

HD Private equity looms over Australia's wine industry

BY John Rice, Associate Professor in Strategic Management at Griffith University; Nigel Martin, Lecturer, College of **Business** and Economics at Australian National University

WC 997 words

PD 5 August 2014

SN The Conversation

SC CONVAU

LA English

CY Copyright 2014. The Conservation Media Group.

LP

It is sometimes said that at least investors in vineyards can drink their losses. Indeed, it's been a rocky few years for the Australian **wine** industry. External pressures have been challenging and much of the industry is in a deep malaise. This is most true for smaller producers, and even more especially true for those at the bottom of the industry's value chain – the growers of non-premium **wine** grapes.

The pressure was ramped up in May's with a bid from private **equity firm** Kohlberg Kravis Roberts for Treasury Wines Estate (TWE) - the owner of the renowned Penfolds - at \$4.70 per share. Joined this week by fellow New York-based hedge fund Rhône Capital, the offer was upped to \$5.20. In the absence of something better, or the bidders getting cold feet, the offer looks likely to succeed.

TD

Foster's foray

Times were not always so tough for small producers. Throughout the 1990s, both **wine** production and export prices **grew steadily**, marking a renaissance for an industry long seen, at home and abroad, as trailing the traditional **wine** growing regions of Europe in terms of quality and efficiency.

Steeped in the history of the South Australian **wine** industry, Penfolds led the growing recognition of quality Australian **wine** with Grange (once Grange Hermitage), generally considered one of the world's great reds – with a price tag to match.

In hindsight its **acquisition** by Foster's in 2005 was **a disaster**, more so for Foster's than the Oatley family, who cashed out their **stake** acquired when they rolled their Rosemount **business** into Southcorp Wines previously.

Foster's takeover was driven by the view that the beer industry was mature and lacking in growth, and thus Foster's management wanted something more exciting. They certainly found this through the **acquisition** of **wine** producers.

Beer and **wine** – what could possibly go wrong?

As it turned out, just about everything went wrong! Beer and spirits are essentially industrial products, while **wine** is deeply rooted in agriculture. External factors beyond the control of the **company** did not help – including a soaring Australian dollar, drought, powerful retail buyers and a production glut producing intense competition from other “new world” producers for sales.

Foster's spun off the various **wine** businesses that it had assiduously acquired into TWE in 2011. Independent of Foster's, TWE did well for a time, before falling foul of the buying power of Australia's retail duopoly of Coles/Wesfarmers and Woolworths in late 2013 and 2014. This was especially true in the vital **lead**-up to Christmas 2013, when sales slumped and profit projections were **downgraded**.

What next for Australia's **wine** industry?

What the Treasury Wines buyout means for the remainder of the Australian **wine** industry is an important question. KKR and Rhône clearly see an opportunity to cut costs and build profits before selling the **business** off in a few years. Likely casualties in such a scenario will be the less profitable labels that produce low margin, low priced **wine**. This process was already underway at TWE, but will likely accelerate under the new ownership.

For many grape growing communities, this process may spell disaster. [Already struggling](#) with prices that barely cover the cost of picking, a smaller industry more focused on premium **wine** will likely see a mass exodus of producers within SA's Riverland, Victoria's Murray Valley and the NSW Riverina.

The upside for the bidders will be building the penetration of their major labels, especially Grange and the remainder of its '[icon and luxury brands](#)' into Asia, and especially **China**.

China's love affair with (premium) **wine**

China's love affair with imported premium **wine** is symptomatic of wider trends. An escalation of [both import volumes and average prices](#) per bottle to **China** have been driven by gift giving and extravagant hospitality. KKR and Rhone see this trend as likely to continue, in spite of the mooted [austerity drive](#) of top Communist party officials.

Chinese consumers of **wine** are generally within its upper economic echelons, and for them consumption of imported **wine** is as much about status symbolism as the product itself. Thus, for Australian **wine** producers hoping to replicate Penfolds' success, the challenge will be to get the right balance between price, volumes and market image.

This won't be easy. Penfolds has both an established **brand** story and access to **Chinese** consumers through its distribution network. For smaller producers, replicating both of these will be a challenge. Groups like [Australia's First Families of Wine](#) are attempting to do just this in a collaborative manner. As private companies, their success is hard to gauge, but their premium products and strong brands should hold them in good stead.

Longer term, the prospect of a hundred **million** middle-class **Chinese** drinking imported **wine** (albeit of the more humble, non-premium variety) regularly is an enticing prospect for Australian exporters. What the last two decades have shown, however, is they will have strong competition. Barriers to increasing supply of such **wine** from producers in Chile, New Zealand and South Africa are limited. Even if exports in **wine** volumes in these lower priced products increase, margins will be scant.

In this regard, the future for **wine** grape growers throughout inland Australia does not look good. Combined with perennial problems of water scarcity and salinity, images from Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath come to mind. Managing the social and economic consequences of this for inland **wine** grape growing regions will be an important challenge.

John Rice is a member of the Australian Labor Party and the National Tertiary Education Union.

Nigel Martin does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any **company** or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

CO kkr : KKR & Co. L.P. | rhcap : Rhone Capital LLC

IN i0 : Agriculture | i81502 : Trusts/Funds/Financial Vehicles | i8150203 : Private Equity | ialtin : Alternative Investments | ifinal : Financial Services | iinv : Investing/Securities | i426 : Wine | i41 : Food/Beverages/Tobacco | ialco : Alcoholic Beverages/Drinks | ibevrge : Beverages/Drinks | icnp : Consumer Goods

NS gwine : Wine | gcat : Political/General News | gfod : Food/Drink | glife : Living/Lifestyle | gwbs : Wine/Beer/Spirits

RE austr : Australia | apacz : Asia Pacific | ausnz : Australia/Oceania

PUB The Conversation Media Group Limited

AN Document CONVAU0020140806ea8500012