



Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia

FACOLTÀ DI INGEGNERIA
Corso di Laurea Triennale in Ingegneria Informatica

PROVA FINALE

Titolo

Candidato:
Luca Lumetti
Matricola 118447

Relatore:
Prof. Maurizio Casoni
Correlatore:
Dott. Martin Klapez

Contents

1	Introduction	2
2	Cryptography Overview	3
2.1	Confidentiality	3
2.1.1	Perfectly Secret	4
2.1.2	Computationally Secret	4
2.1.3	Types of Attacks	4
2.2	Integrity	5
2.2.1	Hash Functions	5
2.2.2	Collision-resistant hash functions	6
2.2.3	The Merkle-Damgård Transform	6
2.2.4	Authentication	7
3	Private Key Cryptography	8
3.1	Pseudorandom Permutations	8
3.2	Block Chipers	9
3.2.1	Electronic Code Book	9
3.2.2	Cipher Block Chaining	10
3.2.3	Randomized Counter Mode	10
3.3	Substitution-Permutation Networks	11
3.3.1	Confusion-diffusion	11
3.3.2	Substitution-Permutation Networks	11
3.4	Advanced Encryption Standard	12
3.4.1	Galois Field	12
3.4.2	Encryption Method	12
3.5	Message Authentication Codes	13
4	Public Key Cryptography	14
5	Conclusions	15

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 2

Cryptography Overview

Cryptography is the study of using digital coding to secure data accessed. In other words to ensure that data can only be access by authorized entities.

To define cryptography jargon we introduce a situation where an entity Alice wants to send a message to another entity Bob through a communication channel. Cryptography is relevant when there's an adversary that tries to access the data sent through the channel without legitimate authorization.

The *plaintext* is the message that Alice wants to send to Bob. The *ciphertext* is the data that goes through the channel and one of the resources that an adversary can access. The process of converting the plaintext to the ciphertext is called *encryption* while the process to convert the ciphertext to the plaintext is called *decryption*. Encryption and decryption are defined by the *cryptographic scheme*, a set of algorithms that Alice and Bob decide to use before the actual communication, and one or more *keys*, that can be confidential and shared only between the authorized entities or they can also be public depending on the type of scheme used.

Regardless of the scheme's type used, which will be discussed later in detail, there are three main features that a cryptographic scheme should have to be defined secure: *confidentiality*, *integrity*, and *authentication*.

2.1 Confidentiality

Confidentiality assures that in a communication, an adversary is unable to obtain any information about the messages exchanged or the key used to encrypt them. This means that the ciphertext should appear to the adversary as completely random bits.

2.1.1 Perfectly Secret

We denote with \mathcal{M} , \mathcal{K} , \mathcal{C} the message space, key space, and ciphertext space, respectively, with $\Pr[M = m]$ the probability that a message m is sent and with $\Pr[C = c]$ the probability that the ciphertext is c .

We can define a cryptographic scheme to be perfectly secret if for every $m \in \mathcal{M}$, every $k \in \mathcal{K}$:

$$\Pr[M = m|C = c] = \Pr[M = m]$$

This means that the distribution over \mathcal{M} is independent of the distribution over \mathcal{C} . To achieve this definition, the key space \mathcal{K} must be greater than the message space \mathcal{M} . This can be impractical and inconvenient because perfect secrecy is defined against an adversary with unbounded computational power. We can relax this latter constraint to just be secure against polynomial-time algorithms.

2.1.2 Computationally Secret

Computational security is the aim of most modern cryptographic schemes. Modern encryption schemes can be broken given enough time and computation, nevertheless, the time required even for the most powerful supercomputer today built is in the order of hundreds of years.

From the previous definition of perfect secrecy we add two relaxations:

- Security is only preserved against efficient adversaries.
- Adversaries can potentially succeed with a negligible probability.

With the term efficient, we refer to an algorithm that can be carried out in *probabilistic polynomial time* (PPT). An algorithm A is said to run in polynomial time if there exists a polynomial $p(\cdot)$ such that for every $x \in 0, 1^*$, $A(x)$ terminates within at most $p(|x|)$. A probabilistic algorithm is one that has access to some randomness so its results depend on changes.

With negligible probability, we refer to a probability asymptotically smaller than the inverse of every polynomial $p(\cdot)$. So a function $f(\cdot)$ is **negligible** (typically denoted with **negl**) if for every polynomial $p(\cdot)$ there exists an N such that for all integers $n > N$ it holds that $f(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}$.

