# 第九届(2024年) 全国高校密码数学挑战赛 参赛论文

# RSA 密码系统的特定密钥泄露攻击

战队名称_		就是能解队
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# 摘 要

RSA 加密算法是一种非对称加密算法,被广泛应用于网络通信、数据传输以及信息安全领域。其本质上基于数论中的大数分解难题。其中,部分私钥泄露攻击是一项很重要的攻击,私钥一般较难获取,但是也往往可以由通讯时间以及测信道攻击等等的攻击方式,得到有关的信息。因此,我们需要用到部分私钥攻击这种攻击方式进行相关的攻击尝试与分析。

对于赛题而言,所给的十二道题均是已知模数 n、公钥 e、密文 c 以及私钥 d 的部分信息泄露,于私钥 d 的信息而言,或是取值范围,或是高位泄露,或是低位泄露,或是汉明重量,或是与 $\varphi(N)$ 的关系已知。针对前三题,我们主要利用 wiener 攻击以及在其基础上扩展的 Boneh-Durfee 攻击。针对后九题,我们主要使用在 LLL 算法寻找最小根后,再用基于格的 coppersmith 方法进行攻击。最后对所求结果分析,得到关于随机数发生器的信息。

最终得知,在私钥d泄露部分比特位或其具体取值与部分已知信息有关时,可以通过数学推导对已知信息进行处理,采取构造多变元模方程或整系数方程的方式对私钥d进行攻击,求取方程小值解后利用获得的d或分解的p、q恢复明文。

关键词: RSA 部分私钥泄露, Boneh-Durfee 攻击, 基于格的 coppersmith 攻击

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# 第一章 引言

RSA 加密算法是一种非对称加密算法,被广泛应用于网络通信、数据传输以及信息安全领域。其本质上基于数论中的大数分解难题,利用了大质数的乘积很容易计算,但从乘积中找出原始质因数却非常困难的特性,使得 RSA 算法在实际应用中具有很高的安全性,有效地保护数据的机密性和完整性。其中,部分私钥泄露攻击是一项很重要的攻击,我们往往可以通过网络抓包,获取明文,密文,以及公钥等等的信息,私钥一般较难获取,但是也往往可以由通讯时间以及测信道攻击等等的攻击方式,得到有关的信息。因此,我们往往需要用到部分私钥攻击这种攻击方式进行相关的攻击尝试与分析。

对于赛题而言,所给的十二道题均是已知模数 n、公钥 e、密文 c 以及私钥 d 的部分信息泄露,于私钥 d 的信息而言,或是取值范围,或是高位泄露,或是低位泄露,或是汉明重量,或是与 $\varphi(N)$ 的关系已知,针对这些信息,我们主要使用的方法有:

● Coppersmith 攻击: 令 B 表示利用 Coppersmith 方法求解模方程

$$f(x_1,...,x_l) \equiv 0 modb$$

小根时构造的格基矩阵。满足

$$\frac{\det(\mathbf{B}')}{\det(\mathbf{B})} < b^m$$

称 $\hat{g}(x_1,...,x_l)$ 为有益多项式。Coppersmith 方法的基本思路是将模多项式方程转化为整数上的多项式方程。

• LLL 算法:格可以视作 n 维欧式空间 $R^n$ 上的一个离散加法子群,定义

$$det(\mathcal{A}) = \sqrt{det(\mathbf{B}(\mathcal{A})^{\top}\mathbf{B}(\mathcal{A}))}$$

为格A的行列式。Lenstra, Lenstra, Lovász 三人提出的 LLL 算法可以在多项式时间内找到格的短向量,对于 n 维格\$\mathcal{A}\$, 利用 LLL 算法可以得到约化基向量,遵循以下不等式:

$$\| \mathbf{v}_{t} \| \le 2^{\frac{n(n-1)}{4(n+1-t)}} det(\mathcal{L})^{\frac{t}{(n+1-t)}}$$

以下是每题的解题结果:

第一题所求得明文 m 为

7211560750615476133641101410998568505639509574732149196734942324774956538791361 1968183729328564132391301926185639936696286792673324141050046544603161058262375 131485972136960821908946097232689498056450728225835250747872903494693577037

对应字符串为: Mathematics is the queen of sciences, and arithmetic [number theory] is the queen of mathematics.

第二题所求得明文 m 为:

4679538408823171814991036629912142984220644865705743907144675057072611873142525 09296933072417732732809103029658160034371

对应字符串为: Cryptography is typically bypassed,not penetrated.

第三题未能求得正确的明文 m, 但寻找到了私钥 d 的近似值为 1939146814304864656321835305465989366837206829454021973377729601500417992641059 17715496687, 后续可利用这一近似值进一步尝试攻击

第四题未能求得正确的明文 m,但寻找到了私钥 d 的近似值为 1338272830305704036458426871008845364175416722916102020104778610500880206230587 606885813520482527299674612948667866009253,后续可利用这一近似值进一步尝试攻击

第五题未能求得正确的明文 m,但寻找到了私钥 d 的近似值为 9059687690744652364588951579066276647947780791894479759555796536459228180753854 046229302514580730344070178538924150223017950272967165926874298186537456553,后续可利用这一近似值进一步尝试攻击

#### 第六题所求得明文 m 为

4117081105489764127785363992211928295978791304187797043404404461978461228669949 7425024123713211595856309970821399098354426296235475477817600478210115521529844 2496870041733756567944507725673757021127337172975026812709705824528341829542021 957086677416458885678605362243282371896905,转换为字符串为 If people do not believe that mathematics is simple, it is only because they do not realize how complicated life is.

#### 第七题所求得明文 m 为

23091332318864302405735497854199567753228316867484116028918390556451398719 160091845749079,具体字符串为 Wir müssen wissen, Wir werden wissen.

#### 第八题所求得明文 m为

1925708306402202745850635034196296879037070526100410979282805105745988781044802 7075446261379656991890881836889318692824251248344438867771946623848834010403937 9084134332969994290293840 转换为字符串为 Plato is my friend, Aristotle is my friend, but my greatest friend is truth.

#### 第九题所求得明文 m 为

2962678228355502779583345732378281964605806105599862692723174469803204673544581 9468241597697065609850960675502435183597768663726152308392797786658205159706413 9413447088244638993075223273917789633213926216056075825104748462415991091464079 21519715337758543965970340752770069692353557305140735862098,其字符串形式为:

Resolving the composite numbers into their prime factors is known to be one of the most important and useful in arithmetic.

第十题所求得明文 m为

820307570753893249794408475962305073085942139245561017669 其字符串形式为:

Eureka, I have found it!

第十一题所求得明文 m 为

8714593305284936859003563422444473928851091227740191029488986400506545918615943 3427196070466375290113480371702829643084847179111112867851667023357939314443149 7657245644265754833188314998240383835607271327755688562060388816458780444461498 95349139015593369673 对应字符串: I have discovered a truly marvelous proof of this, which however the margin is not large enough to contain.

第十二题未能求得正确的明文 m,但找到私钥 d 的近似值为 9100923535212532843725053741553845843870227889713021349857659406790517446122130 7390617415682091862476661426679673412977122043721159944339575305892311665673813 6028231369028485794933987047092183958068113565350070069639238339143660566536172 78329492546090884924273770830661461229732216073819551433132162677496132,后续可利用这一近似值进一步尝试攻击

# 第二章 解题过程

# 2.1 第一题: wiener 攻击

1990年,Wiener 提出如果解密指数 $d < N^{0.25}$ ,那么就能够在多项式时间内分解模数 N,从而恢复完整的私钥并攻破 RSA 密码系统,整个攻击依赖连分式有理逼近的性质。

#### 2.1.1 代码实现

#### 2.1.1.1 根据参数特征确定攻击类型

我们观察到 d 小于 n 的 1/4 次,于是查阅资料,我们使用 wiener attack 来对其发起攻击。

```
def factor rsa wiener (N, e):
   N = Integer(N)
    e = Integer (e)
    cf = (e / N).continued fraction().convergents()
    for f in cf:
        k = f. numer()
        d = f. denom()
        if k = 0:
            continue
        phi_N = ((e * d) - 1) / k
        b = -(N - phi_N + 1)
        dis = b^2 - 4 * N
        if dis. sign() = 1:
            dis sqrt = sqrt(dis)
            p = (-b + dis_sqrt) / 2
            q = (-b - dis_sqrt) / 2
            if p. is integer() and q. is integer() and (p * q) % N = 0:
                p = p \% N
                q = q \% N
                if p > q:
                    return (p, q)
                    return (q, p)
    factor rsa wiener (n, e)
```

#### 2.1.1.2 获得 d 回代

求得 n 的欧拉函数,即可获得 d, 我们往回代入, 验证 d 的 bit 位是否在规定的范围内, 发现 d 的 bit 位刚好是 250 位, 符合题目条件。

```
from gmpy2 import *
n=p*q
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
d=invert(e, phi)
m=pow(c, d, n)
print(m)
```

#### 2.1.1.3 还原明文

根据求得的明文

m=7211560750615476133641101410998568505639509574732149196734942324774956538791 3611968183729328564132391301926185639936696286792673324141050046544603161058262 375131485972136960821908946097232689498056450728225835250747872903494693577037 可以将其转换为字符串形式: Mathematics is the queen of sciences, and arithmetic [number theory] is the queen of mathematics.

# 2.2 第二题: Boneh-Durfee 攻击

将相关的条件输入后,若在 $d < N^{0.25}$ 内,通常情况下,wiener attack 可以保证攻击有效。但如果在 $d < N^{0.25}$ 到 $d < N^{0.292}$ 之间,那么使用 wiener attack 的时间加长,也可能无法求解。此时,往往需要转向考虑 Boneh-Durfee 的方法。

#### 2.2.1 数学推导

由 $ed \equiv 1 mod \varphi(N)$ 可得 $ed = 1 + k \varphi(N)$ ,即ed = 1 + k(N - p - q + 1),由此可以构造模方程f(x,y) = 1 + x(A + y) mod e,选定多项式集合:

$$\begin{split} g_{i,k}(x,y) &= x^i f^k e^{m-k} \\ k &= 0, \cdots, m \quad i = 0, \cdots, m-k \\ h_{j,k}(x,y) &= y^j f^k e^{m-k} \\ k &= 0, \cdots, m \quad j = 1, \cdots, t \end{split}$$

可以构造格基矩阵进行求解,除此之外,还可以进行线性化变换,令1 + xy = u,方程可以转换为f(u,x) = u + Ax,可以构造多项式集合:

$$g_{i,k}(u,x) = xif^k e^{m-k}$$

$$k = 0, \dots, m, i = 0, \dots, m-k$$

$$h_{j,k}(x,x,y) = y^j + ke^{m-k}$$

$$j = 0, \dots, tk = \lfloor \frac{m}{0} \rfloor j, \dots, m$$

且将其中xy项替换为u-1,经过上述变换可以获得更好的格基矩阵优化求解。

# 2.2.2 代码实现

### 2.2.2.1 根据参数特征确定攻击类型

我们根据 d 和 n 的大小关系,确定出该题我们应该使用 Boneh -Durfee 的方法来进行攻击。

#### 2.2.2.2 区分向量是否有用

```
def helpful_vectors(BB, modulus):
    nothelpful = 0
    for ii in range(BB. dimensions()[0]):
        if BB[ii, ii] >= modulus:
            nothelpful += 1

    print(nothelpful, "/", BB. dimensions()[0], " vectors are not helpful")
```

```
def remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, bound, current):
    # end of our recursive function
    if current == -1 or BB. dimensions () [0] \leq =  dimension min:
        return BB
    # we start by checking from the end
    for ii in range (current, -1, -1):
        # if it is unhelpful:
        if BB[ii, ii] >= bound:
            affected_vectors = 0
            affected vector index = 0
            # let's check if it affects other vectors
            for jj in range(ii + 1, BB. dimensions()[0]):
                # if another vector is affected:
                # we increase the count
                if BB[jj, ii] != 0:
                    affected_vectors += 1
                    affected_vector_index = jj
```

```
# level:0
            # if no other vectors end up affected
            # we remove it
            if affected_vectors == 0:
                print("* removing unhelpful vector", ii)
                BB = BB. delete columns([ii])
                BB = BB. delete rows([ii])
                monomials.pop(ii)
                BB = remove unhelpful (BB, monomials, bound, ii-1)
                return BB
            # level:1
            # if just one was affected we check
            # if it is affecting someone else
            elif affected vectors == 1:
                affected deeper = True
                for kk in range(affected_vector_index + 1, BB. dimensions()[0]):
                    # if it is affecting even one vector
                    # we give up on this one
                    if BB[kk, affected_vector_index] != 0:
                        affected deeper = False
                # remove both it if no other vector was affected and
                # this helpful vector is not helpful enough
                # compared to our unhelpful one
                if affected deeper and abs (bound - BB[affected vector index,
affected_vector_index]) < abs(bound - BB[ii, ii]):</pre>
                    print("* removing unhelpful vectors", ii, "and",
affected_vector_index)
                    BB = BB. delete columns ([affected vector index, ii])
                    BB = BB. delete rows ([affected vector index, ii])
                    monomials.pop(affected vector index)
                    monomials.pop(ii)
                    BB = remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, bound, ii-1)
                    return BB
    # nothing happened
    return BB
```

#### 2.2.2.3 求解多项式方程

```
def boneh_durfee(pol, modulus, mm, tt, XX, YY):

# 替换 (Herrman 和 May)

PR. <u, x, y> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)

Q = PR. quotient(x*y + 1 - u)

polZ = Q(pol).lift()

UU = XX*YY + 1

# x-shifts

gg = []

for kk in range(mm + 1):
```

```
for ii in range(mm - kk + 1):
                               x + x = x^i = x^
                               gg. append (xshift)
          gg. sort ()
          # 收集单项式
          monomials = sorted({monomial for polynomial in gg for monomial in
polynomial. monomials()})
          # y-shifts (选自 Herrman 和 May)
          for jj in range(1, tt + 1):
                     for kk in range(floor(mm/tt) * jj, mm + 1):
                               yshift = y jj * polZ(u, x, y) kk * modulus m - kk)
                               gg. append (Q(yshift). lift())
          for jj in range(1, tt + 1):
                     for kk in range(floor(mm/tt) * jj, mm + 1):
                               monomials.append(u^kk * y^jj)
          # 构建矩阵 B
          nn = len(monomials)
          BB = Matrix(ZZ, nn)
          for ii in range(nn):
                     BB[ii, 0] = gg[ii](0, 0, 0)
                     for jj in range(1, ii + 1):
                                if monomials[jj] in gg[ii]. monomials():
                                          BB[ii, jj] = gg[ii].monomial_coefficient(monomials[jj]) *
monomials[jj](UU, XX, YY)
          # 可选步骤: 减少矩阵
          if helpful only:
                     BB = remove unhelpful (BB, monomials, modulus mm, nn - 1)
                     nn = BB. dimensions()[0]
                     if nn = 0:
                               print("failure")
                               return 0, 0
          # 检查行列式是否正确
          det = BB. det()
          bound = modulus (mm * nn)
          if det >= bound:
                     print("We do not have det < bound. Solutions might not be found.")</pre>
                     print("Try with higher m and t.")
                     if strict:
                               return -1, -1
          # 显示矩阵基
          if debug:
                     matrix overview (BB, modulus mm)
          # LLL 算法优化基
          if debug:
```

```
print("optimizing basis of the lattice via LLL, this can take a long
time")
    BB = BB, LLL()
    if debug:
       print("LLL is done!")
    # 寻找独立向量
    found_polynomials = False
    for poll idx in range(nn - 1):
        for pol2 idx in range(pol1 idx + 1, nn):
            PR. \langle w, z \rangle = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
            pol1 = sum(monomials[jj](w*z + 1, w, z) * BB[pol1_idx, jj] /
monomials[jj](UU, XX, YY) for jj in range(nn))
            po12 = sum(monomials[jj](w*z + 1, w, z) * BB[po12_idx, jj] /
monomials[jj](UU, XX, YY) for jj in range(nn))
            rr = pol1. resultant (pol2)
            if not rr.is_zero() and rr.monomials() != [1]:
                print("found them, using vectors", poll idx, "and", pol2 idx)
                found polynomials = True
                break
        if found polynomials:
            break
    if not found polynomials:
        print ("no independent vectors could be found. This should very rarely
happen...")
        return 0, 0
   rr = rr(q, q)
    soly = rr. roots()
    if len(soly) = 0:
        print("Your prediction (delta) is too small")
        return 0, 0
    soly = soly[0][0]
    ss = pol1(q, soly)
    solx = ss. roots()[0][0]
    return solx, soly
```

#### 2.2.2.4 利用小值解求解明文

针对上述步骤中获得的小值解,

```
if solx > 0:
    print("=== solution found ===")
    if False:
        print("x:", solx)
        print("y:", soly)

    d = int(pol(solx, soly) / e)
```

print("private key found:", d)

else:

print("=== no solution was found ===")

可以获得公钥 d 的值,进而可以获取明文

 $m = 4679538408823171814991036629912142984220644865705743907144675057072611873142\\ 52509296933072417732732809103029658160034371$ 

对应字符串为: Cryptography is typically bypassed,not penetrated.

