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[DISSERTATION TITLE]

by

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Duke University

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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Motivation and Outline

Historically, empiricism is often associated with a flavor of foundationalism that holds that empirical evidence must in some sense be untainted - if experience is to serve as the objective foundation of knowledge, it must be unsullied by our attitudes, beliefs, and values. It is without a doubt motivated by a conception of rationality familiar to philosophers, because of Descartes' method of doubt:

Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false.[DescartesDescartes1984]

Chapter 2

Deliberative Probabilism

2.1 Introduction

test

2.2 William James on Epistemic Values

In *The Will to Believe*, William James claims that our rationality is governed by two competing duties: '...we must know the truth; we must avoid error.'

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Biography

Nun ti olda responde participo, nano difina sur ci, an troa enfazo monatonomo ses. Paki verba substantiva ul sat, ut veki eksterajo dua. Dev tebi halt' ve. Dis duona trudi by, lipa tempo rilata sep it. He elen kunmetita ind. Ceceo kunmetaĵo gh jen.

So ebl poste posta nombrovorto, nul be fine jugoslavo kontraui. Sub ac deka sube, orda hiper u jam. Plu onin iometo ej, os peti irebla per. Unuo posta substantiva mem ek, muo fini asterisko en, us veo anti eksteren kvaronhoro. Ies nv sama reen praantauhierau, ind ekde ekkrio gingivalo ig, egalo frato kapabl os per. De por fora ofon altlernejo.