2.1.3 Types of Attacks

Based on the capableness of the adversary, we can define different types of attack that can be carried out against a scheme, which are:

- **Ciphertext-only attack:** is the case when the attacker can only access the ciphertext and try to determine the plaintext that was encrypted. In this case, the attacker is also called "eavesdropper".
- **Known-plaintext attack:** in this attack, the adversary learns one or more pairs of plaintexts/ciphertexts encrypted under the same key. The objective of the attacker is to determine the corresponding plaintext of a ciphertext that has not been known yet.
- **Chosen-plaintext attack (CPA):** the adversary has can obtain the encryption of any plaintext of his choice. Again the adversary aims to decrypt a ciphertext to get the relative plaintext.
- **Chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA):** the final and stronger type of attack. Here the adversary can to encrypt any plaintext and decrypt any ciphertext of its choice. Once again the aim is the same as the previous attacks but with the constraint that the ciphertext that it wants to crack can't be directly decrypted.

2.2 Integrity

Integrity assures to the receiver that a message is not corrupted or that an adversary has not modified and relayed it (for example in a man-in-the-middle attack).

The decryption of the message is not always needed to modify it but can be enough to have the ciphertext. An example is shown in section 3.5

Hash functions are used to assure the integrity of a message.

2.2.1 Hash Functions

In general, hash functions are just functions that take arbitrary-length strings and compress them into shorter strings. A hash function is a pair (Gen, H) such that:

- **Gen:** is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a security parameter n and outputs a key s
- **H:** is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a string $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and a key s to outputs a string $\text{H}^s(x) \in \{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ where l is a polynomial.

In practice, hash functions are unkeyed or, rather, the key is included in the function itself.

As an example of use of hash functions, imagine that a user A wants to send a message m to a user B and he also wants to assure its integrity. After they both agree on the hash function to use, A sends $(m, H(m))$, then upon receiving the pair, B itself calculates $H(m)$ and verifies that it is the same it received from A. If they match, m can be considered intact.

The domain of H is unlimited, instead, its image is limited. For the pigeon-hole principles this means that there are infinite pairs of different strings x and x' such that $H(x) = H(x')$, this is also known as a *collision*.

2.2.2 Collision-resistant hash functions

Hash functions used in cryptography are also called collision-resistant hash function, to emphasize the importance to have the property that no polynomial-time adversary can reverse them in a reasonable time. There are 3 levels of security:

1. **Collision resistance:** is the most secure level and implies that, given the key s , is infeasible to find two different values x and x' such that $H^s(x) = H^s(x')$.
2. **Second preimage resistance:** implies that, given s and a string x , is infeasible for a polynomial-time algorithm to find a string x' such that it collides with x
3. **Preimage resistance:** implies that given the key s and a hash y , is infeasible for a polynomial-time algorithm to find a value x such that $H^s(x) = y$.

Notice that every hash function that is collision resistant is second preimage resistant, also a second preimage resistant function is a preimage resistant function.

2.2.3 The Merkle-Damgård Transform

Even if we have defined hash functions as functions with an infinite domain, in practice they are first constructed to be *fixed-length*, that means their domain is finite, then they are extended to cover the full domain $\{0, 1\}^*$.

This extension is made easy by the Merkle-Damgård transform which also preserves the collision-resistant property.

We will denote the given fixed-length collision-resistant hash function (or *compression function*) by (Gen_h, h) and use it to construct a general collision-resistant hash function (Gen, H) that maps inputs of any length to outputs of length $l(n)$.

Let (Gen_h, h) be a fixed-length hash function with input length $2l(n)$ and output $l(n)$. Construct a variable-length hash function (Gen, H) as follow:

- $\text{Gen}(n)$: upon input n , run the key-generation algorithm: $s \leftarrow \text{Gen}_h$.
- $H^s(x)$: upon input key s and message $x \in 0, 1^*$, compute as follows:
 1. Pad x with zeroes until it's length is a multiple of $l(n)$. Let $L = |x|$ (length of the string) and let $B = \left\lceil \frac{L}{l(n)} \right\rceil$ (number of blocks of length $l(n)$).
 2. Define $z_0 := 0^{l(n)}$ and then $\forall i = 1, \dots, B$, compute:

$$z_i := h^s(z_{i-1} || x_i)$$

where h^s is the given fixed-length hash function.

3. Output $z = H^s(z_B || L)$.

We remark that the value z_0 , also known as *IV* or *initialization vector* can be replaced with any constant of length $l(n)$ bits.

2.2.4 Authentication

In a cryptographic scheme, authentication is needed to authenticate the entities involved in the communication. In other words, authentication assures that messages received by Bob are for sure from Alice.

We talk about authentication in the integrity section because the difference between these two concepts is blurry, moreover authentication implies integrity (but not vice versa).

In symmetric schemes, we will see *messages authentication codes* (MAC) and in asymmetric schemes, we will see *digital signatures algorithms* (DSA).

