Milestone 6

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1 Abstract

This is a replication and extension of "Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries" by Michael Findley, James Piazza, and Joseph Young. This paper analyzes transnational terrorism as a component of interstate rivalries, specifically focusing on the use of terrorism in proxy warfighting. They find that interstate rivalries are a positive predictor of transnational terrorist activity. I find that ... TBD ...

2 Introduction

Findley, Piazza, and Young analyze transnational terrorism as a component of interstate rivalries, specifically focusing on the use of terrorism in proxy warfighting. Their main argument is that terrorist attacks are more likely to occur in the context of a rivalry between two states than in the absence of such a rivalry. They empirically test their hypothesis by analyzing "politically relevant directed state dyads." They define politically relevant as states where "relationships of interest are at least possible" and utilize directed state dyads to indicate directionality of attacks (i.e. the state where the attack originated) in which there exists at least one major power.

The authors include both contiguous states and noncontiguous states in their analysis, which departs from traditional international conflict analysis which prefers to limit observations to contiguous states as a metric for possible occurrence of conflict. This is important because terrorist attacks can be planned and executed in states that have a rivalry but no physical land, sea, or colonial border.

This use of politically relevant and directed dyads allows the authors to incorporate covariates (rivalry, joint democracy, contiguity, and capability ratio) as controls, as well as practice good statistical practices by discounting irrelevant dyads that would increase the number of observations, thus increasing the likelihood of spurious statistical significance.¹²

¹Findley, Piazza, and Young (2012)

²All analysis for this paper is available in my GitHub: https://github.com/LizMas/ms_5


3 Literature Review

Forthcoming

4 Graphic?

Terrorism Events and Interstate Rivalry

Terrorist attacks occur more frequently in the presence of an interstate rivalry



Source: Games Rivals Play, Findley et al

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## [1] M. G. Findley, J. A. Piazza, and J. K. Young. "Games rivals play:
## Terrorism in international rivalries". In: _The Journal of Politics_
## 74.1 (2012), pp. 235-248.
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5 Appendix

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu % Date and time: Tue, Apr 14, 2020 - 10:38:47 PM

Table 1: Reproduction Attempt at Poisson Models of Transnational Terrorist Activity per Findley et al

| | Dependent variable: | | | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|--|
| | terrorCounts | terrorCounts2 | terrorCounts | terrorCounts2 | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| rivalry | 2.127*** | 1.564*** | 1.555*** | 0.891*** | |
| | (0.068) | (0.051) | (0.071) | (0.050) | |
| m joint Dem 1 | 1.071*** | 1.316*** | 0.919*** | 0.146*** | |
| | (0.063) | (0.036) | (0.067) | (0.040) | |
| logcapratio | -0.088*** | -0.409^{***} | -0.413*** | -0.669*** | |
| | (0.021) | (0.012) | (0.026) | (0.021) | |
| historyl1 | | | 0.417*** | 0.805*** | |
| | | | (0.020) | (0.016) | |
| historyl2 | | | | 0.747*** | |
| | | | | (0.018) | |
| coldwar1 | | | -1.115*** | -0.428^{***} | |
| | | | (0.075) | (0.041) | |
| conflict1 | | | 0.813*** | 0.268*** | |
| | | | (0.085) | (0.067) | |
| conflict2 | | | 0.153 | 0.632*** | |
| | | | (0.109) | (0.049) | |
| contiguity | 0.627*** | -0.243*** | 1.186*** | 0.894*** | |
| Ų į | (0.066) | (0.047) | (0.068) | (0.047) | |
| war1 | | | 1.191*** | 1.001*** | |
| | | | (0.062) | (0.038) | |
| war2 | | | -0.252*** | -0.735*** | |
| | | | (0.072) | (0.051) | |
| Constant | -5.046*** | -3.820*** | -5.595*** | -5.990*** | |
| | (0.054) | (0.033) | (0.071) | (0.066) | |
| Observations | 65,538 | 65,538 | 65,538 | 65,538 | |
| Log Likelihood | -6,192.602 | $-14,\!329.580$ | -5,355.860 | -9,493.258 | |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 12,395.200 | 28,669.160 | 10,733.720 | 19,010.510 | |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 1 Negative Binomial Models of Transnational Terrorist Attacks using Dyads 1968-2002

