

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

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**DESIRED RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS:**

PRIMARY

Development Economics

SECONDARY

Behavioral Economics

Labor Economics

**DISSERTATION TITLE:** "Essays in Development and Behavioral Economics"

Date of Completion:

May 2023

Principal Advisor:

Professors Supreet Kaur and Edward Miguel

Other References:

Professors Ulrike Malmendier and Gautam Rao

**CURRENT POSITION:**

Post-Doctoral Fellow at the O'Donnell Center for Behavioral Economics, Haas School of Business

Supervisor: Prof. Ulrike Malmendier

**PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:**

Bocconi University

110/110 cum laude

Bocconi University

110/110 cum laude

**DEGREE**

M.Sc.

**DATE**

2016

**FIELD**

Economics and Social Sciences

B.Sc.

2013

Economics and Social Sciences

**JOB MARKET PAPER**

[The Economic Consequences of Knowledge Hoarding](#) (with Franck Irakoze, Pedro Naso, Nicholas Swanson)

*Abstract:* Strong social ties among individuals can promote knowledge diffusion. In low-income countries, however, individuals in highly localized markets may also compete for economic opportunities, which can create incentives for incumbents to "hoard" their knowledge. In cross-sectional data from rural Burundi, we first document that the level of social diffusion for a given agricultural technology is starkly higher when its returns are non-rival (i.e., unaffected by how many others adopt it). We then test whether knowledge hoarding inhibits the diffusion of a specific high-return technology---row planting, which generates rival rents through a wage premium in the local labor market. In a field experiment covering 223 villages (labor markets), we induce workers skilled in row planting to train unskilled workers. We randomize at the local labor market level whether the unskilled is a competitor (i.e., someone from the same labor market). When incumbents are matched with an individual from the same labor market, knowledge transmission occurs only 3% of the time, but reaches 43% if the unskilled are not competitors. In contrast, the transmission of technologies with non-rival rents (e.g., composting) is high regardless of the unskilled worker's identity. Consistent with strategic behavior, the incumbent appears to obfuscate important aspects of row planting when training competitors. We then examine the aggregate and distributional consequences of knowledge hoarding in the village economy. In villages where the unskilled were trained in row planting by non-competitors, diffusion creates winners and losers: the earnings of the unskilled workers rise by 7%, and farm productivity by 20%. However, skilled workers' earnings decrease by 6%, and the equilibrium wage for the row planting task falls by 3%. Reducing knowledge hoarding boosts overall village output: the days of row planting employment are 16% higher, and the share of row planted fields increases by 27%, suggesting estimated yield gains of 9%. Finally, our results also suggest that the fear of social sanctions is a mechanism that sustains knowledge hoarding among the incumbents, highlighting how social ties can foster social learning, but also inhibit it when knowledge diffusion threatens incumbents' rents.

**WORKING PAPERS:**

[Under-training by Employers in Informal Labor Markets: Evidence from Burundi](#) (with Pedro Naso, Michel Ndayikeza, Nicholas Swanson)

*Abstract:* Workers obtain limited human capital through on-the-job experience in low- and middle-income countries, but the reasons for this are unclear. We test whether one friction contributes to low worker productivity: firms unwillingness to train because they do not appropriate the returns from training. We study casual labor markets in Burundi, where employers can train workers in a newly introduced agricultural practice in the region, row-planting--a technique that substantially raises yields. In a first field experiment, in some randomly selected local labor markets (villages), we induce 1/3 of employers to train workers in row planting--leading to a 20-percentage point increase in the share of skilled workers in the village. Training generates meaningful economic returns: employers in treated villages increase their adoption of row-planting by 10 percentage points (20%)--raising farm profitability by 9%. However, employers fail to appropriate most of this surplus: 2/3 of the surplus generated is captured by non-training employers, because many of the trained workers work for others following training. In a second experiment, we randomize employers into a condition that increases the likelihood that the worker will return to work for the employer in the future. Employers receiving this guarantee are 50 percentage points more likely to train the worker. This suggests the wedge between private and social returns from investments meaningfully reduces worker productivity.