Chapter 3

Private Key Cryptography

With *private-key cryptography* we refer to schemes that use a single key to encrypt and decrypt a message, for this reason, we will refer to them as *symmetric* schemes. A **private-key scheme** is a tuple $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ such that:

- $\text{Gen}(\cdot)$: is a randomized polynomial algorithm that generates the key. It takes as input a security parameter n and outputs a key k that satisfies $|k| \geq n$. We will write this as $k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$.
- $\text{Enc}(\cdot)$: is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that encrypts the message (or other forms of information) to send. It takes as input a key k and a message m to outputs a ciphertext c . We will refer to the unencrypted message also as plaintext. We will write this as $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m)$.
- $\text{Dec}(\cdot)$: is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext c and a key k , and outputs a plaintext m . We will write this as $m := \text{Dec}_k(c)$

It's also required that for every n , every k and every m it holds that $m = \text{Dec}_k(\text{Enc}_k(m))$. Now we want to look which tools are used in the construction of secure private-key scheme.

3.1 Pseudorandom Permutations

Pseudorandom functions are function that map n -bits strings to n -bit strings and that cannot be distinguished from a random permutation chosen uniformly from every function that map n -bit string to n -bit string. The first set of function, for a key of length s bit, have a cardinality of 2^s while the second set has a cardinality of

$2^{n \cdot 2^n}$.

Pseudorandom permutations are pseudorandom functions with some extra properties: Let $F : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^s \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed function and $F_k(m) := F(m, k)$. F is a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) if:

- $\forall k \in \{0, 1\}^s$, F is a bijection from $\{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}^n$.
- $\forall k \in \{0, 1\}^s$ exists an efficient algorithm F_k^{-1} .
- For all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers D :

$$|\Pr[D^{F_k}(n) = 1] - \Pr[D^{f_n}(n) = 1]| < \text{negl}(n)$$

where k is chosen uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}^s$ and f_n is chosen uniformly at random from the set of every permutations on n -bit strings.

3.2 Block Chipers

Block cipher are PRPs families that operate one a block of a fixed length. To ensure security against CPA, there are various mode of operation for block ciphers, like *Electronic Code Block* (ECB), *Cipher Block Chaining* (CBC), and *Counter Mode* (CTR).

3.2.1 Electronic Code Book

Given a plaintext $m = m_1, \dots, m_l$, the encryption is obtained by encrypting each block separately: $c = \langle F_k(m_1), \dots, F_k(m_l) \rangle$. The decryption is carried out by applying to every block F_k^{-1} . Since the encryption process is deterministic, repeated blocks will be repeated also in the ciphertext. This means this mode is not CPA-secure neither has indistinguishable encryption in the presence of an eavesdropper.




Figure 3.1: ECB encryption.

3.2.2 Cipher Block Chaining

First is an initial vector IV of length n is chosen. So is set $c_0 = IV$ and for every $i > 0$, $c_i := F_k(c_{i-1} \oplus m_i)$. The final ciphertext is $\langle IV, c_1, \dots, c_l \rangle$. The IV is not kept secret to allow decryption. The encryption of single blocks must be carried out sequentially




Figure 3.2: CBC encryption.

3.2.3 Randomized Counter Mode

As in CBC, an IV of length n is chosen. Then is computed $r_i := F_k((IV + i) \bmod 2^n)$. Then each block of the plaintext is computed as $c_i := r_i \oplus m_i$. Unlike in CBC, with CTR it's possible to encrypt and decrypt in parallel.




Figure 3.3: CTR encryption.




Figure 3.4: From left to right: original image, image encrypted with ECB, image encrypted with CTR, image encrypted with CBC. It's easy to notice the problem with ECB.

3.3 Substitution-Permutation Networks

3.3.1 Confusion-diffusion

The confusion-diffusion paradigm has been introduced by Shannon for construction concise pseudorandom functions. The idea is to break the input up into small parts, execute on them different random functions, mixed the outputs together and, repeat the process for a finite amount of time. One cycle of this process is called *round* while the full construction is called *network*.

Shannon's original definitions are that confusion refers to making the relationship between the ciphertext and the key as complex as possible, diffusion refers to hide the relationship between the ciphertext and the plaintext. Confusion achieves the fact that each bit of the ciphertext depends on several parts of the key. This means that even if a single bit of the key is changed, most of the bits in the ciphertext will be affected. Diffusion implies that changing a single bit in the plaintext results in a change of (statistically) half of the bits in the ciphertext. Also if one bit of the ciphertext is changed, half of the bits of the plaintexts change.

