

Symbolic Execution

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Agenda

- Introduction
 - Classification
 - Definition
- Traditional symbolic execution
 - Terminology
 - Demo: KLEE
- Advanced symbolic execution
 - Challenges
 - Environment models
 - Search strategies
 - Alternative execution models (DSE, SSE, veritesting)
 - Memory models
 - Other optimizations
 - Limitations
- Impact (exploit detection)
- Tools and applications
 - Exploit detection
 - Program analysis, contract programming
 - · Demo: CrossHair
 - Program exploration, unit test generation
 - Demo: Microsoft IntelliTest
 - Debugging
 - Demo: Symbolic Execution Debugger (SED)
 - Other applications
 - Impactful tools
- Conclusion



Program Analysis

Benchmarks

Contracts

Software metrics (LOC, NOC, EOC, LCOM, ...)

Invariant inference

Dependency analysis

Program slicing

Duplicate code detection

Style checker

Tests

Assertions

Linter/bug detection

Spell checker



Program Analysis

amount of context

Linter/bug detection

Assertions

Duplicate code detection

Tests

Static Spell checker analysis

Contracts

Dynamic analysis

Program slicing

Dependency analysis

Style checker

Benchmarks

Invariant inference

Software metrics (LOC, NOC, EOC, LCOM, ...)



Program Analysis

amount of context

How can we get context?



Non-interactive argument-free commands



Tests



Symbolic execution



What is symbolic execution?

And what it is useful for (and for what not)?



sym·bol·ic ex·e·cu·tion n, abbrev. Sym·Ex or sym·bex

- "bring your code to life"
- "turn a program inside out, so that instead of consuming inputs, it becomes a generator of them"
- uncover all possible execution paths of a program

¹ [cadar2005execution]



- execute program with symbolic values instead of concrete values for variables
- each execution path (aka symbolic state) satisfies a path constraint formula
- for each conditional branch, the execution is forked into two execution paths with divergent constraints
- all execution paths form an execution tree together
- for testing branch conditions for satisfiability, the symbolic expression is checked by an SMT solver
 - SMT = satisfiability modulo ("within") theories
 - special form of SAT solver



```
a = 0 b = 2 c = -1
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
   if (a) {
       x = -2;
                                   • foo(1, -1, 2)
   if (b < 0) {
                                   • foo(0, 2, -1)
       if (!a && c) {
                                   • foo(0, -1, 2)
           y = 1;
       z = 2;
   assert(x + y + z != 3);
```



```
a = \alpha b = \beta
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) {
        x = -2;
    if (b < 0) {
        if (!a && c) {
             \vee = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
```

```
    foo(1, -1, 2)
    foo(0, 2, -1)
    foo(0, -1, 2)
    foo(α, β, γ)
    symbolic variables
```



```
a = \alpha b = \beta
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) {
        x = -2;
    if (b < 0) {
        if (!a && c) {
             y = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
a = \alpha b = \beta c = \gamma
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) {
        x = -2;
    if (b < 0) {
        if (!a && c) {
             y = 1;
         z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
a = \alpha b = \beta c = \gamma
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
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        x = -2;
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    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
        x = -2; x = -2
    if (b < 0) {
        if (!a && c) {
            y = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



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void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
        x = -2; x = -2
    if (b < 0) \{ \beta < 0 \}
        if (!a && c) {
             y = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
        x = -2; x = -2
    if (b < 0) { \beta >= 0
        if (!a && c) {
            y = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
        x = -2; x = -2
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void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
        x = -2; x = -2
    if (b < 0) { \beta < 0
        if (!a && c) { \gamma != 0
            y = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
        x = -2; x = -2
    if (b < 0) { \beta < 0
        if (!a && c) { \gamma = 0
            y = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
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        x = -2; x = -2
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    assert(x + y + z != 3);
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```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
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        x = -2; x = -2
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        if (!a \&\& c) \{ y != 0 \}
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
    if (b < 0) { \beta < 0
        if (!a && c) { γ != 0
    assert(x + y + z != 3); 1 != 3
```



