

Milestone 6

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I am planning to replicate a paper by Michael Findley, James Piazza, and Joseph Young titled “Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries,” appearing in *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 2012, Pp. 235-248. This paper analyzes transnational terrorism as a component of interstate rivalries, specifically focusing on the use of terrorism in proxy warfighting.

Their main argument is that interstate rivalries are a positive predictor of transnational terrorist activity. In other words, terrorist attacks are more likely to occur in the context of a rivalry between two states than in the absence of such a rivalry. They empirically test their hypothesis by analyzing “politically relevant directed state dyads,” meaning that they focus on country-level factors in states that sponsor terrorism as well as target states, while ignoring the states that are unlikely to interact at all in the international system. This use of politically relevant dyads allows the authors to incorporate covariates (rivalry, joint democracy, contiguity, and capability ratio) as controls, as well as practice good statistical practices by discounting irrelevant dyads that would increase the number of observations, thus increasing the likelihood of spurious statistical significance.¹²


My thanks go to Professor Erica Chenoweth for suggesting this paper.

¹Findley, Piazza, and Young (2012)

²All analysis for this paper is available in my GitHub: https://github.com/LizMas/ms_5

Terrorism Events and Interstate Rivalry

Terrorist attacks occur more frequently in the presence of an interstate rivalry



Source: Games Rivals Play, Findley et al

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## [1] M. G. Findley, J. A. Piazza, and J. K. Young. "Games rivals play:  
## Terrorism in international rivalries". In: _The Journal of Politics_  
## 74.1 (2012), pp. 235-248.
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1 Appendix

```
% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu  
% Date and time: Sat, Apr 04, 2020 - 8:03:44 PM
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## 1 PNG      1020     544 sRGB        FALSE   227722 57x57
```

Table 1: Reproduction Attempt at Poisson Models of Transnational Terrorist Activity per Findley et al

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	terrorCounts	terrorCounts2	terrorCounts	terrorCounts2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
rivalry	2.127*** (0.068)	1.564*** (0.051)	1.555*** (0.071)	0.891*** (0.050)
jointDem1	1.071*** (0.063)	1.316*** (0.036)	0.919*** (0.067)	0.146*** (0.040)
logcapratio	-0.088*** (0.021)	-0.409*** (0.012)	-0.413*** (0.026)	-0.669*** (0.021)
historyl1			0.417*** (0.020)	0.805*** (0.016)
historyl2				0.747*** (0.018)
coldwar1			-1.115*** (0.075)	-0.428*** (0.041)
conflict1			0.813*** (0.085)	0.268*** (0.067)
conflict2			0.153 (0.109)	0.632*** (0.049)
contiguity	0.627*** (0.066)	-0.243*** (0.047)	1.186*** (0.068)	0.894*** (0.047)
war1			1.191*** (0.062)	1.001*** (0.038)
war2			-0.252*** (0.072)	-0.735*** (0.051)
Constant	-5.046*** (0.054)	-3.820*** (0.033)	-5.595*** (0.071)	-5.990*** (0.066)
Observations	65,538	65,538	65,538	65,538
Log Likelihood	-6,192.602	-14,329.580	-5,355.860	-9,493.258
Akaike Inf. Crit.	12,395.200	28,669.160	10,733.720	19,010.510
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

TABLE 1 Negative Binomial Models of Transnational Terrorist Attacks using Dyads 1968–2002

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Terror Counts 1	Terror Counts 2	Terror Counts 1	Terror Counts 2
Rivalry (KGD)	1.287*** (0.259)	1.420*** (0.198)	0.793*** (0.248)	0.903*** (0.166)
Joint Democracy	1.115*** (0.202)	1.063*** (0.133)	-0.175 (0.256)	-0.204 (0.134)
Log(Capability Ratio)	-0.054 (0.043)	-0.258*** (0.022)	0.0827 (0.110)	-0.588*** (0.056)
Past Terror (Origin)			0.441*** (0.077)	0.749*** (0.041)
Past Terror (Target)			0.774*** (0.088)	0.637*** (0.042)
Cold War			-0.426*** (0.140)	-0.074 (0.100)
Interstate War (Origin)			0.410** (0.168)	0.296** (0.130)
Interstate War (Target)			-0.262 (0.168)	0.250*** (0.094)
Contiguity	0.886*** (0.260)	0.004 (0.174)	1.652*** (0.257)	0.836*** (0.152)
Civil War (Origin)			0.692*** (0.224)	0.621*** (0.130)
Civil War (Target)			-0.229 (0.205)	-0.408*** (0.125)
Constant	-4.701*** (0.219)	-3.544*** (0.109)	-5.845*** (0.246)	-5.137*** (0.141)
Observations	55,662	55,662	39,756	39,756

