpus)} \quad (1)$$

The entropy of domain d , denoted $H(d)$ is computed as follows:

$$H(d) = - \sum_{t_r \in trigram(d)} P(t_r) \log(P(t_r)) \quad (2)$$

A trigram may occur more than once, say n times in a domain name. Then probability of occurrence of the trigram in the domain is considered $n \times f$, where f is the frequency of occurrence of the trigram.

3.4 Domain Name N-gram Conditional Probability

As mentioned earlier, we noticed that the entropy values for domain length around some threshold value of l are very close for DGAs and legitimate domain names. This makes it difficult to distinguish between them. Hence, conditional probability is a parameter that takes into consideration the domain length.

The conditional probability $P(Y|X)$ quantifies the outcome of a random variable Y given that the value of another random variable X is known.

Let l be the domain length threshold. Let L denote the list of domains from the training datasets having length lesser or equal to l :

$$L = \{d : D | d.length \leq l\} \quad (3)$$

We consider separate domain subsets for positive and negative samples (i.e. DGA and normal). But as the process is the same in both cases; we will describe only one case.

For a given domain d ($d \in L$), let $trigram(d)$ be the set of corresponding trigrams. Let $Trigram(L)$ denote the set of all trigrams in L : $Trigram(L) = \bigcup_{d \in L} trigram(d)$.

Given a trigram t_r in $Trigram(L)$, let $count(t_r, L)$ denote the total occurrence number of t_r in $Trigram(L)$. The conditional probability of trigram t_r with respect to length l is calculated as follows:

$$P(t_r|l) = \frac{count(t_r, L)}{|Trigram(L)|} \quad (4)$$

where $|Trigram(L)|$ denote the size (or cardinality) of $Trigram(L)$.

The conditional probability of domain d with respect to length l is calculated as follows:

$$P(d|l) = \sum_{t_r \in trigram(d)} P(t_r|l) \quad (5)$$

3.5 DGA Domains Detection Model

Our detection model consists of extracting the aforementioned features and classifying them using machine learning. We investigated two different classification techniques in our detection approach. Specifically, the following classification techniques were considered:

- J48 decision tree
- Random Forests algorithm.

We used the Weka machine learning tools to simulate the aforementioned classifiers. Weka is a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks. It contains tools for data pre-processing, classification, regression, clustering, association rules, and visualization.

We studied the impact of using each of the features separately and by grouping them in different subsets. The combination of all the features yield the best performance. However, a naïve combination, where all the features are grouped and used equally in a straightforward way is sensitive to the length of the domains, and yield reduced performance for shorter domains. We refer to this feature model as the “naïve model”. We propose a simple alternate model, which uses different feature model based

on whether the domain is greater or smaller than some length threshold value l . We refer to this model as the “split model”, and it can be summarized as follows:

If ($\text{domain.length} < l$) then use (vowels, consonants, digits, conditional probability)

Else use (vowels, consonants, digits, conditional probability, entropy)

Our experiments show that the “split model” is less sensitive to the domain length, and yields much improved performance compared to the “naïve model”.

4 Experiments

4.1 Datasets

We used in this work a global dataset of 100,000 legitimate domains consisting of legitimate domain names from [alexa.com](https://www.alexa.com), and a dataset of 100,000 DGA domains, giving a complete dataset of 200,000 domain names.

4.2 Domain Length Impact Study

In order to assess the impact of the domain length on detection performance, we run several experiments using different length threshold values. We run these experiments over different feature subsets.

Given a feature subset, we vary the length threshold denoted l , and measure the detection performance for decision tree and random forests classifiers, respectively.

We conducted the experiments using a subset Δ of our global dataset consisting of 40,000, with a mix of 50% DGAs and 50% legitimate domains. In each run of the experiment for length threshold l , the subset $\Delta(l) = \{d \in \Delta | d.\text{length} \leq l\}$ (of the domains of length smaller than or equal to l) is used for training and testing.

We run each of the aforementioned experiments using 10-fold cross validation. We split the input dataset $\Delta(l)$ into 10 subsets of data. In each validation run, we train the machine learning classifier on all but one of the subsets, and then evaluate the model on the subset that was not used for training.

The first experiment was run varying length threshold l on dataset $\Delta(l)$, using as feature the domain trigram entropy only. Tables 3 and 4 show the performance obtained for J48 decision tree and random forests, respectively.