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void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
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        if (!a && c) { y = 0
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
    if (b < 0) { \beta < 0
        if (!a && c) { v = 0
    assert(x + y + z != 3); 0 != 3
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
        x = -2; x = -2
    if (b < 0) { \beta >= 0
        if (!a && c) {
            y = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha != 0
        x = -2; x = -2
    if (b < 0) { \beta >= 0
        if (!a && c) {
            y = 1;
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3); -2 != 3
```



```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha = 0
        x = -2;
    if (b < 0) {
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    if (a) { \alpha = 0
        x = -2;
    if (b < 0) {
         if (!a \&\& c) \{ \gamma != 0 \}
             y = 1;
         z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
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             y = 1;
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        x = -2;
    if (b < 0) {
         if (!a \&\& c) \{ \gamma != 0 \}
             y = 1;
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    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha = 0
        x = -2;
    if (b < 0) {
        if (!a \&\& c) \{ y != 0 \}
        z = 2;
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
```




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    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha = 0
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    if (b < 0) {
        if (!a \&\& c) \{ y != 0 \}
    assert(x + y + z != 3);
}
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


```
void foo(int a, int b, int c) {
    int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
    if (a) { \alpha = 0
        x = -2;
    if (b < 0) {
        if (!a && c) { γ != 0
    assert(x + y + z != 3); 3 = 3
```














Demo: KLEE






Demo: KLEE

```
$ cat >> foo.c
                                                       $ cat klee-last/test000005.abort.err
int main() {
                                                       Error: abort failure
                                                       Stack:
    int a, b, c;
    klee make symbolic(&a, sizeof(a), "a");
                                                               #00000066 in foo(a=symbolic, b=symbolic,
                                                       c=symbolic)
    klee make symbolic(&b, sizeof(b), "b");
                                                               #100000093 in main()
    klee make symbolic(&c, sizeof(c), "c");
                                                       $ ktest-tool klee-last/test000005.ktest
   foo(a, b, c);
                                                       ktest file : 'klee-last/test000005.ktest'
    return 0;
                                                                  : ['foo.bc']
                                                       args
                                                       num objects: 3
$ clang -emit-llvm -c foo.c
                                                       object 0: name: 'a'
$ klee foo.bc
                                                       object 0: size: 4
KLEE: output directory is "/home/andrew/klee-out-0"
                                                       object 0: data: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00'
KLEE: Using STP solver backend
                                                       object 0: hex: 0x00000000
KLEE: ERROR: (location information missing) abort
                                                       object 0: int: 0
failure
KLEE: NOTE: now ignoring this error at this location
                                                       object 0: uint: 0
                                                       object 0: text: ....
                                                       object 1: name: 'b'
KLEE: done: total instructions = 99
KLEE: done: completed paths = 4
                                                       object 1: size: 4
KLEE: done: partially completed paths = 1
                                                       object 1: data: b'\x00\x00\x00\x80'
KLEE: done: generated tests = 5
                                                       object 1: hex : 0x00000080
$ ls klee-last
                                                       object 1: int : -2147483648
assembly.ll messages.txt run.stats
                                                       object 1: uint: 2147483648
test000002.ktest test000004.ktest
                                                       object 1: text: ....
test000005.kquery warnings.txt
                                                       object 2: name: 'c'
             run.istats
                           test000001.ktest
                                                       object 2: size: 4
test000003.ktest test000005.abort.err
                                                       object 2: data: b'\x01\x01\x01\x01'
test000005.ktest
                                                       object 2: hex : 0x01010101
                                                       object 2: int : 16843009
                                                       object 2: uint: 16843009
```

object 2: text:

[cadar2008klee]






[cadar2008klee]



What could possibly go wrong?



Challenges and Solutions





Unknown Environment

- environment = unknown behavior (blackboxes)
 - not symbolically executable
 - syscalls (file system, network, user input, hardware acceleration, ...)

