Public Reactions to International Legal Institutions: The ICC in a Developing Democracy, A Survey Experiment From Kyrgyzstan: Which is a Very Cool Place, But Unfortunately Had Recent Internal Violence... Ok, at This Point I'm Just Trolling Renee Because She Doesn't Like Long Titles

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University of Texas at Austin

Stephen Chaudoin

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Overarching Question

Under what conditions are international organizations (IOs) most effective?

$\rightarrow$ *What explains public reactions to IOs?*

My Framework:

- IO actions $\rightarrow$ contestation, which affect reactions to IOs.
- Show evidence from a survey experiment in Krygyzstan.

Existing Theories

- IOs affect member state behavior by mobilizing subnational enforcement.
  - Human rights: Simmons 2009
  - Trade: Mansfield et al 2002; Chaudoin 2014
- Supported by survey evidence:
  - Bearce and Cook 2015, Chaudoin 2014, Chilton 2014, 2015, Kreps 2014, Tingley and Tomz 2014, Wallace 2013.

My Theoretical Framework

- Subnational actors have heterogeneous preferences.
  - Variation across groups, pro- and anti-compliance.
  - Variation over time.
- IOs trigger competing efforts between groups.
  - Eg lobbying or protests.
  - Contest itself has tangible effects.

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  - Contest itself has tangible effects.
- This, in turn, affects how citizens react to IOs.

Why Kyrgyzstan?



- Relatively recent, localized violence.
- Minimal exposure to the ICC.

Hypotheses

How does contestation matter in this setting?

- Proximity:
  - IO actions create the prospect of contestation.
  - $\rightarrow$ those in close proximity to the violence are less receptive to possible IO actions.

(Not presented today)

- Awareness of court *does not* blunt negative reactions.
- Alignment with the government *magnifies* negative reactions.

Survey



- 1,000 respondents.
- National, proportionate to region, urban/rural pop.
- Face-to-face Kyrgyz or Russian.
- November 2015.
- In-depth pilots.

Survey Instrument

- Brief introduction to the ICC.
- Are you aware of the ICC?

- Control: *Some people have suggested that the International Criminal Court should investigate the violence that occurred in other countries*.
- Treatment: *Some people have suggested that the International Criminal Court should investigate the violence that occurred in the Southern part of Kyrgyzstan in 2010*.

- *Do you think that these investigations would be a good or bad thing?*

Overall Treatment Effects



Proximity Results: Region Effects



Uzbeks vs Non-Uzbeks in Osh



Enumerators

Respondents from Osh city and Osh oblast perceived the [investigation question] in the [forms with the treatment] extremely negatively. These respondents said that this question had to be raised in 2010, and now there is no necessity to raise this question up, since it was difficult to improve the situation but the stability has been finally restored.

- SIAR Technical Report 2015

- The prospect of contestation made respondents less receptive to the ICC.

Kyrgyzstan Take-Aways

- Proximity can magnify negative reactions.
  - IO's increase contestation, which makes public reactions more negative.

- Future work: Philippine war on drugs.
  - Goal: fine grained measures of contestation and public opinion.

  - Scrape all tweets about Duterte, WOD.
  - Media report generated events data.

  - On Thursday, the ICC opened up a preliminary investigation into the Philippines.

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▸ Tmt. Simple ▸ Tmt. Logit ▸ Categorical DV ▸ Multilevel Model

- Philippines:

▸ Deaths ▸ Aut. Events ▸ Twitter Workflow ▸ Goldstein ▸ Margins

Philippines Background

- June 2016: Duterte elected, war on drugs begins.
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

Link Actions with Public Opinion

- Traditional polls:
  - Quarterly, nationally representative
  - Relevant, stable set of questions
- Social media data:
  - 66% of Filipinos are social media users.
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  - Currently: 6M tweets, 28K added daily.

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

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- Objective: $\Pi_i = \phi_i(e_i, e_j)V_i - e_i c_i$
- An institution can increase V_{PC} (or lower c_{PC}).

