How the Civil Rights Movement Revitalized Labor Militancy

Larry Isaac
Florida State University

Lars Christiansen
Augsburg College

Can newly ascendant social movements revitalize the militant culture of older, institutionalized movements? Recent studies have focused on relations between new ascendant social movements like the civil rights, women's, and peace movements that emerged during the postwar cycle of protest, and therefore have been unable to address this question. Focusing on revitalization *as a qualitatively different form of intermovement relation, the authors examine the possibility that civil rights movement insurgencies and organizations revitalized workplace labor militancy during the postwar decades. Time-series models show that the civil rights movement fueled an expanded militant worker culture that challenged management and sometimes union leadership. However, this revitalization of labor militancy was contingent on institutional context (stronger in the public sector than the private sector) and form of insurgent action (protests, riots, organizations) differentially embedded in historical phases (civil rights versus Black Power) of movement development. Theoretical implications for the study of social movements, industrial relations, and class conflict are discussed.*

Scholars generally acknowledge that the civil rights movement fostered serious intraclass conflict in America. From President Kennedy's 1961 Executive Order requiring unions engaged in government contracts take affirmative action to eliminate discrimination, to the federal implementation of the Philadelphia Plan in 1969, trade unions resisted attempts to alter traditional practices that would desegregate their unions (Foner 1981; Quadagno 1992). In the midst of the civil rights insurgency many observers, including labor leaders, tended to see the movement as little more than race-based chaos rather than the largest working-class uprising since the 1930s (Bloom 1987; Moody 1988). After the decline of the civil rights movement, the retrospective view tends to emphasize organized labor's hostility to civil rights forces during those years: Embittered white building-trade unionists who resisted federal intervention favoring racial integration remains the dominant image (Quadagno 1992). Rarely, though, have scholars entertained the possibility that the civil rights movement contributed to *inter*class shop floor conflict between workers and employers.

Historically, the role of the civil rights movement in fostering interclass labor militancy has been obscured, in part, by preoc-

Direct all correspondence to Larry Isaac, Department of Sociology, 523 Bellamy Building, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 32306-2270 (lisaac@coss.fsu.edu). This work benefited from a Florida State University sabbatical award to the senior author, the Mildred and Claude Pepper Endowment, and a National Science Foundation grant (SBR-9711848) to both authors. For helpful comments on early versions of this paper, we thank Jim Fendrich, David Levine, Jim Orcutt, Jill Quadagno, Sidney Tarrow, and Lowell Turner. Jamie Miller, Tim Nickel, and Lisa Branton provided helpful research assistance. We are especially grateful to Debra Minkoff for generously providing her data on civil rights social movement organization density. We also thank the *ASR* Editors and reviewers for their extensive and penetrating comments. Preliminary portions of this paper were presented at the 1998 meetings of the American Sociological Association.

cupation with racial divisiveness coupled with postmortems on the labor movement. Scholars also have tended to analyze movements one at a time; intermovement relations have only recently been analyzed systematically, and those few studies have focused exclusively on contemporaneously emerging movements (McAdam 1995; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Minkoff 1997; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Van Dyke 1998). Notwithstanding its valuable contributions, the development of "new social movement theory" (Kriesi et al. 1995) has tended to marginalize the analysis of labor as an "old," declining, and less relevant movement form. None of the recent intermovement studies has examined the potential of newly ascendant movements to revitalize older, institutionalized movements.

Our central question addresses the influence of the civil rights movement on labor militancy. Did the militancy of the civil rights movement penetrate workplaces to rejuvenate labor-based interclass militancy at a moment in history when it was easy to see only racial conflict? We frame this question theoretically using recent developments on intermovement dependency relations and address several key issues ignored in this literature. First, we focus on collective action by labor that has not been studied in the context of intermovement relations and elaborate "revitalization" as a new form of intermovement relation.[1] Protest waves of a powerful ascendant movement, like the civil rights movement, can spawn new movements (McAdam 1988, 1995), but they can also revitalize militant culture within more mature movements that have been institutionally contained, held in abeyance (Taylor 1989), or are otherwise in decline. Second, we analyze how institutional structures mediate the impact of one movement on another by examining militancy diffusion processes specific to private sector and public sector labor. Because of differential institutional structures, composition, and political cultures, the militancy of the civil rights movement had a more potent revitalization impact in the public sector than in the private sector labor force. Third, we examine the form of collective action and the historical phase of each movement. The civil rights movement's revitalization of labor militancy moved through a complex, contingent sequence that depended, in part, on changing phases of these two movements. In general, we show that institutional and historical context matter in understanding intermovement impact.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND LABOR MOVEMENT HISTORIOGRAPHY

While the historical literature on civil rights/labor movement relations leaves little doubt that these movements shaped each other (e.g., Flug 1990; Foner 1981; Levy 1994), the question we are interested in is: Which of the two movements was the more militant and stood a chance of shaping the movement culture of the other? The answer is, we believe, contingent on historical conditions and changes over time. In short, the historical record suggests that the militancy dynamic of these two movements changed dramatically between the mid-1930s and the post-World War II years.

THE EARLY CIO YEARS

Spearheaded by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) from the mid-1930s to the late 1940s, the industrial union movement was a tremendous force in advancing interracial unionism, civil rights, and equality for "blacks" (Brueggemann and Boswell 1998; Foner 1981; Goldfield 1993; Honey 1993; Zeitlin and Weyer 2001). The CIO break with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) involved a different racial political culture: Unlike the AFL, the dissident

[1] Intermovement militant "revitalization" refers to the process by which a militant culture is reawakened and expanded in one movement as a result of diffusion processes originating in the militant actions of another movement, although the militant actions in the two different movements need not be the same. By "militancy" we refer to engagement in direct (confrontational, disruptive) actions. "Vigor" or "vitality" refers to the general level of activity and strength of a movement. "Progressive" refers to movements that tend to be seeking greater egalitarian change in, as opposed to defending, the existing social order. Militancy could, of course, be a feature of actions in any sort of movement, progressive or reactionary.

CIO worked diligently to integrate workplaces, their unions, and consistently supported federal efforts to combat discrimination (Zeitlin and Weyer 2001:434–41).

Major civil rights social movement organizations, including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National Urban League (NUL), and the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), were influenced by, and in turn, influenced, the industrial union movement. CORE, in particular, was significantly shaped by the industrial union movement: Founders and leaders were active industrial unionists, affiliates were constituted as "locals," unions participated in CORE events, and CORE supported union actions (Meier and Rudwick 1973). Whereas these organizations were highly critical of the racial exclusionary practices of the AFL, the CIO was organically linked to, endorsed and supported by, these civil rights organizations (Meier and Rudwick 1979; Moody 1988).

The Highlander Folk School was an important source of labor movement influence on the civil rights movement. Founded in Monteagle, Tennessee in 1932 by Myles Horton, the Highlander School was deeply rooted in the industrial union movement, and by the early 1940s began to focus its activities on the civil rights struggle. Over the next two decades, the Highlander School educated labor and civil rights activists in elements of movement culture. Many of the tactics (sit-downs to sit-ins, boycotts, marches), and even some songs that were to play key inspirational roles in the early southern civil rights movement, were bequeathed from the labor movement often through the Highlander School (Levy 1990: 296, 1994:12–13; Morris 1984:41–57).

The role of racial egalitarianism in the industrial union movement has been hotly debated (Goldfield 1997:220–26). But there is convincing evidence that the impetus for successful industrial unionism in general, and its racially progressive actions, were ultimately rooted in black working-class militancy and the "urban/labor/left/civil rights coalition" that formed during this period (Goldfield 1997; Zeitlin and Weyer 2001). On balance, *the historical record suggests that the industrial union movement, and especially the CIO, took the lead on militancy for labor and civil rights issues, but primarily with the stewardship of black and politically radical workers.*

Thus, the civil rights era began to emerge most dramatically in the 1940s as blacks became increasingly urban, industrial, and proletarianized (Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988:786). It appeared that a labor-based civil rights coalition was poised to transform American society. However, because of Cold War anti-Communism, antilabor government acts (especially the Taft-Hartley Act), the purge of left labor leadership and left unions in the CIO, the failure of both the AFL and CIO to organize workers in the South, and the general retreat and containment of the union movement, the nascent black civil rights movement that was rooted in labor organizations was suppressed along with the left-led CIO unions (Davis 1986; Zeitlin and Weyer 2001:440–41). Consequently, the civil rights wave that emerged during the 1950s and 1960s had a very different base, character, and agenda (Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988). Dissolution of the "urban/labor/left/civil rights coalition" ultimately meant that the postwar civil rights movement would have to pursue its goals largely without the help of the white working-class or organized labor.

