TCP/IP Attacks

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A public repository containing the files generated and used in this lab can be found on GitHub.

Task 1 - ARP cache poisoning

Related PCAP file is task1_arp_cache_poisoning.pcap

Victim's ARP Table Results

```
root@inside-host:~# arp -n
Address
                        HWtype HWaddress
                                                   Flags Mask
                                                                         Iface
10.0.20.3
                                                                         eth0
                        ether 00:16:3e:ea:12:fc
                                                   С
10.0.20.1
                        ether
                                00:16:3e:d7:0f:f5
                                                                         eth0
root@inside-host:~# ping 10.0.20.1
PING 10.0.20.1 (10.0.20.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.0.20.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.042 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.20.1: icmp_seq=14 ttl=64 time=0.094 ms
--- 10.0.20.1 ping statistics ---
14 packets transmitted, 13 received, 7% packet loss, time 13314ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.041/0.089/0.289/0.064 ms
root@inside-host:~# arp -n
Address
                       HWtype HWaddress
                                                   Flags Mask
                                                                         Iface
10.0.20.3
                       ether 00:16:3e:ea:12:fc C
                                                                         eth0
10.0.20.1
                        ether
                                00:16:3e:ea:12:fc
                                                                         eth0
root@inside-host:~#
```

Here we can clearly see the ARP table having the attackers MAC address set as the HWaddress in their ARP table for the receiver's IP address.

The second arp -n command was run after the second netwox 33 command had been issued, after the continues pinging had ended.

Steps to reproduce

In the inside-host terminal I ran:

- arp -n to print the initial ARP table
- ping 10.20.1 to start pinging the firewall (recipient)

Then, in the attacker terminal I ran netwox 33 --eth-dst ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:-arp-ipsrc 10.0.20.1 --arp-ipdst 10.0.20.2 to send a ARP broadcast request that looks like it comes from firewall 's IP address.

This will make the victim inside-host update its ARP table with the attackers MAC address tied to the IP of firewall.

In the PCAP file this sequence of events can be seen in entry 9 to 14 where for one ping request (before a new ARP request is sent) inside-host sends a ping to the attacker.

Task 2 - ICMP redirect attack

Related PCAP file is task2_ICMP_redirect.pcap

Steps to reproduce

- After redirects are turned on in the inside-host VM I started a ping request to the outside-host
 - ping 10.0.10.2
- I then started the netwox command given in the lab instructions to start sending forged ICMP
 messages whenever packets with the outside-host as destination are sent. These redirect
 messages tells the inside-host that it should route traffic to outside-host via a gateway,
 which is the attacker 's IP.
- The ARP poisoning attack from Task 1 was then run again to cause inside-host to start sending the pings to the attacker
- As can be seen in the PCAP file, this redirect is performed for 9 more pings from inside-host all of which reach the attacker
- An interesting thing from the victim's side is that the pings return as normal although they can se a redirect message in the terminal output. But there is no packet loss.

Task 3 - TCP session hijacking

Related PCAP file is task3_tcp_hijack.pcap

Steps to reproduce

- I started a Wireshark capture to be able to monitor the packets sent between server and client
- Then I started the netcat server on outside-host and then connected a client to it on inside-host
- The messages testing and from_inside were sent to the server via the client
- Using Wireshark I then then looked up the following information: (This information gathering could of course be gathered programmatically if an attacker wished to use this attack)
 - The acknowledgement number sent by the server in response to the client's latest message, this I would use as the sequence number to send in the hijacked message
 - The acknowledgement number used by the client in it's message to the server. This I would use as the acknowledge message later.
 - The TCP Timestamp value and echo reply sent by the servers response to the client's latest message. This I would use to inform the timestamps I use in my hijacking message later.
- To create a message that would hijack the session I formatted the netwox 40 command in the following way:
 - -1 the source IP, in other words the IP of inside-host
 - -m the destination IP, in other words the IP of outside-host
 - -j the IP TTL "Time-to-Live" flag, here I just matched the one used by the client 40 in hex.
 - -o the TCP port used by the client, 55020
 - -p the TCP port we started the server on, 1024
 - -q the TCP sequence number, here I used the ack number used in the server's latest response to the client
 - -r the TCP acknowledgement number, here I used the same ack number sent by the client as it did not seem to change over multiple message.

- -E the TCP window size, here I matched the sized used by the client
- -H the data to send, here I sent the hex equivalent of "test" in ASCII
- In the TCP options to send, here I started with a copy of what the client's latest message sent and only changed to timestamps so that the TimeStamp value was larger than the last one and the TimeStamp echo reply was equal to the Timestamp value sent by the server's latest reply.
- -A/-z using the TCP flags PSH and ACK
- This resulted in the following command being executed in the attacker terminal: netwox 40 -1 10.0.20.2 -m 10.0.10.2 -j 40 -o 55020 -p 1024 -q 2145573434 -r 1329686055 -E 502 -H 746573740a -G 0101080ade0bf16f0417f6bc -A -z
- Sending this message caused the message test to appear on the server and in Wireshark I could see a valid ACK response.
- As can be seen in the PCAP file, any following messages sent from the actual client were not acknowledged due to them now being out of sequence.