


THE POWER OF MEMORY

Is memory size advantageous in interactions?

	C	D
C	3, 3	0, 5
D	5, 3	1, 1



W. H. Press and F. J. Dyson. **Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent** PNAS 2012.

$p^* \rightarrow \text{manipulates} \rightarrow q$

This work considers an optimisation approach to identify:

$p^* \rightarrow \text{best response} \rightarrow q$

$$u_q(p) = \frac{\frac{1}{2} p Q p^T + c^T p + a}{\frac{1}{2} p \bar{Q} p^T + \bar{c}^T p + \bar{a}}, \text{ where } p \in \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]}^4$$

PURELY RANDOM STRATEGIES $p = (p, p, p, p)$


AGAINST A SINGLE OPPONENT




$$p^* = \operatorname{argmax}(u_q(p)), p \in S_q,$$

where:

$$S_q = \left\{ 0, p_{\pm}, 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} 0 < p_{\pm} < 1, \\ p_{\pm} \neq \frac{-c_0}{d_1} \end{array} \right\}$$



AGAINST MULTIPLE OPPONENTS



$$p^* = \operatorname{argmax} \left(\sum_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p) \right), p \in S_{q(i)},$$

where:


$$S_{q(i)} = \frac{2N}{U} \lambda_i \cup \{0, 1\}$$

$\lambda_i \neq \frac{d_{0i}}{d_{1i}}$

$$u_q(p)$$


$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & -a_0 \\ 1 & 0 & \dots & 0 & -a_1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & 1 & -a_{2N} \end{bmatrix}$$

Tournament size $N = 4$



FURTHER WORK

$p = (p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4) \rightarrow \text{RESULTANT THEORY}$



SUMMARY

1. The utility of a given player p against a given opponent q can be written in a compact way.
2. Obtaining the optimal random behaviour p^* reduces to a search over a small finite set.
3. Optimising against the mean utility cannot be captured by optimising against the mean opponent.
4. Memory is important in interactions with multiple agents.