

# Evidential Weight and the Expected Value of Knowledge

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## 1 Introduction

While Keynes was not the first person to discuss the weight of evidence, Keynes' exposition of the idea in his *Treatise on Probability* is perhaps the most referenced source in the topic.<sup>1</sup> While he seems rather ambivalent about the importance of evidential weight, saying that he finds it “somewhat novel” but is “uncertain as to how much importance to attach to it,” he has made many important contributions to ways in which evidential weight can be conceptualized.

This chapter examine two conceptions of weight in Keynes' *Treatise*. The first is Keynes' official position that the weight of evidence is the *absolute amount* of relevance evidence. The second is an expected utility based notion that is extrapolated from an exchange between Keynes and Ramsey about a puzzle on the rationality of evidence gathering noted by Keynes. My contention is that neither sufficiently captures the

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<sup>1</sup>The first person who noted it was Peirce, whose view shall be the main focus of chapter 3.

notion of weight, but, far from being mutually exclusive, they should be seen as complementary explications of evidential weight.

## 2 Weight as the Absolute Amount of Evidence

### 2.1 Keynes' view in *A Treatise in Probability*

Let us begin, however, with a brief overview of the account of probability provided in the *Treatise*. According to Keynes, probability is a logical relation between two propositions. This relation is *logical* in the literal sense, because Keynes sees it as the same relation as the entailment relation between premises and conclusion in a deductive argument, only differing in degrees. Keynes says:

Inasmuch as it is always assumed that we can sometimes judge directly that a conclusion follows from a premiss, it is no great extension of this assumption to suppose that we can sometimes recognise that a conclusion partially follows from, or stands in a relation of probability to, a premiss.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, in a derivation in deductive logic, the set of premises fully entails its conclusion. In probabilistic reasoning, the set of premises *partially* entail its conclusion, so in this view a probability is conceived as the degree of a partial entailment.<sup>3</sup>

Keynes' interpretation has the advantage of providing a direct explanation on why probability is *normative*: we *should* reason in accordance to the axioms of probability for the same reason that we should respect a deductive rule like *modus ponens*: the

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<sup>2</sup>John Maynard Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability* (Macmillan; Co., Limited., 1921), 57.

<sup>3</sup>Keynes, 30.

degrees of a person's partial belief should correspond to the degree to which the premises render the conclusion probable, whereas in a deductive proof, one has to accept the conclusion as necessarily true, were the premises true.<sup>4</sup>

Since probability is a logical relation between propositions, it shares with the classical view of probability, i.e., Frequentism, that probability is *objective*. However, on Keynes' view, probability can only be known to us through intuition and perception. Keynes asserts that we find Darwin's theory probable not because it somehow appeals to our subjective sensibility, but that

there is some real objective relation between Darwin's evidence and his conclusions, which is independent of the mere fact of our belief, and which is just as real and objective, though of a different degree, as that which would exist if the argument were as demonstrative as a syllogism.<sup>5</sup>

The epistemology behind the *Treatise* is rooted in the views of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. In particular, Keynes accepts Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description.<sup>6</sup> Knowledge by acquaintance, a cornerstone of British empiricism, refers to knowledge that can only be acquired through direct perception, such as the qualitative experience of seeing yellow. So, as far as epistemology goes, Keynes in the *Treatise* is an orthodox empiricist in the British tradition. He, for instance, accepts that thesis of logical atomism that there are basic logical

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<sup>4</sup>There is a technical consequence for this. If probability is a relation, it follows that it never makes sense to talk about the probability of an event without in relation to any other proposition, so for Keynes all probabilities are conditional probabilities. Sometimes I will write  $P(H)$ . In the Keynesian context, it should be interpreted as the probability of H conditional on some background knowledge  $K$

<sup>5</sup>Keynes, 5.

<sup>6</sup>Keynes, 11.

atoms knowable only through the senses:

In all knowledge, therefore, there is some direct element; and logic can never be made purely mechanical. All it can do is so to arrange the reasoning that the logical relations, which have to be perceived directly, are made explicit and are of a simple kind.<sup>7</sup>

However, while these logical relations are basic perceptible elements, Keynes does not think all probability relations are knowable. In this aspect, Keynes disagrees with the followers of Laplace, such as De Morgan, and many modern Bayesians that all probabilities can be given a determinate value.<sup>8</sup> Keynes maintains there are some probabilities that can only be vaguely known, some probability can only be measured by comparing to another, and some probabilities are neither measurable nor comparable.

The identification of probability as perceptible relation has introduced an element of subjectivity, and Keynes admits just as much.<sup>9</sup> This is further complicated by Keynes' suggestion that some probability relation more precisely perceived than others. How ought we to, for instance, resolve disagreements when two people claim to perceive the same relation differently? Keynes concedes that "some may have a greater power of logical intuition than others."<sup>10</sup> So some people just happen to be able to perceive logical relations more clearly.

It is then almost ironic that Keynes's claim is directly contradicted by Frank Ramsey, a prodigy in both logic and mathematics:

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<sup>7</sup>Keynes, 14.

<sup>8</sup>Keynes, ch. 3 sec. 2-6.

<sup>9</sup>Keynes, ch.2 sec. 11.

<sup>10</sup>Keynes, 17.