```
int foo(char *fname) {
    FILE *f = fopen(fname, "r");
    if (f == NULL) {
        return -1;
    }
    // ...
    fclose(f);
    return 0;
}
```

- frameworks without sources (only for symbolic interpreters)
- concurrency (scheduler)

[cadar2013symbolic, baldoni2018survey, yang2019advances]



Environment Modeling

- stubs
- mocks class VirtualFileSystem {...}
- heuristics
 - only model problematic subset of behavior (e.g., exceptions)

- frameworks (inversion of control): connect sub-call graphs

using regular grammar

trade-offs

- provided by symbex engine vs extended by users
- model completeness
 vs complexity/performance




Figure 3. a subset of the call graph model for Driving Directions app

(1) $S \rightarrow aA$

- (3) $B \rightarrow A | \varepsilon$
- (2) $A \rightarrow bB|cC|\varepsilon$
- (4) $C \rightarrow A|\varepsilon$



Path Explosion

number of execution paths = 2^(number of branches)

```
int count(int *array, int value) {
  int i, count = 0;
  for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
    if (array[i] == value) {
      count++;
    }
}</pre>
```


infinite tree for conditional loops

return count;

}




Path Explosion (DFS)






Path Explosion (BFS)





Path Explosion (generational search)





Path Explosion

- search strategies
 - depth-first search (DFS): not loop-safe
 - bread-first search (BFS): many context switches, memory overhead
 - generational search (diagonal tree traversal): smaller memory overhead)
- branch prioritization
 - random search: not always loop-safe
 - heuristic priorities:
 - by code coverage increase
 - by control-flow graph coverage
 - by mutation coverage increase
 - evolutionary search
 - hybrid approaches (different strategies for different phases of code coverage)



Alternative Execution Models

- problems with pure symbolic execution (as assumed so far):
 - separate, slower interpreter
 - unable to deal with blackbox environments
- dynamic symbolic execution (DSE)
 - execution-generated testing (EGT)
 - concolic execution
- static symbolic execution (SSE)
 - veritesting




Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE)

- mix concrete and symbolic execution
- execution-generated testing (EGT): interleaving mix
 - use concrete values for executing blackboxes
 - (concretized solution from SMT solver)
- concolic execution (concrete + symbolic): simultaneous mix
 - concrete execution for control flow and concrete values
 - symbolic execution for collecting constraints
 - path discovery: start from concrete tests/inputs, negate single constraint and generate new values
 - implications:
 - implementation: instead of heavy-weight symbolic interpreter, normal executor/processor can be used with instrumented program
 - undecidable branches: don't terminate execution, but omit some paths
 - state of the art technology!



Static Symbolic Execution (SSE)

- convert program source code/AST to single symbolic expression
- no overhead for executing and ordering branches, but higher pressure on SMT solver
 - efficient handling of large/infinite loops!
 - nowadays, SMT solvers are more powerful
- no support for blackboxes or (often) uncommon control flow patterns (goto, function pointers, ...)
- veritesting: mix DSE and SSE





Memory Models

Challenges

- pointers/memory aliases/dispatching
- symbolic memory access:
 void divergent(int x, int y)
 {
 int s[4];
 s[0] = x;
 s[1] = 0;
 s[2] = 1;
 s[3] = 2;
 if (s[x] = s[y] + 2) {
 abort(); //error
 }
 }

Approaches

- limited coverage
- precision of memory model
- lazy initialization of pointers → reduced search space of symbolic addresses



Optimizations for Symbex

- parallelize path exploration (branch-and-bound)
- SMT solvers
 - trade-in precision (e.g., arithmetic theory vs overflow-aware theory of bitvectors)
 - incremental solving (constraint set caches)
 - reuse solutions from similar constraint sets (subsets, supersets)
 - improved performance (parallelization, HW acceleration)
- selective symbolic execution (analyze subset of program)
 - directed symbolic execution (find nearby program parts)
 - lazy test generation (top-down selection)



Trends (selection)

- Path merging and pruning
- Compositional analysis
 - analyze units separately and store pre- and postconditions
- Probabilistic symbolic execution
 - observed or developer-specified branch probabilities
 - rank exploits by probability
 - also used to predict overall performance/reliability
- Shadow symbolic execution
 - exploit symbex results for previous software version and source code diff
- Hybrid heuristics
 - exploit information from static analysis to accelerate and tune symbolic execution (branch selection, memory models, ...)
 - e.g., type flow analysis
- Optimized concurrency models
- •



Remaining Limitations

- No 100% coverage!
 - systematic issues:
 - blackbox environments/mocking overhead
 - unsolvable constraints
 - symbolic pointers
 - performance issues (not an interactive tool)
 - execution complexity (long loops/deep recursion, many branches, large data, ...)
 - computational resources




The Triumph of Symbolic Execution



The Triumph of Symbolic Execution





[dimensions]




Impact (1): Microsoft SAGE

- concolic execution of x86 binaries
- "whitebox fuzzing": find vulnerabilities in parsers by degenerating files
- responsible for finding 1/3 of exploits in Windows 7 (prior to release)
- integral part of Microsoft's internal testing pipelines
- run 24/7 on cluster with >200 nodes



Impact (2): GNU Core Utils



89 binaries · 72k SLOC · 67.6% LCOV



Impact (2): GNU Core Utils

89 binaries - 72k SLOC - 67.6% LCOV

