

apresentados indicam que as ações regulatórias empreendidas por essa Autarquia criaram incentivos corretos para o atingimento desses objetivos, uma vez que houve a entrada de novos participantes e consequente desconcentração das atividades de credenciamento de cartões de pagamento e de emissão de cartões de crédito nos últimos anos.

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