# 2.3 第三题: Boneh-Durfee 攻击

此题思路同第二题,在其基础上进行拓展。目前已知在私钥 d 完全未泄露的情况下能对其成功攻击的界限为 $d < N^{0.292}$ ,本题 $d \approx N^{0.292}$ ,仅通过 Boneh-Durfee 攻击难以破解 d,理论可行性与计算资源的可行性均面临较大挑战。为此,可通过猜测 d 的部分比特位的方法,尝试在可行的穷举范围内,穷举较少比特位的各种可能进而实现攻击。除此之外,也可以沿用第二题的方法调整参数进行试错,尝试进一步获得更有效的信息。

# 2.3.1 数学推导

根据 Yoshinori Aono 的成果,当 $\beta$ 约为 0.290, $\delta$ 约为 0.246 时,需要已知约 40 比特位,选取参数 m=10,时长约为 3 小时 15 分,当 $\beta$ 约为 0.295, $\delta$ 约为 0.246 时,需要已知约 50 比特位,选取参数 m=10,时长约为 4 小时 2 分,综合考虑穷举的次数以及每次求解双变元模方程所需的时间,通过这样的攻击方式本题难以在有限时间内给出解答。在参数 m取值较小时,我们无法得到符合攻击条件的格基矩阵,但能够在较短时间内获得 d 的近似值,可以进一步利用该近似值尝试进行攻击。

# 2.3.2 代码实现

本题使用的代码与第二题相同,当参数 m 取值较小时,获得近似值d'后将方程中的 d 用 $d'+d_0$ 替代,尝试求解与 $d_0$ 有关的方程即可。如果采用穷举的方法,可以尝试穷举 40 或 50 比特位的最低有效位,令 $d=d_1\cdot 2^r+d_0$ ,修改原本的方程进行求解,并将获得的 d 的近似值作为新的信息进一步尝试攻击。

# 2.4 第四题:汉明重量

一个码字中非零分量的个数即为汉明重量,简单来说在我们的 0-1 码中即 1 的个数。 而赛题中提到 d 的汉明重量较轻,可以理解为 0 的个数多而 1 的个数少。同时最高 310 位 比特 1 的个数只可能是 0,1,2,3,4,5,代表着此段消息中具有较长段存在连续的 0。因此可将此题转换为已知私钥中间部分比特位泄露,泄露部分值为 0,求解私钥 d 的问题。对于私钥中间部分比特位泄露的情况,记  $d=d_1\cdot 2^{r_1}+d_2\cdot 2^{r_2}+d_3,0< r_2< r_1< l_d,0\leqslant d_1< 2^{l_d-r_1},0\leqslant d_2< 2^{r_1-r_2},0\leqslant d_3< 2^{r_2},\;\delta_1=\log_N\,2^{r_1},\delta_2=\log_N\,2^{r_2},\;定义 A=e\cdot d_2\cdot 2^{r_2}-1,W=e\cdot 2^{r_1}=N^{\alpha+\delta_1},\;$ 可以构造模方程 $f_{MBS1}(x,y,z)=A+ex-Ny+yz\equiv 0 (\text{mod}W)$ 进行求解,可行攻击范围为 $\beta\leqslant (\delta_1-\delta_2)+\frac{7}{6}-\frac{1}{3}\sqrt{6[\alpha+(\delta_1-\delta_2)]+1}-\varepsilon'$ 

#### 2.4.1 数学推导

就本题而言,对于RSA 密码的私钥  $d(比特位数为<math>l_d)$ ,,定义

$$l_{max} = \max\{l \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \mid d \text{ 的 } l_d \text{ 个比特位中, 存在连续 } l \text{ 个比特位均为 } 0\}$$

对任意小的  $\varepsilon$ '>0,存在大整数 $N_0$ ,使得当 $N > N_0$ 时,只要

$$\beta \leqslant \frac{l_{max}}{\log_2 N} + \frac{7}{6} - \frac{1}{3} \sqrt{6(\alpha + \frac{l_{max}}{\log_2 N}) + 1} - \varepsilon'$$

由于  $d_2=0$  ,  $\delta_1-\delta_2=\frac{r_1-r_2}{\log_2 N}$  ,对 $(r_1,r_2)$ 进行穷搜,可以找到一组 $(r_1,r_2)$ 满足 $r_1-r_2=l_{max}$ ,且因为 $C^2_{l_d-1}<(l_d-1)^2<(\lceil\log_2 N\rceil)^2$ ,可以在多项式时间内实现对 d 的攻击。据此,模方程可以修改为 $f_{MBs1}(x,y,z)=ex-Ny+yz-1\equiv 0 \pmod{W}$ ,并有相应的多项式集合如下:

$$\begin{split} g &= x^{t_1} y^{t_2} (f_{MBS1})^{t_3} W^{m-t_3} \\ t &\in \{0,1,\cdots,m\} \quad t_1,t_2,t_3 \in z^+ \cup \{0\} \quad t_1+t_2+t_3 = t \\ h &= z^i \times^{t_1} (fMBs_1)^{t_3} W^{m-t_3} \\ i &\in \{1,\cdots,t\} \quad t_1,t_3 \in z^+ \cup \{0\}, \quad t_1+t_3 = t \end{split}$$

利用上述多项式集合可以构造格基矩阵进行求解。

# 2.4.2 代码实现

#### 2.4.2.1 依据参数范围决定攻击方式

本题可行攻击范围为 $\beta \leqslant (\delta_1 - \delta_2) + \frac{7}{6} - \frac{1}{3} \sqrt{6[\alpha + (\delta_1 - \delta_2)] + 1} - \varepsilon', \ \delta_1 - \delta_2 = \frac{r_1 - r_2}{\log_2 N}$ ,根据题目已知信息可以确定 $\beta$ 约为 0.390625, $\alpha$ 约为 1,进而可以确定 $\delta_1 - \delta_2$ 至少为 0.109 方可实现攻击,因此我们对 $r_1 - r_2$ 为 112 位的所有可能情况进行穷搜。首先确定 $r_1$ 的 取值, $r_2$ 为 $r_1 - 112$ ,利用每次穷搜得到信息作为已知信息,重复进行攻击直至破解成功

#### 2.4.2.2 构造模方程,确定小值解范围

在整数环 ZZ 上定义三个多项式变量 x,y,z,利用这些变量构造双变元模方程f(x,y,z),小值解的上界分别为 $X = N^{\delta_2}$ , $Y = 2N^{\alpha+\beta-1}$ , $Z = 3N^{0.5}$ ,根据上一步确定的参数范围可以进一步确定其具体数值。

#### 2.4.2.3 构造多项式集合

```
shifts = []
for t1 in range(m + 1):
    for t2 in range(m + 1):
        for t3 in range(m + 1):
            g = x ** t1 * y ** t2 * f ** t3 * W ** (m - t3)
            if(0<=t1+t2+t3<=m):
                  shifts.append(g)

for i in range(1, tau+1):
    for t1 in range(m+1):
        for t3 in range(m+1):
        h = z ** i * x ** t1 * f ** t3 * W ** (m - t3)
        if(0<=t1+t3<=m):
            shifts.append(h)</pre>
```

#### 2.4.2.4 构造格基矩阵并约减

初始化一个集合,存储所有多项式的单项式,遍历每个多项式将其中的单项式添加到集合中,初始化一个整数矩阵 L,遍历每一个单项式和多项式计算格矩阵中的对应项,将单项式集合中的每个元素转换成原始的多项式环。具体代码如下:

并使用 LLL 算法对格进行约简,以便更有效地寻找小根。

#### 2.4.2.5 重构多项式方程

遍历格基矩阵的每一列,如果当前格基元素不为零,将其加入到多项式构建中,如果 当前多项式可以被原始多项式整除,则进行除法,并尝试通过最大公约数简化当前多项式 与已经重构的多项式,跳过那些是常数的多项式,将重构后的多项式添加到列表中。

#### 2.4.2.6 使用 Groebner 基方法求根

计算 Groebner 基,如果 Groebner 基的大小与生成元数量相等,说明每个变量可能都有对应的多项式,可以进一步寻找根,遍历 Groebner 基中的每个多项式,如果是一元多项式,使用单变量根查找方法寻找并合并根,如果找到的根数量与多项式环的生成元数量相等,说明已经为每个变量找到了解,生成这些根并结束函数。

#### 2.4.2.7 恢复明文 m

对于使用 Groebner 基方法求解的小值解 $(x_0, y_0, z_0) = (d_3, k, p + q - 1)$ ,利用p + q - 1可以确定 $\varphi(N)$ 的取值,从而确定 d 的取值,继而使用函数执行模幂运算,根据公式 $m = c^d mod n$ ,求解 m,再依据题目提供的编码方式将数值形式的明文 m 转换为字符串形式。

# 2.5 第五题: 高位&低位同时泄露

此问题也即私钥 d 的 n 个未知块泄露中 n=2 的情况,对于部分高位和部分低位已知的私钥 d,STK 格攻击是目前最佳的攻击方法。解决这类问题的核心是构造多变元模方程,并利用线性代换等改进格基构造的技巧,优化格基矩阵的构造。定义 $d=d_3M_3+d_2M_2+d_1$ , $d_3>N^{\delta_1}$ , $d_2< N^{\beta-\delta_1-\delta_2}$ , $d_1>N^{\delta_2}$ 分别表示私钥 d 的已知高位,未知中间比特位,已知低位,可以构造模方程, $f_{eM_2}(x,y)=1-ed_1+(\ell_1+x)(N+y)$ (mod  $eM_2$ ), $f_e(x,y)=1+(\ell_1+x)(N+y)$ (mod e)

# 2.5.1 数学推导

对于上面的两个方程,它们拥有共同的小根  $(x_0,y_0)=(\ell-\ell_1,-p-q+1)$ , 并且小根的上界为 $X=N^{max(\beta-\delta_1,\beta-1/2)},Y=N^{1/2}$ ,针对本题而言,我们引入定义 $\ell_{k,\tau}^{LSBs}(x)$ :  $= max\left\{0,\left\lceil\frac{x-k}{\tau}\right\rceil\right\}$ ,构造如下的多项式集合:

$$\begin{split} g_{[u,i]}^{(x)}(x,y) &= x^{u-i} f_{eM_2}(x,y)^i (eM_2)^{m-i} \\ u &= 0,1,...,m; i = 0,1,...,u \\ \\ g_{[u,i]}^{(y)}(x,y) &= y^j f_{eM_2}(x,y)^{u-\ell_{k,\tau}^{LSBS}(j)} f_e(x,y)^{\ell_{k,\tau}^{LSBS}(j)} e^{m-u} M_2^{m-(u-\ell_{k,\tau}^{LSBS}(j))} \\ u &= 0,1,...,m; j = 1,2,...,k+|\tau u| \end{split}$$

其中 $k = 2\delta_1 m$ , $\tau = 1 - 2(\beta + \delta_1 - \delta_2)$ ,引入变量 $z = 1 + (\ell_1 + x)y$ 进行线性化处理,可以得到更好的格基,上述攻击在

$$\delta_1 > \frac{\beta - \delta_2 - 1 + \sqrt{-3(\beta - \delta_2)^2 + 4(\beta - \delta_2) + 2\beta - 1}}{2}, \frac{1}{2} - \delta_1 + \delta_2 \leq \beta \leq \frac{1}{2} + \delta_2$$

的范围内是有效的。

#### 2.5.2 代码实现

#### 2.5.2.1 依据参数范围决定攻击方式

STK 格攻击中提到了三种有效的攻击范围,根据本题提供的参数信息,我们可以确定  $\beta$ 约为 0.5, $\delta$ 1约为 0.25, $\delta$ 2约为 0.171,满足

$$\delta_1 > \frac{\beta - \delta_2 - 1 + \sqrt{-3(\beta - \delta_2)^2 + 4(\beta - \delta_2) + 2\beta - 1}}{2}, \frac{1}{2} - \delta_1 + \delta_2 \le \beta \le \frac{1}{2} + \delta_2$$

故而采用 STK 格攻击尝试对 RSA 的私钥进行攻击,并选定参数 $k=2\delta_1 m$ , $\tau=1-2(\beta+\delta_1-\delta_2)$ 

#### 2.5.2.2 构造模方程,确定小值解范围

在整数环 ZZ 上定义三个多项式变量 x,y,利用这些变量构造双变元模方程f(x,y), 小值解的上界分别为 $X = N^{max(\beta-\delta_1,\beta-1/2)}, Y = N^{1/2}$ ,根据上一步确定的参数范围可以进一步确定其具体数值。

#### 2.5.2.3 构造多项式集合求解

def LSB(i,k,tau):
 temp=math.ceil((i-k)/tau)
 largenumber=max(0,temp)

在多项式集合的构造过程中,我们引入了新的变量w,替换 $L_1+x$ ,对多项式集合进行线性化处理,以期获得更好的格基矩阵。针对上述步骤获得的多项式集合,我们使用与第四题中相同的方法进行格基矩阵的构造,在格基约减后进行多项式的重构并求解小值解  $(x_0,y_0)=(\ell-\ell_1,-p-q+1)$ ,进而恢复明文 m。

# 2.6 第六题: 低位泄露

Boneh, Durfee, and Frankel 等人首次提出了暴露部分最低有效位的攻击,Blömer 等人对他们的攻击提出了改进,将已知部分最低有效位攻击扩展到了 $N^{0.875}$ , Takayasu 等人进一步将已知部分最低有效位攻击扩展到了 $N^{0.368}$ 。

除此之外,针对私钥 d 部分低位已知且较小的情况,可以引入新的变量,利用线性化 技巧能够实现对 RSA 的攻击。

# 2.6.1 数学推导

通过对模方程

$$f_{LSB1}(y,z) = Ny - yz - ed_0 + 1 \equiv 0 \operatorname{mod}(e \cdot 2^r)$$

引入新变元

$$u = yz + ed_0 - 1$$

定义

$$f_{LSB2}(y, z, u) = Ny - u$$

构建新的模方程

$$f_{LSB2}(y, z, u) \equiv 0 \pmod{e \cdot 2^r}$$

求解小值解

$$(y_0, z_0, u_0) := (k, p + q - 1, k(p + q - 1) + ed_0 - 1)$$

利用多项式集合:

$$g_{i,j} = y^{t-j}(W)^{m-j} f_{LSB2}^{j} t = 0, ..., m; j = 0, ..., t$$
 
$$\hbar_{i,j} = z^{i}(W)^{m-j} f_{LSB2}^{j} i = 0, ..., \tau; j = \theta_{i}, \theta_{i+1}, ..., m$$

进行格基矩阵的构建进而求解得到小值解。

记 $\delta = \log_N 2^r$ ,  $d \leq N^{\beta}$ ,  $e = N^{\alpha}$ , 上述攻击对于 $d_0 < N^{\beta - 0.5}$ ,  $\beta \leq \delta + 1 - \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2(\alpha + \delta)}$ 是有效的。

#### 2.6.2 代码实现

#### 2.6.2.1 依据参数范围决定攻击方式

分析题目所给参数可以发现,私钥 d 泄露的低位 $d_0$ 为 120542853124939, $\beta$ 约为 0.55, $\delta$ 约 为 0.42, $\alpha$ 约为 1.01,满足 $d_0 < N^{\beta-0.5}$ , $\beta \le \delta + 1 - \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2(\alpha+\delta)}$ ,由此可以进一步构造格基矩阵进行攻击。

#### 2.6.2.2 构造模方程,确定小值解范围

在整数环 ZZ 上定义三个多项式变量 y,z,u 利用这些变量构造双变元模方程f(y,z,u),小值解的上界分别为 $Y=2N^{\alpha+\beta-1}$ , $Z=3N^{\frac{1}{2}}$ , $U=7N^{\alpha+\beta-0.5}$ ,根据上一步确定的参数范围可以进一步确定其具体数值。

#### 2.6.2.3 构造多项式集合

```
Q = pr.quotient(y*z + A - u)
    polZ = Q(f).lift()

shifts = []
    for t in range(m + 1):
        for j in range(t + 1):
            g = y ** (t - j) * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
            g = Q(g).lift()
            shifts.append(g)

for i in range(1, tau + 1):
            for j in range(theati, m+1):
                 h = z ** i * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
                 h = Q(h).lift()
```

shifts.append(h)

与第五题相似,第六题也使用了引入新变量进行线性化操作,在多项式构建时将y\*z替换为u-A,可以增加有益多项式,减少非有益多项式。

#### 2.6.2.4 求解明文 m

根据所求得的小值解( $y_0, z_0, u_0$ ):= ( $k, p+q-1, k(p+q-1)+ed_0-1$ ),利用 $z_0$ 可以获得 $\varphi(N)$ 的具体数字,进而求出 d 的值,根据公式 $m=c^d mod n$ ,求解 m 为 4117081105489764127785363992211928295978791304187797043404404461978461228 6699497425024123713211595856309970821399098354426296235475477817600478210 1155215298442496870041733756567944507725673757021127337172975026812709705 824528341829542021957086677416458885678605362243282371896905,转换为字符串为 If people do not believe that mathematics is simple, it is only because they do not realize how complicated life is.

