Milestone 5

Liz Masten 3/29/2020

Contents

I am planning to replicate a paper by Michael Findley, James Piazza, and Joseph Young titled "Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries," appearing in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 2012, Pp. 235-248. This paper analyzes transnational terrorism as a component of interstate rivalries, specifically focusing on the use of terrorism in proxy warfighting.

Games Rival's Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries Michael Findley, James Piazza, and Joseph Young argue in their paper Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries that interstate rivalries are a positive predictor of transnational terrorist activity. In other words, terrorist attacks are more likely to occur in the context of a rivalry between two states than in the absence of such a rivalry. They empirically test their hypothesis by analyzing "politically relevant directed state dyads," meaning that they focus on country-level factors in states that sponsor terrorism as well as target states, while ignoring the states that are unlikely to interact at all in the international system. This use of politically relevant dyads allows the authors to incorporate covariates (rivalry, joint democracy, contiguity, and capability ratio) as controls, as well as practice good statistical practices by discounting irrelevant dyads that would increase the number of observations, thus increasing the likelihood of spurious statistical significance.¹

My thanks go to Professor Erica Chennoweth for suggesting this paper.

Terror Attacks per Year

year	events
1990	39
1991	39
1992	32
1993	89
1994	36
1995	57
1996	38
1997	14
1998	5
1999	22
2000	27
2001	13
2002	15

¹All analysis for this paper is available in my GitHub: https://github.com/LizMas/ms_5

	$Dependent\ variable:$
	rivalry
terrorCounts	0.045***
	(0.002)
Constant	0.075***
	(0.001)
Observations	80,564
Log Likelihood	-7,263.833
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,531.670
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01