...there really do not seem to be any such things as the probability relations [Keynes] describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain cases, they can be perceived; but speaking for myself I feel confident that this is not true. I do not perceive them, and if I am to be persuaded that they exist it must be by argument; moreover I shrewdly suspect that others do not perceive them either, because they are able to come to so very little agreement as to which of them relates any two given propositions.<sup>11</sup>

In response, Ramsey sketches out a framework for a subjective interpretation of probability, in his groundbreaking paper “Truth and Probability”. We will return to the Keynes-Ramsey connection in the second half of this chapter. It is worth pointing out some major differences between their views. First, Ramsey rejects Keynes’ Russellian empiricism and the appeal to intuitable probability relations; instead, Ramsey draws from C.S. Peirce’s pragmatism and argues for an operationalized and behavioral account of subjective probability. Second, to explicate the equality relation between probability, Ramsey abandons the use of the principle of indifference altogether. Instead, he proposes a procedure to elicit probability assignments based on the agent’s betting behavior. Third, Ramsey rejects Keynes’ commitment that not all probabilities are knowable. Instead, he adopts what comes to be the dominant Bayesian position that all probabilities can be given a precise numeric values.

From a Bayesian perspective, no doubt Ramsey emerges as the victor of the debate. This is bolstered by Keynes’ obituary of Ramsey, in which he states:

Ramsey argues, as against the view which I had put forward, that proba-

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<sup>11</sup>Frank P. Ramsey, *Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 57.

bility is concerned not with objective relations between propositions but (in some sense) with degrees of belief. . . the basis of our degrees of belief - or the a priori probabilities, as they used to be called-is part of our human outfit, perhaps given us merely by natural selection, analogous to our perceptions and our memories rather than to formal logic. So far I yield to Ramsey - I think he is right.<sup>12</sup>

This often cited quote is usually interpreted as a fact that Keynes has given up wholesale on his view, but this is not quite true. Within context, Keynes makes it quite clear that he was only conceding that the appeal to Russellian epistemology was a mistake, and that Ramsey's Peircean approach was a sounder methodology, but he does not think the *rationality* of degrees of belief can be justified pragmatically. Furthermore, some interpreters have suggested that Keynes' *Treatise* still provides a viable interpretation of probability, as long as we ignore the first two chapters on epistemology.<sup>13</sup> Some philosophers, such as Henry Kyburg, has defended and extended the logical interpretation of probability by combining the insights of both Carnap and Keynes.<sup>14</sup>

## 2.2 The Principle of Indifference

Even in the *Treatise*, Keynes recognizes the gap left open by the appeal to intuition. One problem for him is to find a principled way with which we can determine if our perception of certain probability relations are really genuine furniture of the logical

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<sup>12</sup>John Maynard Keynes, *Essays in Biography* (Macmillan; Co., Limited., 1933), 301.

<sup>13</sup>Jochen Runde, "Keynes After Ramsey: In Defence of a Treatise on Probability," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 25, no. 1 (1994): 97-121.

<sup>14</sup>Henry Kyburg, *The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference* (Reidel, 1974).

space. Keynes' general strategy is to first appeal to our intuition about some basic properties of probabilities. He then informally argues for some conditions under which these properties are genuine, and finally these informal conditions and principles are given a formal treatment in the second part of the *Treatise*, in which he develops the fundamental theorems.

Perhaps the most important relation is *judgments of indifference* between two propositions. The relation of indifference has its root in Laplace's "Principle of Non-Sufficient Reason":

When the probability of a simple event is unknown, one may suppose that it is equally likely to take on any value from zero to one. . . the probability of each of these hypotheses, given the observed event, is a fraction whose numerator is the probability of the event under this hypothesis, and whose denominator is the sum of similar probabilities under each of the hypotheses.<sup>15</sup>

In other words, when we are in complete ignorance regarding the event, the probability of each possible outcome is:

$$\frac{1}{\# \text{ of total possible hypotheses}}$$

Laplace's rule was harshly criticized on many grounds. One is the charge that it leads to absurdity, which tends to arise when the space of possible hypotheses is not clearly delineated. Peirce, for instance, asks us to suppose that there are inhabitants

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<sup>15</sup>Pierre-Simon Laplace, *Philosophical Essay on Probabilities* (Spring, 1995), 20.

on Saturn but we have no idea what color of hair they have.<sup>16</sup> Since we are in total ignorance about whether or not their hair color is red, the principle says that the probability of their hair being red is  $1/2$ . This would also go for the probabilities of their hair being blue, green, yellow, etc. Assuming they can only have one hair color, this means that these are mutually exclusive events, but since they are all  $1/2$ , the sum of all of these probabilities would be more than 1, which violates the axioms of probability.

When Keynes wrote *A Treatise on Probability* many years after Laplace, he was keenly aware of these paradoxical results. However, he thinks that the paradoxes only suggest that the principle is to be restricted, not abandoned altogether. He argues that (what he now calls) the Principle of Indifference should not be used when the alternatives under consideration can be further analyzed, or, using his term, “divisible”. Once all the alternatives are *indivisible*, each of them should be assigned the probability of  $1/n$ , where  $n$  is the number of alternatives.<sup>17</sup> Only when the conditions for the proper application of the Principle of Indifference is satisfied, our judgment of indifference is *justified*. So in this thought experiment, if one intuitively feels that the probability of the inhabitant having red hair is  $1/2$ , she is not seeing the logical relation clearly, as demonstrated by the clearly defined Principle of Indifference.

