



# Chapter One

## The Market



# Course Material

《西方经济学》上册  
范里安《微观经济学现代观点》第九版

# Content

## Consumer

- **Market, Constraint, Preference**
- **Utility, Choice, Demand**
- **Slutsky equation, Buying and Selling, Intertemporal Choice**
- **Consumer surplus**
- **Market demand**

## Producer

- **Profit Maximization/Cost Minimization**
- **Firm and Industry supply**
- **Monopoly**
- **Oligopoly**
- **Exchange**
- **Production**
- **Externality and Asymmetric information (If have time)**

# Mark distribution

**Term Mark (30%)**

**– 3 assignments, 10% each**

**Final Exam (70%)**

**The Theory of Economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking which helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions**

**--- John Maynard Keynes**




# Economic Modeling

**What causes what in economic systems?**

**At what level of detail shall we model an economic phenomenon?**

**Which variables are determined outside the model (exogenous) and which are to be determined by the model (endogenous)?**



# Modeling the Apartment Market

**How are apartment rents determined?**

**Suppose**

- apartments are close or distant, but otherwise identical**
- distant apartments rents are exogenous and known**
- many potential renters and landlords**


# Modeling the Apartment Market

**Who will rent close apartments?**

**At what price?**

**Will the allocation of apartments be desirable in any sense?**

**How can we construct an insightful model to answer these questions?**





# Economic Modeling

## Assumptions

Two basic postulates:

- **Rational Choice**: Each person tries to choose the best alternative available to him or her.
- **Equilibrium**: Market price adjusts until quantity demanded equals quantity supplied.

# Modeling Apartment Demand

**Demand:** Suppose the most any one person is willing to pay to rent a close apartment is \$500/month. Then

$$p = \$500 \Rightarrow Q^D = 1.$$

Suppose the price has to drop to \$490 before a 2nd person would rent.

Then  $p = \$490 \Rightarrow Q^D = 2.$


# Modeling Apartment Demand

The lower is the rental rate  $p$ , the larger is the quantity of close apartments demanded

$$p \downarrow \Rightarrow Q^D \uparrow.$$

The quantity demanded vs. price graph is the **market demand curve** for close apartments.


# Market Demand Curve for Apartments



# Modeling Apartment Supply

**Supply:** It takes time to build more close apartments so in this short-run the quantity available is fixed (at say 100).

# Market Supply Curve for Apartments



# Competitive Market Equilibrium

**“low” rental price  $\Rightarrow$  quantity demanded of close apartments exceeds quantity available  $\Rightarrow$  price will rise.**


**“high” rental price  $\Rightarrow$  quantity demanded less than quantity available  $\Rightarrow$  price will fall.**

# Competitive Market Equilibrium


**Quantity demanded = quantity available**  
**⇒ price will neither rise nor fall**  
**so the market is at a competitive equilibrium.**




# Competitive Market Equilibrium




# Competitive Market Equilibrium



# Competitive Market Equilibrium



# Competitive Market Equilibrium



# Competitive Market Equilibrium

**Q: Who rents the close apartments?**

**A: Those most willing to pay.**

**Q: Who rents the distant apartments?**

**A: Those least willing to pay.**

**So the competitive market allocation is by “willingness-to-pay”.**

# Comparative Statics

**What is exogenous in the model?**

- price of distant apartments**
- quantity of close apartments**
- incomes of potential renters.**


**What happens if these exogenous variables change?**

# Comparative Statics

**Suppose the price of distant apartment rises.**


**Demand for close apartments increases (rightward shift), causing a higher price for close apartments.**

# Market Equilibrium






# Market Equilibrium



# Market Equilibrium




# Comparative Statics


**Suppose there were more close apartments.**

**Supply is greater, so  
the price for close apartments falls.**


# Market Equilibrium



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


# Comparative Statics

**Suppose potential renters' incomes rise, increasing their willingness-to-pay for close apartments.**


**Demand rises (upward shift), causing higher price for close apartments.**

# Market Equilibrium






# Market Equilibrium



# Market Equilibrium



Higher incomes cause higher willingness-to-pay, higher market price, and the same quantity traded.

