

**HD**     **Heard on the Street / Financial Analysis and Commentary**

**BY**     By Alex Frangos

**WC**     2,014 words

**PD**     13 October 2014

**SN**     The Wall Street Journal Asia

**SC**     AWSJ

**PG**     32

**LA**     English

**CY**     Copyright © 2014 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

**LP**

Agile Property Plays **China**

Real Estate's Weak Link

**TD**

Investors have been looking for a weak link among **Chinese**-listed property companies for some time. They may have finally found it in Agile Property Holdings.

The midsize apartment seller said last month that it would launch a share rights issue to raise money to pay down debt. The structure of the deal, which involved the controlling Chen family borrowing from the **company's** bankers to pay for its portion of the rights issue, raised eyebrows. That the rights issue was at a steep discount to its shares, at only 0.3 times the **company's** book value, showed the low price the **company** was willing to accept for fresh cash. If it could have gotten the deal done, that is.

The **company** said Friday that the rights issue is off, without saying exactly why. It promised that in the future, if it tries to raise cash in a similar way, the Chen family would source its own funds. The question is whether it will get the chance. The **company's** shares have been suspended pending the release of inside information since Oct 3. Meanwhile, yields on Agile's dollar-denominated **bonds** maturing in 2017 have risen from 6.6% after the rights issue was announced to more than 11% Friday.

The **company** has issues besides debt. A mainland media report linked the **company** to Zhou Yongkang, **China's** former security chief who is now at the center of a corruption probe. The **company** calls the allegations "groundless and totally fabricated," but has disclosed that prosecutors had its chairman in custody. Investors are spooked.

As any market turns down, as **China's** property sector is doing now, it is easy to dismiss the travails of an individual **company** as problems of its own making. Some of its competitors even saw decent sales over the past week's National Day holiday, an important buying period.

But the heart of Agile's problems isn't unique. It borrows lots of money to buy land and build apartment towers and hopes to sell them quickly. It is a tried-and-true formula in **China's** market, which hasn't experienced a prolonged downturn since **Chinese** were allowed to own apartments in the 1990s. Agile has cut prices to keep sales going. Across **China's** cities, the developer formula is being stretched.

**Chinese** companies under stress have proved remarkably able to find fresh cash to save the day. That could still happen here. But it is unlikely that the problems Agile is grappling with are just its own.

-- Alex Frangos

Beijing Prolongs the Pain in **Coal**

**China** made a splash last year saying it wants more market pricing for natural resources. Yet it is now intervening in the **coal** market to drive up the price. It is an old-school move that should have **coal** investors winning.

The world's top **coal** importer sent shock waves when it announced tariffs on imported **coal** of up to 6% Thursday. Shares of Australia's Whitehaven **Coal** fell on the prospect it will have to cut prices to stay competitive in **China**. Those who mine out of Indonesia are spared by a free-trade agreement.

**China's** state media explicitly said this move is intended to protect local companies, 70% of whom are logging losses as **Chinese** thermal **coal** prices have dropped 24% this year. The import tariff now gives these locals the room to raise prices. Higher prices would be supported if they can also cut production, as **China's coal** industry association recently advocated.

The irony is that Beijing used to push for cheap **coal**. **China** got rid of its tariffs on imported **coal** last decade to let industries such as power and steel access more inexpensive **coal** from Indonesia or Australia. It also built out rail networks to lower transport costs and extract more **coal** from the interior.

There is some consolation for international miners in the near term. By nature of **China** being the price setter for global **coal** prices, the higher **Chinese** prices that result from the tariff could help support **coal** globally, says IHS analyst Scott Dendy. A trader who exports to **China** may not get to enjoy the price rise entirely -- thanks to the tariff -- but the higher nominal price he gets in **China** could help him demand a higher price from customers in, say, Japan or South Korea.

Yet the long-term effect of the tariff is to delay the needed consolidation a plummeting **coal** price would have encouraged. Beijing probably isn't interested in **coal** prices that are too high, since that would hurt the **coal**-fired power plants that feed **China's** industrial complex. But it is afraid of letting **coal** miners fail, both because of the thousands they employ and the shadow-banking products they are thought to support.