Thus, the use of the principle in Peirce’s example is not legitimate, because the probabilities should be equally divided among all possible colors  $1/n$ , where  $n$  is number of possible colors, not  $1/2$ . In this case of their hair color being red or not, being not-red is decomposed into being blue, being yellow, etc., the application of

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<sup>16</sup>Charles S. Peirce, “The Probability of Induction,” in *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 3: 1872–1878* (Indiana University Press, 1966), 296.

<sup>17</sup>Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability*, 60.



the rule is illegitimate in Peirce’s example. However, the indivisibility requirement rules out the use of the principle of indifference in continuous cases. As Keynes himself recognizes, the indivisibility requirement “is fatal to the practical utility of the Principle of Indifference” when there is no *ultimate* alternatives could be found, which is the case with continuous distributions.<sup>18</sup>

## 2.3 Keynes on Relevance and Weight

In any case, more pertinent to the notion of evidential weight is the *judgment of irrelevance* and *relevance*. Keynes’ observation is that we often can judge whether one proposition  $E$  counts as being relevant to another proposition  $H$  by considering whether the probability of  $H$  would change on the supposition that  $E$  is true. Keynes’s example is that, in a typical urn example with some black and white balls, if we want to know the probability of a white ball being randomly chosen, the *color* of the ball would not change its probability of being chosen, so the idea is that a ball’s probability of being chosen conditional on being (say) white is the same as the probability of the ball being chosen in general.<sup>19</sup> So, Keynes proposes that evidence  $E$  is irrelevant to the proposition  $H$  if and only if:

$$P(H|E) \neq P(H)$$

Now that the notion of relevance has been introduced, we come to Keynes’ idea of the weight of evidence. Keynes is troubled by the fact that the degree of a probability

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<sup>18</sup>Keynes, 68.

<sup>19</sup>Keynes, 59.

does not scale straightforwardly with the amount of the evidence we have at hand. In a well-known passage, Keynes says:

As the relevant evidence at our disposal increases, the magnitude of the probability of the argument may either decrease or increase, according as the new knowledge strengthens the unfavourable or the favourable evidence; but something seems to have increased in either case,—we have a more substantial basis upon which to rest our conclusion. I express this by saying that an accession of new evidence increases the weight of an argument. New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of an argument, but it will always increase its ‘weight.’

The crucial idea here is the weight of evidence is closely tied to the *absolute amount* of evidence and is conceptual distinct from the “magnitude” of a probability. Keynes explains this as the distinction between the *balance* and the *weight* of evidence: he first brings our attention to the fact that when we consider the conditional probability of the hypothesis in question under all relevant evidence, the resultant number constitutes the *balance* between favorable and unfavorable evidence.<sup>20</sup> For instance, we may say that when the conditional probability  $P(H|E) > 0.5$ , then evidence  $E$  is somewhat in favor of the hypothesis. Of course, the balance changes as we gather more relevant evidence, and it might go from favorable from unfavorable depending on the nature of the new evidence.

However, as Keynes points out, this is not the only epistemologically significant relation between probability and evidence, for we not only care about how much the

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<sup>20</sup>Keynes, 78.

current evidence favors the hypothesis, but we also concern ourselves with the *amount* of evidence involved in calculating the balance of the evidence, and Keynes calls this measure the *weight* of evidence. But, unlike the balance of the evidence, which can go either direction, the weight of evidence can only go up as we gather more relevant evidence. In Keynes' words, "New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of an argument, but it will always increase its 'weight.'" <sup>21</sup>

A critical assumption Keynes makes in the just mentioned quote is that evidential weight forms a correlative relationship with the amount of *relevant* evidence: bringing in new evidence *always* increases the weight of the evidence. As a matter of fact, Keynes suggests that as a matter of definition, to introduce new relevant evidence is simply another way to say that the weight of evidence has increased.<sup>22</sup> The implication of this is that since relevance here is defined in terms of the difference between prior and posterior probabilities, the increase in the weight of evidence must be accompanied by a change in probability.

However, this also contradicts directly with Keynes' earlier observation that sometimes can change the weight of the evidence but not its balance. Keynes is aware of this tension, and tries to resolve it by introducing a "strict" definition of relevance.

## 2.4 The Strict Definition of Relevance

The problem, as Keynes sees it, is that sometimes complex evidence  $E$  might be irrelevant to  $H$ , but its logically simpler components  $E_1$  and  $E_2$  could be relevant to

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<sup>21</sup>Keynes, 78.

<sup>22</sup>Keynes, 78–79.

$H$ , so what we have a situation in which some evidence, when gathered altogether, is irrelevant to the hypothesis in question, but, were they gathered separately, they would yield a posterior probability different than the prior, and so they are would individually relevant.

What Keynes has in mind seems to be this: suppose, by a justified judgment of indifference, you have reasons to believe that the urn in front of you contains 50% white balls and 50% black balls, so your probability for  $H$ , drawing a black ball, would be 0.5. Further suppose  $E_x$  says ‘a ball with the color  $x$  is randomly drawn and replaced’, where  $x = w$  for white and  $x = b$  for black.