# 2.7 第七题: $d = \varphi(N)$ 接近

当我们已知 d 的部分低位信息时,可以利用已知信息构造模方程,而针对低位信息未知,但 d 与 $\varphi(N)$ 接近的情况,可以尝试使用包含 $\varphi(N)$ 的表达式替换 d,进而构造模方程。针对此题,对于本题,我们注意到 $\varphi(N)$ 与 d 的差值t取值范围在 $2^{267}$ 与 $2^{268}$ 之间,我们可以将模方程转换为与 Boneh-Durfee 攻击所使用的模方程类似的形式,进而可以使用与 Boneh-Durfee 中相同的多项式集合构建格基矩阵进行求解。

#### 2.7.1 数学推导

$$ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(N)$$

$$e(\varphi(N) - t) = k\varphi(N) + 1$$

$$e\varphi(N) - et = k\varphi(N) + 1$$

$$et = (e - k)\varphi(N) + 1$$

$$(e - k)(N - p - q + 1) + 1 = et$$

$$y(N - z) + 1 = 0 \mod(e)$$

$$z = p + q - 1 \approx 2N^{\frac{1}{2}} \quad y = e - k = \frac{et - 1}{\varphi(N)} \approx t$$

#### 2.7.2 代码实现

#### 2.7.2.1 参数范围确定

根据题目所给条件特征,可以确定α约为1,根据上述数学推导可知,本题可以使用与 Boneh-Durfee 相同的模方程以及多项式集合构造格基矩阵进行求解,区别在于未知变量由 d 改变为 t,但 t 的范围与 d 可攻击的范围相近,可以使用 Boneh-Durfee 进行攻击。

#### 2.7.2.2 构造多项式集合

```
shifts = []
  for k in range(m + 1):
    for i in range(m - k + 1):
        g = x ** i * f ** k * e ** (m - k)
        g = qr(g).lift()
        shifts.append(g)

for j in range(1, t + 1):
    for k in range(m // t * j, m + 1):
        h = y ** j * f ** k * e ** (m - k)
        h = qr(h).lift()
        shifts.append(h)
```

#### 2.7.2.3 求解 m

利用上述多项式集合我们可以进行格基矩阵的构造,并且重构多项式方程,求得小值  $\mathrm{F}(y_0,z_0)=(e-k,p+q-1)$ ,利用 $z_0$ 的值可以进一步确定 $\varphi(N)$ 以及d,遵循与前几题相同的方式,我们可以求得明文 m 的具体值并将其转换为字符串。

m 为 23091332318864302405735497854199567753228316867484116028918390556451398719 160091845749079,具体字符串为 Wir müssen wissen, Wir werden wissen.

# 2.8 第八题: 低位泄露

对于私钥部分低位泄露的情况,可以考虑构造双变元模方程或三变元整系数方程进行求解,通过求解方程的小值解进而求解 $\varphi(N)$ 的值,从而得到私钥 d 的值。令 $d=d_1\cdot 2^r+$ 

 $d_0$ ,通过 $ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(N)$ ,可以构造二变元模方程 $f_{LSB_1}(y,z) = Ny - yz - ed_0 - 1 \equiv (mode \cdot 2^r)$ 

# 2.8.1 数学推导

对于上述二变元模方程,其小值解 $(y_0, z_0) = (k, p + q - 1)$ ,且上界为

$$Y = 2N^{\alpha+\beta-1}, Z := 3N^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

根据模方程以及根的上界,选定参数 m、τ,可以构造多项式集合:

$$g = y^{t-j} f_{LSB1}^{\ \ j} W^{m-j} \quad t \in (0, ..., m) \quad j = 0, 1, 2, \cdots, t$$
 
$$h = z^{i} (f_{LSB1})^{j} W^{m-j} \quad i \in (1, \cdots, \tau) \quad j = 0, 1, 2, \cdots m$$

其中 $W=e\cdot 2^r$ ,记 $\delta=\log_N 2^r$ , $d\leq N^B$ , $e=N^\alpha$ ,当满足 $\beta\leq \delta+\frac{7}{6}-\frac{1}{3}\sqrt{6(\alpha+\delta)+1}$ 时,能够在多项式时间内找到解。由于能够实现攻击所需要的条件为  $\det(\Lambda)\,T_1(s)< W^{m(s-1)}\Big(T_1(s)=T(s,s)=2^{\frac{s(s-1)}{4}s^{\frac{s-1}{2}}}\Big)$ ,其中

$$s = \frac{1}{2}(m+1)(m+2) + \tau(m+1),$$

 $\det(\Lambda) = W^{\frac{1}{3}m(m+1)(m+2) + \frac{1}{2}\tau m(m+1)} Y^{\frac{1}{3}m(m+1)(m+2) + \frac{1}{2}\tau m(m+1)} Z^{\frac{1}{6}m(m+1)(m+2) + \frac{1}{2}\tau m(m+1) + \frac{1}{2}\tau (\tau + 1)(m+1)}.$ 

由此可得 $Y_3^{1m(m+2)+\frac{1}{2}\tau m}Z_6^{1m(m+2)+\frac{1}{2}\tau m+\frac{1}{2}\tau(\tau+1)}T_1(s)^{\frac{1}{m+1}} < W_6^{1m(m+2)+\frac{1}{2}\tau m-\frac{m}{m+1}}$ ,选取参数 m=9, $\tau$  = 3即可得到合适的格基矩阵进行求解。

# 2.8.2 代码实现

#### 2.8.2.1 依据参数范围决定攻击方式

首先观察所给条件特征,比如 n 与 e 的关系,n 与d的关系,可以确定 $\alpha$ 约为 1, $\beta$ 约为 1, $\delta$ 约为 0.87,满足 $\beta \leq \delta + \frac{7}{6} - \frac{1}{3}\sqrt{6(\alpha + \delta) + 1}$ ,可以实现攻击

#### 2.8.2.2 构造模方程,确定小值解范围

在整数环 ZZ 上定义两个多项式变量 y,z 利用这些变量构造双变元模方程f(y,z),小值解的上界分别为 $Y=2N^{\alpha+\beta-1}$ , $Z=3N^{0.5}$ ,模数大小为 $2^{900}*e$ ,根据上一步确定的参数范围可以进一步确定其具体数值。

#### 2.8.2.3 构造多项式集合

```
shifts = []
for t in range(m + 1):
    for j in range(t + 1):
        g = y ** (t-j) * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
        shifts.append(g)

for i in range(1, tau + 1):
    for j in range(m + 1):
        h = z ** i * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
        shifts.append(h)
```

针对已经构造的模方程,可以构造对应的多项式集合

#### 2.8.2.4 构造格基矩阵并约减

create\_lattice 函数用于从多项式的移位列表 shifts 中创建一个格基矩阵,并按照指定的顺序和排序规则进行排序和创建。

create\_lattice

```
def create_lattice(pr, shifts, bounds, order="invlex",
sort_shifts_reverse=False, sort_monomials_reverse=False):
    logging.debug(f"Creating a lattice with {len(shifts)} shifts
({order = }, {sort shifts reverse = }, {sort monomials reverse
= }) ...")
    if pr.ngens() > 1:
        pr = pr.change ring(ZZ, order=order)
        shifts = [pr (shift) for shift in shifts]
   monomials = set()
    for shift in shifts:
        monomials.update(shift.monomials())
   shifts.sort(reverse=sort shifts reverse)
   monomials = sorted(monomials, reverse=sort monomials reverse)
   L = matrix(ZZ, len(shifts), len(monomials))
    for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
        for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
           L[row, col] = shift.monomial coefficient(monomial) *
monomial (*bounds)
   monomials = [pr(monomial) for monomial in monomials]
       return L, monomials
```

reduce lattice

```
def reduce_lattice(L, delta=0.8):
    return L.LLL(delta)
```

使用格基约减算法(当前为LLL算法)来减小格基。L:格基,delta:LLL算法的 delta 参数(默认为 0.8),调用完成后返回减小后的格基。

#### 2.8.2.5 重构多项式方程

reconstruct\_polynomials 函数从约减后的格基矩阵 B 中重构出多项式。它遍历每一行,根据约减后的基向量重构多项式,并可选地进行多项式的预处理、除以原始多项式 f、以及多项式之间的最大公因数除法。

```
def reconstruct polynomials (B, f, modulus, monomials, bounds,
preprocess polynomial=lambda x: x, divide gcd=True):
    divide original = f is not None
    modulus bound = modulus is not None
    logging.debug(f"Reconstructing polynomials ({divide original
= }, {modulus bound = }, {divide gcd = })...")
    polynomials = []
    for row in range(B.nrows()):
        norm squared = 0
        w = 0
        polynomial = 0
        for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
            if B[row, col] == 0:
                continue
            norm squared += B[row, col] ** 2
            w += 1
            assert B[row, col] % monomial(*bounds) == 0
            polynomial += B[row, col] * monomial //
monomial (*bounds)
        polynomial = preprocess polynomial(polynomial)
        if divide original and polynomial % f == 0:
            logging.debug(f"Original polynomial divides
reconstructed polynomial at row {row}, dividing...")
            polynomial //= f
        if divide gcd:
            for i in range(len(polynomials)):
                g = gcd(polynomial, polynomials[i])
                if g != 1 and g.is constant():
                    logging.debug(f"Reconstructed polynomial has
gcd \{g\} with polynomial at \{i\}, dividing...")
                    polynomial //= q
                    polynomials[i] //= q
        if polynomial.is constant():
            logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} is constant,
ignoring...")
            continue
        polynomials.append(polynomial)
    return polynomials
```

#### 2.8.2.6 使用 Grobner 基方法求根

该函数利用 Groebner 基的概念,对于多项式环中的多项式集合尝试找到 其根。通过逐步求解方程组的方式,利用 Groebner 基的性质进行根的计算。 如果成功找到符合条件的根,则以生成器的形式将其返回。

```
def find roots groebner(pr, polynomials):
   gens = pr.gens()
    s = Sequence(polynomials, pr.change_ring(QQ, order="lex"))
   while len(s) > 0:
        G = s.groebner basis()
        logging.debug(\overline{f}"Sequence length: {len(s)}, Groebner basis
length: {len(G)}")
        if len(G) == len(gens):
            logging.debug(f"Found Groebner basis with length
{len(gens)}, trying to find roots...")
            roots = {}
            for polynomial in G:
                vars = polynomial.variables()
                if len(vars) == 1:
                    for root in find roots univariate(vars[0],
polynomial.univariate polynomial()):
                        roots = {**roots, **root}
            if len(roots) == pr.ngens():
                yield roots
                print(roots)
                return
            logging.debug(f"System is underdetermined, trying to
find constant root...")
            G = Sequence(s, pr.change_ring(ZZ,
order="lex")).groebner basis()
            vars = tuple(map(lambda x: var(x), gens))
            for solution_dict in solve([polynomial(*vars) for
polynomial in G], vars, solution dict=True):
                logging.debug(solution_dict)
                found = False
                roots = {}
                for i, v in enumerate(vars):
                    s = solution dict[v]
                    if s.is constant():
                        if not s.is zero():
                             found = True
                        roots[gens[i]] = int(s) if s.is integer()
else int(s) + 1
                    else:
                        roots[gens[i]] = 0
                if found:
                    yield roots
                    return
            return
        else:
```

s.pop()

#### 2.8.2.7 恢复明文 m

在使用 Groebner 方法求得小值解 $(y_0, z_0) = (k, p + q - 1)$ 之后,沿用前几题的求解 思路,可以得到 m 的具体值及其字符串表达。对于本题,我们求出的明文 m 为 1925708306402202745850635034196296879037070526100410979282805105745988781044802 7075446261379656991890881836889318692824251248344438867771946623848834010403937 9084134332969994290293840,转换为字符串为 Plato is my friend, Aristotle is my friend, but my greatest friend is truth.

# 2.9 第九题: 低位泄露

与第八题相同,对于私钥部分低位泄露的情况,考虑构造双变元模方程进行求解,通过求解方程的小值解进而求解 $\varphi(N)$ 的值,从而得到私钥 d 的值。令 $d=d_1\cdot 2^r+d_0$ ,通过  $ed\equiv 1\ mod\varphi(N)$ ,可以构造二变元模方程 $f_{LSB_1}(y,z)=Ny-yz-ed_0-1\equiv (mode\cdot 2^r)$ 

# 2.9.1 数学推导

对于上述二变元模方程,其小值解 $(y_0, z_0) = (k, p + q - 1)$ ,且上界为

$$Y = 2N^{\alpha+\beta-1}, Z := 3N^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

根据模方程以及根的上界,选定参数 m、τ,可以构造多项式集合:

$$g = y^{t-j} f_{LSB1}^{\ \ j} W^{m-j} \quad t \in (0, ..., m) \quad j = 0, 1, 2, ..., t$$

$$h = z^{i} (f_{LSB_{1}})^{j} W^{m-j} i \in (1, \dots, \tau) \quad j = 0, 1, 2, \dots m$$

对于本题,可以选取参数 m=4, $\tau=1$ ,利用多项式集合构造格基矩阵即可进一步求解双变元模方程的解。

### 2.9.2 代码实现

#### 2.9.2.1 依据参数范围决定攻击方式

针对本题提供的题设信息,可以确定 $\alpha$ 约为 0. 017, $\beta$ 约为 1, $\delta$ 约为 0. 517,满足  $\beta \leq \delta + \frac{7}{6} - \frac{1}{3} \sqrt{6(\alpha + \delta) + 1}$ ,因此可以在多项式时间内实现攻击

#### 0

#### 2.9.2.2 构造模方程与多项式集合

在本题中使用了与第八题相同的思路,使用了相同的模方程,区别在于参数 m 和 t 的值选取不同,多项式集合构建的格基矩阵也有所不同,本题使用 m=4, t=1 即可实现攻击。

#### 2.9.2.3 构造格基矩阵并约减

在多项式的集合中按照指定的顺序和排序规则进行排序和创建格基矩阵,并且使用 LLL 算法对创建的格基矩阵进行约减。

#### 2.9.2.4 重构多项式方程

从约减后的格基矩阵中重构出多项式,它遍历每一行,根据约减后的基向量重构多项式,并可选地进行多项式的预处理、除以原始多项式 f、以及多项式之间的最大公因数除法。

#### 2.9.2.5 使用 Grobner 基方法求根

该函数利用 Groebner 基的概念,通过多项式环中的多项式集合,尝试找到其根。通过逐步求解方程组的方式,利用 Groebner 基的性质进行根的计算。如果成功找到符合条件的根,则以生成器的形式返回。

#### 2.9.2.6 恢复明文 m

与第八题相似,在使用 Groebner 方法求得小值解 $(y_0, z_0) = (k, p + q - 1)$ 之后,沿用前几题的求解思路,可以得到 m 的具体值及其字符串表达。

M=29626782283555027795833457323782819646058061055998626927231744698032046735445 8194682415976970656098509606755024351835977686637261523083927977866582051597064 1394134470882446389930752232739177896332139262160560758251047484624159910914640 7921519715337758543965970340752770069692353557305140735862098,其字符串形式为:

Resolving the composite numbers into their prime factors is known to be one of the most important and useful in arithmetic.

# 2.10第十题: 高位泄露

对于部分私钥泄露的 RSA 攻击,Boneh, Durfee, and Frankel 等人首次提出了暴露部分最高有效位的攻击,Ernst 等人将攻击扩展到了全范围的加密指数, Takayasu 等人进一步改善了上述攻击的范围,将已知部分最高有效位攻击扩展到了 $N^{0.5625}$ 。

# 2.10.1数学推导

记 $d = d_1 \cdot 2^r + d_2, 0 < r < l_d, 0 \le d_1 < 2^{l_d-r}, 0 \le d_2 < 2^r$ ,由 $1 = ed - k\varphi(N) = e(d_1 \cdot 2^r + d_2) - k[N - (p + q - 1)]$ 可以构造模方程 $f_{MSBs1}(x, y, z) = A + ex - Ny + yz$ ,其小值解的上界为 $X = N^\delta$ , $Y = 2N^{\alpha+\beta-1}$ , $Z = 3N^{\frac{1}{2}}$ ,上述攻击在 $\delta \le \frac{5}{6} - \frac{1}{3}\sqrt{6(\alpha+\beta)-5} - \varepsilon$ 时是有效的,根据本题所给已知信息,可以判断本题符合攻击界限。除此之外还可以根据已知信息对k的值进行估计,将估计值作为已知信息修改原本的模方程。

# 2.10.2代码实现

# 2.10.2.1 寻找小根, 进行 coppersmith 攻击

根据题目所给的已知信息,仅最低有效位的 10 位未泄露,可确定参数 bounds =  $(2^{20}, 2^{513})$ 

```
def small_roots(f, bounds, m=1, d=None):
    if not d:
        d = f.degree()

R = f.base_ring()
N = R.cardinality()

k = ZZ(f.coefficients().pop(0))
g = gcd(k, N)
k = R(k/g)

f *= 1/k
```

```
f = f. change_ring(ZZ)
    vars = f.variables()
    G = Sequence([], f. parent())
    for k in range(m):
        for i in range (m-k+1):
             for subvars in itertools.combinations_with_replacement(vars[1:], i):
                 g = f**k * prod(subvars) * N**(max(d-k, 0))
                 G. append (g)
    B, monomials = G. coefficient_matrix()
    monomials = vector (monomials)
    factors = [monomial(*bounds) for monomial in monomials]
    for i, factor in enumerate (factors):
        B. rescale_col(i, factor)
    B = B. dense_matrix().LLL()
    B = B. change ring(QQ)
    for i, factor in enumerate (factors):
        B. rescale_col(i, Integer(1)/factor)
    H = Sequence([], f.parent().change_ring(QQ))
    for h in filter(None, B*monomials):
        H. append (h)
        I = H. ideal()
        if I. dimension() == -1:
             H. pop ()
        elif I. dimension() = 0:
             roots = \square
             for root in I. variety (ring=ZZ):
                 root = tuple(R(root[var]) for var in f.variables())
                 roots. append (root)
             return roots
    return []
k1 = e1*leak1 // n1 + 1
PR. \langle x, y \rangle = PolynomialRing(Zmod(e1*leak1))
f = 1 + k1*((n1+1)-y) - e1*x
bounds = (2^10, 2^513)
res = small_roots(f, bounds, m=2, d=2)
leak = int(res[0][1])
PR. \langle x \rangle = PolynomialRing(RealField(1000))
f = x*(leak-x) - n1
ph = int(f. roots()[0][0])
PR. \langle x \rangle = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n1))
f = ph + x
res = f. small_roots (X=2^{(160+6)}), beta=0. 499, epsilon=0. 02) [0]
```

```
p1 = int(ph + res)
q1 = n1 // p1
print(p1)
    print(q1)
```

#### 2.10.2.2 恢复明文

```
from gmpy2 import *
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
d=invert(e, phi)
m=pow(c, d, n)
print(m)
```

得到 m=820307570753893249794408475962305073085942139245561017669 转换为字符 串即: Eureka, I have found it!

