

$pay = (type, rmd, aux)$

$\begin{cases} type = dirp, aux = (pr, pe, amt) \end{cases}$

$\begin{cases} type = conp, aux = (pr, pe, amt, h, time) \end{cases}$

$\begin{cases} type = fulp, aux = (cmd, cpay) \end{cases}$

$(Input_j = (pay_j, bal_j, ConPay_j), \sigma_j)$

$state = (rnd, \{Input_j, \sigma_j\}_j, F)$

$state_r = (r, \{Input_{r,j}, \sigma_{r,j}\}_j, Fr)$

性质:

① $state$ 中, 包含的各节点余额, 各条件支付的金额与手续费之和与通道内总金额相等.

② $state$ 中包含的每个条件支付要同时出现在交易双方的条件支付集合中.

③ $state$ 中, 各节点的轮次都要不大于 $state$ 的轮次, 并且不大于交易对手的轮次, 若轮次相等, 则两人包含的余额相同.

④ 对于 $state_r$ 和 $state_{r'}$, $r' > r$, 则对节点 P_j 来说, 在 $state_r$ 中的轮次记为 k_j , 在 $state_{r'}$ 中的轮次记为 k'_j , 则 $\begin{cases} k'_j = k_j \\ \text{或 } k'_j > r. \end{cases}$

在 $state_r \rightarrow state_{r'}$, $r' > r+1$ 时.

若包含错误签名的节点的状态, 可直接被验证.

若包含的都是节点自己签名的状态, 则从诚实节点 P_j 的角度看.

(1) 假设节点 P_j 没有发送 $r+1$ 轮的状态, 则 custodian 广播的 P_j 的轮次 $r_c \leq r$.

假设在 $state_r$ 中包含的轮次为 r_j , 在 $state_{r'}$ 中包含的轮次为 r'_j .

{ 若正常更新, 则应该包含 r_j , 即 $r'_j = r_j$.

若不正常, 则 $r'_j \neq r_j$ 且 $r'_j < r$, 则与④相悖.

(2) 假设 P_j 发送了 $r+1$ 轮的状态, 则分为两种情况, 包含与不包含.

若包含, 则相当于认可这笔交易, 此时对方更新后的状态也应该被包含.

如果对方诚实, 那么更新到 $r+1$ 轮, 交易相同.

如果对方与 cws 合谋, 则可能会减 $> r+1$ 的状态, 以损害诚实节点的利益.

体现在余额上, 可能会自己减, 但这不会影响诚实节点的余额, 则与总金额不符, 违反①.

在条件支付上, 可能会单方面将 $cpay$ 减, 违反②.

若不包含, 则与 (1) 相同.

因

$\text{AuditSin}(\text{stater})$.

if (!VerSig(σ) \vee !CheckSum(σ) \vee !CheckConpay(σ) \vee !checkRound(σ)).
return false
else return true.

$\text{VerSig}(\text{stater})$.

parse Stater as $(r, \{\text{Input}_j, \sigma_j | j, Fr)$

if $\exists j, \text{!Verify}_j(\text{Input}_j, \sigma_j)$, return false.

else return true.

$\text{CheckSum}(\text{stater})$

parse Stater as $(r, \{\text{Input}_j, \sigma_j | j, Fr)$

parse Input $_j$ as $(\text{pay}_j, \text{bal}_j, \text{ConPay}_j)$.

if $(Fr + \sum_j (\text{bal}_j + \frac{1}{2} \sum \text{cpay.amt}, \text{cpay} \in \text{ConPay}_j) \neq \text{total.Value})$.

return false

else return true.

$\text{CheckConpay}(\text{stater})$.

parse Stater as $(r, \{\text{Input}_j, \sigma_j | j, Fr)$

parse Input $_j$ as $(\text{pay}_j, \text{bal}_j, \text{ConPay}_j)$.

if $\exists \text{cpay}$, set $P_i := \text{cpay.pr}$, $P_j := \text{cpay.pe}$. $\text{cpay} \notin (\text{ConPay}_i \cap \text{ConPay}_j)$.
return false.

else return true.

$\text{checkRound}(\text{stater})$.

parse Stater as $(r, \{\text{Input}_j, \sigma_j | j, Fr)$

parse Input $_j$ as $(\text{pay}_j, \text{bal}_j, \text{ConPay}_j)$.

if $\exists \text{pay}_j, P_i = \text{pay}_j.\text{other}(P_j)$.

$(\text{pay}_j.\text{rnd} > r) \vee (\text{pay}_i.\text{rnd} > r) \vee (\text{pay}_i.\text{rnd} < \text{pay}_j.\text{rnd})$

$\vee [(\text{pay}_j.\text{rnd} == \text{pay}_i.\text{rnd}) \wedge (\text{pay}_j \neq \text{pay}_i)]$

return false

else return true.