Now further suppose that we have received evidence  $E$ , where  $E = E_b \wedge E_w$ . At this point, an argument could be made that your degree of belief for  $H$  should stay at 0.5, since the sample mean is exactly that. In fact, this is a situation in which the use of Laplace’s “rule of succession” is justified..<sup>23</sup> According to this rule,  $P(H|E_b \wedge E_w)$  is

$$\frac{1 + 1}{2 + 1 + 1} = \frac{2}{4} = \frac{1}{2}$$

But suppose  $E_b$  and  $E_w$  are not gathered at the same time: say  $E_b$  was received first - this would sensibly nudge your opinion slightly toward the opinion that the proportion of black balls is higher than 50%. This could be verified by the rule of succession:  $P(H|E_b) = \frac{2}{3} \neq P(H)$ , so  $E_b$  is relevant to  $H$ . *Mutatis mutandis*, the same argument could be made for  $E_w$ . So we have a situation where getting  $E_w$  and  $E_b$  together does not increase the weight of the evidence, but getting them sequentially

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<sup>23</sup>‘... Thus one finds that when an event has happened any number of times running, the probability that it will happen again next time is equal to this number increased by 1, divided by the same number increased by 2.’, Laplace, *Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*, 11

would lead to an increase. Though he, too, has to speculate Keynes' precise meaning, Carnap gives a similar but formal example.<sup>24</sup>

To avoid this type of problems, Keynes proposes a 'strict' definition of irrelevance. While Keynes calls this the 'strict' definition, the purpose of the definition is to relax the requirement for relevance, so that evidence that is irrelevant "as a whole" may still be relevant due to its components. The strict definition states:

**Definition of Relevance:**  $E$  is relevant to  $H$  on background knowledge  $K$  if and only if there is at least one proposition  $R$ , such that

1.  $R$  is inferable from  $(E \wedge K)$ .
2.  $R$  is not inferable from  $K$ .
3.  $P(H|R \wedge K) \neq P(H|K)$
4. If there is *no* proposition that satisfies conditions 1-3, then  $E$  is irrelevant to  $H$ .

In other words, the strict definition tries to capture the idea that a piece of evidence  $E$  is relevant  $H$  if and only if  $R$ , in conjunction with your existing body of knowledge, can imply some proposition  $R$  that is conditionally relevant to  $H$ . So in the case where  $E = E_b \wedge E_w$ ,  $E$  is *not* irrelevant, i.e., relevant, to  $H$ , because  $E_b$ , which is inferable from  $E \wedge K$ , does raise the probability  $H$ . So, with this new definition, Keynes tries to maintain the close connection between the weight of evidence and the absolute amount of evidence.

Unfortunately, this definition does too little and too much at the same time. It

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<sup>24</sup>Rudolf Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability* (Chicago]University of Chicago Press, 1950), 419.

does too little, because not all weighty but irrelevant evidence can be easily decomposed in the way Keynes describes. This is the point of Popper’s “paradox of ideal evidence.” We shall discuss this in more detail in a later chapter, but the basic idea is that sometimes the evidence we receive is in the form of a basic statistical summary, such as “in a million tosses of the coin  $c$ , heads occurs in  $500,000 \pm 20$  cases.”<sup>25</sup> So, assuming our prior for the probability of  $c$  landing on heads is  $1/2$ , being conditional on the basic statistical summary should not change this probability - both the prior and posterior probabilities should be  $1/2$ .

There is something suspicious about this argument, but there does seem to be some difficulty in analyzing the statistical summary in the way Keynes recommends. It might work if the statistical report is a chain of conjunctions, that is,  $E_1 \wedge \dots E_i \dots \wedge E_{1m}$  where the subscript be the index of the trial. *If* we were to interpret it this way, we might be able to infer  $E_1$ , which, for example, says that the coin lands on heads on the first toss, and conditional on  $E_1$  we get a different posterior probability. But this is not what this report is saying, for we do not know exactly in which of the tosses the coin lands on heads and which tosses tails. In fact, modeled as a Bernoulli trial, the idea is that this particular order does not matter in drawing inferences. Further, it is clear we need more than a chain of conjunctions, because we are given an interval. It is possible that with some clever maneuver we could interpret the statistical report as a chain of disjunctions of conjunctions, but at this point, we must ask ourselves if we are analyzing the evidence or if we are simply distorting it.

There has been attempts to modify Keynes’ definition of relevance slightly to

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<sup>25</sup>Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Routledge, 2002), 425.

accommodate Popper’s paradox.<sup>26</sup> Roughly speaking, the proposal draws from Keynes’ stipulation that if  $X$  to  $Y$  is relevant, then  $\neg X$  is also relevant, and the solution would require adding another condition for relevance that requires both conditional probabilities of  $P(Y|X)$  and  $P(Y|\neg X)$  to be different than  $P(Y)$ .

As it turns out, however, this point is inconsequential, because Carnap has proven that these additional conditions that supposedly saves Keynes’ account of relevance from Popper’s paradox renders the relevance relation trivial. Hence I said Keynes’ definition also does too much: Keynes’ strict definition has the consequence of regarding almost any proposition as being relevant to another, as long as one is not a logical entailment of the another.