In Models 1 and 3: origin country = nationality of the terrorists; target country = location where event occurred. In Models 2 and 4, target country = nationality of the victims. KGD = Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) rivalry. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on dyad; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

% Error: Unrecognized object type.

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## # A tibble: 1 x 7
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```

TABLE 2 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Models of Transnational Terrorist Attacks Using Dyads 1968–2002

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
VARIABLES	Terror Counts 1	Terror Counts 2	Terror Counts 1	Terror Counts 2
Rivalry (KGD)	1.753*** (0.625)	0.568** (0.251)	1.538*** (0.429)	1.003*** (0.241)
Joint Democracy	-0.749*** (0.278)	0.155 (0.160)	-0.865** (0.380)	-0.186 (0.200)
Log(Capability Ratio)	0.862*** (0.209)	-0.834*** (0.112)	0.163 (0.118)	-0.627*** (0.0805)
Past Terror (Origin)	0.519*** (0.152)	0.524*** (0.111)	0.494*** (0.0835)	0.854*** (0.0599)
Past Terror (Target)	0.711*** (0.169)	0.662*** (0.087)	1.057*** (0.0912)	0.771*** (0.058)
Cold War	-0.738*** (0.276)	-0.265 (0.203)	-1.002*** (0.194)	-0.174 (0.158)
Interstate War (Origin)	-0.284 (0.358)	0.299 (0.215)	-0.0219 (0.236)	0.247 (0.161)
Interstate War (Target)	0.462 (0.439)	0.197 (0.153)	-0.105 (0.254)	0.264** (0.106)
Contiguity	-0.186 (0.535)	1.651*** (0.281)	1.928*** (0.247)	1.230*** (0.197)
Civil War (Origin)	0.340 (0.323)	0.0578 (0.199)	0.744*** (0.231)	0.646*** (0.141)
Civil War (Target)	-0.782** (0.371)	-0.510*** (0.176)	-0.696** (0.286)	-0.649*** (0.149)
Constant	-3.898*** (0.779)	-4.688*** (0.438)	-6.053*** (0.412)	-5.771*** (0.185)
Inflate	Terror Present	Terror Present	Terror Present	Terror Present
Rivalry (KGD)	0.795 (1.259)	-1.168** (0.463)		
Joint Democracy	-0.542 (0.401)	1.073*** (0.357)	-14.500*** (1.102)	13.64*** (2.655)
Log(Capability Ratio)	1.035** (0.410)	-0.756** (0.316)		
Past Terror (Origin)	-0.153 (0.307)	-0.866*** (0.133)		
Past Terror (Target)	-0.714** (0.289)	-0.240 (0.185)		
Cold War	0.332 (0.644)	-0.212 (0.431)		
Interstate War (Origin)	-0.829 (0.561)	-0.158 (0.553)		
Interstate War (Target)	1.347* (0.720)	-0.219 (0.290)		
Contiguity	-4.373*** (1.430)	1.739** (0.750)		
Civil War (Origin)	-0.442 (0.560)	-2.319*** (0.885)		
Civil War (Target)	-0.378 (0.605)	0.483 (0.385)		
Constant	2.955** (1.267)	-0.217 (1.102)	-0.491 (0.868)	-16.21*** (0.271)
Observations	39,756	39,756	39,756	39,756

In Models 5 and 7: origin country = nationality of the terrorists; target country = location where event occurred. In Models 6 and 8, target country = nationality of the victims. KGD = Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) rivalry. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on dyad; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

References

Findley, Michael G, James A Piazza, and Joseph K Young. 2012. “Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries.” *The Journal of Politics* 74 (1): 235–48.