Equilibrium Effort



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

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

Treatment Effect: Bayesian

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Overall χ^2: 0.0843 p-value $= 1.000$

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Male	0.318	0.482	0.164	5.29^{***}
Any PS Educ.	0.358	0.384	0.026	0.851
Employed	0.244	0.284	0.04	1.43
Income Ab. Av.	0.788	0.766	-0.022	-0.835

Overall χ^2: 30.9 p-value = 2.61e-05
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- Treatment effect not significantly different for males.

Regional Populations

Province	Urban population			Rural population		
	Pop.	%	No. of int.	Pop.	%	No. of int.
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Chuy	100,698	2.93%	29	448,625	13.07%	131
Bishkek town	606,505	17.67%	177	2,557	0.07%	0
Osh town	155,958	4.54%	45	15,658	0.46%	5
TOTAL	***1,263,428***	***36.81%***	***368***	***2,168,978***	***63.19%***	***632***

Full Survey Outline

- Demographics: Age, Gender, Education level, employment, income, region
- Government opinion: Satisfied with government, things getting better
- Protest: first, second most important issues
- Protest Experiment
- ICC Intro, have you heard of the ICC?
- ICC Experiment
- Outcome measures

ICC Intro in Survey

As you may or may not know, Kyrgyzstan has taken steps to join an international organization called the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court is located in The Hague, in the Netherlands but addresses issues in many countries. The court tries to investigate and prosecute individuals who are accused of serious crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity or crimes committed during wartime.

- "Have you heard of the ICC? [Yes/No]"
  - 25% Yes
  - Osh/Osh Obl.: 22% Yes
  - ABA US Polls: 32% "heard [at least] a little bit about the ICC."

Summary Statistics

	Full mean	Osh/Ob./Jal. mean	Non-Osh mean	Osh city mean	Osh oblast mean	Jalal-Abad mean
Treatment	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
App. Inv.	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.68	0.70	0.53
App. Inv. Num.	2.98	3.03	2.92	2.76	2.97	2.92
App. ICC	0.54	0.50	0.60	0.68	0.73	0.44
App. ICC Num.	2.96	2.92	3.01	2.82	3.08	2.98
DK/RTA	0.19	0.22	0.16	0.00	0.06	0.32
Heard of ICC	0.24	0.29	0.17	0.42	0.17	0.10
Government Approval	2.63	2.59	2.68	2.48	2.77	2.65
Uzbek	0.12	0.05	0.20	0.18	0.23	0.18
Age Under 50	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.84	0.65	0.59
Male	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.32	0.40	0.44
Post Sec. Ed.	0.37	0.42	0.30	0.76	0.22	0.26
Employed	0.26	0.28	0.25	0.40	0.28	0.17
Inc. Aver.	0.78	0.73	0.84	0.94	0.85	0.79
N	1,000	579	421	50	192	179

Treatment Effects: Simple

	Investigation Approval (Binary)				
Treatment Group	N	% Approv.	Diff.	S.E.	t-stat
Control	396	83.1			
Treatment	410	72.9	-10.2	0.03	-3.50

	Investigation Approval (Categorical)			
	Very bad	Somewhat bad	Somewhat good	Very good
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Group				
Control	22	45	208	121
	5.6%	11.4%	52.5%	30.6%
Treatment	51	60	183	116
	12.4%	14.6%	44.6%	28.3%

Protest Treatment

		Region Cluster	Region FE	Exclude "DK/RTA"	with Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Protest Tmt.	-.120	-.120	-.132	-.067	-.099
	(0.131)	(0.149)	(0.133)	(0.17)	(0.135)
Kyrgyz Gov. Approv.					0.142
					(0.1)
Kyrgyz Lang.					-.070
					(0.149)
Under 50					0.167
					(0.143)
Male					0.018
					(0.141)
Any PS Educ.					0.332
					(0.149)**
Employed					-.021
					(0.164)
Income Ab. Av.					0.03
					(0.163)
N	1,000	1,000	1,000	806	960