*Presentations (\*Scheduled):* Harvard/MIT\*, USC, Duke University, World Bank DIME, Oxford University, IIES, NBER SI (Development group), BREAD, Network and Development economics, CSAE, PacDev, Aclec, IZA-CREST, AFE, NEUDC, Y-rise\*

## Habit Formation in Labor Supply (with Supreet Kaur, Heather Schofield, Yogita Shamdasani)

*Abstract:* Economists have long hypothesized the presence of hysteresis in labor supply: transitory labor market shocks may have persistent effects. We examine hysteresis through the lens of habit formation. We undertake a field experiment with casual urban laborers in Chennai, India, where attendance at labor stands provides a revealed preference measure of labor supply. We randomly provide some workers with small financial incentives for attendance over 2 months, leading to a 22% increase in labor supply. We test for habit formation by examining subsequent impacts after the incentives are removed. First, we see a persistent 15% increase in labor supply over the next 2-5 months, resulting in an 11% increase in employment. Second, treated workers exhibit a higher willingness to accept work contracts that are of longer duration and less flexible. They also self-report an increase in automaticity and self-identity around work—suggesting a change in preferences. Third, shocks that temporarily pull workers out of the labor market lead subsequent treatment effects to collapse to zero; in the absence of these shocks, we cannot reject that there is no decay in effects over time. Fourth, in incentivized measures, employers accurately predict treatment effects, and prefer hiring workers who have been treated with a stronger habit stock in the past—findings that have relevance for understanding duration dependence. Finally, in supplementary data from other settings, we replicate short-run persistent effects of transitory labor supply shocks—indicating the broader generalizability of hysteresis in labor supply. Together, our results suggest that the intermittent nature of employment and frequent shocks experienced in low-income settings may inhibit workers from becoming habituated to regular work—with potential implications for absenteeism and labor supply levels.

*Presentations (\*Scheduled):* Yale\*, NYU, Princeton, University of Michigan, PSE, University of Bordeaux, IGC-EGC, BCFG, SITE, CEPR, AFE, NEUDC

## How Do Workers Use Earned Wage Access? Evidence and Welfare Implications (with Eric Koepeke, Afras Sial, Nicholas Swanson)

*Abstract:* Earned Wage Access (EWA)—a financial technology that gives workers access to their wages as they are earned, rather than having to wait until payday—can benefit workers by providing cheap, short-term liquidity. However, when workers have self-control problems or biased beliefs, particularly about their future earnings and liquidity shocks, they may use this technology sub-optimally, resulting in overconsumption. We partner with an EWA fintech firm to quantify these trade-offs using administrative data on earnings and EWA usage, in conjunction with a survey experiment. We find that workers systematically over-predict their future earnings, under-predict their future EWA usage, demand incentives to reduce their EWA usage, and are unable to predict future wage shocks. Using quasi-experimental variation in these wage shocks, we document that workers significantly increase their EWA usage in response to positive wage shocks in both their most recent paycheck and their next paycheck, which determines the amount they can withdraw. Using changes in withdrawal fees, we find patterns consistent with partial sophistication about self-control problems. We organize these facts in a consumption-savings model at the daily level, with workers with biased beliefs and partial awareness of their self-control problems. The estimates from our model imply that EWA increases worker's welfare on net, but that regulations such as fees and withdrawal limits can further enhance welfare.

## WORK IN PROGRESS:

Free-Riding and New Product Adoption: Evidence from Burundi (with Grady Killeen and Nicholas Swanson)

The Long-Term Consequences of Childhood Exposure to Trauma (with Hadar Avivi, Ulrike Malmendier and Maor Milgrom)

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

### RESEARCH:

Research Assistant, Department of Economics, U.C. Berkeley	
Professor Nick Tsivanidis	2020
Professors Stefano della Vigna and David Card	2018 – 2019
Pre-doctoral Fellow, Kellogg School of Business, Northwestern University	2018 – 2017
Professors Paola Sapienza and Paola Giuliano	
Research Assistant, Bocconi University	2015 – 2016
Professors Jérôme Adda and Antonella Trigari	

### TEACHING:

Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, U.C. Berkeley  
Microeconomics (2x), Advanced Econometrics

## FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:

NBER Pre-Doctoral Fellowship on Behavioral Macroeconomics	2021 – 2023
UC Berkeley Rocca Dissertation Fellowship	2021 – 2023
VisitINPS Fellowship (access to the Italian universe of matched employer-employee data, with Andrea Cerrato)	2022 –

## GRANTS:

Fundraised \$700,000+  
As a PI (\$400,000): Weiss Family Fund (2x), PEDL, SurveyCTO, J-Pal ATAI, J-Pal Future of Work Initiative, J-Pal JOI, Psychology & Economics of Poverty, East Africa Social Science Translation (EASST) Collaborative, Center for Contemporary India, Rocca Foundation, Norman S. Buchanan Research Award in Development Economics  
As Co-PI (\$300,000): J-Pal JOI, Weiss Family Fund, STEG, Penn Global research funds

## OTHER INFORMATION:

Languages: English, Italian, French  
Citizenship: Italian