# Taxation Policy Analysis

**Local government taxes apartment owners.**

**What happens to**

- price**
- quantity of close apartments rented?**

**Is any of the tax “passed” to renters?**

# Taxation Policy Analysis

**Market supply is unaffected.**

**Market demand is unaffected.**

**So the competitive market equilibrium is unaffected by the tax.**

**Price and the quantity of close apartments rented are not changed.**

**Landlords pay all of the tax.**

# Imperfectly Competitive Markets

**Amongst many possibilities are:**

- a monopolistic landlord**
- a perfectly discriminatory monopolistic landlord**
- a competitive market subject to rent control.**

# A Monopolistic Landlord

**When the landlord sets a rental price  $p$  he rents  $D(p)$  apartments.**

**Revenue =  $pD(p)$ .**


**Revenue is low if  $p \approx 0$**

**Revenue is low if  $p$  is so high that  $D(p) \approx 0$ .**

**An intermediate value for  $p$  maximizes revenue.**



# Monopolistic Market Equilibrium




# Monopolistic Market Equilibrium







# Monopolistic Market Equilibrium



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
# Perfectly Discriminatory Monopolistic Landlord

**Imagine the monopolist knew  
everyone's willingness-to-pay.**


**Charge \$500 to the most willing-to-pay,**

**charge \$490 to the 2nd most willing-to-pay, etc.**


# Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium




# Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium



# Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium




# Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium





# Discriminatory Monopolistic Market Equilibrium




**Discriminatory monopolist charges the competitive market price to the last renter, and rents the competitive quantity of close apartments.**


# Rent Control

**Local government imposes a maximum legal price,  $p^{\max} < p^e$ , the competitive price.**


# Market Equilibrium




# Market Equilibrium



# Market Equilibrium



# Market Equilibrium



The 100 close apartments are no longer allocated by willingness-to-pay (lottery, lines, large families first?).

# Which Market Outcomes Are Desirable?

**Which is better?**

- Rent control**
- Perfect competition**
- Monopoly**
- Discriminatory monopoly**

# Pareto Efficiency

**Vilfredo Pareto; 1848-1923.**

**A Pareto outcome allows no “wasted welfare”;**

**i.e. the only way one person’s welfare can be improved is not to lower another person’s welfare.**



# Pareto Efficiency

**Jill has an apartment; Jack does not.**

**Jill values the apartment at \$200; Jack would pay \$400 for it.**

**Jill could sublet the apartment to Jack for \$300.**

**Both gain, so it was Pareto inefficient for Jill to have the apartment.**

# Pareto Efficiency

**A Pareto inefficient outcome means there remain unrealized mutual gains-to-trade.**

**Any market outcome that achieves all possible gains-to-trade must be Pareto efficient.**

# Pareto Efficiency

## Competitive equilibrium:

- all close apartment renters value them at the market price  $p^e$  or more
- all others value close apartments at less than  $p^e$
- so no mutually beneficial trades remain
- so the outcome is Pareto efficient.

# Pareto Efficiency

## **Discriminatory Monopoly:**

- assignment of apartments is the same as with the perfectly competitive market**
- so the discriminatory monopoly outcome is also Pareto efficient.**

# Pareto Efficiency

## **Monopoly:**

- not all apartments are occupied**
- so a distant apartment renter could be assigned a close apartment and have higher welfare without lowering anybody else's welfare.**
- so the monopoly outcome is Pareto inefficient.**

# Pareto Efficiency

## Rent Control:

- some close apartments are assigned to renters valuing them at below the competitive price  $p^e$
- some renters valuing a close apartment above  $p^e$  don't get close apartments
- Pareto inefficient outcome.

# Harder Questions

**Over time, will**

- the supply of close apartments increase?**
- rent control decrease the supply of apartments?**
- a monopolist supply more apartments than a competitive rental market?**