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1、文章信息

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题目: Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking by a Consensus Based Approach

2、背景、目的及结论

背景

In this paper, Nash equilibrium seeking among a network of players is considered. Different from many existing works on Nash equilibrium seeking in noncooperative games, the players considered in this paper **cannot directly observe** the actions of the players who are not their neighbors. Instead, the players are supposed to be capable of communicating with each other via an undirected and connected communication graph.

目的

By a synthesis of a leader-following consensus protocol and the gradient play, a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is proposed for the noncooperative games. Analytical analysis on the convergence of the players' actions to the Nash equilibrium is conducted via Lyapunov stability analysis.

结论

For games with **nonquadratic payoffs**, where multiple isolated Nash equilibria may coexist in the game, a **local convergence** result is derived under certain conditions. Then, **a stronger condition is provided to derive a nonlocal convergence** result for the nonquadratic games. For **quadratic games**, it is shown that the proposed seeking strategy enables the players' actions to converge to the **Nash equilibrium globally** under the given conditions.

3、其他文献的方法与局限性

文献 方法 局限性

[2]Finding multiple Nash equilibria in poolbased markets: A

The authors formulated pure strategy Nash equilibrium seeking as a mixed-integer linear programming problem for pool-based electricity market.

stochastic EPEC approach

文化人	力运
[3]On the	
characterization	
of local Nash	Gradient play was leveraged for finding differential Nash
equilibria in	equilibrium in continuous games.
continuous	
games	
[4]Dynamic	
fictitious play,	
dynamic gradient	
play, and	Dynamic fictitious play and gradient paly were exploited for a
distributed	continuous-time form of repeated matrix games.
convergence to	
Nash equilibria	
[5]Multi-agent	
differential	
graphical games: Online adaptive	Policy evaluation and policy improvement were utilized for the
learning solution	computation of the Nash equilibrium in differential graphical
for	games.
synchronization	
with optimality	
[6]Flexible Nash	The discussion of the second state of the seco
seeking using	The discrete-time stochastic algorithm developed, it allows the
stochastic	players to take actions in both simultaneous and asynchronous
difference inclusion	fashions.
[7]Designing	
Games for	A distributed process was proposed to obtain the equilibrium.
Distributed	
Optimization	
[10]Designing	
Games for	Utilizing the saddle point dynamics, convergence to the Nash
Distributed	equilibrium of a two-network zero-sum game.
Optimization	
[11]Distributed	
convergence to	Switching communications were considered for the two-network
Nash equilibria in	zero-sum game.
two-network	J
zero-sum games	
	Nash equilibrium seeking in generalized convex games. Solving
[12]-[13]	the generalized convex game by a discrete-time distributed
	algorithm.
[14]On the	
solution of affine	
generalized Nash	Nash equilibrium seeking in generalized convex games. Lemke's
equilibrium	method was adapted for the computation of generalized Nash
problems with	equilibrium in convex games with quadratic payoffs subject to
shared	linear constraints.
constraints by	
Lamkala mathad	

Lemke's method

文献	方法	局限性
[1]Nash equilibrium seeking in non- cooperative games	integrator-type extremum seeking	
[16]Stochastic Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Games with General Nonlinear Payoffs	discrete-time extremum seeking	
[17]Shahshahani gradient-like extremum	Shahshahani gradient-like extremum seeking	
seeking [18]Lie bracket approximation of extremum seeking systems	Lie bracket approximation-based extremum seeking	A common characteristic of these methods is that no explicit model information is required for the implementation of the methods.
[21]Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N- Person Games	The players' payoff functions are determined by the players' own actions, together with the other players' actions.	Requiring the players' observations over their opponents' actions to search for the Nash equilibrium.
[22]Nash equilibrium seeking by a gossip-based algorithm	Solving games without using full information from all the players was generalized, where the players' payoff functions depend on the players' actions in a more general manner. The Nash equilibrium was characterized by a variational inequality and a gossip-based algorithm was proposed. The players were equipped with a waking clock and they updated their actions asynchronously to reach the Nash equilibrium.	[21], [22] Full communication is impractical in many engineering systems.
[23]-[30], [42], [43]	Utilizing a consensus protocol to broadcast local information.	
[42]Distributed Control of Networked Dynamical Systems: Static Feedback, Integral Action and Consensus	A class of consensus controllers were proposed for networked dynamical systems.	

Approach for A consensus-based approach was studied for distributed coordination of the generation, load, and storage devices in a Multiagent microgrid.

Coordination in a Microgrid

[26]Robust consensus

tracking of a class of second-order multi-agent Leader-following consensus concerns with the synchronization of the agents' states to a common value, which is equal to the reference signal provided by the leader.

dynamic systems
[31]Distributed

learning in large-

scale multi-agent Distributed learning for games on the communication graph was games: A investigated.

modified fictitious play approach [32]Empirical Centroid

For large-scale multiagent games by an adaptation of the fictitious

An Approach for

Distributed

For large-scale multiagent games by an adaptation of the fictitious play.

Learning in Multi-Agent Games

[33]A gossip algorithm for aggregative

The authors considered Nash equilibrium seeking for aggregative games on the graph, where each player's payoff function depends on their own actions and an aggregate of all the players' actions.

games on graphs A discrete-time gossip algorithm was proposed to solve it.

[34]Game Design and Analysis for

Price-Based For the energy consumption game in smart grids, the continuous-Demand time method was based on a dynamic average consensus Response: An protocol and the primal-dual dynamics.

Aggregate Game
Approach

4、文章好在哪里

优点:

1. Nash equilibrium seeking for noncooperative games, where the players have no direct access to the actions of the players who are not their neighbors, is investigated in this paper. Based on a leader-following consensus protocol and the gradient play, a Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is designed. In the proposed algorithm, the players only need to communicate with their neighbors on their estimates of the players' actions. Avoiding full communication among the players broadens the applicability of game theory to engineering systems where only local communication is attainable. 2. The convergence of the players' actions to the Nash equilibrium by utilizing the proposed seeking strategy is analytically explored. Based on the Lyapunov stability analysis, it is shown that the proposed method enables the players' actions to converge to the Nash equilibrium under certain conditions.

不足:

- 1. The players in this paper are supposed to be equipped with an undirected and connected communication graph. Can I extent it to directed graph? In other words, can I conclude a same conclusion in directed graph?
- 2. The designed strategy in this paper is perfect in quadratic games, but not in nonquadratic games. Can I relax the conditions of the strategy or design a good strategy for nonquadratic games?

5、自我想法

1. 文中没有假设收益函数的具体形式,只需要与邻居通信,去估计其他玩家的行动,就可以达到纳什均衡了。这说明在满足本文给出的假设的前提下,函数的形式可以是任意的。

2.