
Symmetric-Key Encryption: constructions

Lecture 5 PRF, Block Cipher

PRG

- \circ G is a PRG if $\{G_k(x)\}_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k} \approx U_{n(k)}$ and G PPT
- A PRG can be used to obtain a <u>one-time</u> CPA-secure SKE
 - Stream cipher: PRG without an a priori bound n(k) on the output length
- Security: The pad produced by the PRG is indistinguishable from a truly random pad
 - Hence the scheme is indistinguishable from the one-time pad scheme (which is onetime CPA secure)
- Question: Multiple-message SKE?




Beyond One-Time


- Need to make sure that the same part of the one-time pad is never reused
 - Sender and receiver will need to maintain state and stay in sync (indicating how much of the pad has already been used)
 - Or only sender maintains the index, but sends it to the receiver. Then receiver will need to run the streamcipher to get to that index.
 - A PRG with direct access to any part of the output stream?
- Pseudo Random Function (PRF)

- A compact representation of an exponentially long (pseudorandom) string
 - Allows "random-access" (instead of just sequential access)
 - A function F(s;i) outputs the ith block of the pseudorandom string corresponding to seed s
 - Exponentially many blocks (i.e., large domain for i)
- Pseudorandom Function
 - Need to define pseudorandomness for a function (not a string)

- F: $\{0,1\}^{k} \times \{0,1\}^{m(k)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n(k)}$ is a PRF if all PPT adversaries have negligible advantage in the PRF experiment
 - Adversary given oracle access to either F with a random seed, or a random function R: $\{0,1\}^{m(k)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n(k)}$. Needs to guess which.
 - Note: Only 2^k seeds for F
 - But 2^(n2m) functions R
 - PRF stretches k bits to n2m bits




A PRF can be constructed from any PRG



- A PRF can be constructed from any PRG
 - Not blazing fast: needs |r| evaluations of a PRG
 - Faster constructions based on specific number-theoretic computational complexity assumptions
 - Fast heuristic constructions
- PRF in practice: Block Cipher
 - Extra features/requirements:
 - Permutation: input block (r) to output block
 - Key can be used as an inversion trapdoor
 - Pseudorandomness even with access to inversion

CPA-secure SKE with a PRF (or Block Cipher)

- Suppose Alice and Bob have shared a key (seed) for a block-cipher (or PRF) BC
- For each encryption, Alice will pick a fresh pseudorandom pad, by picking a <u>new value r</u> and setting pad=BC_K(r)
- Bob needs to be able to generate the same pad, so Alice sends r (in the clear, as part of the ciphertext) to Bob
- Even if Eve sees r, PRF security guarantees that $BC_K(r)$ is pseudorandom. (In fact, Eve could have picked r, as long as we ensure no r is reused.)
- How to pick a new r?
 - Pick at random!




Weak PRF

Note: CPA-Security relied on the inputs to the PRF being just distinct (not random)

But if the input is indeed random, a weaker guarantee on PRF suffices


- Weak PRF: Similar to PRF, but the inputs to the oracle are chosen randomly
 - As before, adversary can see both the input and the output
 - As before, adversary can see as many inputoutput pairs as it wants
- Weak PRF suffices for CPA-secure SKE of singleblock messages



R

CPA-secure SKE with a Block Cipher

- How to encrypt a long message (multiple blocks)?
 - Chop the message into blocks and independently encrypt each block as before?
 - Works, but ciphertext size is double that of the plaintext (if r is one-block long)
- Extend output length of a PRF (w/o increasing input length)



Output is indistinguishable from t random blocks, provided all the inputs to F_K remain distinct (because F itself is a PRF)

CPA-secure SKE with a Block Cipher

- Various "modes" of operation of a Block-cipher (i.e., encryption schemes using a block-cipher). All with one block overhead. Weak PRF
 - Output Feedback (OFB) mode: Extend the pseudorandom output using the first construction in the previous slide
 - © Counter (CTR) Mode: Similar idea as in the second construction. But no a priori limit on number of blocks in a message.
 - Security from low likelihood of (r+1,...,r+t) running into (r'+1,...,r'+t')
 - © Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode: Sequential encryption. Decryption uses $F_{K^{-1}}$. Ciphertext an integral number of blocks.

