Larry J. Griffin and Robert R. Korstad

Class as Race and Gender

Making and Breaking a Labor Union in the Jim Crow South

Early in 1944 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certified Local 22 of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA) as the bargaining agent for manufacturing workers at the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The local was built and largely sustained by the collective actions of African Americans, especially women, who quickly made it the primary institutional locus advancing the racial aspirations of Winston-Salem's black

Social Science History 19:4 (winter 1995).

working class. Operating the largest tobacco manufacturing facility in the world and employing a workforce of 12,000, none unionized (Tilley 1948, 1985), RJR vigorously fought the local from its inception. Local 22's difficulties deepened after it was red-baited by the city's white elites during a bitter strike in 1947 and again after its campaign to organize white workers in 1948 failed. UCAPAWA, moreover, ran afoul of both the Taft-Hartley Act's anticommunist provisions and the CIO's anticommunism. In the end, RJR's race- and technology-based anti-union strategies combined with cold war hysteria to defeat the union. Local 22 officially disbanded in 1951, one year after narrowly losing a recertification election.

In openly challenging unbridled capitalist prerogatives in a culture militantly hostile to black independence and worker self-organization, Local 22's saga both embodied and contributed to many sweeping contradictions then remaking the South and the nation. Among these were the rise of the World War II–era civil rights movement and white resistance to African American demands for justice, the mass entry of southern women and blacks into industries historically organized along racial and patriarchal lines, and the persistence of grassroots political radicalism coupled with the triumph of cold war ideology. The local's history also provides a prism through which we can see with uncommon clarity the refracted gender and racial struggles for identity, voice, and organization in a period charged with contestation and possibility. Our account of the rise, program, and demise of Local 22 merges its class-based institutional structure with its "infrapolitics" of race and gender (Kelley 1993). (See Kimeldorf 1991 for a discussion of this general strategy.) The interpretive frame we use posits that social class fused with race and gender in the local and through its conflicts with RJR, and that this process—that is, class experienced, comprehended, and acted on through the contested meanings and unfolding practices of race and gender—is the key to understanding the history of Local 22.

Class as Race and Gender

Our analysis is premised on class not because class has causal primacy but because Local 22 was intrinsically a working-class organization at odds with another class organization, R. J. Reynolds. Capitalism was one of the root mechanisms that brought RJR's employees together under the same roof

and one of the defining structures under which they and the union existed. Because everything the local did and to which it was subjected originated directly or indirectly in its class character and through its class relations with RJR, class is essential to any interpretation of Local 22. It does not follow, however, that an analysis of class is sufficient to understand the history of this or any other class organization. "People act upon their circumstances according to their own cultural presuppositions, the socially given categories of persons and things" (Sahlins 1981: 67). In the Jim Crow South, those "cultural presuppositions" clearly included race and gender.

Nowhere do we see the immediate force of this more strongly than in RJR's policy of segregating its workers by race and gender. African Americans and women were, by the admission of the company's personnel director in the 1940s, "never" hired as foremen or supervisors (Ed Bumgardner, interview), and black and white workers tended to be employed in separate production divisions. Moreover, physically demanding, dangerous, or dirty jobs, such as casing, cutting, and stemming the tobacco, were generally reserved for blacks, and some of these, such as stemming, were further segregated by gender; for instance, almost 80% of RJR's 3,500 tobacco stemmers were African American women (Korstad 1987: 90–92). Thus RJR employees were relationally defined and organized as "blacks" and "whites" and as "women" and "men" as well as "workers."

These "socially given categories," and the relations and understandings that resulted from them, were neither logically nor empirically subsumed by production or market relations. Joan Scott (1986: 1067) and others (e.g., Laslett 1992) characterize gender as a "constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences . . . a primary way of signifying relationships of power [and] subjective identity." The same can be said of race (Omi and Winant 1988; Feagin 1991; Higginbotham 1992). Gender and race, as well as class, thus mold self-conceptions, structure relationships and therefore institutions, permeate understandings of group interests, and normatively empower or constrain action.

Although class provided Local 22's overt organizing rationale and was the primary vehicle through which race and gender were organized, displayed, and perpetuated in it, class could not operate independently of racial or gender identities and practices and their consequences on the shop floor and in the community. On or off the job, workers at RJR were unlikely to

privilege one social position, identity, or network—be it class, race, or gender—so thoroughly as to suppress their consciousness of the remaining two (Jones 1984; Janiewski 1985, 1987, 1991). Where race and gender coalesce with class in this way to form the basis of economic privilege, political presence, and honorific entitlement, as they did in RJR and in the Jim Crow South more generally, the conventional social science strategy of treating these categories as if their meanings and consequences were analytically distinct is empirically dubious (Fields 1982; Hewitt 1992; Griffin 1995).[1] Indeed, to explain what happened to Local 22, it would seem necessary to view the three categories as *inseparable* "multiple causal structures" (Sewell 1990: 73).

Simply asserting this empirical complexity, however, does not explain how the intersection of gender, class, and race forged the local and its actions. Neither do the general observations of others who have also called for a synthesis of race, class, and gender (Scott 1987; Hewitt 1992; Higginbotham 1992). The task is to bring the categories together—that is, to allow gender and race to work *with* rather than *against* class—in a coherent interpretive frame that comprehends the history of what was unquestionably a working-class organization.

Following the general approach of E. P. Thompson (1963, 1978), our solution is to historicize the analytic content and use of class. William Sewell (1990) contends that four propositions lie at the core of Thompson's theory: Class is (*a*) a historical phenomenon that must be studied historically; (*b*) an outcome of lived experiences in economic, political, and cultural realms; (*c*) the product of human agency as well as of external structures; and (*d*) defined by consciousness, identity, and linguistic practice. Thompson's theory suggests that class is not just an abstraction, a relation of production, or a set of choices. Its utility rests, for us, on the historical fluidity and elasticity of class—that is, on its conflicted and negotiated nature (Canning 1992, 1994; Higginbotham 1992)—and thus on its potential to infuse class with race and gender practices and meanings.

How class is experienced and understood by workers is not shaped exclusively by participation in either a union or a capitalist firm. Unions are not total institutions with the power to reconstitute their members as abstracted and unidimensional "workers" stripped of everything save "class," nor are they ideal-typical Weberian organizations, sealed off from their host environments (Thompson 1967). Instead, unions are penetrated by the very

principles, practices, and meanings that also order their environments and the subjectivities and actions of their members. It follows that actions in and through unions are not functions of class identification only. Rather, real individuals marked with racial and gender statuses, interests, and understandings involve themselves in (or shun or break) unions, and at particular historical moments they do so for reasons of race and gender as well as of class. This, we argue, is what happened in Local 22: class coalesced in the union with gender and race, and as class itself played out through the practices of gender and race, so, too, did the history of the local.