# 2.11第十一题: 高位泄露

此题与第十题相似,在其基础上进行拓展。本题高位泄露的信息发生的变化,相较于第十题有所减少,但仍满足可行的攻击范围,可以在多项式时间内求解 d。本题仍然采用与第十题相同的方程和格基矩阵,区别在于方程的小值解的上界发生了变化。

# 2.11.1数学推导

具体推导过程同第十题

# 2.11.2代码实现

脚本同第十题,根据题目所给信息最低有效位的 20 位未泄露,其余部分均已知,修改参数 bounds =  $(2^{20}, 2^{513})$ ,得到结果

m=87145933052849368590035634224444739288510912277401910294889864005065459186159433427196070466375290113480371702829643084847179111112867851667023357939314443149765724564426575483318831499824038383560727132775568856206038881645878044446149895349139015593369673 对应字符串: I have discovered a truly marvelous proof of this, which however the margin is not large enough to contain.

# 2.12第十二题:已知 q 信息

本题与第七题相似,并未直接给出 d 的泄露信息,但给出了与 RSA 密钥中 $N_{12}$ 取值相近的数N的已知信息,并且N与 $N_{12}$ 含有部分近似公因子,即 $N=kq_{12}+r$ 

# 2.12.1数学推导

基于第七题根据已知信息对无任何比特位泄露的私钥 d 进行变换的思路,以及本题提供的已知信息和 RSA 密钥体制的特性,我们可以得到:

$$dq = d \big( mod \ (q-1) \big)$$

$$N' = kq + r$$

$$r = N' - k (mod \ (q-1))$$

$$2^{511} < k < 2^{512}, 2^{255} < r < 2^{256}$$

$$d = N' - k \ e(N' - k) \equiv 1 (mod \varphi(N))$$

$$e(k(q-1) + r) \equiv 1 (mod \varphi(N))$$

$$er = 1 + t(\frac{N+1}{2} - \frac{P+q}{2}) - 2e(\frac{N'}{2} - \frac{r+k}{2})$$

$$1 + x(A-y) - 2e(B-z) = 0 (mod \ e)$$

对于上述方程,由于 $2^{255} < r < 2^{256}$ ,与 Boneh-Durfee 中的 d 有着相近的数量级,理论上仍可通过求解三变元整系数方程进行求解。

除此之外,也可也考虑将其转换为部分高位泄露的形式,由于:

$$e(N' - k') = k\varphi(N) + 1$$

$$eN' - ek' - k\varphi(N) - 1 = 0$$

$$eN' - 1 - ek' - k(N - (p + q - 1)) = 0$$

$$eN' - 1 - ex - yN + yz = 0$$

其中 $2^{511} < k < 2^{512}$ ,故 $X = N^{\delta} = 2^{512}$ , $Y = 2N^{\alpha+\beta-1}$ , $Z = 3N^{\frac{1}{2}}$ ,根据题目所给信息可以确定 $\delta$ 、 $\alpha$ 、 $\beta$ 的具体取值,发现其满足 $\delta \leqslant \frac{5}{6} - \frac{1}{3}\sqrt{6(\alpha+\beta)-5} - \varepsilon$ ,因此可以采用与已知高位泄露相似的方法进行求解

# 2.12.2代码实现

若采用将其转换为与 Boneh-Durfee 攻击相似的形式,可以使用与第七题或第二题的脚本,需将模方程进行修改,并修改具体参数进行格基矩阵构建和多项式重构,进而求解方程的解,若采用将其转换为高位泄露类似的情况多项式集合构造代码如下:

```
pr = f.parent()
x, y, z = pr.gens()
A = int(f.constant_coefficient())
assert A != 0
while gcd(A, X) != 1:
    X += 1
while gcd(A, Y) != 1:
    Y += 1
while gcd(A, Z) != 1:
    Z += 1
while gcd(A, M) != 1:
    X += 1
```

```
R =M* X ** (m-1)*Y**(m-1) * Z ** (m + tau-1)
f_ = (pow(A, -1, R) * f % R).change_ring(ZZ)
shifts = []
for j in range(m):
    for i2 in range(j + 1):
        for i3 in range(i2 + tau + 1):
            g = x ** (j-i2) * y ** i2 * z ** i3 * f_ * X ** (m - 1-j+i2) * Y

** (m - 1-i2) * Z ** (m-1+tau-i3)
            shifts.append(g)
for i2 in range(m+1):
    for i3 in range(i2 + tau+1):
        g_ = x ** (m-i2) * y ** i2 * z ** i3 * R

        shifts.append(g_)
```

格基矩阵构造与多项式重构的代码与低位泄露相同,此处不再给出。通过以上步骤可 以求得 d 的值,进而求取 m。

# 2.13 随机数发生器

# 2.13.1寻找未翻转的比特串

根据题目所给信息,构成大整数 N 的两个大素数 p、q 中的 p 由随机数发生器生成,q 是随机产生的素数。对求解得到的 p、q 进行观察可以发现其中一个数具有明显的周期特征。随机数生成器通过对输入的种子密钥 $s_i$ 进行变换扩展使之成为具有周期的 512 位比特串,比特串部分位发生翻转后寻找最近的素数即为 p,且根据素数密度公式及实验检验可知,搜寻素数仅对比特串的末尾几个比特位产生影响。进而对攻击得到的 p,针对其种子密钥 $s_i$ 长度不超过 2048 的特性,对所有可能的周期进行遍历,并按照周期长度将 p 截断,依次比对得到翻转次数尽可能少的周期序列。即首先观察周期长度 11,生成所有长度为 11 位的比特串,逐一将其作为周期序列,与截断后的 p 进行比较,得到每一个比特串作为周期序列时的翻转次数,然后观察周期长度 10,依次类推,遍历所有可能的情况后选择翻转次数尽可能少的比特串作为周期序列。

# 2.13.2种子密钥及随机数生成器

对于获得的周期序列,利用其推测随机数发生器的规律以及种子密钥。对于第一题中获得的 p,可能的周期序列为 00, 对于第二题中获得的 p,可能的周期序列为 0001010, 对于第六题中获得的 p,可能的周期序列为 00110101100, 对于第七题中获得的 p,可能的周期序列为 001111000, 对于第八题中获得的 p,可能的周期序列为 110011000, 对于第九题

中获得的 p,可能的周期序列为 000111001,对于第十题中获得的 p,可能的周期序列为 110000001,对于第十一题中获得的 p,可能的周期序列为 11010000000,通过上述周期序 列我们对种子密钥以及随机数生成器存在的规律进行猜测。通过查阅资料发现,目前较为 主流的随机数生成器主要有线性同余生成器 LCG、线性反馈移位寄存器 LFSR、BBS 产生器、Rabin 生成器等。基于多种随机数发生器的特点以及对得到的周期序列进行观察,第一题的周期序列其种子密钥 $s_1$ 大概率为 0,第二题的周期序列其可能的种子密钥 $s_2$ 为 90,第六题的种子密钥 $s_6$ 可能为 864,第七题的种子密钥 $s_7$ 可能为 216,第八题的种子密钥 $s_8$ 可能为 148,第九题的种子密钥 $s_9$ 可能为 101,第十题的种子密钥 $s_{10}$ 可能为 195,第十一题的种子密钥 $s_{11}$ 可能为 320。随机数发生器可能的规律为,对输入的种子密钥 $s_i$ ,基于线性同余算法对其进行处理,对生成的随机数数列,将其中的每个数作为线性反馈移位的输入,利用设定的反馈多项式,计算出一个新的反馈位,对数列中的第 i 个数,其第 i 次迭代时产生的新的最低位输出作为比特序列的一部分。

# 第三章 结论

根据以上十二题的解题过程以及随机数发生器做出的猜想,我们可以得知 RSA 密码体制在私钥泄露方面的安全性仍不够牢靠,如若通过侧信道等手段得到解密信息,就可以利用上述攻击手段进行破解。经过以上解题过程,我们对加深了 RSA 体制的加解密过程,对于理论上界的确定以及部分参数的选取仍显生疏。而最后对于随机数生成器的分析,更能帮助我们深入地从产生两个大素数这一密钥生成过程理解 RSA 的奥义。

对于 RSA 私钥部分信息的泄露而言,目前为止,攻击手段较为初级,更多的是对于其间过程的理解,正如 wiener attack 拓展为 Boneh-Durfee 以及 coppersmith 进阶为基于格的 coppersmith 攻击一样,再加上双变元与三变元(或更多变元)间的辨析,基于部分私钥信息泄露的 RSA 攻击才显得如此莫测。

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# 第五章 谢辞

从四月下旬开始,本小组开始着手进行题目求解,几乎从零开始接触真正的解密,一点点摸索,一点点探究,查阅了大量文献资料,尝试了各种可能的攻击脚本,最终得出上述解答,但这是我们在繁忙的学习生活中挤压时间所得出的成果,在漫天的作业与大山般的期末考试中匀得一些喘息的时间,探索自己喜欢的事情。

首先感谢竞赛官方精心拟题让热爱密码的学子能够切实感受到 RSA 体制的精妙与保护信息安全的重要性。然后感谢指导老师汪定的指导。接下来感谢我们自己,尽管这学期学业尤为繁重,但还是用不怕苦的精神,往赛题里钻,又用不怕难的精神反复进行"失败-再来"的循环。或许这就是解密人的一点点影子吧,只有从每次的"not found"里总结经验,才能知道看到解答不是乱码的惊喜。

# 第六章 附录

## ● 数学工具: sage

Sage 是免费的开源数学软件,支持代数、几何、数论、密码学、数值计算和相关领域的研究和教学。

Sage 的主要作用包括,求逆元,设置有限域上的一元多项式,扩展欧几里得算法,中国剩余定理,求离散对数,取模求根,求欧拉函数,输出表达式近似值,素数分布 \$(P\_i(x))\$,创建整数域中的椭圆曲线,求常微分方程和方程组,矩阵特征值求解,描述随机过程等。这些密码学当中的常用方法,如果单独使用 Python 进行,将会构造一个较为复杂的函数并且需要包含更多的库,尤其是在大整数方面,构造相应的数据结构十分复杂,使用其他的库,诸如 gmm 等也有许多问题。我们尝试了一些可能的方法,均不如直接配置使用 sage 容易,并且在计算的过程当中还存在着诸多困难。因此我们还是使用了 sage 编程环境,进行相关数学问题的处理。

### ● 程序源代码

#### 第一题:

 $n = 1157573064764808238901014881886307767292648186259567111972091829233169\\ 1945000456670513603713812470775724136423836220284833432623096586618288437290\\ 5599812001417295792076008382155051507854558917751540997152031158153627516638\\ 6098916629920214555252088761525122194260227303884301689866348129259974774330\\ 74009315297$ 

 $e=3675911976010751434245152201450472375678193277885453600784488695756667\\4786814219616184569606624829254075411466011531177462192834674042314582632169\\9988699376300478224028491416362044056244652836185591483880232396180100239835\\1530282909623323354635563912078237681516607085886980774103759052802979227849\\6614408403$ 

 $c = 1023068665481662972839905707287193807462743565473494563139111345255110\\ 0988452759507761965831274615454091804060990479276626754093955423066125579044\\ 2398718139161414133218935455395440009626652377478022047762911840522170980051\\ 3873912617748967104219839743188571765564673665451653067906413649171957904442\\ 35849931561$ 

def factor rsa wiener(N, e):

```
N = Integer(N)
       e = Integer(e)
       cf = (e / N).continued_fraction().convergents()
       for f in cf:
          k = f.numer()
          d = f.denom()
          if k == 0:
            continue
          phi_N = ((e * d) - 1) / k
          b = -(N - phi_N + 1)
          dis = b ^2 - 4 * N
          if dis.sign() == 1:
            dis_sqrt = sqrt(dis)
            p = (-b + dis\_sqrt) / 2
            q = (-b - dis\_sqrt) / 2
            if p.is_integer() and q.is_integer() and (p * q) % N == 0:
               p = p \% N
               q = q \% N
               if p > q:
                  return (p, q)
               else:
                  return (q, p)
factor_rsa_wiener(n,e)
```

