

CHAPTER 11

Contested Memories of the Peruvian Internal Armed Conflict

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As the 2016 presidential elections showed, the Internal Armed Conflict (IAC) and the contested memories that reflect, and shape, its legacies, remain at the heart of political contestation in Peru. During the first round of elections the *fujimorista* campaign mobilized a familiar narrative of the conflict and of the role of Alberto Fujimori in the defeat of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, or SL). The anti-*fujimorista* movement, which, as in previous elections, played a key role in the electoral process, countered with its own narrative of the conflict and challenged the notion that Fujimori alone was responsible for the defeat of SL. Instead, it stressed the authoritarian and corrupt nature of the Fujimori regime, warning that a victory for Fujimori's daughter, Keiko, would return Peru to its darkest days. The *fujimorista* campaign replied by accusing its critics, and particularly the members of the left-wing coalition the Frente Amplio, of being “*terrucos*” (see Aguirre 2011). As this suggests, contested memories of the IAC are evident in Peruvian political life today, twenty-five years after the SL leader, Abimael Guzmán, was arrested and the conflict began to unravel. In this chapter, I argue that these contested memories are one of the key struggles over the legacies of Peru's Internal Armed Conflict.

These contested memories are evident in ongoing debates over *El ojo que llora* (The Eye That Cries), a monument in a park in central Lima that memorializes the victims of Peru's IAC, one of the most emblematic post-conflict legacies. In this chapter, I examine the ways in which the monument serves as a point of departure for online debate on Peru's “time of fear” by studying several cyberfora, particularly YouTube videos, which operate as websites of memory. I show that *El ojo que llora* monument has come to function as a synecdoche (a part

that stands for the whole) of the Final Report of the 2001 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), but also, arguably, as its simulacrum, a site where the CVR's report is commemorated but also where adherence to its principles and recommendations can be manifested and performed, as well as challenged. Because of this double function as synecdoche and simulacrum, *El ojo que llora* has become a privileged site in which ongoing contestation over the IAC, and particularly over how, and indeed if, the IAC should be remembered, takes place. While some of this contestation occurs at the physical site of *El ojo que llora*, much more occurs in other media and fora, not least in cyberspace.

Both as synecdoche and as simulacrum, *El ojo que llora* expresses remarkably well the post-history of the CVR Final Report. Although it is only one of many monuments and sites of memory in Peru, *El ojo que llora* is the most emblematic of all.¹ But it is not an "official" site of memory. It is used by human rights groups and victim-survivor associations, but not by government authorities. To the best of my knowledge, no serving or past president has visited the memorial, let alone used it as the site of an official act. In this sense, the memorial's fate since its construction reflects government attitudes toward the CVR Final Report which express, at best, neglect, and at worst, hostility.² In this sense Peru is different from Chile and Argentina, where under Lagos and Bachelet and the Kirchners respectively, the state took an active, indeed official, if far from uncontroversial or unproblematic, position in relation to human rights abuses of the past and the politics of memory (see, for example, Collins 2011; Collins, Hite, and Joignant 2013; Lessa 2013; Allier Montaño and Crenzel 2015). As such, the memory battles that are fought in, and over, *El ojo que llora* take place against the backdrop of state silence regarding the violent past. This is not a position of neutrality. It is a position that not only enables but arguably strengthens memory projects which are explicitly anti-CVR. But it is a position made possible because there is limited demand among the Peruvian population for the CVR's repertoires of memory, that is to say, for the range of narratives about, and interpretations of, Peru's IAC put forward in the Final Report of the CVR.³

In the context of the 2016 elections, the contested memories of the IAC were thrust into the political arena, as noted. Yet most of the time, these memories are not fully visible and only occasionally bubble to the surface. As I will discuss in this chapter, and as I have discussed in greater detail elsewhere, these contested memories reflect incommen-

surable views about the causes of Peru's internal conflict, the responsibilities and culpabilities of different actors for the violence, and how Peruvian society must manage the post-conflict phase (Drinot 2009). But they are not part of an open or official reckoning with the past. In part this reflects the fact, as the CVR report showed, that the victims of the conflict were marginal to Peruvian society: they were predominantly poor, rural, and Quechua-speaking. Despite the efforts of human rights and victim-survivor groups, these victims had or have today little political leverage, which is not to say that they exist outside of politics. The weakness of the Peruvian Left, arguably the natural political channel for these victims' claims for recognition and reparation, has lowered the visibility of the victims and, more generally, the visibility of the conflict itself in post-conflict Peru (see chapter 8 of this volume).