3.3.2 Substitution-Permutation Networks

Substitution-permutation networks are a practical implementation of the confusion-diffusion paradigm. The substitution part is achieved by small random functions called *S-boxes* and the permutation part is achieved by mixing up the outputs of those functions. In the intermediate results, a key is XORed with the output of the round. Different keys are used each round and each key is derived from the previous one (that is called the *master key*).

3.4 Advanced Encryption Standard

AES is a common symmetric key block cipher used worldwide to protect data. It is the successor of *DES* (Data Encryption Standard), another block cipher that now has been classified insecure because of its length key, and after some attacks became too efficient. It has been chosen after a public competition held to meet the need for a new encryption standard.

3.4.1 Galois Field

A Galois Field (or finite field) is a field with a finite number of elements. The most common fields used are given by the integers $\text{mod } p$ where p is a prime number, also written as $\text{GF}[p]$. For $n > 1$, with $\text{GF}[p^n]$ we refer to all polynomial of degree $n - 1$ with coefficients coming from $\text{GF}[p]$. As an example, $\text{GF}[2^3]$ is a field with 8 elements (the integers from 0 to 7) and they can all be represented as a polynomial of degree 2 (6 can be represented as 110_2 or $x^2 + x$).

Even if the sum of polynomials is trivial, the multiplication works differently: an irreducible polynomial $g(x)$ of degree n is chosen, then the multiplication in $\text{GF}[p^n]$ is the ordinary product except you have to take the remainder of the division by $g(x)$. A different $g(x)$ defines a different field.

3.4.2 Encryption Method

The security of AES comes from confusion and diffusion achieved by a substitution-permutation network with a block size of 128 bit and it supports three different key lengths: 128, 198, and 256 bits. Every key length uses a different number of round, respectively it uses 10, 12, and 14 rounds.

Each block of length 128 bits are rearranged in a 4x4 bytes array called *state* and for every round, the following steps are executed:

1. **AddRoundKey:** A 16 byte round key is derived from the master key and it's interpreted as a 4x4 array. Then, the key is XORed with the state array. This step consist of computing $a_{i,j} = a_{i,j} \oplus k_{i,j}$ for every $i, j \in 1, \dots, 4$ where $a_{i,j}$ is the i^{th} row and j^{th} column of the state array and $k_{i,j}$ is the i^{th} row and j^{th} column of the key array.
2. **SubBytes:** Each byte of the state array is substituted by another byte, according to a single fixed lookup table S . So it consists of computing $a_{i,j} = S(a_{i,j})$.

3. **ShiftRows:** Each row of the state array are cyclically shifted to the left as follows: the first row of the array is untouched, the second row is shifted one place to the left, the third row is shifted two places to the left, and the fourth row is shifted three places to the left.
4. **MixColumns:** In this step, each column is mixed via an invertible linear transformation. Specifically, each column is interpreted as a polynomial over $\text{GF}[2^8]$ with $g(x) = x^4 + 1$, and is multiplied with a fixed polynomial $c(x) = 3x^3 + x^2 + x + 2$.

In the final round, the MixColumns stage is replaced with an additional AddRound-Key step.

3.5 Message Authentication Codes

Everything we have seen until now assures only confidentiality. As introduced in chapter 2, message authentication codes (MAC) also called *tags* are used to introduce both integrity and authentication.

Even if an encryption scheme assures confidentiality, integrity and authentication are important to assure that the message is not tampered by an external entity. This is a propriety of encryption schemes called *malleability*.

For example, in CBC an attacker, because the IV and ciphertext blocks are directly XORed with the next block output, a bit changed in the IV or the ciphertext block corresponds with a bit changed in the plaintext. If the attacker is able to guess the format of the unencrypted message the attacker could be able to change sensitive informations of the plaintext.

A message authentication code (MAC) is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Gen , Mac , Vrfy) such that:

- $\text{Gen}(\cdot)$: it takes as input n and outputs a uniformly distributed key of length n .
We will write this as $k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$.
- $\text{Mac}(\cdot)$: It receives as input a key $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ to output a tag $t \in \{0, 1\}^*$.
We will write this as $t \leftarrow \text{Mac}_k(m)$.
- $\text{Vrfy}(\cdot, \cdot)$ on input $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $t \in \{0, 1\}^*$ it outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
We will write this as $b \leftarrow \text{Vrfy}_k(m, t)$.

Chapter 4

Public Key Cryptography

Chapter 5

Conclusions

Bibliography

- [1] John D. Cook. Finite fields (galois fields).
- [2] Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. *Introduction to modern cryptography*. CRC press, 2014.
- [3] Claude E Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. *Bell system technical journal*, 28(4):656–715, 1949.
- [4] HMAC Standard. National institute of standards and technology, the keyed-hash message authentication code (hmac), 2003.