```
klee <tool-name> \
    --max-time 60 \
    --sym-args 10 2 2 \
    --sym-files 2 8
```

```
9
      int i, ac;
                                                           10*
3:
      while (*arg) {
                                                           11*
4:
        if (*arg == ' \setminus \setminus ') {
5:
           arg++;
6:
           i = ac = 0;
7:
           if (*arg >= '0' && *arg <= '7') {
8:
             do {
9:
               ac = (ac << 3) + *arg++ - '0';
10:
               i++;
11:
             } while (i<4 && *arg>='0' && *arg<='7');
12:
             *buffer++ = ac;
13:
           } else if (*arg != '\0')
14:
             *buffer++ = *arg++;
                                                           12*
15:
         } else if (*arg == '[') {
16:
           arg++;
                                                           13
           i = *arg++;
17:
                                                           14
18:
           if (*arg++ != '-') {
                                                           15!
19:
             *buffer++ = ' [';
20:
             arg = 2;
21:
             continue;
22:
23:
           ac = *arg++;
24:
           while (i \leq ac) *buffer++ = i++;
25:
                      /* Skip ']' */
           arg++;
26:
        } else
27:
           *buffer++ = *arg++;
28:
29: }
30: ...
31: int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
32:
      int index = 1;
                                                           3*
      if (argc > 1 \&\& argv[index][0] == '-') {
33:
34:
       . . .
                                                           5
35:
                                                           6
36:
                                                           7
37:
      expand(argv[index++], index);
38:
39: }
```

1 : void expand(char *arg, unsigned char *buffer) {

8

tr ["" ""



Impact (2): GNU Core Utils

89 binaries · 72k SLOC · 67.6% LCOV

Figure 7: KLEE-generated command lines and inputs (modified for readability) that cause program crashes in COREUTILS version 6.10 when run on Fedora Core 7 with SELinux on a Pentium machine.



Impact (2): GNU Core Utils

- 89 binaries 72k SLOC 67.6% LCOV
- KLEE (2008):
 - +56 exploits / 89 h
 - 84.5% LCOV (in 1 h/app)
- Mayhem (2012):
 - 97.6% LVOC (in 1 h/app)



Impact (3): Debian

- 33k binaries 679M SLOC
- MergePoint (2014): 11k exploits / 18 CPU-months
 - Amazon EC2: USD 0.28 / exploit
 - (zero-day market: up to USD 500,000.00 / exploit)




Tools and Applications



Exploit Detection

 aka bug checking, vulnerability checking, exploit generation, (crash) test generation



crash test: just a serialized bug, no assertions



Further Use Cases For Program Analysis

- Assertion checking/invariant testing
 - Are there any read accesses to uninitialized memory?
 - How many SQL queries are executed per request to server?
 - Are there performed any elevated commands before the user has authorized?
 - **–** ...
- Dead code detection
- Invariant mining
 - anomaly detection
 - generation of unit tests/contracts
- Contract programming




CrossHair





Demo: CrossHair (test generation)



[crosshair]



Demo: CrossHair (contract programming)