$\text{AuditDon}(\text{stater}, \text{stater}_1, r' \geq r$.

if $[(r=r) \wedge (\text{stater} \neq \text{stater}_1)] \vee [(r=r+1) \wedge (\text{stater}_1 \neq \text{Update}(\text{stater}))]$

$\vee [(r' > r+1) \wedge [\exists j, (k_j \neq k'_j) \wedge (k'_j \leq r)]]$, return false.

else return true

链上合约中的半判断.

$\text{Audit}(\text{proof})$

parse proof as $(\text{stater}_1, \sigma_1, \text{stater}_2, \sigma_2)$.

for r in $\{r_1, r_2\}$

if !VerSig $_{\text{cus}}(\text{stater}, \sigma_r) \wedge (\text{stater} \neq \text{BestState})$, $\text{stater} := \perp$.

if VerSig $_{\text{cus}}(\text{stater}, \sigma_r) \wedge \text{!AuditSin}(\text{stater})$, $\text{punish}()$

if $(\text{stater}_1 \neq \perp) \wedge (\text{stater}_2 \neq \perp) \wedge \text{!AuditDon}(\text{stater}_1, \text{stater}_2)$.

$\text{punish}()$.

节点离开通道, 发送最新状态.

Depart(state, σ). from P_j at T :
if $DP = \emptyset$, set $deadline := T + \Delta$.

$DP := DPU\{P_j\}$.

Record(state, σ).

emit EventDepart(state).

Record(state, σ). at T .

assert $T < deadline$.

Audit(state, σ , BestState, L)

if $(r > BestRound)$, $BestState := state$, $BestRound := r$.

Resolve() at T :

assert $DP \neq \emptyset \wedge T > deadline$.

$BestState = UpdateCon(BestState)$.

parse BestState as $(r, \{Input_j, \perp_j, F\})$.

if $(cus \in DP) \wedge (\forall j. ConPay_j = \emptyset)$,

send bal_j to P_j

send $F + G$ to cus .

emit EventClose

else for each $P_j \in DP \wedge P_j \neq cus$,

if $bal_j = \emptyset$, send bal_j to P_j .

$P = P \setminus \{P_j\}$.

$totalValue -= bal_j$.

$BestState = (r+1, \{Input_j, \perp_j, P_j \in N, F\})$.

$BestRound := r+1$

$DP := \emptyset$.

emit EventResolve(BestState).

UpdateCon(state). at T :

parse state as $(r, \{Input_j, \sigma_j\}_j, F)$.

parse each c_{pay} as $(comp, rnd, pr, pe, amt, h, time)$

if $(time > T)$

$ConPay_{pr} = ConPay_{pr} \setminus \{c_{pay}\}$. $ConPay_{pe} = ConPay_{pe} \setminus \{c_{pay}\}$

if $pr(h, time)$, $bal_{pe} += amt$,

else $bal_{pr} += amt$.

return $(r, \{Input_j, \perp_j\}_j, F)$.

Punish()

$c = (totalValue + G) / (|P| - 1)$

send $\$c$ to parties in P except cus .

emit EventClose

节点离开通道, 发送最新状态.

Depart(state, σ). from P_j at T :
if $DP = \emptyset$, set $deadline := T + \Delta$.
 $DP := DP \cup \{P_j\}$.
Record(state, σ).
emit EventDepart(state).

Record(state, σ). at T .
assert $T < deadline$.
Audit(state, σ , BestState, L)
if ($r > BestRound$), BestState := state, BestRound := r .

Resolve() at T :
assert $DP \neq \emptyset \wedge T > deadline$.
BestState = UpdateCon(BestState).
parse BestState as ($r, \{Input_j, \perp_j, F\}$).
if ($cus \in DP$) \wedge ($\forall j. ConPay_j = \emptyset$),
send bal_j to P_j
send $F+G$ to cus .
emit EventClose
else for each $P_j \in DP \wedge P_j \neq cus$,
if $bal_j = \emptyset$, send bal_j to P_j .
 $P = P \setminus \{P_j\}$.
 $totalValue -= bal_j$.
BestState = ($r+1, \{Input_j, \perp_j, P_j \in N, F\}$).
BestRound := $r+1$
 $DP := \emptyset$.
emit EventResolve(BestState).

UpdateCon(state). at T :
parse state as ($r, \{Input_j, \sigma_j\}_j, F$).
parse each c_{pay} as ($comp, rnd, pr, pe, amt, h, time$)
if ($time > T$)
 $ConPay_{pr} = ConPay_{pr} \setminus \{c_{pay}\}$. $ConPay_{pe} = ConPay_{pe} \setminus \{c_{pay}\}$
if $PM(h, time)$, $bal_{pe} += amt$.
else $bal_{pr} += amt$.
Return ($r, \{Input_j, \perp_j, F\}$).

Punish()
 $c = (totalValue + G) / (|P| - 1)$
send $\$c$ to parties in P except cus .
emit EventClose

Contract MPC.

Initialize BestState := ($0, \{(\phi, deposit_j, \phi), \perp_j, 0\}$)
BestRound := 0 .
 $P, totalValue = \sum_j deposit_j$.

