

Research Design

- **Quasi-experiment:**
- **Treatment: leaders with insecure shocks**
 - Empirically, how should I conceptualize an insecure shock?
 - **Measuring a leader's secureness at time 0 and over time**
- **Unit of analysis:** leader in the developing countries
- This dataset covers 293 leaders in 61 developing countries between 1995-2005.
- Compares the likelihoods of leaders with insecure shocks and without the insecure shocks to negotiate the South-North PTAs.



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Cases: 81 events out of 293 total observations.

- It excludes leaders in the liberal democracies (V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index above 0.75) where a more demanding notion of democracy that the rule of law and constraints on the executives are respected.
- This dataset also excludes 7 cases where the PTA negotiation (event) happened before the insecure shock (treatment).
- Furthermore, it removes leaders whose tenure is less than one year, in such case they have no time to pursue any substantial policy changes given the short amount of time in office.



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- Hypothesis:
Insecure shocks  PTA Negotiation
- Coding Strategies and Justifications:
- Dependent Variable: South-North PTA negotiation
- Independent Variable: insecure shocks
- Control Variables:
 - Leaders' tenure
 - GDP growth (potential covariate)
 - Human rights conditions (potential covariate)



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
- The hypothesized treatment in this study is an insecure shock that a leader experiences. There are two types of insecure shocks. Before getting into it, here I use two indices to measure the **secureness** of a leader in autocracies: 1) a leader's secureness when he starts his tenure at time 0, and 2) the secureness of the regime when the leader holds office at time t.
- So here are two types of insecureness shocks across regime types. However, note that in democracies, a leader's relation to his past is irrelevant; hence, a leader is automatically assumed as a secure leader at time 0.
- Type 1: a leader is secure at time 0 and becomes insecure immediately onward at time 1.
- Type 2: a leader experiences an in-secureness shock during his tenure at time t.



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Empirical Findings: Data Description


Distributions of Leaders across Regime Types Divided by Secureness Shocks



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Empirical Findings: Treatment Effect with One Covariate

Treatment Effects on Leaders Across Regime Types



Holding leaders' mean tenure constant, on average, without an insecure shock, a leader's probability of negotiating a PTA is around 21.37%.


In contrast, those leaders who have experienced insecure shocks on average have 10.39% higher probability to negotiate a PTA than those without such "treatment".



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Empirical Findings: Treatment Effect with One Covariate

Treatment Effects on Leaders in Autocracies



Holding leaders' mean tenure constant, on average, without an insecure shock, a leader's probability of negotiating a PTA in autocracies is around 22.28%.


In contrast, those leaders who have experienced insecure shocks were on average have 41% probability to negotiate a PTA. The treatment effect (18.72%) is also statistically significant.



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Empirical Findings: Treatment Effect with One Covariate

- In autocracies:



- Note that in democracies, holding tenure constant, a leader with insecure shock has higher probability of PTA to negotiate a PTA, as expected, but the treatment effect is around 5% with no statistical significance (the Fisher's null is 0.406).

Preliminary conclusion:

- My hypothesis is empirically supported.



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