The History of Local 22, Analytically Reconstituted

Confronted with the gender and racial divisions of labor at RJR, UCAPAWA could have pretended that these differences were irrelevant to future organization, incorporated racist and sexist prescriptions by organizing only white men, or recognized the salience of race and gender to black and women workers and devised a strategy to deal with them. Attempts by the AFL-affiliated Tobacco Workers International Union (TWIU) to organize workers at RJR in the 1920s and 1930s had acted on some combination of the first two strategies but had failed because of RJR's paternalism, repression, and spatial organization and because of the union's weakness (Northrup 1942; Marshall 1965: 189; 1967). Of special importance to subsequent CIO strategies, however, was the AFL's unwillingness to organize, or its ineptitude at organizing, African Americans and women. The TWIU fielded few black and no women organizers, maintained racially segregated locals, and did not integrally incorporate African American women into them (Tilley 1985: 378; Korstad 1987: 105–7).[2]

Successful protest organizations, on the other hand, often use powerful cultural schemas such as race and gender and preexisting informal or formal organization derived from them to mobilize constituencies (McAdam 1982; Sewell 1992). Following this strategy, UCAPAWA transformed the TWIU's race and sex "obstacles" into resources for building Local 22. In fact, the CIO was first drawn to RJR because it housed one of the largest concentrations of industrial workers in the South and because, whatever its faults regarding race (Foner 1974; Norrell 1986), the CIO was committed to union-

izing African Americans. UCAPAWA, moreover, had already scored some victories in the South by deploying both African American and white organizers (Kelley 1990; Honey 1993). Inspired by this success and having a cadre of experienced African American organizers at its disposal, UCAPAWA moved into Winston-Salem in 1941, determined to organize RJR's workers.

Our analysis of the union's history indicates that it was punctuated by three decisive "shifts" or "turning points." Together they served as repositories of significant previous actions, funneled their causal impact, and established both opportunities for and constraints on future action by unionists and their antagonists.[3] They were a sit-down strike in June 1943, the NLRB election victory in December 1943, and Local 22's loss in the final NLRB election in March 1950. If we can show that gender and race coalesced with class at the three defining moments and that this coalescence was intrinsic to their causes and consequences, we can plausibly conclude that race and gender were essential, not incidental, to Local 22's existence and to what happened to it as a class organization. This inference, in turn, will permit us to argue that class itself became both gendered and racialized in meaning and practice within and through the local.

The Sit-Down Strike of 1943

Causes. Using preexisting African American organizations, notably the church, to spread the union message (Korstad 1987: 7–10), UCAPAWA organizers met with RJR's black workers and produced the nucleus of the Tobacco Workers Organizing Committee (TWOC) at RJR in 1943. TWOC members were exclusively African American, were well trained by UCAPAWA organizers, were strategically scattered throughout the departments that employed black workers, and were strongly committed to unionization (Theodosia Simpson, interview).

The TWOC used both the race of its members and the tight wartime labor market to generate support for the union among RJR's black workers (Tilley 1985: 373; Korstad 1987: 105–7). It emphasized low wages, poor working conditions, and racial and gender discrimination—all long-term complaints of RJR's African American employees. Often these grievances were expressed in the rhetoric of class. Geneva McLendon, a stemmer and

union member, for example, described the harsh working conditions at the plant: "It was rough, it was rough! Everybody would almost cry every day the way they would work you and talk to you. We weren't allowed to open windows. The heat was almost unbearable. And you wasn't allowed to talk to each other." Several workers also spoke of breathing difficulties caused by tobacco dust and of the pace of the work: "We had to work like dogs to get that tobacco out. At night we would come home and shake from being overworked" (Willie Grier, interview). McLendon (and others) remembered that often, when work piled up, her foreman would stand over the women and say, " 'If you can't get this work out, get your clothes and get out.' " Workers were also rewarded for "snitching" on coworkers who did not work fast enough (Simpson, interview).

Class dissatisfaction was compounded by, and occasionally fused with, race- and gender-based grievances. Ruby Jones claimed that "you were just Jim Crowed all around. [The foreman] didn't regard you as much as an animal. He didn't respect you unless you done their dirty work or went with them." African American women attributed their poor health and infertility to their work at RJR (Foner 1974: 382) and complained that their health needs were generally ignored or racially stereotyped by RJR's medical staff: "If you had a headache, the black folks especially, had to go to the company and get a blood test like [they had] syphilis or some kind of venereal disease" (Simpson, interview). Some women received preferential treatment and higher wages in exchange for sexual favors, and sexual harassment appeared endemic to factory life. Robert Black, a TWOC leader, recalled that foremen would "pat women on their fannies . . . and if her husband was working right next to her, that husband better not say anything." Jones's complaint that the stemmers, virtually all of them black women, lacked privacy in the dressing rooms eloquently tied class and gender together: "When you go to the restroom, you was timed. If you didn't come out at that time . . . the foreman would come in the dressing room, where the women were. . . . Come in there, and you had your clothes off. Come in the toilet! [He would say,] 'You been in here long enough, if you ain't done, you won't get done.' "[4]

Our oral histories reveal that such insults and hardships led workers to individual and small-group acts of resistance, such as sabotaging the production line, committing petty theft, and doing less work than it seemed.

Off the job, workers boycotted or disrupted services in retail shops run by racist clerks. But no organized resistance to Jim Crow practices took place in or out of the plants.

In the summer of 1943 the rising cost of living and an RJR directive to speed production to meet the wartime demand for cigarettes intensified the chronic resentments discussed above (Korstad 1980). On 17 June a white foreman belittled an African American worker in Plant 65 for falling behind.[5] His abuse of her for what he saw as ineptitude inevitably evoked a history of gender and racial degradation, which the other female workers felt oppressively now that this woman, forced to rear her children solely on her own wages and reportedly sick as well, appeared to face dismissal. In the context of these overlapping discourses, and literally as black women initiated a strike to express their grievances against the white foreman (Simpson, interview), another African American worker collapsed and died on the shop floor. He, too, had been sick that morning and apparently had been refused permission to go home or to get medical attention (Lerner 1972: 272). Linking the man's death to their complaints about the speedup, female workers, led by TWOC members, staged a sit-down strike, stopping production.

No single incident provoked this work stoppage. Rather, it was caused by the contingent confluence of four actions and by the meanings black women gave those actions: the formation of the TWOC among African American workers, which provided the organizational base for collective action (Tilly 1978); RJR's production speedup, which exacerbated and symbolized the workers' long-term grievances; and two "triggering" incidents, the humiliation of one black worker and the death of another. Three of these actions were clearly race-specific. The production speedup, on the other hand, hit all production workers hard, but to the African American women enduring yet another episode of racial and gendered abuse, its meaning signaled race and gender as well as class. African American women were thus the first to act collectively, and they occupied center stage in the subsequent struggle. Their centrality was not lost on black men in Local 22. According to one, "The black women made that union possible. We could never have beaten them [RJR] without them" (quoted in Foner 1980: 383). The sit-down, ostensibly a class tactic, would not have occurred without African American women. Here, then, is strong evidence that the first key moment in the local's history was racial and gendered in motivation, meaning, and execution.

Consequences. The sit-down in Plant 65 spread to the other stemmeries, where the vast majority of black women were employed. Most other African Americans walked off the job in solidarity, and within a few days 6,800 workers (about two-thirds of RJR's black employees) had joined the TWOC. The most immediate consequence of the sit-down, therefore, and certainly the one of greatest significance to subsequent union formation, was the TWOC's greatly expanded membership, almost all of it black.

