


Tag generation:  $t = \text{Mac}(k, m)$   
 Tag verification:  $\text{Vrfy}(k, m, t) = 1$  for a valid tag, 0 otherwise  
**Correctness:**  $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, k \in \mathcal{K} \text{ Vrfy}(k, m, \text{Mac}(k, m)) = 1$




No. of keys

for  $N$  bi-directional  
communicating parties

Each:  $N-1 [k]$

Total:  $N(N-1)/2 [k]$

## Unforgeability



$\text{Mac}^{\text{forge}}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}(n) = 1$  if  $\text{Vrfy}(k, m, t) = 1$  and 0 otherwise


$\pi = (\text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy})$  is **existentially unforgeable** under an adaptive chosen message attack if  $\forall \mathcal{A}$  PPT,  $\exists \epsilon(n)$  negligible such that

$$\Pr[\text{Mac}^{\text{forge}}_{\mathcal{A}, \pi}(n) = 1] \leq \epsilon(n)$$

## Terminology

$k$ : symmetric key     $t$ : tag     $\text{Mac}$ : tag generation algorithm  
 $m$ : plaintext                       $\text{Vrfy}$ : tag verification algorithm

\* *Message Integrity Codes (MIC)*



**Integrity**