THE POSTWAR YEARS

The actions of the AFL-CIO from their 1955 merger throughout the modern civil rights era tended to reproduce rather than challenge racism within its ranks or elsewhere. Its efforts (along with other major institutions) failed to launch a frontal assault on the racism that the modern civil rights movement was beginning to challenge (e.g., Foner 1981; Goldfield 1993; Hill 1982; Honey 1993).[2] Contrasting the civil rights actions

[2] This is not to argue that there was no organized labor support for the civil rights movement during this period. There was financial support from a number of unions (Flug 1990; Levy 1990, 1994); and others, like the left-led unions expelled from the CIO in the late 1940s, built civil rights into their policies (Foner 1981:287). Because of their civil rights militancy, District 65 of the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Clerks, and the Drug and Hospital Employees Local 1199 were Martin Luther King's two fa-

of the CIO unions during the 1930s and 1940s with those of labor in the 1960s, one labor scholar characterized the latter as "missing in action" (Goldfield 1997:295), while another concluded, "Organized labor turned its back on the problems of poverty and racism precisely at the moment that Black America began its fight for justice on a massive scale" (Moody 1988:71).

On racial equality, and other progressive causes, much of the labor movement had changed from what it was in the 1930s and 1940s.[3] By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the American labor movement had been largely reduced to a limited trade union movement—"an immobile and isolated aggregation of legally certified bargaining agents" (Montgomery 1979:171). In short, *for the decades following World War II, the historical evidence suggests that the civil rights movement was more militant than the labor movement* (Cornfield 1989; Davis 1986; Goldfield 1997; Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988; Levy 1994).[4] The postwar civil rights movement shook American society, including the culture of collective action in many workplaces.

INTERMOVEMENT RELATIONS: CONCEPTS, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES

During the past decade scholars have begun to challenge the narrowness of the conventional "movement centric view" (McAdam 1995) that treats movements as bounded, discrete entities in which the focus is on the life course—emergence, outcomes, and decline—of a single movement. Redirection of interest has assumed a more fluid, unbounded view presupposing a plurality of movements in a "social movement field" (Calhoun 1995; Tarrow 1998). This reconceptualization has generated new questions that focus on *inter*movement relations and ways in which social movements give rise to and/or shape other movements. Nevertheless, important theoretical gaps remain.

"NEW" MOVEMENT INFLUENCE ON THE "OLD"

Recent sociological studies of intermovement dynamics focus on relations between movements that were emerging contemporaneously. Scholars have categorized these as "new social movements" or as part of the New Left.[5] These movements emerged during the postwar decades, and according to new social movement theorists, they share certain basic characteristics that distinguish them from older movements like labor. The fact, then, that the civil rights, women's, peace, student, and sexual orientation movements have shaped each other is precisely what might be expected from the new social movements literature (cf. Kriesi et al. 1995; Olzak and Uhrig 2001:709). None of the intermovement studies asks, however, if these newer movements influenced older movements, like labor,[6] which was contained by an institutionalized, bureaucratic

vorite unions (Fink and Greenberg 1989; Foner 1981:359).

[3] This was not the first time that a progressive current within labor reversed itself and marginalized racial issues. This happened, for example, in the Knights of Labor during its period of decline (Foner 1981, chap. 4).

[4] Our purpose here is not to rehearse a critique of organized labor leadership, but to characterize the tendencies toward militant movement energy. Labor historian Montgomery's (1979) view is relevant to both our point of labor institutionalization and militancy inside it that we address below: "The very shop floor militancy which so disturbs corporate executives and union officials alike in the 1970s could not assume the open and chronic form which makes it notorious without the presence of union and legal defenses against arbitrary dismissal. To see the role of unions in this setting as *nothing more* than disciplinary agents for management, therefore, is a facile and dangerous myopia" (p. 156).

[5] The distinction between "old" and "new social movements" is contentious (e.g., Calhoun 1995). Labor is typically the standard referent for "old," but classifications of particular movements as "new" vary. For instance, racially based civil rights movements are not part of all new social movement schemes, but in the United States the civil rights movement did form an important part of the New Left.

[6] An exception is Tarrow's (1988) study of the influence of the Italian wave of insurgency in the late 1960s on a rebellion within a Catholic Church in a working-class community of Florence. Others have speculated about or asserted a wider institutional impact of the new movements (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995:112).

structure, domesticating legal environment, and managed by a conservative oligarchic leadership (Turner 1999; Voss and Sherman 2000:309).

In contrast to the empirical cases examined in the recent literature on intermovement relations, the civil rights → labor movement relation is different in form. First, it pairs a new ascendant movement with the premier "old" social movement rather than assuming independence or irrelevance of their trajectories. Second, the literature conceptualizes intermovement relations exclusively in terms of influence between two ascendant movements ("spillover" in Meyer and Whittier [1994]) or one ascendant movement being at least partially determined by another ("spin-off" in McAdam [1995]). By contrast, we conceptualize the possibility that a mature, institutionalized movement could be revitalized by militancy spillover and penetration originating in a newly ascendant movement. Finally, the civil rights movement targeted the workplace and organized labor movement as part of the institutionalized problem that needed reform (Foner 1981; Hill 1982), a focus that was less prominent in other new movements.

In addition to general claims that protest waves can stimulate changes in contending groups, sometimes strengthening forces for reform (Tarrow 1988; Kriesi et al. 1995, chap. 5), case study evidence indicates that civil rights actions sometimes did penetrate, merge with, and stimulate militant labor actions. Important examples include the farm workers' struggles headed by César Chávez in the early-to-mid-1960s (Ganz 2000; Jenkins 1985); Mississippi Freedom Labor Union of agricultural laborers in the mid-1960s (Foner 1981:355); Maryland Freedom Union of low-wage service-sector workers in the mid-1960s (Flug 1990); the sanitation workers' strike in 1968 Memphis (Beifuss 1989); the hospital workers' strike in 1969 Charleston (Fink and Greenberg 1989); Black auto workers' Revolutionary Union Movements formed in the late 1960s to the early 1970s (Geschwender 1977); the postal workers' national wildcat strike in 1970 (Rachleff 1982); and management complaints that workers were becoming increasingly militant by the late 1960s (Aronowitz 1973).

DIFFUSION CHANNELS

Intermovement influence depends on diffusion processes, the flow of information and practices. Diffusion theory identifies two broad channels through which innovations flow: Direct or relational (network) ties, and indirect (cultural) links (Strang and Meyer 1993). What diffusion channels[7] could have transmitted militant culture from the civil rights movement to labor?

FORMAL CHANNELS. Civil rights militancy penetrated and shaped the labor movement through *formal social movement organization relations and coalitions*. As the southern civil rights movement deepened—from Montgomery in the 1950s to the Selma voting rights campaign a decade later—the "big four" organizations (NAACP, CORE, SCLC, SNCC) made critical demands on organized labor. Demands for reform were directed at the AFL-CIO hierarchy as well as at specific affiliated unions, and in the civil rights heyday, funds flowed from some unions to civil rights organizations. Examples of such relations existed between CORE and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), the Teamsters, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Union (AFSCME). There were also formal ties between SCLC and AFSCME, and connections existed between all of the "big four" and the United Auto Workers (UAW) (Foner 1981; Flug 1990). In addition to financial assistance, alliances were sometimes developed or deepened through public shows of support, such as the 1963 March on Washington that mobilized both civil rights activists and labor unionists.[8]

[7] The four forms of diffusion channels that follow are discussed in Meyer and Whittier (1994).

[8] Although AFL-CIO president George Meany refused to endorse the march, delegations from hundreds of union locals turned out, with prominent nationals and internationals represented (Flug 1990; Marable 1985; Zieger 1986). George Meany's position on civil rights changed: In the early 1960s, he was notorious for clashing with and censoring civil rights unionists like A. Philip Randolph and Herbert Hill (Foner 1981); in the mid-1960s he publicly supported antidiscrimination legislation (Foner 1981:367); but by decade's end, with Black Power currents emerg-

INFORMAL CHANNELS. Militant culture moved through *informal channels of overlapping movement communities.* There were important local communities in which civil rights and labor activists intermingled and fed on one another. Hotbeds of civil rights/labor activism included tobacco workers at R. J. Reynolds in Winston-Salem during the late 1940s and early 1950s (Griffin and Korstad 1995; Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988), industrial workers in Memphis in the 1930s and 1940s, and again among municipal workers in 1968 (Honey 1993), much of the black automobile proletariat in Detroit (Geschwender 1977; Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988), and domestic workers from Vine City and "Sweet" Auburn Avenue in Atlanta (Christiansen 1999). "Nonresidential communities" also formed on the basis of political ideology, even when activists were separated by substantial distances (Levy 1990:312).