The thousands of African Americans who struck and joined the TWOC displayed the emboldened collective consciousness that Doug McAdam (1982) terms "cognitive liberation." Robert Black later remembered that on the night of the sit-down, "the people realized something they had never thought of before: we hold the strength in our hands to stop this company." Strike leaders kept workers out of the plants, despite fears of RJR retaliation, by stressing the power derived from solidarity. In mass meetings and private gatherings, unionists told other workers that RJR "was not going to fire them, a bunch of people. . . . if you stick together, they're not going to fire you" (Simpson, interview). Broad, intense group consciousness had become a resource for them (see Sewell 1992). Indeed, so effective was the strike that for five days, with 8,000 workers off the job, all of RJR's factories closed (Tilley 1985: 379).

Coupled with the TWOC-requested intervention of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the shutdown forced RJR to negotiate with the strikers. The sit-down ended as a clear victory for workers: TWOC's membership swelled, it gained quasi-official recognition from both RJR and the federal government, and it acquired the prestige of having brought a powerful, determinedly anti-union corporation to the bargaining table (Korstad 1987: 41–47). The TWOC immediately moved to institutionalize its membership growth and sit-down victory by filing with the NLRB to conduct a representative election at RJR.

Three broad anti-union reactions followed, each displaying the interplay of class and race and each continuing after the organizing drive in 1943.

First, RJR countermobilized by fostering an organization of workers called the Satisfied Reynolds Employees. Later determined by the NLRB to have been instigated by lower-level supervisory personnel, the group was composed of anti-union whites and functioned much as a company union. It filed for a place on the NLRB ballot as the RJR Employees Association and

used legal tactics to delay the election, hoping in the interim to disorganize RJR's workers and mobilize anti-union sentiment among whites (ibid.: 129, 153–54).

The conflation of race and class was also intimately involved in the second consequence of the TWOC's filing for NLRB certification: the formation of the TWOC's most vocal opponent, the Citizens' Emergency Committee (CEC). Composed of prominent middle-class civic leaders from both races, the CEC contended in public proclamations and in newspaper advertisements that RJR workers were treated well and did not need an "unpatriotic" CIO union (Tilley 1985: 382). By reminding RJR's African American workers that the financial generosity of Winston-Salem's whites in the past was based on a "splendid and mutually helpful relation between the white and colored races" and on "a splendid spirit of understanding and co-operation between labor and the employers" (quoted in Korstad 1987: 144), the CEC evoked the alleged benefits of racial paternalism and tried to reframe the identities and interests of African Americans along traditional racial rather than class lines.

Finally, the nearly defunct TWIU exploited the wave of pro-union sentiment by filing for its own place on the NLRB ballot. Directing its appeal to RJR's white workers, the TWIU further racialized Local 22's emerging character by accusing the TWOC of exploiting the "misery of a misguided and misled group" of black workers and of creating "racial hatred, confusion and chaos" (quoted in ibid.: 124).

Previously, these obstacles might have derailed unionization (Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988). But in the context of World War II and the legacy of the New Deal (see generally Foner 1974: 238–68; 1980: 360–93), the state, in the form of a crucial NLRB election ruling, came down on the side of the insurgent workers. After voiding a contested election held in August, the board ruled that seasonal workers were eligible to vote and that white subforemen, as "management," were not. The 1,500 African American women immediately added to the voting rolls assured that a majority of workers would vote for union representation (Korstad 1987: 139–42). The NLRB also ruled that the election must be conducted on the basis of a single, plantwide bargaining unit rather than on the basis of two units distinguished by skill (and hence by race and gender), as proposed by the company. The bargaining power of RJR's African American labor force was strengthened because, once certi-

fied, Local 22 represented all black workers at RJR (as well as any whites who joined), not only those employed in segregated production facilities. These workers now had a strong, firm voice.

Local 22's NLRB Certification

Causes. On 17 December 1943 the TWOC won the second of two NLRB elections by a large majority. The proximate cause of its victory was the NLRB ruling on the eligibility of seasonal workers, which was itself race- and gender-specific in content and consequence. By bringing in the NLRB, the TWOC had escalated the conflict between itself and RJR to a higher structural level (e.g., Schwartz 1976), inducing the intervention of a powerful third party—the federal government—over which the company had little leverage and whose rulings it had to obey by law. In the chain of historical causation, however, union organization at RJR was the culmination of actions set in motion by the 200 African American women who had staged the sit-down six months earlier. The strike had brought together the CIO's national strategy of organizing black workers and the institutionally unrepresented grievances of RJR's African American workers and then, pivotally, had linked both to the latent demand for unionization among thousands of black workers at RJR.

How central were race and gender to Local 22's legal existence as the bargaining agent for RJR's workers? Almost certainly white workers could not have won the NLRB election alone, because they were a minority at RJR in 1943. More important, they were stubbornly anti-union: the TWIU, which had wooed them for years and had flattered their racial sentiments, repeatedly failed to sway enough whites to sustain organization; despite concerted efforts by the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers of America (FTA, the name UCAPAWA adopted after the certification of Local 22), only a handful ever joined the local. When energized by the sit-down, however, African Americans were enthusiastic about unionization and, given the opportunity, voted overwhelmingly for the TWOC.

Consequences. Ironically, racism and sexism helped establish Local 22 as a class organization, shaped the range of its possible class actions, and quickly pushed the local beyond class concerns to those of gender and race.

Union formation directly or indirectly benefited both the local's members and others in Winston-Salem, and it provoked an interrelated set of anti-union reactions detrimental to the local's survival.

1. Class. Local 22 acted as a class organization, altering the distribution of power and authority in the workplace and securing economic benefits for its members and nonmembers. In its first postelection contract in 1944, for example, the local won union-maintenance, wage, and shop-floor control and representation concessions (Tilley 1985: 385, 403; Korstad 1987: 153–98, 349–51, 384–86). Over the next few years the local continued to extract improvements in wages and benefits for all RJR workers and fought for the unemployed as well. It did not, however, obtain a union shop (Korstad 1987: 327–29, 349–51). As we will see, this telling "class" defeat had a racial consequence as well, because it allowed RJR to label Local 22 a "black" organization and thus to play on and magnify racial tensions among workers.

2. Race. The local did do much to advance black interests, especially off the shop floor. Through their political action committee, unionists launched a successful voter registration drive among thousands of the city's black citizens, most of whom were not RJR employees, and forged a cross-class, biracial coalition that in 1947 elected to the city's Board of Aldermen an African American, perhaps the first to win a political contest against a white opponent in the South in the twentieth century (Robert Black, interview). Local 22 also negotiated with the school board in its district to establish adult-education courses for African Americans, and it pressured the city to provide low-income housing for many black workers. Moreover, it encouraged thousands of African American tobacco workers to join the NAACP, making Winston-Salem's chapter the largest in the state. Finally, the local buttressed racial pride and history by providing the city's African Americans a library with books by black leaders and political radicals and by teaching black history in its workers' education classes (Korstad 1987: 199–233).