For this reason, though presidential elections can generate renewed attention from the general population regarding how the violent past is remembered, in the absence of either state interest in addressing the violent past, or political movements or civil society groups with sufficient political leverage to place the unresolved legacies of the violent past and its victims on the political agenda, the battles for memory in Peru, with few exceptions, do not translate into concerted state policies. Nor do they generate sustained interest among the population at large. And yet, as I will show, these contested memories and the antagonism that they generate in those who engage in Peru's politics of memory are clearly essential to understand the broader post-conflict legacies of the IAC. The memory struggles that I discuss in relation to *El ojo que llora* express not only incommensurable views about the violent past but also incommensurable views of the present and the future that are in turn reflected in the politics of Peru today, not least in the ways in which contested memories of the IAC are operationalized in the politics of *fujimorismo* and anti-*fujimorismo*.

El ojo que llora and the Memorialization of Peru's IAC

Although the Cold War shaped the experience of violent conflict throughout Latin America, in Peru, unlike in the Southern Cone in the 1960s and 1970s and Central America in the 1980s, it occurred in a context, the 1980s and 1990s, in which the country was exiting from a period of dictatorship.⁴ As such, the Peruvian IAC is relatively sui ge-

neris within Latin America. The IAC included several armed actors, including the insurgent groups SL and MRTA, the Peruvian armed forces, and peasant self-defense committees, which played a decisive role in the outcome of the war. It was broadly national in scope, although concentrated primarily in the southern Andean region and in the shanty towns of Lima. However, though it had a nationwide impact, scholars of the IAC have shown that at the local level, and particularly in Ayacucho, which bore the brunt of the violence, the IAC was shaped by conflicts both between and within Andean indigenous communities. These conflicts, between pro-SL and anti-SL communities, or between pro-SL and anti-SL individuals within communities, refracted and reproduced in a new, vastly more violent register the conflicts over land, power, and influence that often antedated the SL insurgency. Elsewhere, and particularly in Lima, the conflict took on other, equally complex, dynamics which scholars are only beginning to uncover.⁵

The CVR was set up in 2001 to investigate the causes and nature of the IAC and to report on human rights violations that took place in the period from 1980 to 2000. It published its multivolume Final Report in 2003. The CVR concluded that the Internal Armed Conflict had produced a far greater number of victims, some sixty-nine thousand in total, than had previously been thought. It blamed SL for the highest percentage of the violence, above that committed by the armed forces or the self-defense committees, or indeed by the MRTA.⁶ It also was highly critical of the actions and inactions of the governments of Fernando Belaunde, Alan García, and Fujimori, of political parties of the Left and the Right, and of several institutions, including the Catholic Church. But it also accounted for the violence by framing it in a sociohistorical analysis that stressed the ways in which Peru's deep and intersecting inequalities based on ethnicity, class, and gender were reflected in and reproduced through the violence. The CVR made several recommendations, including personal and collective reparations and prosecution of cases of human rights abuses, which have largely been ignored by successive governments (Macher 2014; Huber and del Pino 2015). However, the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of former President Alberto Fujimori and of his intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, as well as of some high-ranking military officers, on charges of human rights abuses (as well as corruption) in the late 2000s was a significant victory for Peru's human rights community (see Burt 2009a and R. Gamarra 2009).

The CVR's report became the object of intense criticism and remains a matter of contention. Some of the criticism, largely wrong-headed, focused on the methodology used for calculating the number of victims. Some, mostly from the Left, criticized the CVR's report for attributing the largest number of victims to SL and not the armed forces. However, the bulk of the criticism focused on the CVR's supposed inherent bias. Even though the composition of the commissioners reflected diverse political opinions, right-wing commentators, from members of Acción Popular (Belaunde's party) to former president García to newspaper columnists such as Aldo Mariátegui have accused the CVR of being "caviar," by which they imply that it merely reflected left-wing opinion, and even *terruco* sympathies. Similarly, even though the armed forces were represented on the commission, the military, both institutionally and in the personal capacity of several high-ranking officers, has questioned the legitimacy of the CVR and produced its own accounts of the conflict (Milton 2018). The Catholic hierarchy too, and particularly Cardinal Juan Luis Cipriani, was hostile to the CVR and its report. However, it is within the ranks of *fujimorismo* that the hostility to the CVR is greatest. *Fujimoristas* have accused the CVR of being inherently biased against Fujimori and of whitewashing the crimes of SL and the MRTA.⁷