## 2.5 The Problematic Implication of the Strict Definition

Carnap’s argument is that Keynes’s strict definition has essentially counted anything not implied by background knowledge as being relevant, because any proposition that is not implied by our background knowledge plus hypothesis will always have implied components that are relevant to  $H$ , however weakly.<sup>27</sup> The argument is roughly that, for any  $H$  on background knowledge  $K$ , if  $J$  is not implied by  $(H \wedge K)$  and  $R$  is some arbitrary evidence relevant to  $H$ ,  $J$  can always be shown to be relevant by drawing trivial inferences that that involves  $R$ , such as  $(J \vee \neg R)$ .

For a formal argument, first consider these two assumptions about relevance.

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<sup>26</sup>Rod O’Donnell, “Keynes’s Weight of Argument and Popper’s Paradox of Ideal Evidence,” *Philosophy of Science* 59, no. 1 (1992): 50–51.

<sup>27</sup>Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability*, 420.

R1. If  $E$  is relevant, then  $\neg E$  is also relevant.

R2. If a hypothesis is not implied by our background knowledge, then there is some proposition such that it is relevant to the hypothesis.

I will not argue for these assumptions, but note that they are explicitly accepted by Keynes, so we do not have to find them plausible; we just have to accept them for the sake of this particular argument. In addition, Carnap has also proven that Keynes' definition of irrelevance is equivalent to the following:

**Carnap's Definition of Irrelevance:**  $E$  is irrelevant to  $H$  on  $K$  if and only if

1.  $P(H|K) = P(H|K \wedge E)$  or,
2.  $E \wedge K$  is a contradiction.

This alternative definition will be useful in the proof. Carnap's proof is roughly as follows.<sup>28</sup> Suppose both evidence  $J$  and hypothesis  $H$  are contingent on, i.e., not inferable from, background knowledge  $K$ . Also suppose a different piece of evidence  $R$  that is relevant to  $H$  on  $K$  -  $R$  must exist because of assumption R2 above. For an argument by cases, let  $E$  be  $(R \wedge \neg J)$ .  $E$  is either relevant or irrelevant to  $H$ , and from this we can make an argument by cases. It will be demonstrated that from these assumptions alone, we already know  $J$  is relevant, whether or not  $E$  is relevant.

Suppose  $E$  is relevant: this means that  $E$  is relevant to  $H$  by virtue of Keynes' stricter definition; because,  $E$  contains  $R$ , which is relevant to  $H$  on  $K$ . By assumption R1, since  $E$  is relevant to  $H$ ,  $\neg E$  is also relevant to  $H$ . But this means  $J$  is relevant

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<sup>28</sup>Carnap, p.420. My presentation also partly follows Peter Gärdenfors, "On the Logic of Relevance," *Synthese* 37, no. 3 (1978): 351-67



to  $H$  as well:  $\neg E$  is equivalent to  $(\neg R \vee J)$ , which is inferable from  $J$ . Since an implication of  $J$  is relevant to  $H$  given  $K$ , this means  $J$  must be relevant to  $H$ .

Now suppose  $E$  is irrelevant. Since  $R$  is relevant to  $H$  on  $K$ , the only way for  $E$  to be irrelevant is for  $(\neg J \wedge K \wedge R)$  to be a contradiction (by Carnap's alternative definition), so  $\neg(\neg J \wedge K \wedge R)$  has to be true. That is logically equivalent to  $(\neg J \wedge K) \rightarrow \neg R$ . Now, by assumption R1,  $\neg R$  is relevant, because  $R$  is relevant. The above formula means that from  $\neg J$  plus  $K$ , we can infer  $\neg R$ , so this means  $\neg J$  is relevant, which entails  $J$  is relevant.

So, we see that both each case implies that  $J$  is relevant. By argument by cases, then,  $J$  is relevant. Thus, if  $J$  is not inferable from  $K$ , then  $J$  is relevant to  $H$ .

In addition, if  $J$  is relevant to  $H$  on  $K$ , then  $J$  is not inferable from  $K$ , since one of the conditions of the strict definition of relevance is that relevant evidence cannot be a proposition that is a logical consequence of our background knowledge. So, this means that  $J$  is relevant to  $H$  on  $K$  if and only if  $J$  is not inferable from  $K$ .

Loosely speaking, this means that for two positions, they can be shown to be relevant to each other as long as they do not imply, or contradict each other. Carnap's result shows that Keynes' strict definition is not useful: Carnap thinks that we should simply stick with the simpler definition of relevance. Modern Bayesian have followed Carnap in accepting Keynes' basic definition of relevance as a minimal requirement for any confirmation measure. The conclusion to be drawn, I think, is that evidential weight clearly has something to do with how much evidence we have, but it is not worth the trouble to *define* the weight of evidence as the absolute amount of evidence. Furthermore, as we shall see, the notion of evidential weight goes beyond just the

amount of evidence - this is something Keynes himself recognizes.

### 3 Weight as Potential Net Gain in Expected Utility

In the last section, I concerned myself with Keynes' official slogan that evidential weight is the absolute amount of evidence. We saw that Keynes explicitly grounds the concept of evidential weight in his formal notion of relevance. However, in his thinking about the practical significance of evidential weight, he has a slightly notion in mind. In particular, he makes the connection between evidential weight and the *worth* or *value* of the evidence. This points to a *relative* measure of weight, which takes into account between how much information we currently have, and how much information there are to be gathered. In the this section, we will see that Keynes raises some puzzle about the rationality of evidence gathering, which sheds light on this different notion of weight. We will also examine a proposal given by Frank Ramsey.