Table 3. Performance of J48 decision tree on domain trigram entropy only-model, when varying length threshold (experiment 1)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	82.7	17.3
7	87	13
8	89.55	10.5
9	91.55	8.5
10	93.05	7

Table 4. Performance of Random Forests on domain trigram entropy only-model, when varying length threshold (experiment 1)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	78.1	21.9
7	81.65	18.4
8	84.35	15.7
9	88.95	11.1
10	90.55	9.5

It can be noted in both cases that the performance improves as the domain length increases.

The second experiment was run under the same condition as previously, but this time using the domain trigram conditional probability as only feature. Tables 5 and 6 show the performance obtained for J48 decision tree and random forests, respectively.

Table 5. Performance of J48 decision tree on domain trigram conditional probability only-model, when varying length threshold (experiment 2)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	85.15	14.9
7	90.05	10
8	91.8	8.2
9	92.45	7.6
10	94	6

Table 6. Performance of Random Forests on domain trigram conditional probability only-model, when varying length threshold (experiment 2)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	85.15	14.9
7	90	10
8	91.35	8.7
9	92	8
10	94.25	5.8

We can notice that like in the previous experiment as the length threshold increases the accuracy of the detector improves. However, it can also be noted that the use of conditional probability alone achieves improved performance compared to using entropy alone.

The third experiment was run by varying length threshold l on dataset $\Delta(l)$, using our basic feature model (i.e. number of digits, number of consonants, and number of vowels) and the domain trigram entropy, excluding the domain trigram conditional probability. Tables 7 and 8 show the performance obtained for J48 decision tree and random forests, respectively.

Table 7. Performance of J48 decision tree on basic features and domain trigram entropy, excluding domain trigram conditional probability, when varying length threshold (experiment 3)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	87.42	13.4
7	89.19	10.9
8	92.381	7.8
9	93.5	6.5
10	94.043	5.9

Table 8. Performance of Random Forests on basic features and domain trigram entropy, excluding domain trigram conditional probability, when varying length threshold (experiment 3)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	82.98	17.7
7	87.52	12.6
8	91.09	9
9	92.75	7.3
10	93.88	6.2

The combined model achieves some improvement for the decision tree, but the opposite occurs for random forests. So it can be said no clear cut improvement is achieved by excluding the conditional probability.

The fourth experiment was run under the same condition as above, but this time using our basic feature model (i.e. number of digits, number of consonants, and number of vowels) and the domain trigram conditional probability, excluding the domain trigram entropy. Tables 9 and 10 show the performance obtained for J48 decision tree and random forests, respectively.

Table 9. Performance of J48 decision tree on basic features and domain trigram conditional probability, excluding domain trigram entropy, when varying length threshold (experiment 4)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	89	11
7	90.9	9.1
8	93.2	6.8
9	93.1	6.9
10	95.6	4.5

Table 10. Performance of Random Forests on basic features and domain trigram conditional probability, excluding domain trigram entropy, when varying length threshold (experiment 4)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	88.35	11.7
7	90.2	9.8
8	92.8	7.2
9	93.3	6.7
10	94.45	5.6

We can notice a notable improvement when using conditional probability and the basic features over when using entropy and the basic features model. There is also slight improvement when using conditional probability and the basic features over when using conditional probability only.

The fifth experiment was run using all features (i.e. basic features + entropy + conditional probability). We refer to this model as the “naive” model, as it combines the features without any particular transformation or restrictions. Tables 11 and 12 show the performance obtained for J48 decision tree and random forests, respectively. There is a slight improvement in performance over the previous experiments. This is also highlighted by Fig. 2, which depicts the ROC curves outlining the performances for the different experiments. The combined “naive” model achieves better performance over the other models involving a subset of the features, with Random Forests coming as best performing algorithm.