第二题:

```
from __future__ import print_function
import time
Setting debug to true will display more informations
about the lattice, the bounds, the vectors...
debug = True
Setting strict to true will stop the algorithm (and
return (-1, -1)) if we don't have a correct
upperbound on the determinant. Note that this
doesn't necesseraly mean that no solutions
will be found since the theoretical upperbound is
usualy far away from actual results. That is why
you should probably use `strict = False`
strict = False
This is experimental, but has provided remarkable results
so far. It tries to reduce the lattice as much as it can
while keeping its efficiency. I see no reason not to use
this option, but if things don't work, you should try
disabling it
helpful only = True
dimension_min = 7 # stop removing if lattice reaches that dimension
# display stats on helpful vectors
def helpful_vectors(BB, modulus):
  nothelpful = 0
  for ii in range(BB.dimensions()[0]):
     if BB[ii,ii] >= modulus:
       nothelpful += 1
  print(nothelpful, "/", BB.dimensions()[0], " vectors are not helpful")
# display matrix picture with 0 and X
def matrix_overview(BB, bound):
  for ii in range(BB.dimensions()[0]):
     a = ('\%02d'\%ii)
     for ii in range(BB.dimensions()[1]):
       a += '0' \text{ if } BB[ii,jj] == 0 \text{ else 'X'}
       if BB.dimensions()[0] < 60:
          a += ' '
     if BB[ii, ii] >= bound:
       a += '~
     print(a)
# tries to remove unhelpful vectors
# we start at current = n-1 (last vector)
def remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, bound, current):
  # end of our recursive function
  if current == -1 or BB.dimensions()[0] <= dimension_min:
     return BB
  # we start by checking from the end
  for ii in range(current, -1, -1):
     # if it is unhelpful:
     if BB[ii, ii] >= bound:
       affected vectors = 0
       affected\_vector\_index = 0
       # let's check if it affects other vectors
       for jj in range(ii + 1, BB.dimensions()[0]):
```

```
# if another vector is affected:
          # we increase the count
         if BB[jj, ii] != 0:
            affected_vectors += 1
            affected_vector_index = jj
       # level:0
       # if no other vectors end up affected
       # we remove it
       if affected_vectors == 0:
          print("* removing unhelpful vector", ii)
          BB = BB.delete_columns([ii])
          BB = BB.delete\_rows([ii])
          monomials.pop(ii)
         BB = remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, bound, ii-1)
         return BB
       # level:1
       # if just one was affected we check
       # if it is affecting someone else
       elif affected_vectors == 1:
         affected_deeper = True
          for kk in range(affected_vector_index + 1, BB.dimensions()[0]):
            # if it is affecting even one vector
            # we give up on this one
            if BB[kk, affected_vector_index] != 0:
              affected\_deeper = False
          # remove both it if no other vector was affected and
          # this helpful vector is not helpful enough
          # compared to our unhelpful one
         if affected_deeper and abs(bound - BB[affected_vector_index, affected_vector_index]) < abs(bound -
BB[ii, ii]):
            print("* removing unhelpful vectors", ii, "and", affected_vector_index)
            BB = BB.delete_columns([affected_vector_index, ii])
            BB = BB.delete_rows([affected_vector_index, ii])
            monomials.pop(affected_vector_index)
            monomials.pop(ii)
            BB = remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, bound, ii-1)
            return BB
  # nothing happened
  return BB
Returns:
* 0.0 if it fails
* -1,-1 if `strict=true`, and determinant doesn't bound
* x0,y0 the solutions of `pol`
def boneh_durfee(pol, modulus, mm, tt, XX, YY):
  Boneh and Durfee revisited by Herrmann and May
  finds a solution if:
  * d < N^delta
  * |x| < e^{delta}
  * |y| < e^0.5
  whenever delta < 1 - \text{sqrt}(2)/2 \sim 0.292
  # substitution (Herrman and May)
  PR.<u, x, y> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
  Q = PR.quotient(x*y + 1 - u) # u = xy + 1
  polZ = Q(pol).lift()
  UU = XX*YY + 1
  # x-shifts
```

```
gg = []
for kk in range(mm + 1):
  for ii in range(mm - kk + 1):
     xshift = x^ii * modulus^(mm - kk) * polZ(u, x, y)^kk
     gg.append(xshift)
gg.sort()
# x-shifts list of monomials
monomials = []
for polynomial in gg:
  for monomial in polynomial.monomials():
     if monomial not in monomials:
       monomials.append(monomial)
monomials.sort()
# y-shifts (selected by Herrman and May)
for jj in range(1, tt + 1):
  for kk in range(floor(mm/tt) * jj, mm + 1):
     yshift = y^{jj} * polZ(u, x, y)^k * modulus^(mm - kk)
     yshift = Q(yshift).lift()
     gg.append(yshift) # substitution
# y-shifts list of monomials
for jj in range(1, tt + 1):
  for kk in range(floor(mm/tt) * jj, mm + 1):
     monomials.append(u^kk * y^ji)
# construct lattice B
nn = len(monomials)
BB = Matrix(ZZ, nn)
for ii in range(nn):
  BB[ii, 0] = gg[ii](0, 0, 0)
  for jj in range(1, ii + 1):
     if monomials(jj] in gg[ii].monomials():
       BB[ii, jj] = gg[ii].monomial_coefficient(monomials[jj]) * monomials[jj](UU,XX,YY)
# Prototype to reduce the lattice
if helpful_only:
  # automatically remove
  BB = remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, modulus^mm, nn-1)
  # reset dimension
  nn = BB.dimensions()[0]
  if nn == 0:
     print("failure")
     return 0,0
# check if vectors are helpful
if debug:
  helpful_vectors(BB, modulus^mm)
# check if determinant is correctly bounded
det = BB.det()
bound = modulus^(mm*nn)
if det >= bound:
  print("We do not have det < bound. Solutions might not be found.")
  print("Try with highers m and t.")
  if debug:
     diff = (\log(\det) - \log(bound)) / \log(2)
     print("size det(L) - size e^{(m*n)} = ", floor(diff))
  if strict:
     return -1, -1
else:
  print("det(L) < e^(m*n) (good! If a solution exists < N^delta, it will be found)")
# display the lattice basis
if debug:
  matrix_overview(BB, modulus^mm)
```

```
# LLL
  if debug:
    print("optimizing basis of the lattice via LLL, this can take a long time")
  BB = BB.LLL()
  if debug:
    print("LLL is done!")
  # transform vector i & j -> polynomials 1 & 2
  if debug:
    print("looking for independent vectors in the lattice")
  found_polynomials = False
  for pol1_idx in range(nn - 1):
    for pol2_idx in range(pol1_idx + 1, nn):
      # for i and j, create the two polynomials
      PR.<w,z> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
      pol1 = pol2 = 0
      for jj in range(nn):
        pol1 += monomials[jj](w*z+1,w,z) * BB[pol1_idx, jj] / monomials[jj](UU,XX,YY)
        pol2 += monomials[jj](w*z+1,w,z) * BB[pol2_idx, jj] / monomials[jj](UU,XX,YY)
      # resultant
      PR. < q > = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
      rr = pol1.resultant(pol2)
      # are these good polynomials?
      if rr.is_zero() or rr.monomials() == [1]:
        continue
      else:
        print("found them, using vectors", pol1_idx, "and", pol2_idx)
        found_polynomials = True
        break
    if found_polynomials:
      break
  if not found_polynomials:
    print("no independant vectors could be found. This should very rarely happen...")
    return 0, 0
  rr = rr(q, q)
  # solutions
  soly = rr.roots()
 if len(solv) == 0:
    print("Your prediction (delta) is too small")
    return 0, 0
  soly = soly[0][0]
  ss = pol1(q, soly)
  solx = ss.roots()[0][0]
  return solx, soly
def example():
  # the modulus
0xd231f2c194d3971821984dec9cf1ef58d538975f189045ef8a706f6165aab4929096f61a3eb7dd8021bf3fdc41fe
e347f187485aa48b044432e82f5371c08f6e0bbde46c713859aec715e2a2ca66574f3eb
  # the public exponent
54d488041b92bca2fe2c92e3373dedd7e625da11275f6f18ee4aef336d0637505545f70f805902ddbacb21bb8276d
34a0f6dfe37ede87dd95bb1494dbb5763639ba3984240f1178e32aa36ee3c5fcc8115dde5
  # the hypothesis on the private exponent (the theoretical maximum is 0.292)
```

```
delta = .28 \# this means that d < N^delta
  m = 13 # size of the lattice (bigger the better/slower)
  # you need to be a lattice master to tweak these
  t = int((1-2*delta)*m) # optimization from Herrmann and May
  X = 2*floor(N^delta) # this _might_ be too much
  Y = floor(N^{(1/2)}) # correct if p, q are ~ same size
  # Problem put in equation
  P.<x,y> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
  A = int((N+1)/2)
  pol = 1 + x * (A + y)
  # Find the solutions!
  # Checking bounds
  if debug:
     print("=== checking values ===")
     print("* delta:", delta)
    print("* delta < 0.292", delta < 0.292)
    print("* size of e:", int(log(e)/log(2)))
    print("* size of N:", int(log(N)/log(2)))
    print("* m:", m, ", t:", t)
  # boneh_durfee
  if debug:
    print("=== running algorithm ===")
    start_time = time.time()
  solx, soly = boneh_durfee(pol, e, m, t, X, Y)
  # found a solution?
  if solx > 0:
     print("=== solution found ===")
     if False:
       print("x:", solx)
       print("y:", soly)
    d = int(pol(solx, soly) / e)
    print("private key found:", d)
  else:
    print("=== no solution was found ===")
  if debug:
    print(("=== %s seconds ===" % (time.time() - start_time)))
if __name__ == "__main__":
  example()
```

## 第三题:

```
return (-1, -1)) if we don't have a correct
upperbound on the determinant. Note that this
doesn't necesseraly mean that no solutions
will be found since the theoretical upperbound is
usualy far away from actual results. That is why
you should probably use `strict = False`
strict = False
This is experimental, but has provided remarkable results
so far. It tries to reduce the lattice as much as it can
while keeping its efficiency. I see no reason not to use
this option, but if things don't work, you should try
disabling it
helpful_only = True
dimension_min = 7 # stop removing if lattice reaches that dimension
# display stats on helpful vectors
def helpful_vectors(BB, modulus):
  nothelpful = 0
  for ii in range(BB.dimensions()[0]):
     if BB[ii,ii] >= modulus:
        nothelpful += 1
  print(nothelpful, "/", BB.dimensions()[0], " vectors are not helpful")
# display matrix picture with 0 and X
def matrix_overview(BB, bound):
  for ii in range(BB.dimensions()[0]):
     a = ('\% 02d'\% ii)
     for jj in range(BB.dimensions()[1]):
        a += 0' if BB[ii,jj] == 0 else 'X'
        if BB.dimensions()[0] < 60:
          a += ' '
     if BB[ii, ii] >= bound:
       a += '~'
     print(a)
# tries to remove unhelpful vectors
# we start at current = n-1 (last vector)
def remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, bound, current):
  # end of our recursive function
  if current == -1 or BB.dimensions()[0] <= dimension min:
     return BB
  # we start by checking from the end
  for ii in range(current, -1, -1):
     # if it is unhelpful:
     if BB[ii, ii] > = bound:
        affected\_vectors = 0
        affected\_vector\_index = 0
        # let's check if it affects other vectors
        for jj in range(ii + 1, BB.dimensions()[0]):
          # if another vector is affected:
          # we increase the count
          if BB[ii, ii] != 0:
             affected_vectors += 1
             affected_vector_index = jj
        # level:0
        # if no other vectors end up affected
        # we remove it
        if affected\_vectors == 0:
          print("* removing unhelpful vector", ii)
          BB = BB.delete_columns([ii])
```

```
BB = BB.delete\_rows([ii])
          monomials.pop(ii)
          BB = remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, bound, ii-1)
          return BB
       # level:1
       # if just one was affected we check
       # if it is affecting someone else
       elif affected vectors == 1:
          affected_deeper = True
          for kk in range(affected_vector_index + 1, BB.dimensions()[0]):
            # if it is affecting even one vector
            # we give up on this one
            if BB[kk, affected_vector_index] != 0:
              affected\_deeper = False
          # remove both it if no other vector was affected and
          # this helpful vector is not helpful enough
          # compared to our unhelpful one
          if affected_deeper and abs(bound - BB[affected_vector_index, affected_vector_index]) < abs(bound -
BB[ii, ii]):
            print("* removing unhelpful vectors", ii, "and", affected_vector_index)
            BB = BB.delete_columns([affected_vector_index, ii])
            BB = BB.delete_rows([affected_vector_index, ii])
            monomials.pop(affected_vector_index)
            monomials.pop(ii)
            BB = remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, bound, ii-1)
            return BB
  # nothing happened
  return BB
,,,,,,
Returns:
* 0,0 if it fails
* -1,-1 if `strict=true`, and determinant doesn't bound
* x0,y0 the solutions of `pol`
def boneh_durfee(pol, modulus, mm, tt, XX, YY):
  Boneh and Durfee revisited by Herrmann and May
  finds a solution if:
  * d < N^delta
  * \; |x| < e^{delta}
  |y| < e^{0.5}
  whenever delta < 1 - \operatorname{sqrt}(2)/2 \sim 0.292
  # substitution (Herrman and May)
  PR.<u, x, y> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
  Q = PR.quotient(x*y + 1 - u) # u = xy + 1
  polZ = Q(pol).lift()
  UU = XX*YY + 1
  # x-shifts
  gg = []
  for kk in range(mm + 1):
     for ii in range(mm - kk + 1):
       xshift = x^i * modulus(mm - kk) * polZ(u, x, y)^k
       gg.append(xshift)
  gg.sort()
  # x-shifts list of monomials
  monomials = []
  for polynomial in gg:
     for monomial in polynomial.monomials():
       if monomial not in monomials:
```

```
monomials.append(monomial)
monomials.sort()
# y-shifts (selected by Herrman and May)
for jj in range(1, tt + 1):
  for kk in range(floor(mm/tt) * jj, mm + 1):
     yshift = y^{jj} * polZ(u, x, y)^k * modulus^(mm - kk)
     yshift = Q(yshift).lift()
     gg.append(yshift) # substitution
# y-shifts list of monomials
for jj in range(1, tt + 1):
  for kk in range(floor(mm/tt) * jj, mm + 1):
     monomials.append(u^kk * y^jj)
# construct lattice B
nn = len(monomials)
BB = Matrix(ZZ, nn)
for ii in range(nn):
  BB[ii, 0] = gg[ii](0, 0, 0)
  for jj in range(1, ii + 1):
     if monomials[jj] in gg[ii].monomials():
       BB[ii, ji] = gg[ii].monomial_coefficient(monomials[ji]) * monomials[ji](UU,XX,YY)
# Prototype to reduce the lattice
if helpful_only:
  # automatically remove
  BB = remove_unhelpful(BB, monomials, modulus^mm, nn-1)
  # reset dimension
  nn = BB.dimensions()[0]
  if nn == 0:
     print("failure")
     return 0,0
# check if vectors are helpful
if debug:
  helpful_vectors(BB, modulus^mm)
# check if determinant is correctly bounded
det = BB.det()
bound = modulus^(mm*nn)
if det >= bound:
  print("We do not have det < bound. Solutions might not be found.")
  print("Try with highers m and t.")
     diff = (log(det) - log(bound)) / log(2)
     print("size det(L) - size e^{(m*n)} = ", floor(diff))
  if strict:
     return -1, -1
  print("det(L) < e^{\land}(m*n) \; (good! \; If \; a \; solution \; exists < N^{\land}delta, \; it \; will \; be \; found)")
# display the lattice basis
if debug:
  matrix_overview(BB, modulus^mm)
# LLL
  print("optimizing basis of the lattice via LLL, this can take a long time")
BB = BB.LLL()
if debug:
  print("LLL is done!")
# transform vector i & j -> polynomials 1 & 2
if debug:
```

```
print("looking for independent vectors in the lattice")
  found_polynomials = False
  for pol1_idx in range(nn - 1):
    for pol2_idx in range(pol1_idx + 1, nn):
      # for i and j, create the two polynomials
      PR.<w,z> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
      pol1 = pol2 = 0
      for jj in range(nn):
        pol1 += monomials[jj](w*z+1,w,z) * BB[pol1_idx, jj] / monomials[jj](UU,XX,YY)
        pol2 += monomials[jj](w*z+1,w,z) * BB[pol2_idx, jj] / monomials[jj](UU,XX,YY)
      # resultant
      PR. < q > = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
      rr = pol1.resultant(pol2)
      # are these good polynomials?
      if rr.is_zero() or rr.monomials() == [1]:
        continue
        print("found them, using vectors", pol1_idx, "and", pol2_idx)
        found_polynomials = True
        break
    if found_polynomials:
      break
  if not found_polynomials:
    print("no independant vectors could be found. This should very rarely happen...")
  rr = rr(q, q)
  # solutions
  soly = rr.roots()
  if len(soly) == 0:
    print("Your prediction (delta) is too small")
    return 0, 0
  soly = soly[0][0]
  ss = pol1(q, soly)
  solx = ss.roots()[0][0]
  return solx, soly
def example():
  # the modulus
7ab41701f6b8768e71009c41a3d5e9e7c109455341d549c7611f9f52851a2f017906aa9ccbedb95d238468e2c8577
# the public exponent
2dd10e62dbd94a3386b97d92ee817b0c66c1507514a7860b9139bc2ac3a4e0fe304199214da00a4ca82bfcb7b182
53e7e6144828e584dac2dfb9a03fabaf2376ce7c269923fbb60fc68325b9f6443e1f896f
  # the hypothesis on the private exponent (the theoretical maximum is 0.292)
  delta = .29 # this means that d < N^delta
  m = 8 # size of the lattice (bigger the better/slower)
  # you need to be a lattice master to tweak these
  t = int((1-2*delta)*m) # optimization from Herrmann and May
  X = 2*floor(e^delta) # this _might_ be too much
  Y = 2*floor(e^{(1/2)}) # correct if p, q are ~ same size
  # Problem put in equation
  P.\langle x,y\rangle = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
```

```
A = N
  pol = x * (A - y)-1
  # Find the solutions!
  # boneh_durfee
  if debug:
    print("=== running algorithm ===")
    start_time = time.time()
  solx, soly = boneh\_durfee(pol, e, m, t, X, Y)
  # found a solution?
  if solx > 0:
    print("=== solution found ===")
     if False:
       print("x:", solx)
       print("y:", soly)
    print(solx)
    print(soly)
    d = int(pol(solx, soly) / e)
    print("private key found:", d)
  else:
    print("=== no solution was found ====")
    print(("=== %s seconds ===" % (time.time() - start_time)))
if __name__ == "__main__":
  example()
```