Treatment Effects: Logits

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.600	-.606	-.574	-.578
	(0.134)***	(0.175)***	(0.139)***	(0.18)***
Uzbek			-.145	-.118
			(0.12)	(0.284)
Under 50			-.039	-.035
			(0.167)	(0.19)
Male			-.151	-.175
			(0.205)	(0.187)
Post Sec. Ed.			0.16	0.269
			(0.211)	(0.197)
Employed			-.080	-.017
			(0.255)	(0.208)
Income Ab. Av.			-.176	-.177
			(0.24)	(0.224)
Const.	1.591		1.786	
	(0.1)***		(0.251)***	
Obs.	806	806	806	806

Treatment Effects: Inv. Appr., Categorical

Figure: Distribution of Inv. Approval, Categorical



1: Very bad idea, 4: Very good idea

Multilevel Model

- Let treatment effect vary by region.
- Include region-specific intercepts and controls.

$$
\begin{aligned}
y_i &= \beta_0 + \beta_i \mathit{Treatment}_i + X_i\Gamma + \epsilon_i \\
\beta_0 &= u_{1j} \\
\beta_i &= u_{2j}
\end{aligned}
\tag{1}
$$

Multilevel Model: Results



Region i, ranked by Estimated Treatment Effect β_i

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

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

Philippines Data and Contestation

- As international institutions intervene:
  - Does this trigger blanket mobilization by pro-IO groups?
  - Or contestation from both types of groups?
- As contestation unfolds:
  - Is there a uniform increase in opposition to the war?
  - Or increased polarization as groups compete?

Conclusions

- Preference heterogeneity and contestation explains:
  - When IOs are effective.
  - How citizens react.
- Raises normative questions about what IO actions are most desirable.

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

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

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

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Bishkek town	606,505	17.67%	177	2,557	0.07%	0
Osh town	155,958	4.54%	45	15,658	0.46%	5
TOTAL	***1,263,428***	***36.81%***	***368***	***2,168,978***	***63.19%***	***632***

Full Survey Outline

- Demographics: Age, Gender, Education level, employment, income, region
- Government opinion: Satisfied with government, things getting better
- Protest: first, second most important issues
- Protest Experiment
- ICC Intro, have you heard of the ICC?
- ICC Experiment
- Outcome measures

ICC Intro in Survey

As you may or may not know, Kyrgyzstan has taken steps to join an international organization called the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court is located in The Hague, in the Netherlands but addresses issues in many countries. The court tries to investigate and prosecute individuals who are accused of serious crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity or crimes committed during wartime.

- "Have you heard of the ICC? [Yes/No]"
  - 25% Yes
  - Osh/Osh Obl.: 22% Yes
  - ABA US Polls: 32% "heard [at least] a little bit about the ICC."

Summary Statistics

	Full mean	Osh/Ob./Jal. mean	Non-Osh mean	Osh city mean	Osh oblast mean	Jalal-Abad mean
Treatment	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
App. Inv.	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.68	0.70	0.53
App. Inv. Num.	2.98	3.03	2.92	2.76	2.97	2.92
App. ICC	0.54	0.50	0.60	0.68	0.73	0.44
App. ICC Num.	2.96	2.92	3.01	2.82	3.08	2.98
DK/RTA	0.19	0.22	0.16	0.00	0.06	0.32
Heard of ICC	0.24	0.29	0.17	0.42	0.17	0.10
Government Approval	2.63	2.59	2.68	2.48	2.77	2.65
Uzbek	0.12	0.05	0.20	0.18	0.23	0.18
Age Under 50	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.84	0.65	0.59
Male	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.32	0.40	0.44
Post Sec. Ed.	0.37	0.42	0.30	0.76	0.22	0.26
Employed	0.26	0.28	0.25	0.40	0.28	0.17
Inc. Aver.	0.78	0.73	0.84	0.94	0.85	0.79
N	1,000	579	421	50	192	179