Local 22 thus became an important vehicle for the *racial* aspirations of RJR's black workers and of the African American community generally. In resisting Jim Crow practices on the shop floor and in Winston-Salem, the local functioned as a counterhegemonic institution broader in scope and purpose than a conventional trade union (Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988). It

became the linchpin of an oppositional culture that used political struggles to redefine the meaning and place of race (see, generally, Lipsitz 1988).

So intertwined were class and race, however, that there were significant class meanings even in the actions specifically connoting the politics of race. By spurring the mobilization of the African American community, Local 22 consciously strengthened the social bases of its own existence as a class organization. Unionists could reasonably expect the political empowerment of working-class blacks to counter partially RJR's economic power, thereby putting the local on a more nearly equal footing with the company in industrial—that is, in class—disputes. "We saw the need of strengthening the NAACP, not to dominate it with our members but to build it. Because that was the political arm of the blacks, short of our union. By building and getting our members to support these organizations, it gave us extra strength in our community" (Black, interview).

At the same time, Local 22's racial composition and program exacerbated class divisions in the black community. Middle-class African Americans in the anti-union CEC, for example, had their own class interests to advance (Korstad 1987: 144–52), and some publicly supported the CEC and RJR against the TWOC: "We will have to admit that the fairest wages and working conditions for us [African Americans] in the entire tobacco industry are to be found" at RJR. Black workers responded with indignation: "How could anyone who does not work in the factory and knows nothing of the conditions under which others work expect to make sense of what workers do?" (quoted in ibid.: 125–26). Occasionally, class conflict among African Americans was expressed more forcefully: black workers boycotted a business owned by an African American critic of the union and left the churches of unsupportive black ministers (ibid.: 125–29). Generally, African American workers used Local 22 as a platform from which to challenge their middle-class counterparts for leadership in the black community.

3. Gender. While the local never explicitly put the "woman question" on its formal agenda (Janiewski 1987: 175), it did advance solutions to the specific problems of African American working women in and out of RJR and self-consciously promoted women to leadership positions. Union contracts generated disproportionately better pay and job benefits for African American women, who, as the lowest-paid workers, received the largest percentage

increases. The creation of a shop steward system moderated or eliminated the arbitrary control of the foremen, empowering black women vis-à-vis their white male supervisors. Moreover, the local opened its shop steward positions to these workers. But basic human dignity on the job was as important as pay and position to them. When shop steward Ruby Jones was asked by her foreman what she wanted, she replied, "I want your respect, that's all I want" (quoted in Korstad and Lichtenstein 1988: 791).

Local 22 also served as an alternative social world that linked working-class African American women together regardless of job, neighborhood, or church affiliation. The local sponsored singing groups and softball teams, fostered intellectual growth in reading groups and basic literacy courses, and encouraged leadership development through public speaking and administrative duties (Korstad 1987: 204–15). In accentuating these "networks of solidarity" among African American women (Kelley 1993: 98), the local structured and mobilized gender as well as race and class.

The racial and gender advances spurred by the local were, to be sure, limited. In the 1946 contract negotiations, for example, its failure to achieve gender and racial integration inside RJR's plants (Korstad 1987: 251) soon had profound consequences. Even the local's effectiveness in organizing African Americans on and off the shop floor had contradictory implications. On the one hand, such organization mobilized much-needed human and ideological resources. During the 1947 strike, for example, black merchants donated food to the local's soup kitchen, African American barbers and beauticians provided free services to the strikers, and uniformed black veterans marched in support of the local (ibid.: 301–3). On the other hand, its gender and racial makeup rendered Local 22 dependent on certain groups of workers and thus vulnerable to attacks on its efficacy and existence that would not otherwise have carried such potency.

4. Anti-union retaliation. For its part, RJR intended to break the local by flexing its enormous economic and political muscle (Tilley 1985: 376). Its anti-union strategy—the final consequence of Local 22's formation that we discuss—appears to have drawn on white supremacist definitions of race and traditional southern "solutions" to labor problems to weaken the local's structural and racial foundations. First, RJR put up unyielding resistance in collective bargaining negotiations, prolonging the 1946 negotiations over

a new contract for months and almost provoking a strike then (ibid.: 385–86). When negotiations began for the next contract in 1947, the company was unwilling to meet Local 22's demands even though it had just reported huge profits (ibid.: 395). Citing profit and cost-of-living statistics, the local bargained aggressively for raises to offset postwar inflation (e.g., food prices had increased twice as fast as wages [Korstad 1987: 342; Tilley 1985: 659]). These demands, too, were rebuffed. Faced with an unbending opponent, Local 22 reluctantly called a strike in May 1947 (Tilley 1985: 395–96; Korstad 1987: 287, 292–97).

The strike ended in stalemate, but not before it had depleted the local's treasury (Korstad 1987: 340). More important, it had served RJR's long-term interest of marshaling preexisting or emerging anti-union forces. These forces did not dissipate after the strike; RJR continued to use them against the local over the next three years.

Technology provided RJR with its second anti-union tactic: after World War II, the company reduced its dependence on unionized labor by mechanizing production. In addition to eliminating several predominantly black departments in 1946 (Tilley 1985: 383; Korstad 1987: 237–40), mechanization permitted RJR to employ unskilled white scab labor to replace African American strikers during the 1947 strike, because simple mechanized tasks required little experience. (All but about 150 of the 5,000 to 8,000 strikers were black [Korstad 1987: 297].) RJR thus kept enough plants open to blunt the strike's effectiveness.[6] Then, when the strike was settled, the company permanently absorbed most of the white anti-union scabs, placed them in what had been considered "black" jobs, and thus exacerbated racial hostility. By February 1948 mechanization had eliminated 2,100 jobs once largely filled by union-conscious African American women (Tilley 1985: 487). The union had lost political clout, internal solidarity, a militant pressure group, and the structural power to halt production (see, generally, Edwards 1979 on this last point).

Another strategy to limit Local 22's influence was to remobilize white elites and the African American middle class. Hoping to channel black discontent from the union's racial program toward moderate middle-class "social welfare" programs, for instance, local elites brought in the National Urban League in 1946 to study race relations and to make recommendations for the improved delivery of social services to the African American

community. The league's report, which got extensive publicity in the local newspaper, ignored the conditions of workers per se and failed to question racial segregation and discrimination. RJR also pledged $250,000, one-half of the required amount, to build a YMCA-YWCA building for black youth (Korstad 1987: 380–81). But judged by the 1947 strike and the 1950 certification results, both supported by most blacks at RJR, these attempts at racial amelioration seem to have had little influence on the local's lifeblood, the African American rank and file.

The company also tacitly unleashed the still-active RJR Employees Association, which claimed almost 5,000 members in 1946, to badger Local 22 and further divide workers along racial lines (Tilley 1985: 388–407). The association attacked the union in newspapers, called segregated mass meetings of RJR workers, manipulated racial fears and tensions, and participated in a red-baiting campaign against Local 22. Distributing leaflets claiming, "We will work! We will not strike. We can carry on!" and similar messages during the 1947 strike (ibid.: 396), the association facilitated RJR's use of scab labor to keep production from plummeting. After the strike, it continued to present itself as the noncommunist, "white" alternative to Local 22, helping to undermine the FTA's subsequent drive to organize white workers, and forced its way onto the NLRB recertification ballot in 1949 in a racially divisive and disorganizing four-way election.

