



Introduzione ad Android

Lezione 4
Android security

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A.A. 2022/2023

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1. Android OS
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
Android OS (1/3)

- System Architecture
 - Linux Version 2.6 or 3.0.1
 - Dalvik Virtual Machine (VM)
 - Application Framework

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Android OS (2/3)



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Android OS (3/3)

- Applications
 - Applications are written in Java or Python
 - Applications are run on the Dalvik Virtual Machine
 - Development done in the Android SDK
 - Development is open to all
 - User driven Android Market

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Android security (1/8)

- Security triad applicability
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Availability

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Android security (2/8)

- Android Security
 - Relies on security of its foundations: Linux, Dalvik, and Java.
 - Security Goal: *“A central design point of the Android security architecture is that no application, by default, has permission to perform any operations that would adversely impact other applications, the operating system, or the user.”*

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Android security (3/8)

- Enforcement strategy
 - Application signing and certification
 - Linux username base access restriction
 - Capability permissions

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Android security (4/8)

- Application Sandboxes
 - All Applications run as their own Linux user
 - Several Inter-Process Communication methods
 - Activities
 - Services
 - BroadcastReceiver
 - ContentProvider
 - Intent
 - Applications utilize a capability like model to protect the system and the user

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Android security (5/8)

- Android capabilities and permissions
 - Capabilities default to safe state
 - Must be explicitly defined to enable capabilities
 - Permissions are static on install
 - Users have open view of permissions


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Android security (6/8)

String	ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION	Allows an application to access coarse (e.g., Cell-ID, WIFI) location
String	ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION	Allows an application to access fine (e.g., GPS) location

<http://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission.html>



http://www.simplehelp.net/images/quick_gps/img06.png

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Android security (7/8)

- Security concerns for developers
 - Protect your application, use least privilege principle
 - If you expose, mediate IPCs
 - Provide maximum availability
 - Minimize memory footprint
 - Minimize battery usage

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Android security (8/8)

- Security concerns for users
 - Do your research
 - Read reviews.
 - Analyze capabilities/permissions before installing
 - Use common sense
 - <http://www.downloadsquad.com/2010/06/28/understanding-the-android-market-security-system/>

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Security analysis (1/3)

- Security Analysis
 - Mediation
 - Verifiability
 - Integrity of TCB

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Security analysis (2/3)

- Principles of Secure Design
 - Least privilege
 - Fail safe defaults
 - Economy of mechanism
 - Complete mediation
 - Defense in depth
 - Open design
 - Separation of privilege
 - Least common mechanism
 - Psychological acceptability

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Security analysis (3/3)

- Secure architecture
- Reliance on trust
- As with all things, use your head

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Credits

- Daniel Angelis, Michael Rothstein, „Android™ OS Security - A brief synopsis of the Android Operating System and its security”