Depart() \leftarrow triggered
Record() \leftarrow triggered. 调用.
Resolve() \leftarrow triggered.
Punish() \leftarrow 只能在内部调用.
UpdateCon() \leftarrow 只能在内部调用.
Audit() \leftarrow triggered 或内部调用.
{ Audit on
Audit Don. 被内部调用.

```

pay=(type, rmd, aux)
{
  type=dirp, aux=(pr, pe, amt)
  type=comp, aux=(pr, pe, amt, h, time)
  type=fulp, aux=(cmd, cpay)
}

```

```

(Inputj=(payj, balj, ConPayj),  $\sigma_j$ )
state=(rmd, {Inputj,  $\sigma_j$  | j, Fr)
stater=(r, {Inputrj,  $\sigma_r$  | j, Fr)

```

性质:

- ① state中, 包含的各节点余额, 各条件支付的全额与手续费之和与通道内总金额相等。
- ② state中包含的每个条件支付要同时出现在交易双方的条件支付集合中。
- ③ state中, 各节点的轮次都要不大于state的轮次并且不大于交易对方的轮次, 若轮次相等则两人包含的交易相同。
- ④ 对于stater和state_r, $r' > r$, 则对节点_j来说, 在state_r中的轮次记为 k_j , 在state_{r'}中的轮次记为 k'_j , 则 $\begin{cases} k_j = k'_j \\ \text{or } k'_j > r \end{cases}$

在state_r \rightarrow state_{r'}, $r' > r+1$ 时:

若包含错误签名的节点的状态, 可直接被验证。
若包含的都是节点自己签名的状态, 则从诚实节点_j的角度看。

- (1) 假设节点_j没有发送 $r+1$ 轮的轮次, 则custodian广播的_j的轮次 $r_c \leq r$ 。
假设在state_r中包含的轮次为 k_j , 在state_{r'}中包含的轮次为 k'_j 。
若正确更新, 则应该包含 k_j , 即 $k'_j = k_j$ 。
若不正常, 则 $k'_j \neq k_j$ 且 $k'_j < r$, 则⑤相悖。
- (2) 假设_j发送了 $r+1$ 轮的轮次, 则分为两种情况, 包含与不包含。
若包含, 则相当于认可这笔交易, 此时对方更新后的状态也应该被包含。
如果对方诚实, 那么更新到 $r+1$ 轮, 交易相同。
如果对方与_j合谋, 则可能会生成 $> r+1$ 的状态, 以损害诚实节点的利益。
体现在余额上, 可能会自己减, 但不会影响到诚实节点的余额, 则总金额不等, 违反①。
在条件支付上, 可能会单方面将cpay空掉, 违反②。
若不包含, 则⑤(1)相同。

```

AuditDou(stater, stater'), r' > r.
if [(r=r) ∧ (stater ≠ stater')] ∨ [(r'=r+1) ∧ (stater' ≠ update(stater, r))]
  ∨ [(r' > r+1) ∧ [∃j, (k_j ≠ k'_j) ∧ (k'_j ≤ r)]], return false.
else return true

```

链上合约中的判断:

```

Audit(proof)
parse proof as (stater1,  $\sigma_{r1}$ , stater2,  $\sigma_{r2}$ ).
for r in {r1, r2}
  if !VerSigcus(stater,  $\sigma_r$ ) ∧ (stater ≠ BestState), stater := ⊥.
  if VerSigcus(stater,  $\sigma_r$ ) ∧ !AuditSin(stater), punish()
if (stater1 ≠ ⊥) ∧ (stater2 ≠ ⊥) ∧ !AuditDou(staterr1, staterr2).
  punish().

```

因此, AuditSin(stater).

```

if(!VerSig(r) ∨ !checksum() ∨ !checkConpay() ∨ !checkRound())
  return false
else return true.

```

```

VerSig(stater).
parse stater as (r, {Inputj,  $\sigma_j$  | j, Fr)
if ∃j, !Verifyj(Inputj,  $\sigma_j$ ), return false.
else return true.

```

```

checksum(stater)
parse stater as (r, {Inputj,  $\sigma_j$  | j, Fr)
parse Inputj as (payj, balj, ConPayj).
if (Fr +  $\sum_j$  (balj +  $\frac{1}{2} \times$  cpay. amt, cpay ∈ ConPayj) ≠ totalValue).
  return false
else return true.

```

checkConpay(stater).

```

parse stater as (r, {Inputj,  $\sigma_j$  | j, Fr)
parse Inputj as (payj, balj, ConPayj).
if ∃cpay, set Pi := cpay.pr, Pj := cpay.pe, cpay ∉ (ConPayi ∧ ConPayj).
  return false.
else return true.

```

checkRound(stater).

```

parse stater as (r, {Inputj,  $\sigma_j$  | j, Fr)
parse Inputj as (payj, balj, ConPayj).
if ∃payj, Pi = payj.other(Pj).
  (payj.rmd > r) ∨ (payj.rmd > r) ∨ (payj.rmd < payj.rmd)
  ∨ [(payj.rmd == payj.vonmd) ∧ (payj ≠ payj)]
  return false
else return true.

```