Treatment Effects: Simple

	Investigation Approval (Binary)				
Treatment Group	N	% Approv.	Diff.	S.E.	t-stat
Control	396	83.1			
Treatment	410	72.9	-10.2	0.03	-3.50

	Investigation Approval (Categorical)			
	Very bad	Somewhat bad	Somewhat good	Very good
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Group				
Control	22	45	208	121
	5.6%	11.4%	52.5%	30.6%
Treatment	51	60	183	116
	12.4%	14.6%	44.6%	28.3%

Protest Treatment

		Region Cluster	Region FE	Exclude "DK/RTA"	with Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Protest Tmt.	-.120	-.120	-.132	-.067	-.099
	(0.131)	(0.149)	(0.133)	(0.17)	(0.135)
Kyrgyz Gov. Approv.					0.142
					(0.1)
Kyrgyz Lang.					-.070
					(0.149)
Under 50					0.167
					(0.143)
Male					0.018
					(0.141)
Any PS Educ.					0.332
					(0.149)**
Employed					-.021
					(0.164)
Income Ab. Av.					0.03
					(0.163)
N	1,000	1,000	1,000	806	960

Treatment Effects: Logits

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.600	-.606	-.574	-.578
	(0.134)***	(0.175)***	(0.139)***	(0.18)***
Uzbek			-.145	-.118
			(0.12)	(0.284)
Under 50			-.039	-.035
			(0.167)	(0.19)
Male			-.151	-.175
			(0.205)	(0.187)
Post Sec. Ed.			0.16	0.269
			(0.211)	(0.197)
Employed			-.080	-.017
			(0.255)	(0.208)
Income Ab. Av.			-.176	-.177
			(0.24)	(0.224)
Const.	1.591		1.786	
	(0.1)***		(0.251)***	
Obs.	806	806	806	806

Treatment Effects: Inv. Appr., Categorical

Figure: Distribution of Inv. Approval, Categorical



1: Very bad idea, 4: Very good idea

Multilevel Model

- Let treatment effect vary by region.
- Include region-specific intercepts and controls.

$$
\begin{aligned}
y_i &= \beta_0 + \beta_i \mathit{Treatment}_i + X_i\Gamma + \epsilon_i \\
\beta_0 &= u_{1j} \\
\beta_i &= u_{2j}
\end{aligned}
\tag{2}
$$

Multilevel Model: Results



Region i, ranked by Estimated Treatment Effect β_i

Deaths from War on Drugs



Source: Rappeler's "By the Numbers"

Automated Event Coding



Source	Target	Verbs	Action
NGOHRI	*PHLCOP*	*[`has', `said', `accused']*	*11: Disapprove* *- 112: Accuse* *--- 1122: Accuse of human rights abuses*

- Identify 14,510 events from 122,720 documents
- June 2016 - Sept 2017.

Twitter Workflow



Event Network: Goldstein Scale

Types of Variation

- Intensive margin:
  - How many actions does i take against j?
  - How many resources does i use against j?
- Extensive margins:
  - How many actors does i target?
  - How many actors target j?
- Qualitative margins:
  - What actions does i take against j?
  - Qualities of media coverage of those actions?
- Temporal margins:
  - How do these change over time?
  - In response to shocks?

Public Reactions to International Legal Institutions: The ICC in a Developing Democracy

Stephen Chaudoin *University of Illinois*

- Model:

▸ Model Setup ▸ Effect on Contest ▸ Value to IO

- Kyrgyzstan:

▸ Bayes ▸ Balance ▸ Full Sur. Instr. ▸ Regions ▸ Sum Stats ▸ Protest Tmt. ▸ ICC Intro.

▸ Tmt. Simple ▸ Tmt. Logit ▸ Categorical DV ▸ Multilevel Model

- Philippines:

▸ Deaths ▸ Aut. Events ▸ Twitter Workflow ▸ Goldstein ▸ Margins