#### 3.1 Keynes' puzzle about the demand for new evidence

Keynes is not satisfied with his account of evidential weight in the *Treatise*. One particular vexing issue is that he could not seem to explain the *practical* import that the weight of evidence has. He is explicitly conflicted:

For in deciding on a course of action, it seems plausible to suppose that we ought to take account of the weight as well as the probability of different

expectations. But... I do not feel sure that the theory of ‘evidential weight’ has much practical significance.

His diffidence is further amplified by a “a very confusing problem”: Bernoulli, he points out, suggests that inductive inference requires the utilization of all evidence available to us. Keynes reasons that this implies that it’s always rational to get more evidence, but then it raises another critical question about whether or not one could ever be rational in refusing new evidence.<sup>29</sup> If the answer for the former question is positive, and the latter question negative, then we have to conclude that rationality dictates us that we should never stop looking for more evidence.

Keynes does not make the jump from “using all the evidence” to “get all the evidence” clear. Nevertheless, this problem is revisited many years later in an exchange between Ayer and Carnap. In his *Logical Foundation of Probability*, Carnap restates Bernoulli’s claim as “the requirement of total evidence”.

*Requirement of total evidence:* in the application of inductive logic to a given knowledge situation, the total evidence available must be taken as basis for determining the degree of confirmation.<sup>30</sup>

Ayer, in response to Carnap, raises the Keynesian question: should “total evidence” include relevant evidence that I do not yet have in possession?<sup>31</sup> The answer must be “yes”, Ayer argues. If finding the truth value of some proposition  $P$  could potentially sway the balance of my evidence, then I should definitely acquire it. Thus the principle of total evidence seems to suggest that I am also rationally compelled to consider

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<sup>29</sup>Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability*, 84–85.

<sup>30</sup>Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability*, 211.

<sup>31</sup>A. J. Ayer, *Probability and Evidence* (Macmillan, 1972), 56.

some evidence I do not yet have.

But Ayer points out that this cannot be the whole picture: taken as a rule of rationality, this means we should never stop acquiring unless we are certain that we have acquired all available evidence. This, however, assumes that we know what evidence is available, but it could often be unrealistic to expect to know how much evidence we *do not* currently have.

There is also a deeper problem. The logical interpretation of probability, held by both Carnap and Keynes, takes probability as a logical relation between propositions, so within this picture, inductive rationality is a matter of having the right degrees of belief between premises and conclusion. However, this says nothing about sufficiency of the set of premises I have available as my evidence. In other words, the requirement of the probability axioms does not imply the requirement of total evidence. This is reminiscent of the criticism of coherentism in epistemology. If having knowledge is having a belief justified in virtue of being coherent with the rest of my beliefs, how do I know if my beliefs are in any way reflections of the world? This problem affects the subjective interpretation of probability as well. As Leonard Savage points out:

According to the personalistic view, the role of the mathematical theory of probability is to enable the person using it to detect inconsistencies in his own real or envisaged behavior. It is also understood that, having detected an inconsistency, he will remove it. An inconsistency is typically removable in many different ways, among which the theory gives no guidance for choosing.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Leonard J. Savage, *The Foundations of Statistics* (Dover, 1954), 57.

Keynes tries to deal with this problem by introducing the dimension of utility to the notion of weight: he suggests that sometimes getting more evidence is clear the action that will “probably produce the greatest amount of good,” especially when our evidence is slight and we know more is available.<sup>33</sup> Thus, for a given hypothesis of interest  $H$ , the same evidence  $E$  generates different amount of “good” relative to the amount of information we already have for  $H$ . If an agent has almost no information about  $H$ , gathering more information would generate the most utility, but for the same evidence, the demand might be low, because the agent might already have enough information about  $H$ , so getting more evidence would yield very little to no utility. What seems to be the lesson here is that the weight of evidence should be a measure of the *sufficiency* of the evidence, by informing us if the evidence we have at hand is *enough*.

Note, however, that this question can take two forms: the first is a question about finding a threshold of sufficiency: we increase the weight of our evidence until it reaches this threshold, and the second is to *define* sufficiency *in terms* of weight: our body of evidence is sufficient, when relevant evidence no longer increases its weight. The conceptual connection between the sufficiency and weight is tighter in the second form than the first, and this is the route Ramsey takes in his attempt to answer Keynes’ question.

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<sup>33</sup>Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability*, 84–85.

### 3.2 Ramsey on the Value of Evidence

Keynes' implicit suggestion that weight can be a measure of the worth of evidence is picked up by Ramsey, perhaps one of the most famous critics of Keynes' theory of probability. Interestingly, however, he has proven essentially the opposite conclusion reached by Ayer and Keynes: Ramsey shows that we should always look more more evidence, because we can never be worse off from doing it. How can this be?

Ramsey's argument is roughly that, *if* we assume an agent to be a perfect Bayesian and that new information does not cost anything, then she will never be no worse off getting new evidence.<sup>34</sup> In fact, she is guaranteed to be *better* off as long as the new evidence will tell her something new. A perfect Bayesian agent is someone who studiously updates her opinions based on Bayes' rule and then act by choosing the action that maximize her expected utility. As Skyrms points out, this also implies that the agent knows that she will always *stays* being perfectly Bayesian in the future.