Anticommunism provided the local's enemies yet another weapon in the anti-union crusade. Shrewdly incorporating into local conflicts the political discourse emanating from a multifaceted national assault on the economic and political gains of the New Deal and the labor movement, RJR and the city's white elites used the communist affiliations or sympathies of many of Local 22's leaders in a massive attack against its representativeness and integrity. The local's and the FTA's communism, real or alleged, was first made an issue by the TWOC's AFL competitor, the TWIU, during the 1943 organizing drive, but was radically intensified during (and because of) the 1947 strike. Red-baiting was so steady, so prolonged, and so public, with startling "exposés" and revelations by former unionists and journalists almost daily in May 1947, that the U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee began an investigation (Korstad 1987: 305–18). ("Exposé of 'Commie' Unionists, Undenied in Countercharges, Prompts Hopes for Settlement," announced one headline [quoted in ibid.].) As evidenced by the vote for Local 22 in the 1950

NLRB elections, however, red-baiting, like the previous racial amelioration project, appears to have had little effect on most African American workers' loyalties. But it weakened the local's already fragile ties to the black middle class, played on the fears of white workers and thus damaged the campaign to organize them, and generally haunted the local for the rest of its days.

Local 22's Defeat in NLRB Elections in March 1950

This was the final turning point in our interpretation of Local 22's history. Its causes reflect the convergence of dynamics internal to the union-RJR relationship and forces initially outside the class and racial conflicts in Winston-Salem. It also meant the death of the local, the main consequence of interest to us here.

Causes. One of the exogenous factors of import was the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which permitted government injunctions, safeguarded the open shop, marginalized communists in the labor movement, and generally shifted the balance of power from unionists and rank-and-file workers to employers (see Foner 1980: 402). Another was the refusal of Local 22's parent union, the FTA, to sign Taft-Hartley's noncommunist affidavits in 1948 (Korstad 1987: 331–39). This, in turn, further divided RJR's workers along racial and ideological lines, because most white workers were fiercely anticommunist. RJR then used the FTA's noncompliance as its rationale not to bargain with Local 22 in the 1948 contract negotiations (Tilley 1985: 403; Korstad 1987: 351–54). This tactic set the stage for a four-way competition to represent RJR's workers in another NLRB certification election. In addition to Local 22, which filed after the FTA did agree to the Taft-Hartley stipulations in 1949, the contenders were the RJR Employees Association, which renewed its organizing efforts under the banner of "No Union"; the newly energized TWIU; and the United Transport Service Workers, a right-wing, all-black CIO union that red-baited Local 22 by tying it to Russian communism (Korstad 1987: 392).

After the certification election was called, Local 22 was struck by a final, and perhaps the most damning, exogenous force. The NLRB ruled that over 1,000 female seasonal workers, most of them black (and likely union support-

ers), could not be part of the bargaining unit, it also franchised several hundred nonunion, in-plant white clerical workers and technicians who, the local had argued, exercised disciplinary power and thus should be barred from voting (Tilley 1985: 409; Korstad 1987: 395). Both decisions were crippling to the union's electoral support. Coupled with the anti-union sentiments of the scabs retained by RJR after the 1947 strike, the failure to organize whites in 1948 (due in part to the local's communist tag), and the huge losses of African American union votes induced by layoffs since 1946, the NLRB's rulings resulted in the rejection, by a mere 66 votes, of Local 22 as RJR workers' bargaining agent in a 1950 runoff. With no institutional mechanism to guarantee its continued existence, the local finally disbanded in October 1951.

Previous explanations for the local's demise have focused mainly on either race or anti-communism. Ray Marshall (1965: 248), for example, attributes it to Local 22's inability to win the support of white workers, and Alan Draper (1994: 12) suggests that the local's "principled" racial liberalism, which kept working-class whites away, was at fault. Philip Foner (1974: 281–82; 1980: 408–10) and, less explicitly, Jacqueline Jones (1985: 264–65), on the other hand, locate the cause of the defeat in the anticommunism of the CIO, combined with repressive labor legislation. On close inspection, however, these deterministic explanations fail to convince. Local 22 had weathered the animosity of racist white workers and the organizational difficulties of a racially divided working class for six years because it had enjoyed the loyalty of most of RJR's African American workers. Yet their votes could not sustain the local in 1950. Why? As to anticommunism, other left-wing unions withstood purges and the harshness of Taft-Hartley (e.g., Foner 1980; Kimeldorf 1988), and Local 22 almost did, losing the last election by only a few dozen votes out of more than 7,000 cast. What happened in the case of the union to make McCarthyism especially damning?

Evidently, something more, and more complex, happened in Winston-Salem than simply white supremacy and anticommunism. Our interpretation of how Local 22 was defeated (*a*) acknowledges its initial structural disadvantages (i.e., its racial, gender, and skill composition and its southern location); (*b*) incorporates centrally gender and RJR's industrial organization, both completely ignored in previous explanations; and (*c*) shows how all of these were contingently configured with race and anticommunism. But again, class is the first key that must be turned.

We found no evidence that RJR's implacable opposition to Local 22 derived from its hostility to the advancement of blacks or women. Just as it had been inimical to the mostly white and male TWIU, and indeed had repeatedly thwarted its organizing efforts, RJR opposed Local 22 primarily for reasons of class—that is, for reasons of profit, costs, and labor control—which were sharpened by an intensely competitive intraclass battle for market share with other tobacco manufacturers (Tilley 1985: 488). Yet all facets of class were inevitably gendered and racialized during the history of Local 22. Such was the case even in RJR's use of that classic capitalist cost-cutting and union-busting device, mechanization. This leads to the second key that must be turned, racial and gender segregation inside RJR plants.

Segregation largely limited the employment opportunities of African American women to the stemmeries. So when the stemmeries were mechanized for reasons of class and competition rather than of race or gender per se, African American women disproportionately lost their jobs. Once laid off, moreover, they were barred by gender prescriptions from "men's" jobs (Janiewski 1991). The double victimization of black women, the local's most active supporters, materially reduced the local's chances of survival.

Over and above the impediments of skill composition and regional location, then, Local 22 was born institutionally weak in that it was founded on a structurally vulnerable workforce: African Americans, especially females, who were at risk of dismissal from RJR due to the calculus of capitalist rationality. Because these particular workers were vulnerable to job loss, moreover, the union was at risk of losing their commitment and votes precisely because of how they were defined and inserted into the production process. As we noted earlier, as workers they were also organized as "women" and as "blacks" due to the fusion of class with RJR's discriminatory gender and racial practices.

When RJR mechanized the stemmeries after World War II and then fortified the political logic of that decision with selective racial and gender hiring, firing, and retention after the 1947 strike, it pushed Local 22 onto a "path-dependent" trajectory of structural weakness and numerical loss. Path dependencies are evident when the cumulative consequences of past actions constrain future ones and thus establish a likely (but not certain) trajectory (Abrams 1982; Aminzade 1992; Sewell forthcoming). "Path reversals" in Local 22's downward trajectory became less likely with each subsequent

union failure, miscalculation, and contingency. Thus, when white workers bought into the racial ploys of the RJR Employees Association, scabbing in the 1947 strike and ignoring the 1948 FTA campaign to win them over,[7] they drove another nail into the local's coffin, because the local, already suffering from a sizable reduction in black members, desperately needed white votes for NLRB recertification. Likewise, when Local 22's and the FTA's supposed ties to the Communist Party were used to stall the drive to organize whites and were exploited by RJR to deny the local recognition, the local was exposed to interunion rivalry and another NLRB election.