```
File Edit Selection View Go Run Terminal Help
                                                                              D ∨ Ø Ⅲ …
      binary.py X
      crosshair > 🕏 binary.py
             from typing import Optional
        2
             class Node:
        4
                 def __init__(self, value: int, left: Optional['Node']=None, right: Optional['Node']=None):
                     self.value <sup>I</sup> value
        5
                     self.left = left
        6
        7
                     self.right = right
        8
9
                 def rotate left(self):
        10
        11
                     pre: self.right != None
post: __return__.count() == __old__.self.count()
        12
        13
        14
                     new root = self.right
                     self.right = new_root.left
        15
                     new root.left = self
        16
                     return new_root
        17
        18
        19
                 def rotate_right(self):
        20
                     new_root = self.left
(Q)
                     self.left = new_root.right
        21
        22
                     new_root.right = self
        23
                     return new_root
        24
           لا main*
                    → $ ⊗ 0 ∆ 0
                                                       CH off Ln 11, Col 32 Spaces: 4 UTF-8 CRLF Python 3.9.5 64-bit ('3.9.5': pyenv) ↔ ⊘ Prettier

✓ WSL: Ubuntu
```

[crosshair]



Demo: CrossHair (behavioral diff)

```
File Edit Selection View Go Run Terminal Help
                                                                            D ∨ Ø Ⅲ …
      binary.py X
      crosshair > 🕏 binary.py
             from typing import Optional
        2
        3
             class Node:
        4
                 def __init__(self, value: int, left: Optional['Node']=None, right: Optional['Node']=None):
                     self.value <sup>I</sup> value
        5
                     self.left = left
        6
        7
                     self.right = right
        8
9
                 def rotate left(self):
        10
        11
                     pre: self.right != None
post: __return__.count() == __old__.self.count()
        12
        13
        14
                     new root = self.right
                     self.right = new_root.left
        15
                     new_root.left = self
        16
                     return new_root
        17
        18
        19
                 def rotate_right(self):
        20
                     new_root = self.left
(Q)
                     self.left = new_root.right
        21
        22
                     new_root.right = self
        23
                     return new_root
        24
           ழ main* 🔾 🐉 ⊗ 0 🛆 0
                                                      CH off Ln 11, Col 32 Spaces: 4 UTF-8 CRLF Python 3.9.5 64-bit ('3.9.5': pyenv)

✓ WSL: Ubuntu
```

[crosshair]



CrossHair

- test generation
 - multiple coverage strategies
- contract programming with interactive assertions
- compare implementations



- aid for improving code coverage
- faster discovery of bugs
- other advantages of contract programming for larger teams and projects

- overhead for writing specification
 - preconditions/types and postconditions
- very limited practicability
 - insufficient performance
 - insufficient theories (e.g., for strings)




Compare Implementations

assert foo(*args) == bar(*args)



Contractual SemVer Verification

 SemVer (Semantic Versioning): versioning scheme for backward compatibility



- Contractual SemVer: SemVer with compatibility definitions based on formal contracts
- Verification: symbolic comparison of versions



Microsoft IntelliTest






Demo: Microsoft IntelliTest

- explore method: display input/output table (compare versions)
- generate parametrized unit test (compare versions)
 - assumptions and assertions
 - show generated source code
 - automated type choice (IComparer)
 - automatic mocking (PexPConsoleInContext)
- more examples -> performance limits
 - regex
 - hashes
 - factorization
- further observations
 - better performance, but still limited
 - interactive exploration/reverse engineering
 - many conveniences, still hard to deal with context
 - overhead for specifying mocks/factories
 - only simply applicable for methods with little context
 - too many contingencies: Console.WriteLine() might throw several exceptions one might not want to handle
 - configuration overhead




Demo: Microsoft IntelliTest (exploration)






Demo: Microsoft IntelliTest





Demo: Microsoft IntelliTest





Microsoft IntelliTest

- parametrized unit testing (PUT)
- input/output table for exploration
- framework and predefined suite of mocks and stubs



- aid for improving code coverage
- exploration of program behavior and edge cases
- better performance and practicability

still limited performance



Test Generation

Limitations:

- tests suite size vs code quality
 - readability/documentation of fixtures
 - code reuse/idiomacity of setup code
 - robustness against future refactorings
- choice of concrete values
 - should provide intuition
 - -1425360904 vs -1
 - '厧d•頥' vs 'abcd' vs 'John'
- too many contingencies
 - uncommon exceptions
 - implicit contracts
 - configuration overhead
- missing context
 - overhead for specifying mocks/factories
 - low entry barrier only for any method/unit with little context