The basic idea of the proof is that the ideal Bayesian will always get better expected utility from more evidence, until there is no more evidence, but even in that case the agent will not be worse off. An intuitive example is perhaps more helpful than reproducing the proof.<sup>35</sup> Suppose we have three hypotheses about the content of an urn in front of us:

1.  $H_b$ : 90 black balls and 10 white balls

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<sup>34</sup>F. P. Ramsey, "Weight or the Value of Knowledge," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 41, no. 1 (1990): 1–4, also see I. J. Good, "On the Principle of Total Evidence," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 17, no. 4 (1966): 319–21 and Savage, *The Foundations of Statistics*, sec 6.2.

<sup>35</sup>This example is adapted from Isaac Levi, "The Weight of Argument," in *Fundamental Uncertainty: Rationality and Plausible Reasoning*, ed. Silva Marzetti Dall'Aste Brandolini and Roberto Sczzeri (Palgrave MacMilan, 2011), 39–58

2.  $H_w$ : 10 white balls and 90 black balls
3.  $H_n$ : 50 white balls and 50 black balls.

We then start by assuming  $P(H_b) = P(H_w) = P(H_n) = 1/3$ . Suppose we win \$1 by picking the correct hypothesis. Our expected payoff for choosing each hypothesis would be the same at  $1/3$ . Nevertheless, we are allow to sample with replacement as many times as we wish. Should we get more evidence? Yes, according to Ramsey, we should.

To begin, at this point, the probability of getting a black ball is the same as getting a white ball. Let  $E_b$  be “a black ball is drawn” and  $E_w$  for white balls. So:

$$\begin{aligned} P(E_b) &= P(H_b)P(E_b|H_b) + P(H_w)P(E_b|H_w) + P(H_n)P(E_b|H_n) \\ &= 1/3(0.9) + 1/3(0.1) + 1/3(0.5) = 0.5 \end{aligned}$$

And  $P(E_w) = 1 - P(E_b) = 0.5$ . So, in the event of drawing a black ball from the urn, we would update our belief like so:

$$P(H_b|E_b) = \frac{P(H_b)P(E_b|H_b)}{P(E_b)} = \frac{1/3(0.9)}{0.5} = 0.6$$

Similarly, applying the calculation on the other hypotheses, we get:

$$P(H_w|E_b) = 0.067$$

$$P(H_n|E_b) = 0.333$$

Similar argument can be made assuming  $E_w$ , that is, a white ball is chosen. In that case  $P(H_w|E_w) = 0.6$ . If we were an ideal Bayesian agent, we should pick  $H_b$  if  $E_b$ , and pick  $H_w$  if  $E_w$ . Since an ideal Bayesian would choose the option that maximizes our expected utility, in either case the expected value after drawing from the urn once is 0.6, which is an improvement, since before drawing our expected utility is  $1/3$  for all options. The net gain in expected utility would be  $0.6 - 0.33 = 0.27$ , is referred to as *the value of information* in the decision theory literature.<sup>36</sup>

It turns out that we would be even better off if we were to draw from the urn again. Suppose the first draw yields a black ball. So now we have one piece of evidence in hand. Let us refer to our state of belief after the first draw as  $H'_b, E'_b, \dots$  and so on. For instance,  $P(H'_b) = P(H_b|E_b)$  and  $P(E'_b) = P(E_b|E_b)$ . One notable change is that  $P(E'_b) = 0.7132$  and  $P(E'_w) = 0.2868$ . If we draw again and get a black ball, this means:

$$P(H'_b|E'_b) = 0.757$$

$$P(H'_w|E'_b) = 0.009$$

$$P(H'_n|E'_b) = 0.233$$

If a white ball were to be drawn:

$$P(H'_b|E'_w) = 0.21$$

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<sup>36</sup>Howard Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer, *Applied Statistical Decision Theory* (Harvard, 1964), 89–90. For a more digestible presentation see Robert Winkler, *An Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision* (Probabilistic Publishing, 2010) sec.6.3.



$$P(H'_w|E'_w) = 0.21$$

$$P(H'_n|E'_w) = 0.58$$

Thus, if for the second sample we get a black ball, we would choose  $b$  since it has the maximum expected utility at 0.757, and if we get a white ball, we choose  $n$  with the expected value at 0.58. So, the expected utility, if we were to draw from the urn again, is:  $0.7132(0.757) + 0.2867(0.58) = 0.706$ , which is an improvement over just drawing once. The net gain is  $0.706 - 0.6 = 0.106$ . Ramsey's proof shows that we can keep on getting more evidence and we will never be worse off. In fact, we will be better off as long as there is evidence out there we do not yet have.

### 3.3 Defining Weight in Terms of the Difference in Prior and Posterior Expected Utility

What should we make of Ramsey's proof? There are two issues involved here. The first is whether Ramsey's proof provides an account of evidential weight, and the other is whether it addresses Keynes' puzzle about gathering evidence. The two are related; let us address them in turn.

Ramsey's note is tantalizing, because he never clearly explains what he thinks the weight of evidence is, even though it's in the title. But assuming that he is interpreting Keynes' question of the weight of evidence as whether in relation to the value or worth of evidence, it is not far fetched to think that he is thinking evidential weight in terms for the expected utility that new evidence will generate. Ramsey might have something like the following in mind: the weight of new evidence  $E$  for hypothesis  $H$  is

the difference between the prior expected utility  $EU(H)$  and the posterior  $EU(H|E)$ .

