


THE POWER OF MEMORY

Is memory size advantageous in interactions (social, biological, ...) ?

	C	D
C	3, 3	0, 5
D	5, 3	1, 1

	1	2	3	...	$n-1$	n
player p	C	C	C	...	D	...
player q	C	C	D	...	D	...

memory size $n-1$



$$\begin{bmatrix} p_1 q_1 & p_1 (-q_1 + 1) & q_1 (-p_1 + 1) & (-p_1 + 1) (-q_1 + 1) \\ p_2 q_3 & p_2 (-q_3 + 1) & q_3 (-p_2 + 1) & (-p_2 + 1) (-q_3 + 1) \\ p_3 q_2 & p_3 (-q_2 + 1) & q_2 (-p_3 + 1) & (-p_3 + 1) (-q_2 + 1) \\ p_4 q_4 & p_4 (-q_4 + 1) & q_4 (-p_4 + 1) & (-p_4 + 1) (-q_4 + 1) \end{bmatrix}$$

W. H. Press and F. J. Dyson. **Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent** PNAS 2012.

$$p^* \rightarrow \text{manipulates} \rightarrow q$$


This work considers an optimisation approach to identify:

$$p^* \rightarrow \text{best response} \rightarrow q$$

$$\max_q : \frac{\frac{1}{2} p Q p^T + c^T p + a}{\frac{1}{2} p \bar{Q} p^T + \bar{c}^T p + \bar{a}}$$

PURELY RANDOM STRATEGIES $p = (p, p, p, p)$

AGAINST A SINGLE OPPONENT




$$p^* = \operatorname{argmax}(u_q(p)), p \in S_q,$$

where the set S_q is defined as:

$$S_q = \left\{ 0, p_{\pm}, 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} 0 < p_{\pm} < 1, \\ p_{\pm} \neq \frac{-d_0}{d_1} \end{array} \right\}$$

AGAINST MULTIPLE OPPONENTS



$$p^* = \operatorname{argmax} \left(\sum_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p) \right), p \in S_{q(i)},$$

where the set $S_{q(i)}$ is defined as:

$$S_{q(i)} = \bigcup_{i=1}^{2N} \lambda_i \cup \{0, 1\}$$

RESULTS

1. The utility of a given player p against a given opponent q can be written in a compact way.
2. The optimal purely random player.
3. Complex strategies outperform optimal purely random.

FUTURE WORK RESULTANT THEORY

