# The automated testing of randomness with multiple statistical batteries

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
### Thesis structure

- Creation of a unified interface supporting multiple statistical batteries.
  - NIST Statistical Testing Suite
  - Dieharder
  - TestU01
- Conducting the baseline (control) experiment to create a reference point for the further experiments.
- Evaluating randomness of outputs of well-known cryptographic primitives.
- Analysing validity of the Dieharder battery results.

## Randomness Testing Toolkit – overview


- Design and implementation of a tool for consistent randomness evaluation.
- The developed tool (RTT) acts as an interface between the user and the statistical batteries common format of the battery settings and results.
- The toolkit supports multiple statistical batteries NIST STS, Dieharder, and TestU01; it is possible to add more batteries over time.
- Both standalone program and online service were developed.

## Randomness Testing Toolkit – local interface



- 1. User executes the binary, basic configuration is set through command-line arguments.
- 2. RTT reads advanced settings in common format
- 3. The common settings are translated into battery-specific settings.
- 4. Binary data is read from file supplied to battery.
- 5. The binary stream is analysed.
- 6. The battery-specific results are gathered and translated into unified format by RTT.
- 7. The results are stored for user to inspect.

## Randomness Testing Toolkit - web service



- 1. Experiment and data are submitted.
- 2. Data is uploaded.
- 3. Experiment and related jobs are created.
- 4. Single pending job is selected.
- 5. Data is downloaded.
- 6. The data is analyzed.
- 7. The results of the analysis are stored.
- 8. The results in the database are presented.
- 9. Analysis of the data is inspected.

# Statistical testing of randomness -1/2

## Testing hypothesis – $H_0$

During the experiments, we evaluated the hypothesis that the analysed data were produced by a truly random generator. We denote the hypothesis as  $H_0$  (null hypothesis).

### Statistical battery

Software with the purpose of detecting biases in data stream; collection of statistical tests.

#### Statistical test

A single unit in a statistical battery checking some property of the data (e.g. count of ones). Output of a test is the probability that the analysed data were produced by TRNG. Each test in a given battery will either fail ( $H_0$  rejection) or pass ( $H_0$  retainment).

# Statistical testing of randomness -2/2

#### **Significance level** – $\alpha$

The significance level is set prior to the experiments (usually 0.001) and based on it, the null hypothesis is rejected or retained.

### False positive (Type I error)

The false positive result is observed when  $H_0$  holds true, but it is rejected – stream produced by TRNG is evaluated as non-random. The probability of Type I error is  $\alpha$ .

## False negative (Type II error)

The false negative result is observed when  $H_0$  is false, but it is not rejected – stream generated by biased generator is evaluated as random.

## Establishing baseline results

- The interpretation of a battery is obtained from the proportion of the failed tests in the battery (e.g. we consider data biased if more than 2 out of 15 tests fail).
- However, even data generated by a perfect TRNG may fail some tests (false positives).
- We analysed large amount of data for which the hypothesis held and examined the results.
- From the results we drew the basis for interpretation of future experiments.

# Analysis of well-known algoritms -1/2

**Goal:** Evaluate randomness of the outputs of round-reduced cryptographic primitives and observe their security margins.

- We analysed 15 algorithms in multiple configurations. In total, more than 80 data streams were processed. The algorithms were chosen based on their popularity (AES, DES, RC4, TEA) or their success in crypto competitions eSTREAM (Rabbit, Grain, ...) and SHA3 (Keccak, Grøstl, ...).
- The results were compared to another randomness analysis approach developed in CRoCS (EACirc).

