# **Project 3 Report**

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## **GitHub Repository**

Link: https://github.com/LokZhang-edu/dl\_proj3.git

#### **Team Members**

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### **Project Overview**

This project explores the design and impact of adversarial attacks on image classification using ResNet-34. We implement and evaluate three attack strategies: FGSM, I-FGSM, and patch-based attacks. The resulting adversarial datasets are tested both on the original model and on a transfer model (DenseNet-121) to analyze transferability of adversarial examples. Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy scores are reported alongside L norms and attack visualizations.

## Methodology

**Model and Dataset:** We use a pretrained ResNet-34 model from PyTorch's torchvision, evaluated on a 100-class subset of ImageNet. Images are normalized with standard ImageNet mean and std, and labels are mapped to ImageNet indices 401–500.

#### **Attacks Implemented:**

- FGSM(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015): Single-step sign gradient update with  $\epsilon=0.02$ .
- I-FGSM(Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017): An iterative extension of FGSM using multiple steps of signed gradient updates. We use  $\epsilon=0.02,\,\alpha=0.002,$  and 10 steps.).
- Patch Attack with Momentum (Localized MI-FGSM(Dong et al. 2018)): To improve the effectiveness of patch attacks, we implemented a variant of Momentum Iterative FGSM (MI-FGSM) adapted to a spatially localized patch. During each iteration, the signed gradient is normalized using L1 norm and combined with accumulated momentum before being applied to a randomly chosen  $32 \times 32$  patch in the input image. The accumulated gradient  $g_t$  is updated as:

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```
def fgsm_attack_1(image, label, model, epsilon, min_val=0, max_val=1):

Perform FGSM attack on the input image.

Args:

image: input image (tensor)
label: true label (tensor)

model: target model

epsilon: attack strength

min_val: minimum pixel value

Returns:

adversarial image (tensor)

original_image = image.clone().detach()
image = original_image.clone().detach().requires_grad_(True)

outputs = model(image)
loss = rm.CrossEntropyLoss()(outputs, label)

model.zero_grad()
loss.backward()

grad = image.grad.data
adv_image = image.grad.data
adv_image = torch.clamp(adv_image, min_val, max_val).detach()

return adv_image
```

Figure 1: Code for FGSM

$$g_t = \mu \cdot g_{t-1} + \frac{\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(f(x), y)}{\|\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(f(x), y)\|_1}$$
(1)

Where  $\mu$  is the momentum factor (set to 0.9), and the final perturbation is confined to a square patch at a random location. This approach enhances attack strength while maintaining spatial locality. We set  $\epsilon=0.5$  and use 20 steps.

**Evaluation:** For each adversarial version of the test set, we:

- 1. Evaluate ResNet-34 on Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy
- 2. Save adversarial images in structured folders
- Transfer adversarial samples to DenseNet-121 and measure accuracy drop

**Visualization:** We visualize attack success cases where the original image is classified correctly but the adversarial one is not, and show the noise heatmap and predictions.

```
def iterative_frem(model, image, label, epsilon=0.02, alpha=0.002, steps=10):
    fl adv = image.clome().detach().to(device)
    fl adv.requires_grad = True
    image = image.to(torch.float32)
    original_image = image.clome().detach()
    adv = original_image.clome().detach().requires_grad_(True)

for _ in range(steps):
    outputs = model(adv)
    loss = rm.CroseEntropyLoss()(outputs, label)
    model.sero_grad()
    loss.backward()
    with torch.no_grad():
        sdv = adv + alpha * adv.grad.sign()
        perturbation = torch.clamp(sdv - image, min=-epsilon, max=epsilon)
        adv = corch.clamp(image * perturbation, 0, 1).detach_()
        return adv
```

Figure 2: **I-FGSM:** An iterative extension of FGSM using multiple steps of signed gradient updates. We use  $\epsilon=0.02$ ,  $\alpha=0.004$ , and 10 steps.

Figure 3: Adversarial image generated using Patch-MI-FGSM attack. A  $32 \times 32$  localized patch was perturbed over 20 iterative steps using momentum accumulation ( $\mu=0.9$ ) with  $\epsilon=0.5$ . The perturbation is targeted toward ImageNet class 401. The adversarial patch remains visually subtle but successfully fools the classifier.

#### **Results**

#### Model Accuracy on ResNet-34:

- Original: Top-1 = 76.00%, Top-5 = 94.20%
- FGSM: Top-1 = 26.40%, Top-5 = 50.60%
- I-FGSM: Top-1 = 0.80%, Top-5 = 9.40%
- Patch: Top-1 = 75.40%, Top-5 = 94.20%

#### Transfer Accuracy on DenseNet-121:

- Original: Top-1 = 74.60%, Top-5 = 93.60%
- FGSM: Top-1 = 38.20%, Top-5 = 60.80%
- I-FGSM: Top-1 = 38.80%, Top-5 = 59.40%
- Patch: Top-1 = 73.60%, Top-5 = 93.00%

## **Architectural Choices and Tradeoffs**

- FGSM is fast but weak: High efficiency but limited perturbation capability.
- I-FGSM is stronger: Iterative attack yields more fooling samples at cost of more compute.




Figure 4: Visualization of FGSM




Figure 5: Visualization of iterative FGSM

- Patch attacks are localized: Visually stealthy but require careful tuning of patch size and location.
- **Transferability is attack-dependent:** FGSM and I-FGSM examples transfer better than patch.

#### **Lessons Learned**

- Attack strength can vary drastically even with same  $\epsilon$  bound.
- Transferability depends on both model similarity and attack diversity.
- Visualizing perturbations is key to validating correctness.
- Directory structure must be preserved for ImageFolder evaluation to be reliable.

#### Conclusion

We implemented and compared three adversarial attack methods on ResNet-34. I-FGSM performed the strongest in degrading model performance, and transfer attacks worked well against DenseNet-121. Patch attacks showed lower transferability but maintained strong local perturbations. This project demonstrates the practical implications of adversarial robustness and highlights the importance of evaluating both direct and transferred threats.

# References

Dong, Y.; Liao, F.; Pang, T.; Su, H.; Zhu, J.; Hu, X.; and Li, J. 2018. Boosting Adversarial Attacks with Momentum. arXiv:1710.06081.

Goodfellow, I. J.; Shlens, J.; and Szegedy, C. 2015. Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples. arXiv:1412.6572.

Kurakin, A.; Goodfellow, I.; and Bengio, S. 2017. Adversarial examples in the physical world. arXiv:1607.02533.