OVERLAPPING PERSONNEL. Civil rights militancy sometimes informed labor militancy through *overlapping personnel*—activists who had a foot in each movement culture. Early civil rights movement leadership appeared inside the labor movement in the form of the black unionists with strong civil rights agendas. Men like A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, and Cleveland Robinson were important "bridge activists"[9] in a dual sense: They linked rank-and-file black workers to the white union leadership, and they generally connected the civil rights movement's agenda to the organized labor movement. Herbert Hill was the consummate bridge activist serving as the formal liaison between the NAACP and the AFL-CIO hierarchy. Martin Luther King, too, must be seen as a bridge activist. Long apprenticed in progressive labor politics from his connections to the Highlander Folk School, King increasingly linked civil rights and worker rights in his rhetoric and action as the 1960s progressed (Isaac, Street, and Knapp 1994:129–31; Honey 1997:146). And there were, of course, scores of less well-known individuals who circulated simultaneously within civil rights and labor movement cultures.

CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT. Civil rights militancy fueled labor militancy through the *social-political environment and mainstream culture.* During the 1960s, black militancy created political conditions for a renewal of social reform for the first time since the 1940s. The civil rights movement transformed the political environment, creating a culture dense with movement frames and tactics while altering the political opportunity structure for other challengers. In general, mainstream culture was becoming more liberal, racial reform was on the political agenda, and spin-off movements were being launched (e.g., the women's movement), partly because of the change in culture and political opportunity resulting from the civil rights insurgencies (Evans 1979; McAdam 1988, 1995; Minkoff 1997).

Thus, diffusion theory and historical evidence in combination with several literatures discussed previously—intermovement relations, protest waves, and case histories—suggest that the militant culture of the civil rights movement flowed through a variety of direct networks and indirect cultural channels. These channels carried militant culture produced by the civil rights movement's collective actions into workplaces across America. This reasoning leads to our foundational hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The civil rights movement revitalized labor militancy by diffusing into workplaces and elevating interclass conflict between workers and employers.

INSURGENT EVENT "DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS"

Surely one of the most significant sources of militancy diffusion is the exemplar of collective struggles that serve as focal points in which participants come to directly experience the power of collective action, and others, often at a distance, experience this power indirectly in the form of a "demonstration effect" (Tarrow 1998:145).

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ing in industry, Meany and the AFL-CIO hierarchy were willing to have Randolph, Bayard Rustin, and other black civil rights unionists speak for organized labor (Foner 1981:322–35; Levy 1994:75).

[9] Our notion of "bridge activist" is inspired by but different from Robnett's (1996) concept of "bridge leader."

Throughout the life cycle of the civil rights movement, highly visible struggles formed important flashpoints that demonstrated to others the potential power of the relatively powerless through collective action. Campaigns like those in Montgomery, Birmingham, Selma, and Memphis—"socio-dramas" as Martin Luther King (1963:63) called them—and even the urban rebellions during the late 1960s were tutorials on collective struggles that would fuel militant culture and spark imaginations for how such actions might be used in other arenas. Social networks and the mass media were integral to this image diffusion process.[10] Therefore, both theory and history lead to our second major expectation:

Hypothesis 2: The civil rights movement revitalized labor militancy through protest "demonstration effects."

Organization Effects

Movement trajectories are driven by increases in protest activity *and* increases in the density of social movement organizations. Expansion of movement organizations accelerates the diffusion of activism across multiple constituencies by simultaneously spreading a sense of protest legitimacy, activist culture, and laying a resource infrastructure to support collective action (Minkoff 1997). In fact, because social movement organizations are more enduring than protest events, and because they can foster a culture of militancy, transmit it, and furnish a resource base to support it, growth of movement organizations is likely to provide a more potent revitalization spillover than protest demonstration effects. This line of thought motivates our third prediction:

Hypothesis 3: The civil rights movement revitalized labor militancy through social movement organization growth, which was more efficacious than were "demonstration effects."

The effects of the intermovement impact of social movement organizations may not be monotonic: In the early phase of an initiator movement cycle, a movement's organizational density is expected to have a positive effect on mobilization of subsequent movements as it opens up legitimate political space for activism, accelerating the diffusion of militancy across multiple constituencies by transfer of information *and* development of resource infrastructure. During the later phase of a movement's development, the effects of the initiator movement on other movements turn negative as a more crowded social movement field produces competition for a diminishing share of attention, adherents, and resources (Minkoff 1997). Therefore, we expect:

Hypothesis 4: The effects of civil rights organizations on labor militancy were nonlinear revealing early positive effects that later turned negative as density increased.

Mediating Structures

The examination of mediating conditions in the intermovement relations literature is virtually nonexistent. However, because our recipient institutionalized movement (labor) is housed in heterogeneous workplaces, the institutional composition and cultural context are likely to mediate the intensity of militancy revitalization. Therefore, we examine the private sector/public sector distinction to see if there was a differential revitalization of militancy across sectors. After 1960, the public sector continued to attract younger workers and members of minority groups who were generally more favorably disposed to militant rhetoric and action (Burton 1979:11; Roscigno and Kimble 1995). Although both sectors were dominated by white workers, between the late 1960s and late 1970s the public sector contained a greater proportion of black labor than did the private sector (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970:118–21, table 52; 1978:266–67, table 59). Moreover, relevant life-course

[10] Roscigno and Danaher (2001) demonstrate how radio facilitated the mobilization of southern textile workers in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In our time period, television was beginning to play a key role in the diffusion process, relaying images of civil rights protesters as targets of violence in the South (McAdam 1988) and spreading images of the urban riots in the late 1960s (Myers 2000).

evidence suggests that worker politics influenced employment selection: Ex-activists from the civil rights and other New Left movements more frequently pursued employment in public sector social service occupations, while nonactivists were more likely to seek higher paying jobs in the corporate world (Fendrich 1993; Klatch 1999; McAdam 1988; Whalen and Flacks 1989). Also, during the 1960s and 1970s, the proportion of state employment involved in the social component (welfare state broadly construed) grew from roughly one-half to two-thirds (Draper 2000:18). This shift increased the density of employees in social welfare functions, including professionals like teachers, social workers, and nurses. Workers employed in these functions tend to be more liberal/social democratic in their political views than those in other segments of state employment, or their professional counterparts in the private sector—executives, engineers, lawyers—who are organized around the market, profit maximization and are more inclined to see the world from management's point of view (see Draper 2000:20; Moody 1988:211; Wright 1997:459–91). If a central part of militancy diffusion takes place through cognitive and cultural identification processes in which the recipient's identification with actors in the ascendant movement is important (McAdam 1995; Strang and Meyer 1993), then those labor market locations with the largest concentrations of young, racial minorities, ex-New Left activists, and liberal/social democrats should have been most receptive to the militant *zeitgeist*.

Institutional context—unionization dynamics and political culture—also favored stronger diffusion of militancy in the public sector. Where unionization was low or nonexistent (as in the public sector early in the postwar years), militancy frequently was directed at organizing, a more politically charged activity than collective bargaining over economic issues (Wallace 1989). Where unionization was already substantial (e.g., in the core industries of the private sector), entrenched labor leaders, including a rigid shop floor regime and union structure (Lichtenstein 1995:372), led to attempts at containment of militancy as collective action was channeled in conventional economic directions (Fantasia 1988; Moody 1988). At the beginning of the 1960s, approximately 32 percent of private sector labor was unionized, while the comparable figure for the entire public sector was only about 10.5 percent. Unions in the public sector were still illegal in many states (Freeman 1988). However, by the mid-1960s, in the wake of Kennedy Executive Order 10988, increasing numbers of states passed laws to allow state and local-level public service unions. By 1970, union density in the public sector had surpassed that of the private sector. This would have contributed to a more highly politicized workforce—one more receptive to civil rights movement militancy and more likely to be inspired by that militancy in organizing struggles.

Finally, there are important differences in institutional structure that can shape political culture. In the private sector, workers struggle to formulate goals and respond to the demands of the contractual terms of private market exchange. Public sector workers, on the other hand, frame demands in the context of formal-legal standards and public policy rather than directly against market-oriented imperatives. And while not completely overriding market forces, public policy is represented as rational, universalistic, and ostensibly in the public interest (Johnston 1994:211). However, public sector standards and the implementation of formal administrative justice is not an automatic extension of the espousal of democratic values, but surfaces most forcefully in "response to social movements and political conflict" (Johnston 1994:10). Thus, when the civil rights movement began to shape the terms of formal-legal administrative justice, it empowered public sector workers to push workplace demands in new ways—articulated with a democratic rights "master frame" (Snow and Benford 1992)—within the context of the broader public interest. Even workers in the most degraded, routine jobs could begin to formulate militant workplace demands that were articulated with issues of rational, legal, and formal justice integral to the public interest. Importantly, workers' rights were being framed increasingly in the context *of* and *as* civil rights. Memphis sanitation strikers in 1968 who carried signs that simply said "I Am A Man"

and the 1969 Charleston hospital worker strike steward Claire Brown who wrote "I Am Somebody" are cases in point (Beifuss 1989; Fink and Greenberg 1989:158).