# Analysis of well-known algorithms -2/2

Algorithm	Round	Total rounds	NIST STS (x/15)	Dieharder (x/27)	Small Crush (x/10)	<b>Crush</b> (x/32)	Rabbit (×/16)	Alphabit (x/4)	Block Alphabit (x/4)	EACirc (proportion)	Security margin (rounds)	Security margin (proportion)
AES	3	10	8	15	5	20	5	2	4	0.182	7	0.70
BLAKE	1	16	- 11	11	5	18	5	2	3	0.107	15	0.93
Grain*	2 6	13	14 1	27 0	9/9	31/31 3	15 1	4 0	4	1.000 0.017	7	0.53
Grøstl	2	14	12	23	9	27	9	3	3	1.000	12	0.85
JH	6	42	12/13	27	10	30/31	15	4	4	1.000	36	0.85
Keccak	2	24	14 0	27 1	10 1	31 11	15 4	4	4 3	1.000 0.017	21	0.87
MD6*	8 10	104	9	19 0	5 0	16 2	8 3	2	3	0.748 0.010	94	0.90
Rabbit*	0 4	4	1 0	1 0	0	4	3	1	1	0.017 0.009	0	0
Salsa20	2	20	12	26	8	28	11	3	3	1.000	18	0.90
Single DES	4 5	16	7 1	22 6	7	26 18	11 5	4 2	4 3	0.193 0.010	11	0.68
Skein	3 4	72	12 0	27 0	10 0	30 10	13 4	3 1	4 3	1.000 0.014	68	0.94
SOSEMANUK	4	25	13/13	27	10	31/31	16	4	4	1.000	21	0.84
TEA	4 5	32	8	19 3	6	15 4	4	2 0	3 3	0.444 0.012	27	0.84
Triple DES	2	16	12 1	26 4	9	31 4	15 0	3 1	4	1.000 0.017	13	0.81
RC4* (roundless)	-	-	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0.009	-	0

# Analysis of the results of Dieharder battery -1/2


**Goal:** Verifying uniformity of partial results of Dieharder battery.


- Partial results of the battery are expected to be uniformly distributed on the interval (0,1] during random data analysis; the assumption of uniformity is used to further process the battery results.
- Eight TB of quantum random data were processed by each test. More than a billion of partial results was extracted and analysed.

#### **Experiment results**

- Out of 110 partial result sets, we found that 39 sets were not uniformly distributed.
- The broken assumption can cause wrong result interpretation.
- Further implications of the non-uniformity are a part of ongoing research.

## Analysis of the results of Dieharder battery -2/2





## Conclusion

### **Randomness Testing Toolkit**

- User-friendly tool with easy interpretation of results.
- Already used by researchers in CRoCS.
- Will be used in future research publication.

### Randomness evaluation of cryptographic algorithms

- Most algorithms have large enough security margins.
- RC4 and Rabbit cipher have bias in their full version.

## Analysis of Dieharder validity

- Surprisingly significant results.
- Full implications are part of ongoing research publication.

### References

### Randomness Testing Toolkit

https://github.com/crocs-muni/randomness-testing-toolkit

#### EACirc

https://github.com/crocs-muni/eacirc

### NIST Statistical testing suite

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/documentation\_software.html


#### Dieharder

http://www.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php


#### TestU01

http://simul.iro.umontreal.ca/testu01/tu01.html

## Baseline experiment – uncorrected results



## Baseline experiment - corrected results



## Baseline experiment – reference failure counts

	Closeness to				
Battery name	Uncorrected	Uncorrected	Allowed failures		
Dieharder	$5.32 \cdot 10^{-17}$	0.38	3/27		
NIST STS	$2.17 \cdot 10^{-2}$	$4.44 \cdot 10^{-7}$	2/15		
TU01 Small Crush	0.71	0.95	2/10		
TU01 Crush	$3.36\cdot10^{-11}$	$3.31 \cdot 10^{-3}$	3/32		
TU01 Rabbit	$2.02 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$1.45 \cdot 10^{-23}$	2/16		
TU01 Alphabit	$2.14 \cdot 10^{-8}$	$2.8 \cdot 10^{-7}$	1/4		
TU01 Block Alphabit	$1.87 \cdot 10^{-68}$	$5.15 \cdot 10^{-47}$	1/4		