Even this far down the path toward oblivion, however, Local 22 would have survived this particular challenge had the NLRB ruled differently about the voting eligibility of seasonal and supervisory workers in the final election. What gave the exogenous rulings such historical weight—that is, why the decisions were causally woven into the event's unfolding with such determining force—was the local's ever-growing structural vulnerability, coupled with the gender and racial specificity of the rulings themselves: the workers who were disfranchised were seasonal and, not coincidentally, given the racism and sexism at RJR and in society, they were also black women.

The seeds of Local 22's defeat were planted after the war, when RJR extensively mechanized the jobs of African American women. But they did not bear fruit and need not have borne any, despite the local's initially unfavorable conditions, if race and gender in their many facets and anticommunism had not converged in 1950 with the downward trajectory established in 1946.

Discussion

Local 22 concurrently built on and challenged a class structure in Winston-Salem and at RJR that was already imbued with gender and racial constructions. By becoming both the organizational repository and expression of the hurts and hopes of RJR's African American workers, the local elicited, framed, and mobilized racial and gender, as well as class, identities. Because black workers were its organizational base and its sustenance, moreover, Local 22 became a focal point for contestation over the definition and practice of race and gender even as it also remained a class organization.

Class was the underpinning of the organization and advancement of African American women and men in and through the local. Local 22's racial

and gender projects were grounded in and effected through, first, its structural ties to blacks and women *as workers* and, second, its class relationship with RJR. But class in the Jim Crow South did not exist in a cultural vacuum and could not operate in an analytically "pure" fashion. Class fused with gender and race in the local and at RJR to create a deeply interwoven cultural fabric that fashioned how workers, employers, and others interpreted their situations and how they acted on their interpretations. Most particularly, this coalescence significantly shaped each group's experience of class and thus what class meant to them and to the projects of Local 22.

That the experience of class was conditioned by and merged with those of race and gender is evident from the expressed complaints of African American workers (e.g., pay differentials, job segregation, and sexual coercion). These were class grievances because they resulted from wage, production, and supervisory relations; they were at the same moment racial and gender grievances because they derived from race and gender relations, affecting primarily African American women at RJR. Black workers thus experienced *racialized and gendered class grievances*, and they honed *racialized and gendered class consciousness and interests* (see generally Lewis 1991: 58; Kelley 1993).

Class practices were also permeated by race and gender because Local 22's demographic composition critically defined what it became and did. African Americans organized on the shop floor as oppressed workers and then consciously used their class organization to challenge the social and political foundations of white male privilege both at RJR (e.g., in the attempt to desegregate the production departments) and in the broader polity (e.g., in the NAACP membership drive). When RJR's management established racial wage differentials, segregated jobs by race and gender, and racialized its conflict with the local, it, too, acted on its knowledge and experience of class as filtered through the lens of race and gender. White workers who shunned the local and scabbed on it were equally unlikely to have separated their class and racial sensibilities. Racial solidarity, both black and white, then, was at the center of Local 22's battles; with the significant exception of the local's middle-class black opponents, the contending forces at RJR were as identifiable by their skin color as by their class. Gender divisions were less visible, because there was little gender solidarity across racial groups; white women seemed no more likely to support the local than white men were. But given the organization of the company's African American female workforce in the

plants and how the local responded to this and other gender issues, Local 22 could not avoid contesting RJR's sexist hiring and job assignment practices. Local 22 and its actions thus embodied *racialized and gendered class organization and racialized and gendered class practices.*

All of this suggests that class became increasingly gendered and racialized in meaning and execution. The local's class successes, such as improved job benefits, were therefore necessarily racial and gender successes, and its class failures, such as its inability to obtain a closed shop or to abolish job segregation in RJR's plants, were racial and gender failures that subsequently rebounded to weaken class organization. Conversely, the local's racial triumphs, such as the successful voter registration drive, were transmuted into class resources, which were deployed in a racial struggle against white supremacy. Perhaps, then, it is just as accurate to say that African American workers used Local 22 to voice and activate *class-conveyed racial and gender consciousness and practices.* Indeed, the very difficulty of determining whether these actions derived from or targeted class, race, or gender indicates profound categorical coalescence.

In their own sense of the source of their grievances, in their evocation of collective memory, and in their consciousness of how the union transformed their daily lives, Local 22's African American women signaled precisely this confluence: "You worked just like a dog and was talked to just like a dog. We didn't get no recognition or be treated like human beings until that union came in there. Even in the newspaper nobody had a Mrs. on their name until that union came. There were stores that you couldn't go into. When the union came, it was just like being reconstructed" (Ruby Jones, quoted in Janiewski 1987: 175).

The antagonistic class relationship between the local and RJR and its allies thus could not be disentangled from gender and racial conflicts. Local 22's history represents a struggle not only over class formation but over racial hierarchies and formations as well (e.g., Omi and Winant 1988). Gender organization and conflicts, too, were instrumental to what happened in and to the local, preeminently so at its birth and death. Simply put, class was made meaningful in all facets of daily life and thus played out in the union in ways that were inescapably racial and gendered. To account for Local 22's existence, actions, and demise as a class organization, and to ascertain its

general significance, thus requires continuous recourse to gender and race as they molded the meaning and practice of class.

Conclusion

Challenges that the growing analytical prominence of gender and race poses to the conceptual integrity and empirical utility of conventional notions of social class are not isolated. Analytic Marxism (Przeworski 1986), the "relative autonomy of the political" (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1991), and linguistic constructions of class (Sewell 1990) have all helped intensify a wholesale debate. The options appear to be (*a*) to minimize the relevance of class or deconstruct it out of existence (e.g., Scott 1987), (*b*) to ignore the challenges and maintain class as a purely structural and determining concept (e.g., Wright et al. 1992), or (*c*) to advance or adapt conceptualizations of how class meshes with other social categories. So as not to jettison class or dismiss the criticisms of conventional understandings, we have chosen the last alternative.

Our interpretive frame consists of three interdependent core propositions, each contrary to those usually employed or assumed in social research. First, the definitions of class, race, and gender are mutable, not fixed, because their meanings are historically contested as actors attempt to define and organize themselves and others in these categorical terms. Ahistorical, static conceptualizations that concretize the meanings of these categories fail to capture this contest and the ongoing definition and redefinition.

Second, when the social formations that are the context, subject, and object of these struggles are characterized by a systemic interpenetration of gender, race, and class, as in the Jim Crow South, the experience and practice of these categories themselves become interdependent, fused in appreciation and in cultural signification (Griffin 1995). "Experience" and "practice" are of equal importance here, the former because group consciousness, identity, and relations, and their associated grievances, interests, and opportunities, become sensible and meaningful through the experience of categorical membership; the latter because social practices are the behavioral enactments of the experience of group membership and, as such, represent the point of articulation between actors and the reproduction or transformation of social formations and their constitutive social categories (Giddens 1979; Abrams

1982; Sewell forthcoming). The use of discrete categories of analysis generally obscures the fact that class may be experienced and acted on as race and gender and that struggles over class may at times also be struggles over gender and race.