We use the term "abeyance structures" to refer to those conditions that allow movements to sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and that provide continuity from one wave of mobility to another (Taylor 1989:761). In sum, then, institutional differences (labor force composition, workplace structure, and worker culture) combine to differentially shape these abeyance structures across sectors and lead us to anticipate greater receptivity to militant reform messages among public sector workers. Thus:

Hypothesis 5: The civil rights movement generated greater militancy revitalization among public sector labor than among its private sector counterparts.

Temporal Sequencing of Militancy Revitalization Spillover

Social movements typically change through time, sometimes dramatically so. The civil rights movement went through major transformations. Labor as a differentially institutionalized movement also passed through phases that differed across sectors and over time. Therefore, militancy diffusion effects from one movement to another are unlikely to occur evenly through time. We suspect that the *phases* through which each movement passes must be considered jointly when evaluating sequence effects in the volume, intensity, and qualities of militancy diffusion.

Internal dynamics—like shifts in master frames and associated tactical innovations—can produce important changes in a movement (Snow and Benford 1992), so it is likely that such shifts could also produce important surges in militancy between movements as well. The early civil rights frame was associated primarily with disruptive nonviolent protest tactics that challenged Jim Crow institutions. The challenge, coupled with scattered local victories, produced an exhilarating change of consciousness and emboldened those attached to the movement, while simultaneously communicating the power of movement to others. Expressing growing frustration with the direction and tactics of the early movement, the shift to the *Black Power* frame in the mid-1960s created a new wave of excitement and consciousness in the movement as large, violent, urban rebellions came to displace the nonviolent civil disobedience of the early phase of the movement. The urban riots did for inner city blacks what the nonviolent protests did for southern blacks—they contributed to a sense of collective pride and efficacy (Myers 2000:176). Both forms of insurgency fostered an acceptance of militant collective action that extended far beyond core movement participants (Myers 2000:177).

But these sequential militant civil rights surges would differentially penetrate labor—stirring workers to act collectively on workplace grievances—depending on structural and cultural characteristics associated with public and private sectors. Therefore:

Hypothesis 6: The civil rights movement's revitalization of labor militancy was conditioned by the phase of the civil rights movement and the sectoral context of labor. We expect that protests were more salient in the early phase of the movement, while riots became sources of militancy diffusion in the later phase of the movement and the strength of civil rights organizations grew over time. Coupled with Hypothesis 5, we expect these changing sequence effects to be strongest in the public sector.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Observational Time Frame

We employ annual U.S. time-series observations from 1947 through 1981 to test our hypotheses. Temporal framing—opening and closing dates—is important for shaping the empirical context and interpretation of time-series estimates (Griffin and Isaac 1992; Isaac and Griffin 1989). We begin with the late 1940s because the postwar industrial relations regime was largely established in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the late 1940s, a series of related events—the Taft-Hartley Act, productivity deals between labor and management in leading industries, Red



Figure 1. Sector-Specific Strike Frequency, 1947 to 1981

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (various years).

scares and purges of leftists, defeat of a labor-based (CIO) civil rights movement, damaging court decisions, and National Labor Relations Board rulings—converged to promote productivity, stabilize labor markets, fragment worker solidarity, and to contain and channel the movement in more conservative directions (Davis 1986; Fantasia 1988).

We end our time frame with 1981 because it, too, marks another turning point in the structure of labor-management relations, including the meaning and measurement of strike activity. Symbolized in President Reagan's assault on the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in the public sector and struggles at Phelps-Dodge and Hormel in the private sector (Clawson and Clawson 1999), the early 1980s saw a pronounced and widespread shift to the right in corporate and government policy. The Reagan administration also altered the definition used for reporting annual aggregate strike data, with 1981 marking the last year the prior definition was used (Edwards 1983:392–94). For both private and public sector labor relations, the early 1980s can be termed the "last gasp of the postwar capital-labour accord in the U.S., and the beginning of a new period in capital-labour relations" (Wallace 1989:11). Also, the 1947 to 1981 time frame encompasses the major phases in the life cycle of the civil rights movement.

Dependent Variable: Labor Militancy

Labor militancy is complex, multidimensional, and is manifested in a variety of forms. The strike—the organized withholding of collective labor power from corporate consumption—is a major form of collective militancy, a key form of *inter*class conflict, and an integral aspect of working-class culture. Moreover, strike activity is an important quantitative indicator that is highly correlated with other aspects of labor militancy that are more difficult to measure (Wallace 1989:8). We employ sector-specific strike frequency from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (various years), displayed in Figure 1, as our primary measure of labor militancy.

Unionization in the public and private sector followed different trajectories during the postwar decades and was shaped by at least partially different social dynamics that generated two relatively separate labor movements (Freeman 1988; Johnston 1994). Sector-specific labor militancy also followed different trajectories (although both show declining trends by the early 1980s) suggesting that conditions shaping militancy within these two broad institutional work regimes behaved differently (Goldfield 1990; Johnston 1994). From a social movement perspective, these sectors can be thought of as different institutional-cultural formations

that condition the extent to which civil rights insurgency fueled labor militancy at work.

Militancy in the Civil Rights Movement

We focus on the actions that constituted the central thrust of the civil rights movement emerging in the 1950s and extending into the 1970s (see McAdam 1982). In particular, we employ two form-specific measures of collective militancy—*protests* and *urban rebellions (riots).* The protest measure captures the nonviolent tactics (e.g., boycotts, sit- ins, protest marches) that characterized the movement during its emergence (1955–1960) and heyday (1960–1965). The operationalization follows Burstein (1979), was coded from the *New York Times Index*, and is the annual frequency of civil rights events that were a "public, manifestly political action by at least five people on behalf of the rights of minorities" (p. 168).

The second major form of collective action is the more militant *urban ghetto rebellions* or *race riots* that coincided with the Black Liberation phase of the civil rights movement (1966 to the early 1970s). This measure is operationalized as black-initiated collective actions involving a minimum of 30 participants and resulting in at least some property damage and/or personal injury (Isaac and Kelly 1981).[11]

Our third measure gauges the trajectory of *civil rights organizational density.* This data series was constructed (and provided) by Minkoff (1997), and is a measure of development in movement organizational infrastructure. Organizational density is operationalized as "the total number of Black civil rights organizations active at the end of the prior year, plus new entrants, minus those groups that exited" (Minkoff 1997:787).

All three collective action measures are displayed in Figure 2. Collectively they capture a wider variety of dimensions than do previous intermovement studies,[12] and these dimensions correspond well with what is generally known about the trajectory and phases of the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982; Minkoff 1997; Morris 1984).

Control Variables

While we are primarily concerned with the relations between the civil rights movement's insurgencies/organizations and labor militancy, it is necessary to estimate these relations in models that account for other theoretically important determinants. We rely on major hypotheses regarding strikes, represented in four basic explanatory categories: (1) *labor organization strength*; (2) *labor market conditions* and *economic hardship*; (3) *legal-institutional industrial relations regime*; and (4) *political environment/ opportunity structure* (see Franzosi 1995). We also include two other potential determinants; (5) *intrasector cross-temporal diffusion of militancy,* captured by the lagged value of the dependent variable; and (6) *intersectoral diffusion of militancy,* captured by the lagged value of public sector strikes

[11] Press sources for counts of collective action events are widely employed (Minkoff 1997; Myers 2000; Olzak and Uhrig 2001). Such sources are considered generally reliable for purposes of indexing trajectory (rather than making claims about "true" levels of such events) and in reporting "hard" factual aspects like timing, location, or form of action (Franzosi 1987; Kriesi et al. 1995, app.). There are, of course, limitations to even the best press reports on such events (Franzosi 1987; Kriesi et al. 1995; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999; Snyder and Kelly 1977). Our protest measure is likely to be afflicted with the most measurement error (undercount) because the data pertain to less dramatic (smaller, nonviolent), hence less newsworthy, events, and protests were coded from a single source—*The New York Times Index.* As Minkoff (1997:787) suggests, such data characteristics are likely to provide a conservative test of protest effects. The urban rebellion data are more likely to have higher reliability than the protest data because they are more dramatic events (larger, violent) hence more newsworthy (McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999; Snyder and Kelly 1977), and the data were collected from multiple sources (Isaac and Kelly 1981:1380–82).

[12] Our civil rights movement measures are conceptually and empirically distinct dimensions. The simple correlations between these measures are: protests and rebellions ($r = .11$); protests and organizations ($r = -.21$); and rebellions and organizations ($r = .21$).



Figure 2. Number of Civil Rights Protests, Urban Rebellions, and Black Social Movement Organizations, 1947 to 1981

Sources: *New York Times Index*; Isaac and Kelly (1981); Minkoff (1997).

for private sector strike models and the lagged value of private sector strikes for the public sector models (Conell and Cohn 1995). These categories, measurement details, and data sources are presented in Appendix A.