第四题:

```
def _bm_6(N, e, r1,r2, m, t,tau):
  x,y, z = ZZ["x","y", "z"].gens()
  f = e*x-N*y+y*z-1
  X = 2**r2
  Y = int(2*RR(N)**(0.39022))
  Z = int(3 * RR(N) ** (1/2))
  W = e*2**r1
  for x0,y0, z0 in modular_trivariate(f, W, m, t, tau, X, Y, Z):
     phi = N - z0
     d = pow(e, -1, phi)
     print("d:")
     print(d)
     if pow(pow(2, e, N), d, N) == 2:
       print("d:")
       print(d)
       factors = factorize(N, phi)
       if factors:
          return *factors, d
  return None
def modular_trivariate(f, W, m, t, tau, X, Y, Z, roots_method="groebner"):
  f = f.change\_ring(ZZ)
  pr = f.parent()
  x, y, z = pr.gens()
  shifts = []
  for t1 in range(m + 1):
     for t2 in range(m + 1):
```

```
for t3 in range(m + 1):
          g = x ** t1 * y ** t2 * f ** t3 * W ** (m - t3)
          if(0 \le t1 + t2 + t3 \le m):
            shifts.append(g)
  for i in range(1, tau+1):
     for t1 in range(m+1):
       for t3 in range(m+1):
          h = z ** i * x ** t1 * f ** t3 * W ** (m - t3)
          if(0 \le t1 + t3 \le m):
              shifts.append(h)
  L, monomials = create_lattice(pr, shifts, [X, Y, Z])
  L = reduce\_lattice(L)
  polynomials = reconstruct_polynomials(L, f, W ** m, monomials, [X, Y, Z])
  for roots in find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials)
     yield roots[x], roots[y], roots[z]
def factorize(N, phi):
  s = N + 1 - phi
  d = s ** 2 - 4 * N
  p = int(s - isqrt(d)) // 2
  q = int(s + isqrt(d)) // 2
  return p, q if p * q == N else None
def find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials):
  gens = pr.gens()
   s = Sequence(polynomials, pr.change_ring(QQ, order="lex"))
  while len(s) > 0:
     G = s.groebner basis()
     logging.debug(f"Sequence length: {len(s)}, Groebner basis length: {len(G)}")
     if len(G) == len(gens):
       logging.debug(f"Found Groebner basis with length {len(gens)}, trying to find roots...")
       roots = \{\}
       for polynomial in G:
          vars = polynomial.variables()
          if len(vars) == 1:
             for root in find_roots_univariate(vars[0], polynomial.univariate_polynomial()):
               roots = {**roots, **root}
       if len(roots) == pr.ngens():
          yield roots
          print(roots)
          return
       logging.debug(f"System is underdetermined, trying to find constant root...")
       G = Sequence(s, pr.change_ring(ZZ, order="lex")).groebner_basis()
       vars = tuple(map(lambda x: var(x), gens))
       for solution_dict in solve([polynomial(*vars) for polynomial in G], vars, solution_dict=True):
          logging.debug(solution_dict)
          found = False
          roots = \{ \}
          for i, v in enumerate(vars):
             s = solution\_dict[v]
             if s.is constant():
               if not s.is_zero():
                  found = True
               roots[gens[i]] = int(s) if s.is_integer() else int(s) + 1
             else:
               roots[gens[i]] = 0
          if found:
             vield roots
             return
       return
     else:
       s.pop()
```

```
def create_lattice(pr, shifts, bounds, order="invlex", sort_shifts_reverse=False,
sort_monomials_reverse=False):
  if pr.ngens() > 1:
    pr_ = pr.change_ring(ZZ, order=order)
     shifts = [pr_(shift) for shift in shifts]
  monomials = set()
  for shift in shifts:
     monomials.update(shift.monomials())
  shifts.sort(reverse=sort_shifts_reverse)
  monomials = sorted(monomials, reverse=sort_monomials_reverse)
  L = matrix(ZZ, len(shifts), len(monomials))
  for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
     for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       L[row, col] = shift.monomial_coefficient(monomial) * monomial(*bounds)
  monomials = [pr(monomial) for monomial in monomials]
  return L, monomials
def reduce_lattice(L, delta=0.8):
  logging.debug(f"Reducing a {L.nrows()} x {L.ncols()} lattice...")
  return L.LLL(delta)
def reconstruct_polynomials(B, f, modulus, monomials, bounds, preprocess_polynomial=lambda x: x,
divide gcd=True):
  divide_original = f is not None
  modulus_bound = modulus is not None
  logging.debug(f"Reconstructing polynomials ({divide_original = }, {modulus_bound = }, {divide_gcd
  polynomials = []
  for row in range(B.nrows()):
    norm\_squared = 0
     w = 0
     polynomial = 0
     for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       if B[row, col] == 0:
         continue
       norm\_squared += B[row, col] ** 2
       \mathbf{w} += \mathbf{1}
       assert B[row, col] % monomial(*bounds) == 0
       polynomial += B[row, col] * monomial // monomial(*bounds)
    polynomial = preprocess_polynomial(polynomial)
    if divide_original and polynomial % f == 0:
       logging.debug(f"Original polynomial divides reconstructed polynomial at row {row}, dividing...")
       polynomial //= f
     if divide_gcd:
       for i in range(len(polynomials)):
          g = gcd(polynomial, polynomials[i])
         if g != 1 and g.is_constant():
            logging.debug(f"Reconstructed polynomial has gcd {g} with polynomial at {i}, dividing...")
            polynomial //= g
            polynomials[i] //= g
     if polynomial.is constant():
       logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} is constant, ignoring...")
       continue
```

```
if DEBUG_ROOTS is not None:
   logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} roots check: {polynomial(*DEBUG_ROOTS)}")
  polynomials.append(polynomial)
 logging.debug(f"Reconstructed {len(polynomials)} polynomials")
 return polynomials
14917269868724734330748477442746394704043538593953831799557780293370835665974478130884965\\
696691326017062575682989124677170212774709\\
047936300701816660809819387668301355706749
 m=4
 t=2
 tau=2
 for r2 in range(1,280):
 r1=r2+120
 result=_bm_6(N, e, r1,r2, m, t,tau)
 print(result)
```

#### 第五题:

```
N=
10457299607549794131909181519260953703025474723566238558365855104066129316674627875566503
53453028412903210555510949988013491543417067943845693672205422111252084002419254298175372
264336884067007265677926936185819930249121
e =
91450677560471955241983215901211916819840833873038760023523455723633175352792200061518956
68476230800333225447771855406768594758121
d1=78240989953785170095539221006587788208684073909320290992544625739340203214273
d3=16144942937992801419219495484979117548755795338679209
d3_length=176
d2 length=80
d1_length=256
d=2**512
beata = math.log(d, N)
M1=2**(d3_length+d2_length)
M2=2**d3 length
theat1=math.log(M1,N)
theat2=math.log(M2, N)
result=_bm_6(N, e, d1, d3, m, M1,M2,beata,theat1,theat2)
print(result)
def _bm_6(N, e, d1, d3, m, M1,M2,beata,theat1,theat2):
 k=2* (theat1) * m
 tau=1-2*(beata+theat1-theat2)
 x,y,z = ZZ["x", "y","z"].gens()
 L1 = math.floor(e * d1 * M1 / N)
 fem2 = 1-e*d3+(L1+x)*(N+y)
 fe = 1 + (L1+x) * (N+y)
 X = int(RR(N) ** (0.5-0.23))
 Y = int(RR(N)**(1/2))
 Z = int(RR(N)**(0.5+1/2))
 W=e*M2
 for x0, y0, z0 in modular_trivariate(fem2, fe, W, m, k,tau, X,Y,Z,e,M2,L1):
   phi = N + y0
```

```
d = pow(e, -1, phi)
     print("d:")
    print(d)
     if pow(pow(2, e, N), d, N) == 2:
       print("d:")
       print(d)
       factors == factorize(N, phi)
       if factors:
          return *factors, d
  return None
def LSB(i,k,tau):
  temp=math.ceil((i-k)/tau)
  largenumber=max(0,temp)
  return largenumber
def modular_trivariate(fem2,fe, W, m,k, tau, X, Y, Z,e,M2,L1):
  fem2 = fem2.change\_ring(ZZ)
  fe = fe.change\_ring(ZZ)
  pr = fem2.parent()
  x, y,z= pr.gens()
shifts = []
  for u in range(m + 1):
    for i in range(u + 1):
          g = x^{**} (u-i) * fem2 ** i * (e*M2) ** (m-i)
         g = g.subs(\{(1+(L1+x)*y): z\})
          shifts.append(g)
  for u in range(m + 1):
    for j in range(1,(math.floor(k+tau*u))):
         p=LSB(j,k,tau)
          g = y**j* fem2 ** (u-p) * fe ** p * e ** (m-u) * M2 ** (m-u+p)
          g = g.subs(\{(1+(L1+x)*y): z\})
          shifts.append(g)
  L, monomials = create_lattice(pr, shifts, [X, Y,Z])
  L = reduce_lattice(L)
  polynomials = reconstruct_polynomials(L, fem2, W ** m, monomials, [X, Y,Z])
  for roots in find_roots_groebner (pr, polynomials):
    yield roots[x], roots[y],roots[z]
def factorize(N, phi):
  s = N + 1 - phi
  d = s ** 2 - 4 * N
  p = int(s - isqrt(d)) // 2
  q = int(s + isqrt(d)) // 2
  return p, q if p * q == N else None
def find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials):
  gens = pr.gens()
  s = Sequence(polynomials, pr.change_ring(QQ, order="lex"))
  while len(s) > 0:
     G = s.groebner_basis()
     logging.debug(f"Sequence length: {len(s)}, Groebner basis length: {len(G)}")
    if len(G) == len(gens):
       logging.debug(f"Found Groebner basis with length {len(gens)}, trying to find roots...")
       roots = \{ \}
       for polynomial in G:
          vars = polynomial.variables()
          if len(vars) == 1:
            for root in find_roots_univariate(vars[0], polynomial.univariate_polynomial()):
              roots = {**roots, **root}
       if len(roots) == pr.ngens():
          yield roots
          print(roots)
          return
       logging.debug(f"System is underdetermined, trying to find constant root...")
```

```
G = Sequence(s, pr.change_ring(ZZ, order="lex")).groebner_basis()
       vars = tuple(map(lambda x: var(x), gens))
       for solution_dict in solve([polynomial(*vars) for polynomial in G], vars, solution_dict=True):
         logging.debug(solution_dict)
         found = False
         roots = \{ \}
         for i, v in enumerate(vars):
            s = solution\_dict[v]
            if s.is constant():
              if not s.is_zero():
                found = True
              roots[gens[i]] = int(s) if s.is_integer() else int(s) + 1
            else:
              roots[gens[i]] = 0
         if found:
            yield roots
            return
       return
    else:
       s.pop()
def create_lattice(pr, shifts, bounds, order="invlex", sort_shifts_reverse=False,
sort_monomials_reverse=False):
  if pr.ngens() > 1:
    pr_ = pr.change_ring(ZZ, order=order)
    shifts = [pr_(shift) for shift in shifts]
  monomials = set()
  for shift in shifts:
    monomials.update(shift.monomials())
  shifts.sort(reverse=sort_shifts_reverse)
  monomials = sorted(monomials, reverse=sort_monomials_reverse)
  L = matrix(ZZ, len(shifts), len(monomials))
  for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
    for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       L[row, col] = shift.monomial_coefficient(monomial) * monomial(*bounds)
  monomials = [pr(monomial) for monomial in monomials]
  return L, monomials
def reduce lattice(L, delta=0.8):
  logging.debug(f"Reducing a {L.nrows()} x {L.ncols()} lattice...")
  return L.LLL(delta)
def reconstruct_polynomials(B, f, modulus, monomials, bounds, preprocess_polynomial=lambda x: x,
divide_gcd=True):
  divide_original = f is not None
  modulus bound = modulus is not None
  logging.debug(f"Reconstructing polynomials ({divide_original = }, {modulus_bound = }, {divide_gcd
= })...")
  polynomials = []
  for row in range(B.nrows()):
    norm\_squared = 0
    \mathbf{w} = 0
    polynomial = 0
    for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       if B[row, col] == 0:
         continue
       norm\_squared += B[row, col] ** 2
       w += 1
       assert B[row, col] % monomial(*bounds) == 0
```

```
polynomial += B[row, col] * monomial // monomial(*bounds)
  polynomial = preprocess_polynomial(polynomial)
  if divide_original and polynomial % f == 0:
    logging.debug(f"Original polynomial divides reconstructed polynomial at row {row}, dividing...")
    polynomial //= f
  if divide_gcd:
    for i in range(len(polynomials)):
       g = gcd(polynomial, polynomials[i])
       if g != 1 and g.is_constant():
         logging.debug(f"Reconstructed polynomial has gcd {g} with polynomial at {i}, dividing...")
         polynomial //= g
         polynomials[i] //= g
  if polynomial.is_constant():
    logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} is constant, ignoring...")
    continue
  if DEBUG ROOTS is not None:
    logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} roots check: {polynomial(*DEBUG_ROOTS)}")
  polynomials.append(polynomial)
logging.debug(f"Reconstructed {len(polynomials)} polynomials")
return polynomials
```

#### 第六题

```
70936643674737888885180168344979348603174918550973327065618736738185122619868769737164638
021437571861432446137749410332589024170613
87646655833181458621455153603177265630462735000992749122301250684285945010609426381819923
048668179614515564136977857232552022228387
r = 437
d = 2**560
# Logarithm calculations
\log N = \text{math.log}(N)
log_e = math.log(e)
log_2 = math.log(2)
# Calculate 'a'
a = log_e / log_N
b = \text{math.log}(d, N)
# Calculate log_N(2^r)
theat = (r * log_2) / log_N
#result,d=attack(N, e, partial_d)
d_bit_length=560
d0_bit_length = 437
d0= 120542853124939
m=8
tau=3
```

```
theati=3
result=_bm_6(N, e, d_bit_length, d0, d0_bit_length, m, tau,theati,a,b,theat)
print(result)
def _bm_6(N, e, d_bit_length, d0, d0_bit_length, m, tau,theati,a,b,theat):
  y, z, u = ZZ["y", "z", "u"].gens()
  A = e*d0-1
  u = y*z+A
  f = (-1)*N*y + u
  W = int(RR(N)**(a+theat))
  \#W = 2**d0\_bit\_length*e
  Y = int(2*RR(N)**(a+b-1))
  Z = int(2 * RR(N) ** (1/2))
  U = int(7*RR(N)**(a+b-0.5))
  logging.info(f"Trying \{m = \}, \{tau = \}...")
  for y0, z0, u0 in modular_trivariate(f, N, m, W, A, theati, tau, Y, Z, U):
    phi = N - z0
     d = pow(e, -1, phi)
    print("d:")
     print(d)
    if pow(pow(2, e, N), d, N) == 2:
       print("d:")
       print(d)
       factors = factorize(N, phi)
       if factors:
         return *factors, d
  return None
def modular_trivariate(f, N, m, W, A, theati, tau, Y, Z, U, roots_method="groebner"):
  f = f.change\_ring(ZZ)
  pr = f.parent()
  y, z, u = pr.gens()
  logging.debug("Generating shifts...")
  Q = pr.quotient(y*z + A - u) # u = xy + 1
  polZ = Q(f).lift()
  shifts = []
  for t in range(m + 1):
    for j in range(t + 1):
       g = y ** (t - j) * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
        g = Q(g).lift()
        shifts.append(g)
  for i in range(1, tau + 1):
    for j in range(theati, m+1):
        h = z ** i * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
        h = Q(h).lift()
        shifts.append(h)
  L, monomials = create_lattice(pr, shifts, [Y, Z, U])
  L = reduce\_lattice(L)
  polynomials =reconstruct_polynomials(L, f, W **m, monomials, [Y, Z, U], preprocess_polynomial=lambda
p: p(y, z, 1 + y * z))
  for roots in find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials):
    yield roots[y], roots[z], roots[u]
def factorize(N, phi):
  s = N + 1 - phi
  d = s ** 2 - 4 * N
  p = int(s - isqrt(d)) // 2
  q = int(s + isqrt(d)) // 2
  return p, q if p * q == N else None
def find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials):
  gens = pr.gens()
  s = Sequence(polynomials, pr.change_ring(QQ, order="lex"))
  while len(s) > 0:
```

```
G = s.groebner\_basis()
    logging.debug(f"Sequence length: {len(s)}, Groebner basis length: {len(G)}")
    if len(G) == len(gens):
       logging.debug(f"Found Groebner basis with length {len(gens)}, trying to find roots...")
       roots = \{ \}
       for polynomial in G:
          vars = polynomial.variables()
         if len(vars) == 1:
            for root in find_roots_univariate(vars[0], polynomial.univariate_polynomial()):
              roots = {**roots, **root}
       if len(roots) == pr.ngens():
         yield roots
         print(roots)
         return
       logging.debug(f"System is underdetermined, trying to find constant root...")
       G = Sequence(s, pr.change_ring(ZZ, order="lex")).groebner_basis()
       vars = tuple(map(lambda x: var(x), gens))
       for solution_dict in solve([polynomial(*vars) for polynomial in G], vars, solution_dict=True):
         logging.debug(solution_dict)
         found = False
         roots = \{\}
         for i, v in enumerate(vars):
            s = solution\_dict[v]
            if s.is_constant():
              if not s.is_zero():
                 found = True
              roots[gens[i]] = int(s) if s.is\_integer() else int(s) + 1
            else:
               roots[gens[i]] = 0
         if found:
            yield roots
            return
       return
    else:
       s.pop()
def create_lattice(pr, shifts, bounds, order="invlex", sort_shifts_reverse=False,
sort monomials reverse=False):
  if pr.ngens() > 1:
    pr_ = pr.change_ring(ZZ, order=order)
    shifts = [pr_(shift) for shift in shifts]
  monomials = set()
  for shift in shifts:
    monomials.update(shift.monomials())
  shifts.sort(reverse=sort_shifts_reverse)
  monomials = sorted(monomials, reverse=sort_monomials_reverse)
  L = matrix(ZZ, len(shifts), len(monomials))
  for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
    for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       L[row, col] = shift.monomial\_coefficient(monomial) * monomial(*bounds)
  monomials = [pr(monomial) for monomial in monomials]
  return L, monomials
def reduce_lattice(L, delta=0.8):
  logging.debug(f"Reducing a {L.nrows()} x {L.ncols()} lattice...")
  return L.LLL(delta)
```

```
def reconstruct_polynomials(B, f, modulus, monomials, bounds, preprocess_polynomial=lambda x: x,
divide_gcd=True):
  divide_original = f is not None
  modulus_bound = modulus is not None
  logging.debug(f"Reconstructing polynomials ({divide original = }, {modulus bound = }, {divide gcd
= })...")
  polynomials = []
  for row in range(B.nrows()):
    norm_squared = 0
    w = 0
    polynomial = 0
    for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       if B[row, col] == 0:
         continue
       norm\_squared += B[row, col] ** 2
       w += 1
       assert B[row, col] % monomial(*bounds) == 0
       polynomial += B[row, col] * monomial // monomial(*bounds)
    polynomial = preprocess_polynomial(polynomial)
    if divide_original and polynomial % f == 0:
       logging.debug(f"Original polynomial divides reconstructed polynomial at row {row}, dividing...")
       polynomial //= f
    if divide gcd:
       for i in range(len(polynomials)):
         g = gcd(polynomial, polynomials[i])
         if g != 1 and g.is_constant():
            logging.debug(f"Reconstructed polynomial has gcd {g} with polynomial at {i}, dividing...")
            polynomial //= g
           polynomials[i] //= g
    if polynomial.is_constant():
       logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} is constant, ignoring...")
       continue
    if DEBUG ROOTS is not None:
       logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} roots check: {polynomial(*DEBUG_ROOTS)}")
    polynomials.append(polynomial)
  logging.debug(f"Reconstructed {len(polynomials)} polynomials")
  return polynomials
```