Finally, in many circumstances no single category, historical happening, or social process can be adequately interpreted unless the interpenetration just discussed is acknowledged and exploited for inferential purposes. Monocausal categorical explanations may be theoretically elegant, but they are too often empirically bereft.

We suspect that the complex merging of these categories in Local 22 is a very nearly universal process in social formations that place cultural significance on these status markers, privileging some distinctions at the expense of others. This generalization is no doubt true for southern labor history (Jones 1984; Kelley 1990; Honey 1993; Draper 1994; Halpern 1994; Love 1994), but it also appears useful in reinterpreting aspects of policy formation (Quadagno 1994), racial violence (Hall 1979), deviance (Hall 1991), and other issues. Thus the primary implication of our interpretive frame is both clear and, at least potentially, quite general. Rather than conceptualize class, race, and gender as discrete and separable factors with fixed conceptual meanings (e.g., Wilson 1980; Beck 1980; Wright et al. 1992), we should focus on how these (and other) categories variously fuse across a range of contested situations and try to understand how such coalescence contingently structures historical possibilities, conflicts, and outcomes.

Notes

Larry J. Griffin is professor of sociology and political science at Vanderbilt University. With Don H. Doyle, he edited the recently published *The South as an American Problem* and is now studying patterns of lynching and averted lynching during the Jim Crow period.

Robert R. Korstad is assistant professor of public policy and director of the Hart Leadership Program at Duke University. He is also research associate at the Center for Documentary Studies at Duke, where he helps coordinate an NEH-funded study, "Behind the Veil: African-American Life in the Jim Crow South." He is completing a study of black working-class activism in Winston-Salem during the 1940s and is beginning a project on the War on Poverty in the South.

The authors acknowledge the support of Vanderbilt University and National Science Foundation grant BSN-8700864 to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behav-

ioral Sciences in the preparation of this article. An earlier version was presented to the 1992 "Reworking American Labor History: Race, Gender, and Class" conference, sponsored by the State Historical Society of Wisconsin and the University of Wisconsin—Madison history department. In commenting on previous drafts of this article, the following scholars generously gave their time and expertise: Ron Aminzade, Chris Botsko, Karen Campbell, Dan Cornfield, James Epstein, Bill Fletcher, Jacquelyn Hall, Larry Isaac, Howard Kimeldorf, John Markoff, Holly McCammon, Yvonne Newsome, Peggy Thoits, Lynn Weber, Maurice Zeitlin, and two anonymous reviewers.

1 Barbara Fields (1990: 100) posits that race and class cannot compete for relative exploratory importance because of their "joint indispensability," that is, because of the historical meaning of class as race. She labels attempts to ascertain their causal primacy "meaningless," equating them with efforts to decide the relative importance of the numerator and the denominator to a fraction.

2 Theodosia Simpson, a worker-organizer in Local 22, stated in an interview that her black coworkers resisted the initial CIO foray into RJR because they remembered TWIU racism. See also the comments of Luanna Cooper, another Local 22 militant, in Lerner 1972: 268.

3 Most of our information is taken from primary sources, including newspapers (e.g., the *Daily Worker* and the *Winston-Salem Journal*), union newsletters and documents (e.g., Local 22's *Tobacco Workers Voice* and AFL-CIO Region 8 papers), reports from federal agencies (e.g., the NLRB and the National War Labor Board), and 27 oral histories of participants and other knowledgeable sources conducted by Robert Korstad from 1976 to 1987. The oral histories are particularly useful as sources of information not found in the "class-rich" but "gender-poor" documents. Rather than lengthen this article with references to primary sources, we cite Korstad's (1987) dissertation on Local 22 and Nannie Tilley's (1985) official history of RJR. Both fully reference all primary sources, and Tilley appears to have had virtually open access to RJR's records. Because Local 22 is a well-known case (e.g., Lerner 1972; Giddens 1984), the secondary literature is considerable, and we also draw on it.

Our interpretation of the local's history has been facilitated by event-structure analysis (ESA). ESA elicits the analyst's understanding of the causal relations within a narrative by transforming a chronology constructed by the analyst into questions in which he or she is asked whether some action depends on a given temporal antecedent (Heise 1989). The responses are diagrammed to form a logical display of the *imputed* causal connectedness of all actions defining the event. The diagram (not shown) can then be used, as we did here, to identify particularly significant actions in the event (Griffin 1993). In ESA, events are conceptualized as causally indeterminate contingent happenings, in that they did not have to unfold as they did (Griffin 1992). No known computer algorithm or formal logic can anticipate all novel and counterfactual possibilities at each moment in the event's unfolding. It follows that formal algorithms cannot explain what actually happened. ESA assumes that the analyst, not the algorithm, possesses the knowledge to anticipate, counterfactualize, explain,

and interpret (Griffin and Ragin 1994). Causality and historical significance are not "discovered" through ESA. Its value is thus largely heuristic, because it prods users to think about events more seriously than they might otherwise do (Griffin 1993).

4 These descriptions are consistent with the oral histories of other tobacco workers and with objective assessments of working conditions and pay both at RJR and in the southern tobacco industry more generally (Johnson 1935; Foner 1980; Jones 1984; Janiewski 1985; Tilley 1985).

5 Oral histories suggest that the woman's female coworkers were unwilling to help her catch up because they believed that she had previously benefited from managerial favoritism. Their refusal highlights the danger of presupposing solidarity based on group identity as an explanation for collective action. On the other hand, what happened next demonstrates both that understandings of group solidarity and individual interests can quickly change and that these identities can be mobilized, given specific power relations.

6 Strikers tried unsuccessfully to win the scabs over with leaflets that appealed to their racism. "Did they tell you before the strike that you would have to operate a stemming machine?" the leaflets asked (Korstad 1987: 297–98). Using this tactic, black workers were apparently reproducing racist stereotypes both of African Americans and of the "color" of jobs. But by racializing a class tactic, striking blacks were actually trying to preserve sufficient class strength to contest racist definitions of race and jobs.

7 The FTA campaign in 1948 was itself often segregationist (Korstad 1987: 345–48). FTA organizers justified its Jim Crow tone by pointing to its necessity for the survival of the largely African American local. "There was less than a year to do something with white workers" (Jack Frye, interview). Only 100 or so white workers signed up, and RJR co-opted or harassed and isolated them, forcing most to leave the local (Korstad 1987: 349; Korstad 1992).

References

Abrams, Philip (1982) Historical Sociology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Aminzade, Ronald (1992) "Historical sociology and time." Sociological Methods and Research 20: 456–80.

Beck, E. M. (1980) "Labor unionism and racial income inequality: A time series analysis of the post–World War II period." American Journal of Sociology 85: 791–814.

Canning, Kathleen (1992) "Gender and the politics of class formation: Rethinking German labor history." American Historical Review 97: 736–68.