ESTIMATING EVENT COUNT MODELS

Because the dependent variables are event counts in an interval of time they require special estimators. Commonly used approaches include the Poisson and negative binomial models (Minkoff 1997; Olzak and Uhrig 2001). The Poisson formulation assumes that the conditional mean and conditional variance are equal, an assumption that often does not hold in social movement event data. If this assumption is violated ("overdispersion"), Poisson standard errors will be downwardly biased (Barron 1992). Our strategy was to first estimate the models with the negative binomial (a generalization of the Poisson model), which yields an estimate of overdispersion. If the overdispersion parameter was nonsignificant, we relied on Poisson estimates; if it was significant (always the case below), we reported the negative binomial results.

The coefficients for explanatory variables have been converted to easily interpretable percentage change figures ($[(\exp b) - 1]100$). Standard errors are reported for the original negative binomial coefficients which can be recovered by applying the inverse of the conversion formula. We gauged the possibility of serially correlated errors by detailed examination of the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions; we also report the Lujung-Box Q value, a summary serial correlation test.

RESULTS

THE CIVIL RIGHTS MILITANCY EXOGENEITY PREMISE

Our hypotheses are based on the premise that, during the postwar decades, the civil rights movement was more of a driving force in shaping labor militancy rather than the reverse. Most historical scholarship tends to agree that when the question of influence between these two movements is posed at the level of *social movement militancy on a national scale*, the civil rights movement was the more dynamic "initiator" of the two (Davis 1986; Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988; Levy 1994).

To supplement historical arguments about the causal direction of the flow of mass militancy between these two movements during the postwar decades, we present additional empirical evidence. We estimated a series of Granger causality tests (Cromwell et al.

Table 1. Granger Exogeneity Tests for Relations between Civil Rights Movement Variables and Labor Strikes: 1947 to 1981

	Private Sector		Public Sector	
Null Hypothesis	F-Value	Conclusion	F-Value	Conclusion
Civil Rights Militancy Not Exogenous				
Protests do not cause *strikes*	.21	Accept null	27.34**	*Protests* cause *strikes*
Rebellions do not cause *strikes*	7.22*	*Rebellions* cause *strikes*	4.00*	*Rebellions* cause *strikes*
SMOs do not cause *strikes*	3.34	Accept null	8.08*	*SMOs* cause *strikes*
Labor Militancy Not Exogenous				
Strikes do not cause *protests*	1.78	Accept null	.14	Accept null
Strikes do not cause *rebellions*	.94	Accept null	4.10*	*Strikes* cause *rebellions*
Strikes do not cause *SMOs*	1.32	Accept null	2.50	Accept null

Note: F-values are Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis: $\beta_{T-1} = \ldots = \beta_{T-10} = 0$ for each equation.
*$p \leq .05$ **$p \leq .01$ ***$p \leq .001$ (two-tailed tests)

1994) that evaluate regressions of the following distributed lag form:

$$y_t = a_0 + a_1 y_{t-1} + \ldots + a_\ell y_{t-\ell} + b x_{t-1} + \ldots + b_\ell x_{t-\ell}, \quad (1)$$

$$x_t = a_0 + a_1 x_{t-1} + \ldots + a_\ell x_{t-\ell} + b_1 y_{t-1} + \ldots + b_\ell y_{t-\ell}. \quad (2)$$

The idea is to evaluate the contribution to y (e.g., current labor militancy) from distributed lagged x (past militancy of the civil rights movement) beyond that of distributed lagged y (past labor militancy). The symmetric form of the test allows an evaluation of which of the two processes (labor militancy or civil rights militancy) is driving the other or if there is evidence of mutual determination.

Table 1 reports data from three pairwise tests by sector, yielding a total of 12 results. The test provides a Wald F-statistic for the joint hypothesis that the cumulative distributed lags for each variable are not different from zero. The tests were evaluated with a distributed lag structure of 10 periods (i.e., $\ell = 10$ in equations 1 and 2 above). Civil rights militancy is said to "Granger cause" labor militancy if the cumulative distributed lags for civil rights militancy are jointly different from zero, net of the distributed lags for labor militancy. While the Granger test is not a gauge of causality in any deep sense of the term, the information is useful as an assessment of exogeneity, especially when combined with historical data of the sort discussed earlier.

Table 1 shows that all significant Wald F-tests (rejecting the null hypothesis) are for civil rights actions as exogeneous (top panel). The only exception to this pattern is for the relation between public sector strikes and urban rebellions.[13] In general, the pattern of results reported in Table 1 is consistent with our premise, drawn from historical literature, that the preponderance of militancy diffusion between these two movements flowed from the civil rights movement to labor over the postwar decades.

FULL MODELS, BY SECTOR

We turn to the estimates of the effect of militancy in models containing all control variables. Table 2 presents the estimates of the negative binomial results for private sector militancy. Model 1 contains control variables only and serves as a baseline by which to evaluate the introduction of the civil rights movement variables.

[13] Because the Memphis sanitation workers' strike in which Martin Luther King was assassinated sparked hundreds of urban rebellions in the spring and summer of 1968 (Isaac et al. 1994), we suspected that 1968 may be producing this deviant result. When we eliminated the influence of 1968, our tests confirmed this suspicion: Rebellions "Granger caused" public sector strikes with no evidence for the reverse determination.

Table 2. Percentage-Change Coefficients from Negative Binomial Event-Count Models of Civil Rights Movement Influence on Labor Strike Militancy: Private Sector, 1948 to 1981

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Civil Rights Movement Variables							
Protests $[(t) + (t-1)]$	—	$-.029$ $(.002e^{-1})$	—	—	—	$-.009$ $(.002e^{-1})$	—
Rebellions $[(t) + (t-1)]$	—	—	$-.012$ $(.002e^{-1})$	—	—	.003 $(.017e^{-2})$	—
Organizations $(t-1)$	—	—	—	$.397^{*}$ $(.018e^{-1})$	.083 (.005)	$.501^{*}$ $(.017e^{-1})$	$.552^{***}$ $(.012e^{-1})$
Organizations ^{2} $(t-1)$	—	—	—	—	.002 $(.002e^{-2})$	—	—
Control Variables							
Strikes $(t-1)$	$.014^{***}$ $(.003e^{-2})$	$.013^{***}$ $(.004e^{-2})$	$.014^{***}$ $(.004e^{-2})$	$.010^{**}$ $(.004e^{-2})$	$.010^{**}$ $(.004e^{-2})$	$.001^{*}$ $(.004e^{-2})$	$.009^{*}$ $(.004e^{-2})$
Union density $(t-1)$	6.773^{***} (.020)	7.322^{***} (.020)	7.402^{***} (.021)	6.631^{***} (.018)	7.416^{***} (.022)	8.004^{***} (.019)	7.519^{***} (.016)
Unemployment (t)	-4.223^{**} (.016)	-4.625^{**} (.016)	-4.883^{**} (.019)	-3.653^{*} (.016)	-4.396^{*} (.020)	-4.627^{**} (.018)	-4.473^{**} (.016)
Wage deprivation $(t-1)$	2.228 (.017)	1.543 (.017)	2.038 (.017)	3.129 (.016)	2.173 (.016)	2.675 (.016)	—
Labor regime (t)	2.106^{*} (.010)	3.729^{*} (.015)	2.483^{*} (.011)	.165 (.013)	1.201 (.021)	1.106 (.018)	—
Democrat strength (t)	8.399^{***} (.025)	8.651^{***} (.024)	8.601^{***} (.025)	7.596^{**} (.023)	7.887^{***} (.024)	7.939^{***} (.022)	7.369^{***} (.022)
Public sector strikes $(t-1)$	$.116^{***}$ $(.004e^{-1})$	$.091^{*}$ $(.004e^{-1})$	$.125^{***}$ $(.004e^{-1})$	.030 $(.005e^{-1})$	.024 $(.005e^{-1})$	.030 $(.005e^{-1})$	—
Constant	5.288^{***} (.704)	5.328^{***} (.695)	5.103^{***} (.750)	5.388^{***} (.653)	5.227^{***} (.698)	5.010^{***} (.664)	5.217^{***} (.551)
Dispersion parameter	-4.51^{***}	-4.55^{***}	-4.52^{***}	-4.65^{***}	-4.66^{***}	-4.78^{***}	-4.63^{***}
Log-likelihood	−255.07	−254.18	−254.84	−252.71	−252.51	−250.51	−252.99
Lujung-Box Q $(t-2)$[a]	.05	.98	.95	.97	.99	.12	.89

Notes: Negative binomial coefficients have been transformed to yield percentage change coefficients ([(exp b) − 1]100); negative binomial coefficients can be recovered by applying the inverse transformation: ln[(percentage change /100) + 1].

Standard errors for the original negative binomial coefficients are in parentheses; "e^{-1}" or "e^{-2}" indicate that the standard error should be multiplied by 10^{-1} or 10^{-2}, respectively.

[a] The Lujung-Box Q statistic is a test for serial correlation in the errors. In the present context, it is asymptotically distributed as χ^2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of autocorrelations ($t = 2$ in this case) under the null hypothesis.