```
Details
 [TestMethod]
 [PexGeneratedBy(typeof(NodeTest))]
 public void ToString01913()
   string s;
   Node s0 = new Node(0);
   s0.Left = (Node)null;
   s0.Right = (Node)null;
   s = this.ToString01(s0);
   Assert.AreEqual < string > ("0", s);
   Assert.IsNotNull((object)s0);
```

7/7 blocks, 0/0 asserts, 32 runs


Error Message

I/O error occurred

Object reference not set to an instance of an object

Insufficient memory to continue the execution of the program.

Specified argument was out of the range of valid values



Program.Main2(String[]) 3 (3) 4

Summary / Exception

NullReferenceException

OutOfMemoryException

ArgumentOutOfRangeException



Symbolic Execution Debugger (SED)





Demo: Symbolic Execution Debugger (SED)

debug QuickSort


- navigate through and expand execution tree
- see symbolic variables

observations:

- no entry point required
- overcrowded, too many branches
- still need to specify much missing context (sometimes optional only to clean up execution tree)
- hard to follow control statements (e.g., loops)
- potentially helpful to evade too much irrelevant context



Demo: Symbolic Execution Debugger (SED)





Symbolic Execution Debugger (SED)

- interactive exploration and advancement of execution tree
- inspect symbolic variables
- visualize memory layouts




- debugging without entrypoint
- evade irrelevant / distracting context

- overcrowded tree
- still often need to specify missing context
 - sometimes optional only to clean up execution tree
- hard to follow control statements in tree
 - e.g., loops



Symbolic Execution Debugging: Ponce



[ponce]



Smart Contract Validation



Markets

The DAO Attacked: Code Issue Leads to \$60 Million Ether Theft

TheDAO, the largest and most visible ethereum project, has reportedly been hacked, sparking a broad market sell-off.

2003 10:01



The DAO, the distributed autonomous organization that had collected over \$150m worth of the cryptocurrency ether, has reportedly been hacked, sparking a broad market sell-off.

A leaderless organization comprised of a series of smart contracts written on the ethereum codebase, The DAO has lost 3.6m ether, which is currently sitting in a separate wallet after being split off into a separate grouping dubbed a "child DAO".

Ether markets plunged on the news, falling below \$13 in trading on the cryptocurrency exchange Poloniex. With ether currently trading at roughly \$17.50 per coin, that puts the value of the stolen cryptocurrency at more than \$60m.

[castillo2016dao]



Dynamic Recompilation

- context: automatic patching of binaries without source code
 - security patches
 - optimizations
- deny changes in behavior through symbolic execution



Tooling Impact

- Dynamic analysis frameworks
 - angr, Manticore, Miasm, Triton, ... (>2k stars on GitHub)
- Disassembly
 - Ponce, Medusa (>1k stars on GitHub)
- Testing and exploration
 - Microsoft IntelliTest (available to millions of Visual Studio users)
 - CrossHair, DeepState (>700 stars on GitHub)



Suitability

- So when does it make sense to use symbolic execution for my project?
- For test generation: consider
 - complexity of data and computations
 - degree of coupling to environment (frameworks, APIs, I/O, ...)
 - your computational and temporal resources
 - your quality requirements and security policy
- For interactive programming feedback:
 - usual trade-offs for linter-like tools (e.g., immediacy of feedback vs distractions)
- For reverse engineering/disassembling tasks:
 - Symbex debugging/exploration tools can support the understanding of poor-readable code bases.



Alternatives

Static analysis tools:

- better performance
- lower precision/selectivity
- often more and more mature solutions available

Fuzzing:

- better performance
- lower precision/selectivity


Generative AI tools:

- e.g., GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT for finding/fixing bugs or generating tests
- depending on popularity of domain, possibly higher efficiency than manual approaches
- still, quality of results is unreliable and overconfident, awkward workflow



Conclusion

- Symbolic execution: dynamic program analysis technique to check (almost) all program paths
- Tools for bug detection, unit testing, and program exploration exist in many programming languages
- Used successfully for various popular software
- Systemic limitations (path explosion, unsolvable constraint sets, symbolic pointers, ...)
- Overhead for specifying tests/mocks






class VirtualFileSystem {...}



Reading



LinqLover/symbolic-execution-survey



Additional notes



Documented examples



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Report



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