By not tolerating low prices now, Beijing is consigning the **coal** industry to more pain in the future.

-- Abheek Bhattacharya

#### **China's** Slower Growth Story

##### Could Give the Fed the Chills

The slowing of **China's** economy is pushing down on prices in the U.S. There may be much more pressure to come.

With recent economic data even weaker than expected, there lately has been a reassessment of how fast **China** is likely to grow. Last week, the World Bank lowered its forecast for **Chinese** gross-domestic-product growth in 2014 to 7.4% from 7.6%, and in 2015 to 7.2% from 7.5%. Many private forecasts are lower.

Slower **Chinese** growth may presage a cooling in prices that could give the Federal Reserve the fits. Its preferred measure of inflation already is below its 2% target, raising the risk of deflation if a recession hits, as well as offering a signal that plenty of slack remains in the economy.

**China's** slowdown is an big reason commodity prices have fallen so much recently. **China**-made raw materials, like aluminum, that used to be absorbed by domestic demand now are getting exported, weighing on prices globally. Years of rising **Chinese energy** demand led to the development of new sources of **oil**, like shale, and drove the developed world to improve fuel economy. But now that **China's** economy has decelerated, there is a threat of a glut, and **oil** prices have fallen sharply.

The drop in **oil** prices, especially, will cool consumer inflation in the months ahead as it shows up at gasoline pumps. And as it moderates manufacturing and freight costs, it will over time damp price increases for other goods.

The more persistent effect of **China's** slowdown on inflation, however, could come through the prices of the **Chinese** goods the U.S. imports. These have lately shown hints of slippage: The Labor Department reported Friday that its index of **Chinese** import prices was down 0.1% in September from October, which put it 0.1% above its year-earlier level. If **China** moves to ramp up exports in a bid to keep the economy from slowing too quickly, U.S. import prices could get a lot softer.

**China** has targeted GDP growth of about 7.5%, and Beijing will tolerate it growing a bit more slowly next year. Unwilling to court unrest, it will be at pains to ensure growth doesn't fall too quickly. With low **Chinese** inflation readings suggesting consumer demand is still too weak to drive the economy on its own, **China** may turn to exports to keep it purring. But export-fueled growth won't be as easy to pull off as in the past.

In the 2000s, **China** massively increased its export position. Its share of U.S. manufactured-goods, machinery and transportation-equipment imports went from 10.4% in 1999 to 29.2% in 2009. But then its import penetration stalled, with its share of those imports coming to 28.8% last year.

One reason is the financial crisis. As well, events such as 2011's tsunami in Japan and floods in Thailand prompted many firms to rethink the logic of long supply chains. In addition, rising wages cut into the cost savings **China** could offer. And in many product categories, **Chinese** imports were close to the saturation point, with remaining categories much harder to crack.

That doesn't mean **China**'s share of imports in the U.S. and other countries can't grow. But **China** may have to charge lower prices to do this. The date when the Fed finally meets its 2% inflation target is looking even further off.

-- Justin Lahart

#### Blackstone Investors Are Wary

Blackstone Group is in the business of buying low and selling high. So it is only fair for investors to ask why they should buy what it is selling.

That was true when the private-**equity firm** went public in 2007. It took 81 months for the shares to trade above the \$35.06 price they closed at on the first day of trading. And the question should again ring in investors' ears in light of Blackstone's announcement Friday that it is spinning off its financial-advisory business.

Blackstone claims this will unlock value. Conflicts of interest with its much-larger asset-management business were preventing its investment bankers from competing for many deals, it said on an analyst call Friday. The implication is that a stand-alone **firm** will expand faster than it could within Blackstone. Yet that isn't the story Blackstone told when it went public: Back then, it touted the combination of its private-**equity** and advisory businesses, saying this gave it "unique insights into how to best maximize value."

It is true that Blackstone's financial-advisory business has expanded more slowly than the rest of the **firm**. Revenue there rose 15% last year, compared with 76% revenue growth in private **equity**. Yet growth at Blackstone's advisory business was about in line with that of competitors such as Evercore Partners.