$^{*}p \leq .05$ $^{**}p \leq .01$ $^{***}p \leq .001$ (two-tailed tests)

Most controls perform as expected. There is a cross-temporal continuity to militancy indicated in the consistently significant lag effect of strikes in all equations. Labor regime shows positive effects, contrary to expectation, until civil rights organization density is introduced (Models 4 to 7), suggesting a spurious influence of labor regime. Among controls, the most powerful and consistently significant effects occur for union density (positive), Democratic party office strength (positive), and unemployment (negative). The negative influence of unemployment and positive effect of union den-

sity are consistent with a resource mobilization perspective and the positive impact of the Democratic party office strength is consistent with a political opportunity structure perspective. The slopes are interpretable as percentage change coefficients. For example, the negative unemployment effect in Model 1 is consistent with much of the empirical research on strikes (see Franzosi 1995), and the –4.223 coefficient indicates that a 1-percent increase in the unemployment rate suppresses private sector strikes by about 4.2 percent, net of other factors.

Models 2 through 4 introduce protests, rebellions, and organization density, respectively. There is no evidence of a demonstration revitalization effect for private sector labor militancy, but there is a significant organizational effect (Model 4). Model 5 evaluates the curvilinear hypothesis by introducing a second degree polynomial term. Taken together, Models 4 and 5 indicate that the organization density effect is, in fact, linear in form with no evidence of competitive dampening at higher levels of organizational density. Finally, Model 6 presents the effects of all controls and all civil rights variables estimated simultaneously. Again, civil rights organizations are shown to play a significant role in stimulating strike militancy in the private sector, and the pattern holds when insignificant variables are excluded (Model 7).

Table 3 presents results for the public sector. Focusing on control variables, the largest and most consistent effects are for unemployment and Democratic party office strength, negative and positive respectively, as expected. Labor regime has a substantial containment effect on militancy in Models 5 and 6, also as expected. Models 2 through 4 show the influence of the civil rights movement variables separately. Overall, we find a null result for protests, but rebellions and movement organizations show significant positive effects on labor militancy (see Models 6 and 7). Moreover, the positive autoregressive effect for strikes and the union density effect disappear when organization density is introduced, suggesting that civil rights organization density accounts for these two influences in the public sector. While the reduction of the lagged effect for strikes may not be surprising, removal of the union effect implies that the civil rights movement may have played a role in stimulating public sector union growth.

We are now in a position to evaluate our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: We expected the civil rights movement to elevate interclass conflict between workers and employers and the evidence provided in Tables 2 and 3 is generally supportive of this expectation. We found organizational militancy revitalization effects on strikes in both sectors and a rebellion effect in the public sector as well.

Hypothesis 2: The civil rights movement contributed to revitalization of labor militancy through protest "demonstration effects." Here the evidence is mixed. We find no "demonstration effects" in the private sector and only "demonstration effects" for riots in the public sector. While we expected a protest effect, if only in the public sector, this overall pattern is nonetheless consistent with Hypothesis 5.

Hypothesis 3: The civil rights movement revitalized labor militancy through movement organizational growth that was more potent than movement "demonstration effects." Tables 2 and 3 strongly support this hypothesis: Civil rights organization density is the only significant movement influence in the private sector and organizations had the largest influence of the three civil rights movement variables in the public sector. These results are consistent with Minkoff's (1997) findings for civil rights movement organizational effects on the women's movement and her general claim that social movement organizations are central in diffusing militancy in protest cycles.

Hypothesis 4: Civil rights organization effects were nonlinear, revealing positive effects that eventually turn negative as the broader protest cycle expands. This hypothesis—tested in Model 5 of Tables 2 and 3 by introducing a second degree polynomial term for organization density—is not supported by the data and is also consistent with Minkoff's (1997) empirical results. For the private sector, the organizational effect is clearly linear (Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 2). The public sector counterpart indicates a weak tendency to turn from a positive to a negative effect (the squared term in Model 5 in Table 3). However, the stronger test with all civil rights movement variables included

Table 3. Percentage-Change Coefficients from Negative Binomial Event-Count Models of Civil Rights Movement Influence on Labor Strike Militancy: Public Sector, 1948 to 1981

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Civil Rights Movement Variables							
Protests [(*t*) + (*t* − 1)]	—	.035 ($.051e^{-2}$)	—	—	—	−.014 ($.005e^{-1}$)	—
Rebellions [(*t*) + (*t* − 1)]	—	—	.126** ($.044e^{-2}$)	—	—	.123* ($.005e^{-1}$)	.170* ($.003e^{-1}$)
Organizations (*t* − 1)	—	—	—	2.462*** (.007)	4.660*** (.011)	4.603** (.016)	2.368*** (.002)
Organizations^2 (*t* − 1)	—	—	—	—	−.010* ($.004e^{-2}$)	.009 ($.006e^{-2}$)	—
Control Variables							
Strikes (*t* − 1)	.480*** ($.094e^{-2}$)	.501*** (.001)	.378*** (.001)	−.009 (.002)	.055 (.001)	−.060 ($.009e^{-1}$)	—
Union density (*t* − 1)	5.010*** (.015)	4.715** (.016)	4.919*** (.013)	.460 (.018)	−.717 (.017)	−.477 (.014)	—
Unemployment (*t*)	−39.357*** (.121)	−37.954*** (.126)	−26.803* (.126)	−36.682*** (.103)	−25.073* (.117)	−24.476** (.092)	−29.441*** (.092)
Wage deprivation (*t* − 1)	.090 (.006)	.124 (.006)	.286 (.006)	.989 (.006)	1.147* (.005)	1.141** (.004)	.854* (.004)
Labor regime (*t*)	9.489 (.100)	7.001 (.105)	11.299 (.090)	−14.005 (.111)	−18.845* (.104)	−19.727* (.092)	−11.840 (.080)
Democrat strength (*t*)	27.719** (.086)	26.527** (.087)	25.274** (.075)	26.698*** (.073)	22.769** (.067)	22.336*** (.053)	27.163*** (.049)
Private sector strikes (*t* − 1)	.027* ($.014e^{-2}$)	.029* ($.014e^{-2}$)	.029* ($.012e^{-2}$)	.022 ($.012e^{-2}$)	.026* ($.011e^{-2}$)	.020* ($.009e^{-2}$)	.020* ($.009e^{-2}$)
Constant	1.633* (.784)	1.530 (.795)	1.122 (.706)	1.644* (.674)	.692 (.712)	1.115* (.556)	1.620*** (.498)
Dispersion parameter	−2.39***	−2.39***	−2.71***	−2.79***	−3.06***	−3.87***	−3.57***
Log-likelihood	−163.92	−163.68	−160.29	−158.66	−156.08	−149.87	−151.39
Lujung-Box Q (*t* − 2)	.05	.16	.67	.55	1.82	3.59	2.40

Note: See notes on Table 2.

*$p \leq .05$ **$p \leq .01$ ***$p \leq .001$ (two-tailed tests)

simultaneously in Model 6 indicates that the organizational influence is linear. It may be that nonlinear competition effects occur in organization-organization relations more strongly than in organization-protest relations of the type evaluated here.

Hypothesis 5: Militancy revitalization from the civil rights movement was greater among public sector labor than in the private sector. This hypothesis is generally supported by the data presented in Tables 2 and 3. There is a "demonstration effect" in the public sector (Model 6, Table 3) via urban rebellions (a .12-percent increase in strikes per rebellion) that does not show up in the private sector. And while organization density had a positive effect in the private sector (Model 6, Table 2) *and* in the public sector (Model 6, Table 3), the latter is about nine times larger than the former (a 4.6-percent increase per organization versus a .5-percent increase) and the difference in coefficients is statistically significant ($F_{1,33} = 6.72, p < .02$). Overall, the evidence suggests that the diffusion of civil rights militancy into the public sector was more multifaceted, intense, and robust (see Appendix B) than it was in the private sector.

Temporal Sequencing and Sources of Revitalization Effects

Tables 2 and 3 treated the civil rights movement → labor militancy revitalization as if it were time-invariant or homogeneous across the 1948–1981 period. However, it may be that this assumption of temporal homogeneity (Griffin and Isaac 1992) may have obscured important civil rights movement influences on labor militancy. We relax this assumption to evaluate Hypothesis 6.