Table 11. Performance of J48 decision tree on all features combined (basic features, domain trigram conditional probability, and domain trigram entropy), when varying length threshold (experiment 5)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	89.1	10.9
7	91.95	8.1
8	93.7	6.3
9	93.9	6.1
10	94.9	5.1

Table 12. Performance of random forests on all features combined (basic features, domain trigram conditional probability, and domain trigram entropy), when varying length threshold (experiment 5)

Length	Detection rate (%)	FP rate (%)
6	88.05	12
7	90.55	9.5
8	93.9	6.1
9	94.25	5.8
10	95.55	4.5

4.3 Split Model Study

Our split model relies on the consideration that the domain entropy does not contribute much for short domain length. So for short domains, the basic features and the domain trigram probability is used as feature model, while for longer domain names, all the features are used. The split is controlled by a length threshold. We studied different values by varying the length threshold using the same dataset of 40,000 domains as in the previous subsection. Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 show the performance obtained when




Fig. 2. ROC curves illustrating the performances obtained by varying the length thresholds with different features models.

Table 13. Performance of split model when length threshold $l = 7$

Algorithm	Detection rate (%)	FPR (%)
J48	95.59	4.45
Random forest	96.68	3.4

Table 14. Performance of split model when length threshold $l = 8$

Algorithm	Detection rate (%)	FPR (%)
J48	95.59	4.2
Random forest	96.81	3.2

Table 15. Performance of split model when length threshold $l = 9$

Algorithm	Detection rate (%)	FPR (%)
J48	96.82	3.3
Random forest	97.21	2.9

Table 16. Performance of split model when length threshold $l = 10$

Algorithm	Detection rate (%)	FPR (%)
J48	97.10	3.2
Random forest	97.53	2.6

varying the threshold l from 7 to 10. We can notice a notable improvement in performance when using the split model.

Figure 3 depict ROC curves comparing the performance of the split model against the straight. The split model achieves far better performance. The best performance is achieved when using threshold value of $l = 10$.




Fig. 3. ROC curves comparing the performances of the split model against the combined or straight model obtained when varying the length threshold values.

We run the split model using threshold $l = 10$ on a larger dataset consisting of 200,000 domain names, with 50% legitimate domains and 50% DGA domains. We run the experiment using 5-fold cross validation. Table 17 outlines the average performance obtained, which confirms and even slightly improves the performance shown in Table 16, which was obtained on a smaller dataset.

Table 17. Performance of split model on large dataset (200,00 domains) and threshold $l = 10$

Algorithm	Detection rate (%)	FPR (%)
J48	97.33	2.95
Random forest	98.96	2.10

Tables 18 and 19 show the performance of the algorithms on the two upper and lower partitions of the dataset (i.e. domains of length smaller than 10, and domains of length greater or equal 10).

Table 18. Performance of split model on large dataset – subset of domains of length < 10

Algorithm	Detection rate (%)	FPR (%)
J48	95.72	4.4
Random forest	99.24	0.7

Table 19. Performance of split model on large dataset – subset of domains of length ≥ 10

Algorithm	Detection rate (%)	FPR (%)
J48	98.94	1.5
Random forest	98.69	1.4

The Random forests algorithm achieves the best performance, and it performs almost similarly on shorter and longer domains. So the split model allows smooth transition, in quasi transparent way.

5 Conclusion

Modern botnets, such as HTTP botnets, heavily use AGDs as one of the preferred methods to evade detection. DGA-based malware try to contact C&C servers more than thousands of times in a day. The DGA domains are short-lived and difficult to blacklist. Hence it is very important to recognise the unique characteristics of DGA domains as part of any comprehensive strategy to detect botnets. Reverse engineering the Domain Generation Algorithm is a very tedious and difficult task, hence it is important to detect the generated domains themselves in a timely and efficient manner.

As a result of experimentation, we can say that *Length* is an extremely important factor in determining if the domain is normal or DGA-based. In this work, we can see that for domains with length below some threshold value, the characteristics of normal and DGA domains are very similar and as such, are difficult to distinguish. We developed in this work a simple model that uses information theoretic metric and length threshold value as pivot to transparently and dynamically detect DGA domains of various lengths, whether short or long. Two different machine learning classification techniques, namely decision tree and random forests, yielded very encouraging detection performances.

While detecting automatically generated domains is our main focus in this work, identifying the malware family to which the DGAs belong would be beneficial.

Future work will consist of expanding our feature space and algorithms to identify and categorize the specific algorithms used in generating the AGDs. Future work will also include testing the ability of the model for detecting novel, unseen form of AGD. This will be conducted by training the model on one dataset and testing it on another, totally different dataset. Novelty detection is important as one of the characteristics of malware such as botnets is evolution to escape detection.

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