## 第七题:

```
\begin{array}{l} N = \\ 1226899184472778155949436865107390284843700442715040565515414622004719807518416248582102 \\ 6453666046477449965975088631400028426756760347269552667369549689555135107380488539241752 \\ 8790967016144729996908982001503242120492551192253210865308554615583054581596696365790191 \\ 179344735793019759201836850351629092137955949 \\ e = \\ 4684667847353631341577930735089827025421476402181720438338531024226533088753527531907279 \\ 5210397086538619520232074806887007217445407760734032258418110871463070527826377049064472 \\ 8515093392106685231694369917346854007151105339302953452581957846053904289490818009361213 \\ 45426659798376351142354639489204256737558029 \\ m=8 \\ t = int((1-2*0.27)*m) \\ result=\_bm\_6(N, e, m, t) \\ print(result) \end{array}
```

```
def _bm_6(N, e, m,t):
  x, y = ZZ["x", "y"].gens()
  A = N
  f = x*(A-y)+1
  delta=0.27
  X = int(2*(N**delta)) # this _might_ be too much
  Y = int(2*(N**(1/2))) # correct if p, q are ~ same size
  W = e
  \#W = int(RR(N)**(a+theata))
  for x0, y0 in modular_bivariate(f, W, m, t, X, Y):
     phi = N-y0
     d = pow(e, -1, phi)
     if pow(pow(2, e, N), d, N) == 2:
       print("d:")
        print(d)
        factors = factorize(N, phi)
        if factors:
          return *factors, d
  return None
def modular_bivariate(f, e, m, t, X, Y):
  f = f.change\_ring(ZZ)
  pr = ZZ["x", "y", "u"]
  x, y, u = pr.gens()
  qr = pr.quotient(1 + x * y - u)
  \hat{\mathbf{U}} = \hat{\mathbf{X}} * \hat{\mathbf{Y}}
  logging.debug("Generating shifts...")
  shifts = []
  for k in range(m + 1):
     for i in range(m - k + 1):
       g = x ** i * f ** k * e ** (m - k)
        g = qr(g).lift()
        shifts.append(g)
  for j in range(1, t + 1):
     for k in range(m // t * j, m + 1):
       h = y ** j * f ** k * e ** (m - k)
       h = qr(h).lift()
        shifts.append(h)
  L, monomials = create_lattice(pr, shifts, [X, Y, U])
  L = reduce\_lattice(L)
  pr = f.parent()
  x, y = pr.gens()
  polynomials = reconstruct_polynomials(L, f, None, monomials, [X, Y, U], preprocess_polynomial=lambda
p: p(x, y, 1 + x * y)
  for roots in find_roots_groebner (pr, polynomials):
     yield roots[x], roots[y]
def factorize(N, phi):
  s = N + 1 - phi
  d = s ** 2 - 4 * N
  p = int(s - isqrt(d)) // 2
  q = int(s + isqrt(d)) // 2
  return p, q if p * q == N else None
def find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials):
  gens = pr.gens()
  s = Sequence(polynomials, pr.change_ring(QQ, order="lex"))
  while len(s) > 0:
     G = s.groebner\_basis()
     logging.debug(f"Sequence length: {len(s)}, Groebner basis length: {len(G)}")
     if len(G) == len(gens):
```

```
logging.debug(f"Found Groebner basis with length {len(gens)}, trying to find roots...")
       roots = \{\}
       for polynomial in G:
          vars = polynomial.variables()
          if len(vars) == 1:
            for root in find_roots_univariate(vars[0], polynomial.univariate_polynomial()):
               roots = {**roots, **root}
       if len(roots) == pr.ngens():
          yield roots
          print(roots)
          return
       logging.debug(f"System is underdetermined, trying to find constant root...")
       G = Sequence(s, pr.change_ring(ZZ, order="lex")).groebner_basis()
       vars = tuple(map(lambda x: var(x), gens))
       for solution_dict in solve([polynomial(*vars) for polynomial in G], vars, solution_dict=True):
          logging.debug(solution_dict)
          found = False
          roots = \{ \}
          for i, v in enumerate(vars):
            s = solution_dict[v]
            if s.is_constant():
               if not s.is_zero():
                 found = True
               roots[gens[i]] = int(s) if s.is_integer() else int(s) + 1
            else:
               roots[gens[i]] = 0
          if found:
            yield roots
            return
       return
     else:
       s.pop()
def create_lattice(pr, shifts, bounds, order="invlex", sort_shifts_reverse=False,
sort_monomials_reverse=False):
  if pr.ngens() > 1:
     pr_ = pr.change_ring(ZZ, order=order)
     shifts = [pr_(shift) for shift in shifts]
  monomials = set()
  for shift in shifts:
     monomials.update(shift.monomials())
  shifts.sort(reverse=sort_shifts_reverse)
  monomials = sorted(monomials, reverse=sort_monomials_reverse)
  L = matrix(ZZ, len(shifts), len(monomials))
  for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
     for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       L[row, col] = shift.monomial_coefficient(monomial) * monomial(*bounds)
  monomials = [pr(monomial) for monomial in monomials]
  return L, monomials
def \ reduce\_lattice(L, \ delta=0.8):
  logging.debug(f"Reducing a {L.nrows()} x {L.ncols()} lattice...")
  return L.LLL(delta)
def reconstruct_polynomials(B, f, modulus, monomials, bounds, preprocess_polynomial=lambda x: x,
divide_gcd=True):
  divide_original = f is not None
```

```
modulus_bound = modulus is not None
  logging.debug(f"Reconstructing polynomials ({divide_original = }, {modulus_bound = }, {divide_gcd
= })...")
  polynomials = []
  for row in range(B.nrows()):
    norm\_squared = 0
     \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}
    polynomial = 0
     for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       if B[row, col] == 0:
         continue
       norm_squared += B[row, col] ** 2
       w += 1
       assert B[row, col] % monomial(*bounds) == 0
       polynomial += B[row, col] * monomial // monomial(*bounds)
    polynomial = preprocess_polynomial(polynomial)
    if divide_original and polynomial % f == 0:
       logging.debug(f"Original polynomial divides reconstructed polynomial at row {row}, dividing...")
       polynomial //= f
    if divide_gcd:
       for i in range(len(polynomials)):
         g = gcd(polynomial, polynomials[i])
         if g != 1 and g.is constant():
            logging.debug(f"Reconstructed polynomial has gcd {g} with polynomial at {i}, dividing...")
            polynomial //= g
            polynomials[i] //= g
    if polynomial.is_constant():
       logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} is constant, ignoring...")
       continue
    if DEBUG_ROOTS is not None:
       logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} roots check: {polynomial(*DEBUG_ROOTS)}")
     polynomials.append(polynomial)
  logging.debug(f"Reconstructed {len(polynomials)} polynomials")
  return polynomials
```

## 第八题:

```
N =
969382507933130905332528902771966796618029
40318231723912180760337273264135861151560708782566834752308018623\\
r = 900
d = 2**1024
log_N = math.log(N)
log_e = math.log(e)
log_2 = math.log(2)
a = log_e / log_N
b = \text{math.log}(d, N)
theata = (r * log_2) / log_N
d_bit_length=1024
d0_bit_length = 900
```

```
d0 =
62499294515877582218716674980797301691097724080357476936079271514631246935707964795811604\\
5703
m=9
tau=3
result=_bm_6(N, e, d_bit_length, d0, d0_bit_length, m, tau,a,b,theata)
print(result)
def bm 6(N, e, d_bit_length, d0, d0_bit_length, m, tau,a,b,theata):
  y, z = ZZ["y", "z"].gens()
  A = e * d0-1
  f = A-N*y+y*z
  Y = int(2*RR(N)**(a+b-1))
    Z = int(3 * RR(N) ** (1/2))
    W = 2**(d0\_bit\_length)*e
    logging.info(f"Trying \{m = \}, \{tau = \}...")
    for y0, z0 in modular_bivariate(f, W, m, tau, Y, Z):
      phi = N - z0
      d = pow(e, -1, phi)
      print("d:")
      print(d)
      if pow(pow(2, e, N), d, N) == 2:
        print("d:")
        print(d)
         factors = factorize(N, phi)
         if factors:
          return *factors, d
    return None
  def modular_bivariate(f, W, m, tau, Y, Z, roots_method="groebner"):
    f = f.change\_ring(ZZ)
    pr = f.parent()
    y, z = pr.gens()
    \#bounds=int(1/6*m*(m+2)+1/2*tau*m-m/(m+1))
    logging.debug("Generating shifts...")
    shifts = []
    for t in range(m + 1):
      for j in range(t + 1):
        g = y ** (t-j) * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
         shifts.append(g)
    for i in range(1, tau + 1):
      for i in range(m + 1):
        h = z ** i * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
         shifts.append(h)
    L, monomials = create_lattice(pr, shifts, [Y, Z])
    L = reduce\_lattice(L)
    polynomials = reconstruct_polynomials(L, f, W**m, monomials, [Y, Z])
    for roots in find_roots_groebner (pr, polynomials):
      yield roots[y], roots[z]
def factorize(N, phi):
  s = N + 1 - phi
  d = s ** 2 - 4 * N
  p = int(s - isqrt(d)) // 2
  q = int(s + isqrt(d)) // 2
  return p, q if p * q == N else None
def find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials):
  gens = pr.gens()
  s = Sequence(polynomials, pr.change_ring(QQ, order="lex"))
  while len(s) > 0:
    G = s.groebner\_basis()
    logging.debug(f"Sequence length: {len(s)}, Groebner basis length: {len(G)}")
    if len(G) == len(gens):
      logging.debug(f"Found Groebner basis with length {len(gens)}, trying to find roots...")
```

```
roots = \{\}
       for polynomial in G:
          vars = polynomial.variables()
          if len(vars) == 1:
            for root in find_roots_univariate(vars[0], polynomial.univariate_polynomial()):
              roots = {**roots, **root}
       if len(roots) == pr.ngens():
          vield roots
         print(roots)
          return
       logging.debug(f"System is underdetermined, trying to find constant root...")
       G = Sequence(s, pr.change_ring(ZZ, order="lex")).groebner_basis()
       vars = tuple(map(lambda x: var(x), gens))
       for solution_dict in solve([polynomial(*vars) for polynomial in G], vars, solution_dict=True):
          logging.debug(solution_dict)
          found = False
          roots = \{\}
          for i, v in enumerate(vars):
            s = solution\_dict[v]
            if s.is_constant():
              if not s.is_zero():
                 found = True
              roots[gens[i]] = int(s) if s.is_integer() else int(s) + 1
              roots[gens[i]] = 0
         if found:
            vield roots
            return
       return
     else:
def create_lattice(pr, shifts, bounds, order="invlex", sort_shifts_reverse=False, sort_monomials_reverse=False):
  if pr.ngens() > 1:
    pr_ = pr.change_ring(ZZ, order=order)
     shifts = [pr_(shift) for shift in shifts]
  monomials = set()
  for shift in shifts:
    monomials.update(shift.monomials())
  shifts.sort(reverse=sort_shifts_reverse)
  monomials = sorted(monomials, reverse=sort_monomials_reverse)
  L = matrix(ZZ, len(shifts), len(monomials))
  for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
    for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       L[row, col] = shift.monomial_coefficient(monomial) * monomial(*bounds)
  monomials = [pr(monomial) for monomial in monomials]
  return L, monomials
def reduce_lattice(L, delta=0.8):
  logging.debug(f"Reducing a {L.nrows()} x {L.ncols()} lattice...")
  return L.LLL(delta)
def reconstruct_polynomials(B, f, modulus, monomials, bounds, preprocess_polynomial=lambda x: x,
divide_gcd=True):
  divide_original = f is not None
  modulus_bound = modulus is not None
```

```
logging.debug(f"Reconstructing polynomials ({divide_original = }, {modulus_bound = }, {divide_gcd
= })...")
 polynomials = []
  for row in range(B.nrows()):
    norm\_squared = 0
    \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}
    polynomial = 0
    for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
      if B[row, col] == 0:
         continue
      norm_squared += B[row, col] ** 2
      w += 1
      assert B[row, col] % monomial(*bounds) == 0
      polynomial += B[row, col] * monomial // monomial(*bounds)
    polynomial = preprocess_polynomial(polynomial)
    if divide_original and polynomial % f == 0:
       logging.debug(f"Original polynomial divides reconstructed polynomial at row {row}, dividing...")
      polynomial //= f
    if divide_gcd:
      for i in range(len(polynomials)):
         g = gcd(polynomial, polynomials[i])
         if g != 1 and g.is_constant():
           logging.debug(f"Reconstructed polynomial has gcd {g} with polynomial at {i}, dividing...")
           polynomial //= g
           polynomials[i] //= g
    if polynomial.is_constant():
       logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} is constant, ignoring...")
      continue
    if DEBUG_ROOTS is not None:
      logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} roots check: {polynomial(*DEBUG_ROOTS)}")
    polynomials.append(polynomial)
 logging.debug(f"Reconstructed {len(polynomials)} polynomials")
 return polynomials
```

## 第九题:

```
N=
14350449507413511652347957251319325753845789197605229843865207992959665152343236493734193
09821730235521754361738856549309713769703229224983179764935620729261366598523449200098583
323684443197642773123213917372573050601477
e = 65537
r = 530
d = 2**1024
log_N = math.log(N)
log_e = math.log(e)
log_2 = math.log(2)
a = log_e / log_N
b = \text{math.log}(d, N)
theata = (r * log_2) / log_N
d_bit_length=1024
d0_bit_length = 530
17617146364519807052255965154418246970340963048225666436979818980358870556588070204426629
24585355268098963915429014997296853529408546333631721472245329506038801\\
m=4
tau=1
result=_bm_6(N, e, d_bit_length, d0, d0_bit_length, m, tau,a,b,theata)
```

```
print(result)
def _bm_6(N, e, d_bit_length, d0, d0_bit_length, m, tau,a,b,theata):
  y, z = ZZ["y", "z"].gens()
  A = e * d0-1
  f = A-N*y+y*z
  Y = int(2*RR(N)**(a+b-1))
     Z = int(3 * RR(N) ** (1/2))
     W = 2**(d0\_bit\_length)*e
     logging.info(f"Trying \{m = \}, \{tau = \}...")
     for y0, z0 in modular_bivariate(f, W, m, tau, Y, Z):
       phi = N - z0
       d = pow(e, -1, phi)
       print("d:")
       print(d)
       if pow(pow(2, e, N), d, N) == 2:
          print("d:")
          print(d)
          factors = factorize(N, phi)
          if factors:
            return *factors, d
     return None
  def modular_bivariate(f, W, m, tau, Y, Z, roots_method="groebner"):
     f = f.change\_ring(ZZ)
     pr = f.parent()
     y, z = pr.gens()
     \#bounds=int(1/6*m*(m+2)+1/2*tau*m-m/(m+1))
     logging.debug("Generating shifts...")
     shifts = []
     for t in range(m + 1):
       for j in range(t + 1):
          g = y ** (t-j) * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
          shifts.append(g)
     for i in range(1, tau + 1):
       for j in range(m + 1):
          h = z ** i * f ** j * W ** (m-j)
          shifts.append(h)
     L, monomials = create_lattice(pr, shifts, [Y, Z])
    L = reduce\_lattice(L)
     polynomials = reconstruct_polynomials(L, f, W**m, monomials, [Y, Z])
     for roots in find_roots_groebner (pr, polynomials):
       yield roots[y], roots[z]
def factorize(N, phi):
  s = N + 1 - phi
  d = s ** 2 - 4 * N
  p = int(s - isqrt(d)) // 2
  q = int(s + isqrt(d)) // 2
  return p, q if p * q == N else None
def find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials):
  gens = pr.gens()
  s = Sequence(polynomials, pr.change_ring(QQ, order="lex"))
  while len(s) > 0:
     G = s.groebner\_basis()
     logging.debug(f"Sequence length: {len(s)}, Groebner basis length: {len(G)}")
     if len(G) == len(gens):
       logging.debug(f"Found Groebner basis with length {len(gens)}, trying to find roots...")
       roots = \{\}
       for polynomial in G:
          vars = polynomial.variables()
          if len(vars) == 1:
            for root in find_roots_univariate(vars[0], polynomial.univariate_polynomial()):
               roots = {**roots, **root}
       if len(roots) == pr.ngens():
```

```
yield roots
          print(roots)
          return
       logging.debug(f"System is underdetermined, trying to find constant root...")
       G = Sequence(s, pr.change_ring(ZZ, order="lex")).groebner_basis()
       vars = tuple(map(lambda x: var(x), gens))
       for solution_dict in solve([polynomial(*vars) for polynomial in G], vars, solution_dict=True):
          logging.debug(solution dict)
          found = False
          roots = \{\}
          for i, v in enumerate(vars):
            s = solution\_dict[v]
            if s.is_constant():
               if not s.is_zero():
                 found = True
               roots[gens[i]] = int(s) if s.is\_integer() else int(s) + 1
            else:
               roots[gens[i]] = 0
          if found:
            yield roots
            return
       return
     else:
       s.pop()
def create_lattice(pr, shifts, bounds, order="invlex", sort_shifts_reverse=False, sort_monomials_reverse=False):
  if pr.ngens() > 1:
     pr_ = pr.change_ring(ZZ, order=order)
     shifts = [pr_(shift) for shift in shifts]
  monomials = set()
  for shift in shifts:
     monomials.update(shift.monomials())
  shifts.sort(reverse=sort_shifts_reverse)
  monomials = sorted(monomials, reverse=sort_monomials_reverse)
  L = matrix(ZZ, len(shifts), len(monomials))
  for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
     for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       L[row, col] = shift.monomial\_coefficient(monomial) * monomial(*bounds)
  monomials = [pr(monomial) for monomial in monomials]
  return L, monomials
def reduce_lattice(L, delta=0.8):
  logging.debug(f"Reducing a {L.nrows()} x {L.ncols()} lattice...")
  return L.LLL(delta)
def reconstruct_polynomials(B, f, modulus, monomials, bounds, preprocess_polynomial=lambda x: x,
divide_gcd=True):
  divide_original = f is not None
  modulus_bound = modulus is not None
  logging.debug(f"Reconstructing polynomials ({divide_original = }, {modulus_bound = }, {divide_gcd
  polynomials = []
  for row in range(B.nrows()):
     norm\_squared = 0
     \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}
     polynomial = 0
     for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       if B[row, col] == 0:
```

```
continue
     norm_squared += B[row, col] ** 2
    w += 1
    assert B[row, col] % monomial(*bounds) == 0
    polynomial += B[row, col] * monomial // monomial(*bounds)
  polynomial = preprocess_polynomial(polynomial)
  if divide_original and polynomial % f == 0:
    logging.debug(f"Original polynomial divides reconstructed polynomial at row {row}, dividing...")
    polynomial //= f
  if divide_gcd:
    for i in range(len(polynomials)):
       g = gcd(polynomial, polynomials[i])
       if g != 1 and g.is_constant():
         logging.debug(f"Reconstructed polynomial has gcd {g} with polynomial at {i}, dividing...")
         polynomial //= g
         polynomials[i] //= g
  if polynomial.is_constant():
    logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} is constant, ignoring...")
    continue
  if DEBUG_ROOTS is not None:
    logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} roots check: {polynomial(*DEBUG_ROOTS)}")
  polynomials.append(polynomial)
logging.debug(f"Reconstructed {len(polynomials)} polynomials")
return polynomials
```