The crucial turning point inside the civil rights movement took place between 1965 and 1966. By 1965, the heyday of the movement had come to an end (McAdam 1982). Major legislation for civil rights and voting rights had been accomplished, the focus increasingly turned to economic issues and the war in Vietnam, and the Watts riot exploded signaling a qualitatively new phase of militancy. The *rights* master frame of the civil rights movement was joined by the *Black Power/Black Nationalist* frames by 1966. At that moment, the civil rights movement surged northward into the urban strongholds of organized labor. As the Black Power frame was employed to attack racism in all American institutions, including liberal unions, militancy that cut in all directions—both intraclass and interclass—heated up in America's workplaces (Aronowitz 1973; Levy 1994).[14]

With these turning points in mind, we examine possible temporal heterogeneity in the effects of the civil rights movement on labor militancy by breaking the full period into two subperiods, 1948–1965 and 1966–1981.[15] The period-specific, sector-specific results (same specifications as in Tables 2 and 3) are presented in Table 4. Concentrating on the civil rights movement variables, we note important cross-period heterogeneity.[16] Most of the militancy influence occurs in the post-1965 period, where we find significant effects for movement organizations in both sectors (Models 3 and 4) and a significant effect for rebellions in the public sector (Model 4). The differential penetration/receptivity of public sector militancy persists: Organization density effects are larger in the public sector than in the private sector, and the difference is statistically significant ($p = .03$). The big news is that protests—which appeared inconsequential for the 1948–1981 period for both sectors—show a significant positive militancy effect for the public sector during the 1948–1965 period as expected (Model 2). The early protest activity of the civil rights movement was beginning to stimulate militancy among teachers and other public sector workers (Goldfield 1990), but protests had declined substantially by the second half of the decade. In general, the evidence presented in Table 4 is consistent with Hypothesis 6. Importantly, the historical subperiod analyses reveal a significant militancy effect (protests in the public sector) that was obscured in the full period models, and generates a more complex view of between-movement sequencing processes in which the form of collective action interacts with different labor market locations.

REVITALIZING LABOR

In general, we conclude that workplace interclass labor militancy received a revitalization stimulus from the civil rights movement, from its protests, demonstrations, urban riots, and movement organizations. Specifically, we found the public sector to be more conducive to the diffusion of militancy from the civil rights movement. There, protests increased labor militancy in the civil rights phase (pre-1966), urban rebellions increased labor militancy in the Black Liberation phase (post-1965), both indicating a re-

[14] Levy (1994:66) argues that the Black Power current of the New Left might have been reconciled in a coalition with organized labor, but the division was exacerbated beyond repair by the concurrent escalation of the antiwar movement and counterculture.

[15] This periodization is based on our assessments of the historical record *and* a wide variety of analyses of the temporal heterogeneity in these movement relations, including temporally recursive regressions (Isaac and Griffin 1989; Griffin and Isaac 1992) and Chow structural shift tests.

[16] Chow structural shift tests for the hypothesis that the subperiods are different from the overall "pooled" historical time frame are significant for both sectors (private sector: $F_{11,12} = 6.36$, $p < .01$; public sector: $F_{11,12} = 8.40$, $p < .01$).

Table 4. Percentage-Change Coefficients from Negative Binomial Event-Count Models of Civil Rights Movement Influence on Labor Militancy, by Sector and Historical Period

	Civil Rights Movement Phase			
	1948–65		1966–81	
Independent Variable	Private Sector	Public Sector	Private Sector	Public Sector
Civil Rights Movement Variables				
Protests [(*t*) + (*t* – 1)]	–.011 (.028e^{-2})	.210** (.001)	–.031 (.041e^{-2})	–.030 (.071e^{-2})
Rebellions [(*t*) + (*t* – 1)]	–.686 (.017)	4.144 (.042)	.045 (.024e^{-2})	.110** (.034e^{-2})
Organization (*t* – 1)	.074 (.007)	.063 (.020)	.894*** (.003)	2.214*** (.004)
Control Variables				
Within-sector strikes (*t* – 1)	.008 (.001e^{-1})	–1.873 (.012)	–.003 (.005e^{-2})	–.055 (.060e^{-2})
Union density (*t* – 1)	–21.042 (.351)	–4.769 (.029)	16.941*** (.022)	–2.484 (.028)
Unemployment (*t*)	–4.860** (.019)	–56.665** (.282)	–5.399 (.030)	6.056 (.157)
Wage deprivation (*t* – 1)	9.856 (.057)	–4.014 (.038)	8.470* (.032)	.077 (.005)
Labor regime (*t*)	–9.216 (.118)	–19.834 (.172)	–18.231*** (.057)	–39.887** (.163)
Democrat strength (*t*)	–7.465 (.156)	16.661 (.090)	14.763*** (.039)	15.465 (.075)
Cross-sector strikes (*t* – 1)	–.046 (.007)	.032 (.025e^{-2})	.046 (.038e^{-2})	.001 (.008e^{-2})
Constant	17.426 (13.330)	5.183** (1.986)	.359 (1.194)	4.724*** (1.051)
Dispersion parameter	–5.79***	–4.68***	–5.56***	–5.58***
Log-likelihood	–122.50	–56.55	–113.06	–76.07
Lujung-Box Q (*t* – 2)	.51	2.34	4.81	3.98

Note: See notes on Table 2.

*$p \leq .05$ **$p \leq .01$ ***$p \leq .001$ (two-tailed tests)

ceptivity to demonstration effects. Insurgent events—their excitement, possibilities, tactics—witnessed in the course of the movement contributed to workers' resort to collective action to deal with workplace grievances. But we found no such parallel demonstration effects in the private sector. While specific locations in the private sector likely had receptive abeyance structures and were influenced by civil rights movement militancy, in general workforce composition and workplace culture were less susceptible there than in the public sector.

Insurgent events and organizations "speak" to audiences. However, contrary to the argument that organizations necessarily work to mute militancy (Piven and Cloward 1979), civil rights organizations were more efficacious militancy-enhancing vehicles in both sectors. Organizations may be more potent carriers of militancy information than events because they are more enduring—they can frame events in a persuasive manner and they can deliver their message to select audiences (network-building) in a way that insurgent-event demonstration effects

(typically carried through mass media) cannot. We suspect that these differences in "ways of speaking" account for the fact that we found effects of social movement organizations in both public and private sectors. As civil rights organization density grew, social networks multiplied, and these networks positively framed and delivered the promise of militant collective action.

The civil rights movement influenced labor militancy in other ways, too. In addition to an expansion of strike militancy, it rejuvenated and expanded the *tactical repertoire* deployed by workers. For example, it spawned sit-downs and mass marches-sans-strikes that had not been seen since the 1930s, political strikes associated with major events like the assassination of Martin Luther King, civil rights unionism campaigns, increased support for local civil rights, and Title VII lawsuits wielded against employers and unions. Second, the civil rights movement produced changes in workplace *organizational structures*, including rank-and-file caucuses, committees, councils, formal bodies (like the Negro American Labor Council and Coalition of Black Trade Unionists), and even Revolutionary Union Movements (Foner 1981; Geschwender 1977; Thompson 1995). Finally, by the 1970s, the *leadership* of organized labor was beginning to show more racial and ethnic diversity as a result of the civil rights movement. People like César Chávez (United Farm Workers), Maggie Mae Edwards (United Furniture Workers of America), William Lucy (AFSCME), and Nelson Jack Edwards (UAW) were inspired by and rode the civil rights movement wave to gain access to and improve minority representation within the labor movement (Cornfield 1989; Moody 1988; Nyden 1983).

By revitalizing a tradition of militancy, the civil rights movement spawned a series of important union reform movements in the private sector (Hill 1969; Thompson 1995). Heightened politicization led black workers to play key roles in most of these reform struggles of the 1970s and 1980s, even in cases where their numbers were small, as in the United Mine Workers (Moody 1988: 257). In the public sector, militancy stimulated greater organizing activity (results not shown). Whether by fostering greater militancy that led to union reforms in the private sector or greater unionization in the public sector, a measured judgement of the civil rights movement's impact on labor suggests not only heightened interclass militancy but greater democracy in workplaces as a result, even if it was less than ideal and prone to subsequent retrenchments. The civil rights movement contributed, at least in part, to what some analysts have termed "the labor revolt" of the late 1960s and 1970s (Aronowitz 1973; Moody 1988; Weir 1967). However, if entrenched conservative labor leadership had not worked so hard to contain militancy (Aronowitz 1973; Davis 1986; Turner 1999) but instead had harnessed its power for mass organizing and reform, the revitalization of the American labor movement might have proven much more significant and consequently been in a stronger position to withstand subsequent employer offensives, antilabor political regimes, and detrimental globalization processes.

The full effects of these insurgencies have yet to play out. A longer-term consequence of the civil rights movement's insurgencies may be the experience it gave to individuals who are only now (mid-1990s to present) attempting to rejuvenate the organized labor movement (Voss and Sherman 2000). Waves of insurgent revitalization can play an important role in sustaining a movement cadre and militant culture inside abeyance structures from one massive cycle of protest to another.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Our findings have important implications for several major bodies of research. First, for social movement theory, cross-movement revitalization adds a new dimension to intermovement relations theory, one that augments prior conceptualizations of spillover, spin-off, and sequencing effects. Social movement protest waves, like those that erupted during "the long sixties," are crucibles of conflict and innovation that forge new political opportunities for other collective actors by diffusing new forms of action, master frames, networks, and alliances (Tarrow 1998:190). This widening organizational infrastructure and culture of militancy helps other groups find or rediscover their

own agency (Morris 1999:539). Intermovement revitalization processes suggest that protest waves can expand, in part, by diffusing into institutionalized arenas and movements in abeyance, although the reawakened militancy might be directed at targets quite different from those of the initiator movement. Intermovement revitalization and abeyance structures (Taylor 1989) suggest that social movement scholars might do well to shift some attention from theories of movement emergence to theories of movement reemergence.