True, boutiques trade at much higher multiples than asset managers. Blackstone is at about eight times forward earnings, while Evercore and Moelis are around double that. So a spinoff may clarify the advisory business's valuation and remove some drag.

But investors were likely assigning it a similar multiple in their sum of Blackstone's parts. And the advisory business isn't an automatic route to riches for shareholders. It remains highly dependent on deal flow and the macroeconomic environment.

Investment bankers don't come cheap. Compensation ate through about 62% of Blackstone's advisory revenue last year. That expense could rise at a stand-alone **firm**. Compensation at Evercore devoured nearly 66% of advisory revenue.

That is evident in the price that Blackstone shareholders are paying for the spinoff. Just 65% of the new **company** will be owned by them, while its investment bankers will own the other 35%.

-- John Carney

#### Overheard: The ECB's Scenic Route

The European Central Bank has resisted calls to buy government **bonds** in large quantities. But is it engaging in stealth quantitative easing?

With ECB deposit rates at minus 0.2%, about 1.3 trillion euros (\$1.6 trillion) of short-dated eurozone government debt is now trading at a negative yield, Bank of America Merrill Lynch notes. That is a problem for investors like banks and central banks, which are traditionally big buyers of such debt.

BofA calculates that if these investors were to try to offset the hit to interest income since the beginning of June, there could be 400 **billion** euros to 600 **billion** euros of demand for longer-dated or riskier paper. That relies on the same mechanism -- making very safe assets unpalatable and encouraging risk appetite -- as quantitative easing in other countries.

That could be one way in which the market is underestimating the effect of the ECB's actions so far. But it still represents an indirect, passive route to easing, rather than the shock-and-awe effect that might eventually be needed.

[License this article from Dow Jones Reprint Service](#)

**CO** eurcb : European Central Bank

**IN** i1 : Energy | i111 : Coal Mining | i13 : Crude Oil/Natural Gas | i81401 : Central Banking | i85 : Real Estate Transactions | i8500031 : Residential Property Dealing/Owning | ireest : Real Estate | i814 : Banking | ibasicm : Basic Materials/Resources | ibnk : Banking/Credit | icre : Real Estate/Construction | ifinal : Financial Services | imet : Mining/Quarrying | irreal : Residential Real Estate

**NS** c314 : Pricing | gtrade : Tariffs/Trade Barriers | c1521 : Analyst Comments/Recommendations | ccat : Corporate/Industrial News | cspin : Spin-offs | m11 : Equity Markets | ndj : Dow Jones Top Stories | nedc : Commentaries/Opinions | neqac : Equities Asset Class News | nfiac : Fixed Income Asset Class News | nhrd : Heard on the Street | nsum : News Digests | ntesi : Essential Stock Market Information | ntop : Top Wire News | c02 : Corporate Changes | c11 : Plans/Strategy | c15 : Performance | c152 : Earnings Projections | c18 : Ownership Changes | c31 : Marketing/Markets | cactio : Corporate Actions | cncc : New Companies Creation | e51 : Trade/External Payments | ecat : Economic News | gcat : Political/General News | gdip : International Relations | gpri : Politics/International Relations | mcat : Commodity/Financial Market News | ncat : Content Types | nfact : Factiva Filters | nfce : C&E Exclusion Filter | nfcpe : C&E Executive News Filter | nfcpi : C&E Industry News Filter | niwe : IWE Filter | redit : Selection of Top Stories/Trends/Analysis

**RE** china : China | austr : Australia | eurz : Europe | usa : United States | use : Northeast U.S. | usny : New York State | beijin : Beijing | apacz : Asia Pacific | asiaz : Asia | ausnz : Australia/Oceania | bric : BRICS Countries | chinaz : Greater China | devgcoz : Emerging Market Countries | dvpcoz : Developing Economies | easiaz : Eastern Asia | namz : North America

**IPC** ABO

**PUB** Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

**AN** Document AWSJ000020141012eaad0000g