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| VARIABLES | Terror Counts 1 | Terror Counts 2 | Terror Counts 1 | Terror Counts 2 |
| Rivalry (KGD) | 1.287*** (0.259) | 1.420*** (0.198) | 0.793*** (0.248) | 0.903*** (0.166) |
| Joint Democracy | 1.115*** (0.202) | 1.063*** (0.133) | -0.175 (0.256) | -0.204 (0.134) |
| Log(Capability Ratio) | -0.054 (0.043) | -0.258*** (0.022) | 0.0827 (0.110) | -0.588*** (0.056) |
| Past Terror (Origin) | | | 0.441*** (0.077) | 0.749*** (0.041) |
| Past Terror (Target) | | | 0.774*** (0.088) | 0.637*** (0.042) |
| Cold War | | | -0.426*** (0.140) | -0.074 (0.100) |
| Interstate War (Origin) | | | 0.410** (0.168) | 0.296** (0.130) |
| Interstate War (Target) | | | -0.262 (0.168) | 0.250*** (0.094) |
| Contiguity | 0.886*** (0.260) | 0.004 (0.174) | 1.652*** (0.257) | 0.836*** (0.152) |
| Civil War (Origin) | | | 0.692*** (0.224) | 0.621*** (0.130) |
| Civil War (Target) | | | -0.229 (0.205) | -0.408*** (0.125) |
| Constant | -4.701*** (0.219) | -3.544*** (0.109) | -5.845*** (0.246) | -5.137*** (0.141) |
| Observations | 55,662 | 55,662 | 39,756 | 39,756 |

In Models 1 and 3: origin country = nationality of the terrorists; target country = location where event occurred. In Models 2 and 4, target country = nationality of the victims. KGD = Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) rivalry. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on dyad; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

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Table 2 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Models of Transnational Terrorist Attacks Using Dyads 1968–2002

| | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| VARIABLES | Terror Counts 1 | Terror Counts 2 | Terror Counts 1 | Terror Counts 2 |
| Rivalry (KGD) | 1.753*** (0.625) | 0.568** (0.251) | 1.538*** (0.429) | 1.003*** (0.241) |
| Joint Democracy | -0.749*** (0.278) | 0.155 (0.160) | -0.865** (0.380) | -0.186 (0.200) |
| Log(Capability Ratio) | 0.862*** (0.209) | -0.834*** (0.112) | 0.163 (0.118) | -0.627*** (0.0805) |
| Past Terror (Origin) | 0.519*** (0.152) | 0.524*** (0.111) | 0.494*** (0.0835) | 0.854*** (0.0599) |
| Past Terror (Target) | 0.711*** (0.169) | 0.662*** (0.087) | 1.057*** (0.0912) | 0.771*** (0.058) |
| Cold War | -0.738*** (0.276) | -0.265 (0.203) | -1.002*** (0.194) | -0.174 (0.158) |
| Interstate War (Origin) | -0.284 (0.358) | 0.299 (0.215) | -0.0219 (0.236) | 0.247 (0.161) |
| Interstate War (Target) | 0.462 (0.439) | 0.197 (0.153) | -0.105 (0.254) | 0.264** (0.106) |
| Contiguity | -0.186 (0.535) | 1.651*** (0.281) | 1.928*** (0.247) | 1.230*** (0.197) |
| Civil War (Origin) | 0.340 (0.323) | 0.0578 (0.199) | 0.744*** (0.231) | 0.646*** (0.141) |
| Civil War (Target) | -0.782** (0.371) | -0.510*** (0.176) | -0.696** (0.286) | -0.649*** (0.149) |
| Constant | -3.898*** (0.779) | -4.688*** (0.438) | -6.053*** (0.412) | -5.771*** (0.185) |
| Inflate | Terror Present | Terror Present | Terror Present | Terror Present |
| Rivalry (KGD) | 0.795 (1.259) | -1.168** (0.463) | | |
| Joint Democracy | -0.542 (0.401) | 1.073*** (0.357) | -14.500*** (1.102) | 13.64*** (2.655) |
| Log(Capability Ratio) | 1.035** (0.410) | -0.756** (0.316) | | |
| Past Terror (Origin) | -0.153 (0.307) | -0.866*** (0.133) | | |
| Past Terror (Target) | -0.714** (0.289) | -0.240 (0.185) | | |
| Cold War | 0.332 (0.644) | -0.212 (0.431) | | |
| Interstate War (Origin) | -0.829 (0.561) | -0.158 (0.553) | | |
| Interstate War (Target) | 1.347* (0.720) | -0.219 (0.290) | | |
| Contiguity | -4.373*** (1.430) | 1.739** (0.750) | | |
| Civil War (Origin) | -0.442 (0.560) | -2.319*** (0.885) | | |
| Civil War (Target) | -0.378 (0.605) | 0.483 (0.385) | | |
| Constant | 2.955** (1.267) | -0.217 (1.102) | -0.491 (0.868) | -16.21*** (0.271) |
| Observations | 39,756 | 39,756 | 39,756 | 39,756 |

In Models 5 and 7: origin country = nationality of the terrorists; target country = location where event occurred. In Models 6 and 8, target country = nationality of the victims. KGD = Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) rivalry. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on dyad; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

References

Findley, Michael G, James A Piazza, and Joseph K Young. 2012. "Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries." *The Journal of Politics* 74 (1): 235–48.