This analysis indicates that militancy moved from the streets to the shop floors through a variety of insurgent actions as well as organizations: Protests (during the heyday of the civil rights movement) and urban rebellions (during the Black Liberation phase) each stimulated labor militancy (in the public sector) but did so in historical sequence that corresponded to the two major phases of the movement. This suggests that as an ascendant movement goes through internal transformations of frames, goals, and tactics, it generates novel opportunity effects that increase the likelihood of stimulating other movement constituencies, even those in abeyance. Importantly, *inter*movement "sequencing of social movements" (Minkoff 1997) depends, at least in part, on the *intra*movement sequencing of insurgent waves within specific historical phases of the ascendant movement. This implies that the flow of militant culture between movements may be more complex than simply being stimulated by insurgent events or organizations.

The American labor movement is frequently singled out as the *locus classicus* of the "iron law of oligarchy" at work in a mature movement. But scholars have rarely asked whether a conservative, oligarchical trajectory within a mature movement might be altered. Voss and Sherman's (2000) pathbreaking exception emphasizes revitalization processes that are endogenous to the contemporary organized labor movement. Our extension of intermovement relations theory suggests that movements are sometimes rejuvenated by waves of insurgent activity that start elsewhere in society and spread into older movements, but leaders and grass-roots participants must be willing to make the most of such historical opportunities. This did not happen evenly across labor.

The civil rights movement was a potent historical force, but it was not felt equally and in the same ways in all corners of American society. Our findings indicate that surges in the civil rights movement's militancy (protests, rebellions) and growth in movement organizations contributed to a revival of labor militancy against the terms of work. But these actions operated differently across the public and private sectors. This suggests the importance of the form of collective action in the ascendant movement *and* the character of abeyance structures in the institutionalized movement. Social movements are important engines of institutional change, but institutional conditions differentially mediate the impact of movement-induced change. As sociologists focus increasingly on relations among movements, and ascendant movement → mature movement influences in particular, heterogeneity in the institutional and abeyance structures of mature movements will require greater attention.

Our findings on cross-movement relations suggest another way in which social movement theory contributes to our understanding of labor history and industrial relations (Kimeldorf and Stepan-Norris 1992). The literature contains a well-developed repertoire of explanations for strikes (see Franzosi 1995), but the role of other social movements is missing. Our evidence indicates that organized labor and workplace activism are embedded in a wider "social movement field." At minimum, this suggests that a social movement hypothesis should be added to the stock of standard explanations for strikes.

Finally, our findings suggest that intraclass struggles have interclass consequences that are not exclusively divisive. The civil rights movement produced a militancy that valorized racial politics and identity, even though most of the population that it represented was, in fact, working class (Bloom 1987). Typically when scholars have addressed questions that might implicate class relations, racialization swamped class imagery and issues except to highlight the reactionary character of the white working class (Quadagno 1992). Thus, for all its importance, intraclass divisions have been fea-

tured to the exclusion of interclass dynamics. Our results suggest that the movement, steeped in the politics of racial identity, fueled not only intraclass struggles around race, but also interclass militancy of workers at work. The civil rights movement created a host of complex and often unintended consequences and the revitalization of militancy in the working-class was one of them.

Larry Isaac *is the Mildred and Claude Pepper Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Florida State University. His current research agenda is focused on a larger project (of which this article is a part) that examines the influence of newly emerging social movements on more mature movements, like labor; and a study of elite capitalist militias in the Gilded Age.*

Lars Christiansen *is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Augsburg College, Minneapolis, where he studies social movements, labor and work, organizations, and urban sociology. Currently he is writing about the unionization of domestic workers, and is doing research on youth activism in contemporary progressive movements and on communities that use alternative currencies.*

APPENDIX A

Definitions and Data Sources for the Control Variables [a]

Union density, the percentage of the sector-specific labor force unionized, is our measure of labor organizational strength. We lag union density to avoid simultaneity bias in the unionization → strike relation. *Sources*: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 1971–1981).

Unemployment, the percentage of the sector-specific labor force unemployed, is our measure of labor market conditions. *Sources*: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 1971–1981).

Wage deprivation is our measure of economic hardship. For the private sector, we computed moving averages of wage changes over two-year windows for 1947–1968 and over three-year windows for 1969–1981. The duration differences are grounded in the average duration of labor contracts during these two historical periods (Kaufman 1982). The lag specification obviates the possibility of simultaneity bias in the wage-strike relations.

Literature on the public sector refers to two central hypotheses regarding economic hardship—the deterioration in real wages over time and the relative wage gap between public sector workers and their unionized counterparts in the private sector (Goldfield 1990). We combined both the cross-temporal and cross-institutional dimensions into one measure: the percentage decline in public sector average annual real (inflation-adjusted) wage for decline years (increase years scored as zero) plus the percentage wage gap between public sector average annual wage and the unionized private sector average annual wage. *Sources*: Constructed from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 1971–1981); U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1971–1981).

Labor regime measures the legal-institutional climate surrounding labor-management relations. Following McCammon (1994), we constructed cumulative counts specific to sector of the number of major legal-institutional events (including legislative, judicial, and labor bureaucracy actions) likely muting labor's use of the strike. The actions that served to mute labor strike militancy in the private sector include: the Taft-Hartley Act (1947); purge of left unions and labor leaders I (1949); purge of left unions and labor leaders II (1950); AFL-CIO merger (1955); Lincoln Mills decision (1957); Borg-Warner decision (1958); Landrum-Griffin Act (1959); Warrior and Gulf decision (1960); American Manufacturing decision (1960); Enterprise Wheel and Car decision; Lucas Flour decision (1962); Boys Market decision (1970); Gateway Coal decision (1974); Buffalo Forge decision (1976); Reagan-PATCO labor chill (1981). The events pertaining to the public sector include: the Taft-Hartley Act (1947); AFL-CIO merger (1955); Public Law 330 (which made it a felony for federal employees to strike, to assert the right to strike, or to belong to an organization that asserted the right to strike) (1955); Postal Service Reorganization Act (1971); Reagan-PATCO labor chill (1981). *Sources*: Davis (1986); Goldfield (1987, 1990); McCammon (1990, 1994); Rachleff (1982); Turner (1999).

Democratic party strength in both the legislative and executive branches is our measure of the institutionalized political climate. We computed the sum of: the proportion of non-Dixiecrat Democratic representatives in the House, plus "1" if Democrats are a majority; the proportion of non-Dixiecrat Democratic Senators, plus "1" if Democrats hold majority in the Senate; "1" for Democratic president; "0" for Republican president. "Dixiecrat" is defined as those legislators from southern "right-to-work" states. *Sources*: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 1971–1981).

APPENDIX B

Tests for Robustness

We examined many different specifications to gauge the robustness of civil rights movement effects on labor militancy. We considered a variety of alternative control variables (percent Democrat in the House, election year, Executive Order 10988, percent nonwhite workers in the labor force) and lag structures (from one to five years) in all relations

[a] Descriptive statistics for all variables will be provided by the authors on request.

between our movement variables and strikes. These experiments did not alter our key results.

We also considered alternative specifications of the dependent variable. First, we analyzed labor militancy as the number of strikes per million workers in the labor force. All significant movement effects remained except one: The organization effect on private sector labor militancy shown in Table 2 did not attain statistical significance ($p = .14$) in this case. Thus the validity of this particular effect in the private sector is weakened, and lends additional support to Hypothesis 5. Second, because wildcat strikes may be one of the greatest signs of labor militancy aimed at both management and union leadership (Fantasia 1988), we analyzed strikes occurring during the term of a labor contract as a proxy for wildcat strikes (see McCammon 1990). We obtained the same basic pattern of civil rights movement effects reported here.

Third, because scholars have noted the concentration of civil rights opposition displayed by the building trades within organized labor, we analyzed separately construction industry strikes and private sector strikes excluding construction. Those tests produced null results for all movement variables in the construction industry models and movement effect patterns for private sector non-construction strikes that mimic those reported for the entire private sector in Table 2. The null results for the construction industry are consistent with our expectation of differential structures and cultures mediating militancy diffusion. In the case of the building trades, because an almost exclusively white male labor force jealously protected a long legacy of racially exclusive labor market practices that were being challenged by civil rights forces and the state, the movement fueled more race-based intraclass hostility than interclass conflict in that industry.

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