——— (1994) "Feminist history after the linguistic turn: Historicizing discourse and experience." Signs 19: 368–404.

Draper, Alan (1994) Conflict of Interests: Organized Labor and the Civil Rights Movement in the South, 1954–1968. Ithaca, NY: ILR.

Edwards, Richard (1979) Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century. New York: Basic.

Feagin, Joe (1991) "The continuing significance of race: Anti-black discrimination in public places." American Sociological Review 56: 101–16.

Fields, Barbara J. (1982) "Ideology and race in American history," in J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson (eds.) Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward. New York: Oxford University Press: 143–77.

——— (1990) "Slavery, race, and ideology in the United States of America." New Left Review, no. 181: 95–118.

Foner, Philip (1974) Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619–1973. New York: International.

——— (1980) Women and the American Labor Movement: From World War I to the Present. New York: Free Press.

Giddens, Anthony (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Giddens, Paula (1984) When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America. New York: Bantam.

Griffin, Larry J. (1992) "Temporality, events, and explanation in historical sociology: An introduction." Sociological Methods and Research 20: 403–27.

——— (1993) "Narrative, event-structure analysis, and causal interpretation in historical sociology." American Journal of Sociology 98: 1094–1133.

——— (1995) "How is sociology informed by history?" Social Forces 73: 1245–54.

Griffin, Larry J., and Charles Ragin (1994) "Some observations on formal methods of qualitative analysis." Sociological Methods and Research 23: 3–20.

Hall, Jacquelyn (1979) Revolt against Chivalry: Jesse Daniel Ames and the Women's Campaign against Lynching. New York: Columbia University Press.

——— (1991) "Private eyes, public women: Images of class and sex in the urban South, Atlanta, Georgia, 1913–1915," in Ava Baron (ed.) Work Engendered: Toward a New History of American Labor. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 243–72.

Halpern, Rick (1994) "Organized labour, black workers, and the twentieth-century South: The emerging revision." Social History 19: 369–83.

Heise, David (1989) "Modeling event structures." Journal of Mathematical Sociology 14: 139–69.

Hewitt, Nancy (1992) "Compounding differences." Feminist Studies 18: 313–26.

Higginbotham, Evelyn B. (1992) "African-American women's history and the metalanguage of race." Signs 17: 251–74.

Honey, Michael (1993) Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Janiewski, Dolores (1985) Sisterhood Denied: Race, Gender, and Class in a New South Community. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

——— (1987) "Seeking 'a new day and a new way': Black women and unions in the southern tobacco industry," in Carol Groneman and Mary Beth Norton (eds.) "To

Toil the Livelong Day": America's Women at Work, 1780–1980. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 161–78.

——— (1991) "Southern honor, southern dishonor: Managerial ideology and the construction of gender, race, and class relations in southern industry," in Ava Baron (ed.) Work Engendered: Toward a New History of American Labor. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 70–91.

Johnson, Charles (1935) "The tobacco worker: A study of tobacco workers and their families." Industrial Relations Section, Division of Review, National Recovery Administration, Washington, DC.

Jones, Beverly (1984) "Race, sex, and class: Black female tobacco workers in Durham, North Carolina, 1920–1940, and the development of female consciousness." Feminist Studies 10: 441–51.

Jones, Jacqueline (1985) Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family, from Slavery to the Present. New York: Basic.

Kelley, Robin (1990) Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Great Depression. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

——— (1993) "We are not what we seem': Rethinking black working-class opposition in the Jim Crow South." Journal of American History 80: 75–112.

Kimeldorf, Howard (1988) Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront. Berkeley: University of California Press.

——— (1991) "Bringing unions back in (or Why we need a new old labor history)." Labor History 32: 91–103.

Korstad, Karl (1992) "Black and white together: Organizing in the South with the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union (FTA-CIO), 1946–52," in Steve Rosswurm (ed.) The CIO's Left-Led Unions. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press: 69–94.

Korstad, Robert R. (1980) "Those who were not afraid: Winston-Salem, 1943," in Marc Miller (ed.) Working Lives: The Southern Exposure History of Labor in the South. New York: Pantheon: 184–99.

——— (1987) "Daybreak of freedom: Tobacco workers and the CIO, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 1943–1950." Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Korstad, Robert R., and Nelson Lichtenstein (1988) "Opportunities found and lost: Labor, radicals, and the early civil rights movement." Journal of American History 75: 786–811.

Laslett, Barbara (1992) "Gender in/and social science history." Social Science History 16: 177–95.

Lerner, Gerda (1972) "Organizing at Winston-Salem, North Carolina," in Gerda Lerner (ed.) Black Women in White America: A Documentary History. New York: Pantheon: 265–74.

Lewis, Earl (1991) In Their Own Interests: Race, Class, and Power in Twentieth-Century Norfolk, Virginia. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lipsitz, George (1988) "The struggle for hegemony." Journal of American History 75: 146–50.

Love, Richard (1994) "In defiance of custom and tradition: Black tobacco workers and labor unions in Richmond, Virginia, 1937–1941." Labor History 35: 25–47.

Marshall, Ray (1965) The Negro and Organized Labor. New York: Wiley.

——— (1967) Labor in the South. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McAdam, Doug (1982) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Norrell, Robert (1986) "Caste in steel: Jim Crow careers in Birmingham, Alabama." Journal of American History 73: 669–94.

Northrup, Herbert (1942) "The Tobacco Workers International Union." Quarterly Journal of Economics 56: 606–26.

Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant (1988) Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Przeworski, Adam (1986) Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quadagno, Jill (1994) The Color of Welfare: How Racism Defeated the War on Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sahlins, Marshall (1981) Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Schwartz, Michael (1976) Radical Protest and Social Structure: The Southern Farmers' Alliance and Cotton Tenancy, 1880–1890. New York: Academic.

Scott, Joan W. (1986) "Gender: A useful category of historical analysis." American Historical Review 91: 1053–75.

——— (1987) "On language, gender, and working-class history." International Labor and Working Class History 31: 1–13.

Sewell, William (1990) "How classes are made: Critical reflections on E. P. Thompson's theory of working-class formation," in Harvey Kaye and Keith McClelland (eds.) E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives. Philadelphia: Temple University Press: 50–77.

——— (1992) "A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation." American Journal of Sociology 98: 1–29.

——— (forthcoming) "Three temporalities: Toward an evenemental sociology," in Terrence McDonald (ed.) The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Stepan-Norris, Judith, and Maurice Zeitlin (1991) " 'Red' unions and 'bourgeois' contracts?" American Journal of Sociology 96: 1151–1200.

Thompson, E. P. (1963) The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage.

——— (1978) The Poverty of Theory. London: Merlin.

Thompson, James (1967) Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Tilley, Nannie M. (1948) The Bright-Tobacco Industry, 1860–1929. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

——— (1985) The R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Tilly, Charles (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Wilson, William (1980) The Declining Significance of Race: Black and Changing American Institutions. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wright, Eric, Karen Shire, Shu-Ling Hwang, Maureen Dolan, and Janeen Baxter (1992) "The non-effects of class on the gender division of labor in the home: A comparative study of Sweden and the United States." Gender and Society 6: 252–82.