For instance, we saw that in the example above, the posterior expected utility of the first draw was 0.27 higher than our prior expected utility, and we saw a net gain of 0.106 in expected utility if we were to draw again after drawing a black ball, so we see that the first piece of evidence has a higher Ramseyian weight than the second one. What Ramsey's proof demonstrates is that new evidence has a diminishing return - I get a "bigger bang for the buck" for my evidence gathering endeavor when I have less evidence.

This way of thinking about evidential weight explains how weight cannot be measured just in terms of the amount of relevant evidence at hand: if we are almost always better off getting more evidence, we should incorporate and acquire as much new evidence as possible, but since evidence has a diminishing return, at a certain point that new evidence will no longer raise our expected utility in a meaningful way (even though it will also never decrease it). This also means that at that point the new evidence will no longer have any weight, since the posterior expected utility will stay the same, even though it would have been weighty if we have no prior evidence.

I think that Ramseyan weight captures aspect of the weight of evidence, but it cannot be the whole picture. To be sure, I do not question that given some assumptions, Ramsey's result will necessarily follow: the same result is proven by both Good and Leonard Savage, so there is no doubt that the result will hold if the assumptions are granted, but that's a big *if*.

Perhaps the most crucial assumption here is that new information has no cost. It is assumed in the example that it costs us neither money nor time to draw from

the urn. Suppose it costs us 25 cents for each sample. This means that we would be gaining only  $0.27 - 0.25 = 0.02$  in expected payoff for the first draw, and the second draw would definitely not be worth the additional 25 cents. Or suppose that one dollar is not worthy any endeavor that lasts longer than 15 seconds, and it takes 30 seconds to draw from the urn. Cost might also enter into consideration in different forms, e.g., computational cost or memory. As such as minimally realistic assumptions are introduced, Ramsey's result no longer holds.

Of course, Ramsey probably understood that information was rarely free. It is clear that he intended his note to be an response to Keynes' remarks on weight of evidence, as the title of his note is "Weight or the Value of Knowledge," which suggests that he interprets the problem Keynes poses as a question why evidence is valuable. Good interprets Ayer's remarks in the same way. According to Good, Ayer is questioning "why... we should bother to make new observations."<sup>37</sup> So, both Ramsey and Good seem to think what is needed is a justification for getting new evidence *in general*. With respect to this version of the problem, the proof makes perfect, since it demonstrates that all things being equal we usually end up with better expected utility by considering more evidence. But Keynes' question was about reconciling the general duty to get more evidence and the intuition that evidence gathering for a belief of interest is not always a worthy endeavor.

Good, who proved the same result independently of Ramsey, tries to address this issue by distinguishing what he calls Type I and Type II rationality.<sup>38</sup> Type

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<sup>37</sup>Irving J. Good, *Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and Its Applications* (Univ Minnesota Pr, 1983), 178.

<sup>38</sup>Good, p. 29-30 As far as I could tell, this has nothing to do with the distinction between Type I and Type II error in Frequentist statistics.

I rationality is that of the ideal Bayesian agent, one who lives her life by abiding to the principle of maximizing expected utility. Good recognizes, however, that type I rationality provides no guidance in regard to when an investigation should be concluded. This is where type II rationality comes in: it is principle of maximizing expected utility *plus* the consideration of “the cost of theorizing.” More important, the goal of type II is “a sufficient maturity of judgments.”<sup>39</sup>

I think Good’s distinction, and the admission that there are aspects of evidential practice that cannot be captured by the inductive ideal expressed by Type I rationality, is the crux of the problem. In other words, “a sufficient maturity of judgments” cannot just be a matter of maximizing our expected utility. Intuitively, maturity implies a sort of stability - a sort of imperturbability against confounding experience. We can interpret Keynes’ puzzle in this light: perhaps sometimes it is rational to refuse evidence, because my belief has reached a degree of maturity such that new evidence is either just noise or not significant enough to change my mind. This, I think, is one of the normative roles played the weight of evidence: it ought to provide a way to justify the stability of certain judgments. It should guide us in distinguishing between a mature state of belief and just plain stubbornness. The latter is often irrational, and an agent who is simply refusing evidence out of stubbornness should be considered as irrational. This will be elaborated when we examine the notion of *resiliency* in formal epistemology.

These issues will be the focus of the rest of the dissertation - the key point I intended to establish in this chapter is that both the amount of evidence and its utility are part of how we think of the weight of evidence, and stability is one way in which

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<sup>39</sup>Good, 29.

the dynamic between the two is summarized. This complements Keynes' idea that when the evidence is weighty, additional data appears to be less desirable, in that it should also be noted that the high weight is not necessarily *only* a function of the amount of relevance we have; because, sometimes the low desirability of more evidence could be caused by the low expected utility, instead of the lack of evidence.

The other dimension of evidential weight highlighted by our comparison between the volume and the value of evidence is that the weight of the evidence is best thought of as a disposition: the question is what *would* happen, if I were to get new evidence that supports or undermine my current belief? This is implicit in talking about weight as a stability, for stability *is* a disposition. This aspect of weight will become important when we come to Peirce.

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