#### 第十题:

```
import itertools
def small_roots(f, bounds, m=1, d=None):
  if not d:
     d = f.degree()
  R = f.base\_ring()
  N = R.cardinality()
  k = ZZ(f.coefficients().pop(0))
  g = gcd(k, N)
  k = R(k/g)
  f *= 1/k
  f = f.change\_ring(ZZ)
  vars = f.variables()
  G = Sequence([], f.parent())
  for k in range(m):
     for i in range(m-k+1):
       for subvars in itertools.combinations_with_replacement(vars[1:], i):
          g = f^{**}k * prod(subvars) * N^{**}(max(d-k, 0))
          G.append(g)
  B, monomials = G.coefficient_matrix()
  monomials = vector(monomials)
  factors = [monomial(*bounds) for monomial in monomials]
  for i, factor in enumerate(factors):
     B.rescale_col(i, factor)
  B = B.dense\_matrix().LLL()
```

```
B = B.change\_ring(QQ)
   for i, factor in enumerate(factors):
      B.rescale col(i, Integer(1)/factor)
   H = Sequence([], f.parent().change_ring(QQ))
   for h in filter(None, B*monomials):
      H.append(h)
      I = H.ideal()
      if I.dimension() == -1:
         H.pop()
      elif I.dimension() == 0:
         roots = []
         for root in I.variety(ring=ZZ):
            root = tuple(R(root[var]) for var in f.variables())
            roots.append(root)
         return roots
   return []
a3c145c6d181c5bd3c267288ec4765a19ca6b957b4535a1a185bd1b87d2e39b30e2430ed648175c29fdc1fde378
7c426783dd66ba17f98b42ba13a7b3532970d0aa31b5ffa5f3eae243337a1668bae456bfbfb
3fc4da69cf34e35ead6f7eb79923960b9c83d9923e591b07b65275bf67f0b3d424cd7e6e6dd88ea39a5cfa27ecee6
52095ee97c698199f4c5991279f6d3e74d4c14d01d137d42722df0d4565ff2a5275f9cac66dc4dfdf3304f85cbdc3
d18eda1e32ac5d03675141a722ceefe0ea0533b53d7e50ed7eda1a1bbce47ed0ecb966f8678d
e1 = 65537
k1 = e1*leak1 // n1 + 1
PR.<x,y> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(e1*leak1))
f = 1 + k1*((n1+1)-y) - e1*x
bounds = (2^10, 2^513)
res = small roots(f,bounds,m=2,d=2)
leak = int(res[0][1])
PR.<x> = PolynomialRing(RealField(1000))
f = x*(leak-x) - n1
ph = int(f.roots()[0][0])
PR.<x> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n1))
f = ph + x
res = f.small_roots(X=2^{(160+6)}, beta=0.499,epsilon=0.02)[0]
p1 = int(ph + res)
q1 = n1 // p1
print(p1)
print(q1)
攻击, 求出 p和 q
2246217830296553177303208167413016742103206604903812714839551204589
51682128930227151469309640903353145013377646752106391473373652877601
然后套用 RSA 解密脚本即可,求出 m 的值
2095 e e 97 c 698199 f 4 c 5991279 f 6d 3 e 74 d 4 c 14 d 01 d 137 d 42722 d f 0 d 4565 f f 2a 5275 f 9 c a c 66 d c 4d f d f 3304 f 85 c b d c 3d f 85 c b 
18eda1e32ac5d03675141a722ceefe0ea0533b53d7e50ed7eda1a1bbce47ed0ecb966f8678d
2246217830296553177303208167413016742103206604903812714839551204589
51682128930227151469309640903353145013377646752106391473373652877601
```

```
c=0x3b42fa3dc9089a21e9dabfe18297df47272f7e0ff59bf9bf16bc55e7fa70504c03fed56ca5ae93ac028f60ce5da
3c145c6d181c5bd3c267288ec4765a19ca6b957b4535a1a185bd1b87d2e39b30e2430ed648175c29fdc1fde3787
c426783dd66ba17f98b42ba13a7b3532970d0aa31b5ffa5f3eae243337a1668bae456bfbfb
e=65537
from gmpy2 import *
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
d=invert(e,phi)
m=pow(c,d,n)
print(m)
```

#### 第十一题:

```
#from Crypto.Util.number import *
#from tqdm import *
import itertools
def small_roots(f, bounds, m=1, d=None):
  if not d:
    d = f.degree()
  R = f.base_ring()
  N = R.cardinality()
  k = ZZ(f.coefficients().pop(0))
  g = gcd(k, N)
  k = R(k/g)
  f *= 1/k
  f = f.change\_ring(ZZ)
  vars = f.variables()
  G = Sequence([], f.parent())
  for k in range(m):
     for i in range(m-k+1):
       for subvars in itertools.combinations_with_replacement(vars[1:], i):
          g = f^{**}k * prod(subvars) * N^{**}(max(d-k, 0))
          G.append(g)
  B, monomials = G.coefficient_matrix()
  monomials = vector(monomials)
  factors = [monomial(*bounds) for monomial in monomials]
  for i, factor in enumerate(factors):
     B.rescale_col(i, factor)
  B = B.dense\_matrix().LLL()
  B = B.change\_ring(QQ)
  for i, factor in enumerate(factors):
     B.rescale_col(i, Integer(1)/factor)
  H = Sequence([], f.parent().change_ring(QQ))
  for h in filter(None, B*monomials):
     H.append(h)
     I = H.ideal()
     if I.dimension() == -1:
       H.pop()
     elif I.dimension() == 0:
       roots = []
       for root in I.variety(ring=ZZ):
         root = tuple(R(root[var]) for var in f.variables())
          roots.append(root)
       return roots
  return []
```

```
215965999c908a79bf07e093ee0c402e727a09a1c1f13831875d66ebbc3f89507163de90339af055bcd7d7785747
75214accfbd8ae20001f27bc196b974cb3ac215fea3debb7b17a21a8ebb1a9880a671539ef21
leak1 = 0x4f77b72b04e6fb2d02e5a43edef4784a2e22df0d42bfc7c9093a58ec35eb21a11962103be960b0088d0cc
2e0dfb473bc2ba0a22cea1c73997442c8fab5e4bad22cd131055b0382eb9264ad40ec8257abaff11b33b173ffd016
ae 583 fe 4 ceb 3 fc 93 c4 905 803 ad 3e 9214 ad a 050 d5 c0 ff 785 a 13 a 5c 9157 c3154 ad 8d 7015 a 2d 239 fe 13e f836 d3279 c5 cd
5dc96013ac40f372a9c9226d2f5fe73f312c56e11d9cdfbf9fb0db627ac1a752f5f0bd2b29
e1=65537
k1 = e1*leak1 // n1 + 1
PR.<x,y> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(e1*leak1))
f = 1 + k1*((n1+1)-y) - e1*x
bounds = (2^20, 2^963)
res = small\_roots(f,bounds,m=2,d=2)
leak = int(res[0][1])
PR.<x> = PolynomialRing(RealField(1000))
f = x*(leak-x) - n1
ph = int(f.roots()[0][0])
PR.<x> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n1))
f = ph + x
res = f.small_roots(X=2^{(220+6)}, beta=0.499,epsilon=0.02)[0]
p1 = int(ph + res)
q1 = n1 // p1
print(p1)
print(q1)
```

## 第十二题:

```
N =
818121529472111754548534713423735960454177872494310794091492785010018503347446737454324\\
445281846985013381344698564280453510050410298353
e = 65537
m=4
tau=2
a = 0.01
b = 0.99
theata = 0.49
result,d=_ernst_4_1_1(N, e, m, tau ,a,b,theata)
print(result)
def _ernst_4_1_1(N, e, m, tau,a,b,theata):
N = 910092353521253284372505374155384584387022788971302134985765940679051744612213073906
174156820918624766614266796734129771220437211599443395753058923116656756042904263631608
28079268984049423705537646872906584729352983977872\\
 x, y, z = ZZ["x", "y", "z"].gens()

f = e*N_- - e*x - N*y + y*z-1
 X = 2**513 # Equivalent to N^delta
 Y = e \# Equivalent to N^beta
 Z = int(3 * RR(N) ** (1 / 2))
 M = N * Y
 logging.info(f"Trying \{m = \}, \{tau = \}...")
 for x0, y0, z0 in integer_trivariate_1(f, m, tau, M, X, Y, Z):
   print(z0)
   phi = N - z0
   print(phi)
   d = pow(e, -1, phi)
   if pow(pow(2, e, N), d, N) == 2:
```

```
print("hello")
       print(d)
       factors = factorize(N, phi)
       if factors:
          return *factors, d
  return None
def integer_trivariate_1(f, m, tau, M, X, Y, Z, check_bounds=True, roots_method="groebner"):
  pr = f.parent()
  x, y, z = pr.gens()
  #if check_bounds and RR(X) ** (1 + 3 * tau) * RR(Y) ** (2 + 3 * tau) * RR(Z) ** (1 + 3 * tau + 3 * tau
** 2) > RR(W) ** (1 + 3 * tau):
     #logging.debug(f"Bound check failed for \{m = \}, \{t = \}")
     #return
  A = int(f.constant_coefficient())
  assert A != 0
  while gcd(A, X) != 1:
     X += 1
  while gcd(A, Y) != 1:
     Y += 1
  while gcd(A, Z) != 1:
     Z += 1
  while gcd(A, M) != 1:
     M += 1
  R = M* X ** (m-1)*Y**(m-1) * Z ** (m + tau-1)
  f_{-} = (pow(A, -1, R) * f % R).change_ring(ZZ)
  logging.debug("Generating shifts...")
  shifts = []
  for j in range(m):
     for i2 in range(j + 1):
       for i3 in range(i2 + tau + 1):
          g = x ** (j-i2) * y ** i2 * z ** i3 * f_ * X ** (m - 1-j+i2) * Y ** (m - 1-i2) * Z ** (m-1+tau-i3)
          shifts.append(g)
  for i2 in range(m+1):
     for i3 in range(i2 + tau+1):
       g_{-} = x ** (m-i2) * y ** i2 * z ** i3 * R
       shifts.append(g_)
  L, monomials = create_lattice(pr, shifts, [X, Y, Z])
  L = reduce_lattice(L)
  polynomials = reconstruct_polynomials(L, f, R, monomials, [X, Y, Z])
  for roots in ind_roots_groebner (pr, [f] + polynomials):
     yield roots[x], roots[y], roots[z]
def factorize(N, phi):
  s = N + 1 - phi
  d = s ** 2 - 4 * N
  p = int(s - isqrt(d)) // 2
  q = int(s + isqrt(d)) // 2
  return p, q if p * q == N else None
def find_roots_groebner(pr, polynomials):
  gens = pr.gens()
  s = Sequence(polynomials, pr.change_ring(QQ, order="lex"))
  while len(s) > 0:
     G = s.groebner_basis()
     logging.debug(f"Sequence length: {len(s)}, Groebner basis length: {len(G)}")
     if len(G) == len(gens):
       logging.debug(f"Found Groebner basis with length {len(gens)}, trying to find roots...")
       roots = \{ \}
```

```
for polynomial in G:
         vars = polynomial.variables()
         if len(vars) == 1:
            for root in find_roots_univariate(vars[0], polynomial.univariate_polynomial()):
              roots = {**roots, **root}
       if len(roots) == pr.ngens():
         yield roots
         print(roots)
         return
       logging.debug(f"System is underdetermined, trying to find constant root...")
       G = Sequence(s, pr.change_ring(ZZ, order="lex")).groebner_basis()
       vars = tuple(map(lambda x: var(x), gens))
       for solution_dict in solve([polynomial(*vars) for polynomial in G], vars, solution_dict=True):
         logging.debug(solution_dict)
         found = False
         roots = \{\}
         for i, v in enumerate(vars):
            s = solution\_dict[v]
            if s.is_constant():
              if not s.is_zero():
                 found = True
              roots[gens[i]] = int(s) if s.is_integer() else int(s) + 1
            else:
              roots[gens[i]] = 0
         if found:
            yield roots
            return
       return
    else:
       s.pop()
def create_lattice(pr, shifts, bounds, order="invlex", sort_shifts_reverse=False,
sort_monomials_reverse=False):
  if pr.ngens() > 1:
    pr_ = pr.change_ring(ZZ, order=order)
    shifts = [pr_(shift) for shift in shifts]
  monomials = set()
  for shift in shifts:
    monomials.update(shift.monomials())
  shifts.sort(reverse=sort_shifts_reverse)
  monomials = sorted(monomials, reverse=sort_monomials_reverse)
  L = matrix(ZZ, len(shifts), len(monomials))
  for row, shift in enumerate(shifts):
    for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       L[row, col] = shift.monomial_coefficient(monomial) * monomial(*bounds)
  monomials = [pr(monomial) for monomial in monomials]
  return L, monomials
def reduce_lattice(L, delta=0.8):
  logging.debug(f"Reducing a {L.nrows()} x {L.ncols()} lattice...")
  return L.LLL(delta)
def reconstruct_polynomials(B, f, modulus, monomials, bounds, preprocess_polynomial=lambda x: x,
divide_gcd=True):
  divide_original = f is not None
  modulus_bound = modulus is not None
```

```
logging.debug(f"Reconstructing polynomials ({divide_original = }, {modulus_bound = }, {divide_gcd
= })...")
  polynomials = []
  for row in range(B.nrows()):
    norm\_squared = 0
    \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}
    polynomial = 0
    for col, monomial in enumerate(monomials):
       if B[row, col] == 0:
         continue
       norm_squared += B[row, col] ** 2
       w += 1
       assert B[row, col] % monomial(*bounds) == 0
       polynomial += B[row, col] * monomial // monomial(*bounds)
    polynomial = preprocess\_polynomial(polynomial)
    if divide_original and polynomial % f == 0:
       logging.debug(f"Original polynomial divides reconstructed polynomial at row {row}, dividing...")
       polynomial //= f
    if divide_gcd:
       for i in range(len(polynomials)):
         g = gcd(polynomial, polynomials[i])
         if g != 1 and g.is_constant():
           logging.debug(f"Reconstructed polynomial has gcd {g} with polynomial at {i}, dividing...")
           polynomial //= g
            polynomials[i] //= g
    if polynomial.is_constant():
       logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} is constant, ignoring...")
       continue
    if DEBUG_ROOTS is not None:
       logging.debug(f"Polynomial at row {row} roots check: {polynomial(*DEBUG_ROOTS)}")
    polynomials.append(polynomial)
  logging.debug(f"Reconstructed {len(polynomials)} polynomials")
  return polynomials
```