Far from providing an account of the IAC around which a consensual memory of the violence and a politics of reconciliation could be built, as originally intended, the CVR and its Final Report have been thrust regularly into the very center of the politics of memory and, indeed, into the center of politics itself, serving as an issue that is regularly mobilized and operationalized politically by those who support its findings, primarily the Left and human rights organizations, and those who oppose it, primarily *fujimoristas* but also other right-wing members of what Vergara and Encinas refer to in chapter 9 as a "conservative archipelago." It is, itself, a contested site of memory, as is, indeed, the memorial El ojo que llora, which, as I have suggested, has acted more than any other memory site as both synecdoche and simulacrum of the CVR's Final Report.⁸ Designed by the recently deceased Dutch-born Lima resident artist Lika Mutal, the memorial consists of a large central rock from which water spurts, surrounded by small stones arranged in a way that forms paths around the central rock, on which are engraved the names of over thirty thousand victims of the violence. The memorial, part of the symbolic reparations envisaged by the CVR, has been the site of regular commemorations of the publica-

tion of the Final Report of the CVR and other activities organized by human rights and victim-survivor organizations.

In late 2006, Peru's right-wing press criticized the memorial for including the names of Shining Path members killed during a police raid on Castro Castro prison, where they were being held (see Aguirre 2013; Feinstein 2014). The controversy was sparked by a ruling issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which ordered the Peruvian state to include the names of these *senderistas*, now considered "victims," in the memorial. However, it soon was discovered that the names of the *senderistas* already were featured in the memorial, since they had been added to a list of names given to Lika Mutal by human rights organizations. In late September 2007, El ojo que llora memorial was again the scene of controversy when it was attacked during the night. The attackers threw orange paint on the central rock and on the stones and battered the monument with a sledgehammer. The attack followed the decision of the Chilean authorities to extradite Fujimori to Peru to face human rights and corruption charges. In 2000, facing allegations of corruption and malfeasance, Fujimori had fled the country and taken refuge in Japan. Why he decided to travel to Chile remains unclear, but his arrest, extradition to Peru, and eventual trial and sentencing was a landmark process. *Fujimoristas* continue to claim that Fujimori's conviction was a sham. Typically, they blame human rights organizations and what they call the "caviar" class for his wrongful imprisonment. Fujimori, they insist, saved Peru from SL, and that he is a hero, not a criminal.

As this suggests, and as I have argued elsewhere (Drinot 2009), the attack on and defacement of El ojo que llora, and the debates that surrounded the memorial in 2006 and 2007, reflected the tensions between two antagonistic and mutually exclusive narratives of the IAC: a *fujimorista* "memory of salvation," and a "human rights memory" initially mobilized by human rights organizations and later largely reproduced in the CVR report. These narratives, in turn, are expressive of different ontologies of violence, i.e., of different interpretations of (1) the causes of the violence, (2) the responsibilities and culpabilities of different actors in the conflict, and (3) how Peruvian society must manage the post-conflict phase. These narratives of the IAC are not the only ways Peruvians remember the conflict, as many scholars have shown. The range of engagements with the violent past discernible in Peruvian society cannot be neatly reduced to a human rights repertoire of memory and a *fujimorista* repertoire of memory. Nevertheless,

these conflicting memories or narratives of the violent past are routinely mobilized and operationalized. As such, they shape both how the violent past is remembered and, in particular, how that past is politicized, as the recent 2016 elections demonstrated. I will discuss this in greater detail later in this chapter with regard to *El ojo que llora*'s cyber projection.

As Cynthia Milton has noted, "the socio-political opening that gave rise to the CVR also created other spaces for public discussion that were previously unavailable, thus allowing for alternative media of 'truth-telling': for instance, visual and performance art, memory sites, cinema, stories, humor, rumor and song" (2009, 64–65). The study of such media as a means to explore how Peruvians make sense of their recent violent past has produced an expanding and sophisticated literature. Scholars working in several disciplines have turned their attention to cultural artifacts such as novels, films, photography, plays, comics, song and other music forms, art, and testimony in order to access and analyze the construction of personal and collective memories of the violent past.⁹ Such studies reveal the broad range of memory practices that Peruvians engage in, often at the local level and in highly specific contexts, as well as the distinctive memory politics that they participate in through such practices. I stress, however, that these practices are not reducible to either the memory of salvation or the human rights memory, but are nevertheless informed and in some ways framed by these repertoires of memory with hegemonic pretensions. Cyberspace offers another medium through which to explore how such memory practices are engendered and deployed.

Scholars increasingly recognize the potential of the Internet as a medium through which to study what Elizabeth Jelin (2003) has called the labors of memory. Students of memory are well aware that what Wulf Kansteiner has called "media of memory" (2002, 195) not only transmit memory but actually construct it: "all media of memory, especially electronic media, neither simply reflect nor determine collective memory but are inextricably involved in its construction and evolution." Increasingly, therefore, scholars interested in how memory operates on the Internet have turned to examining cyberfora such as personal and institutional websites as well as digital artifacts such as Facebook, Flickr, and YouTube (see Bhattacharya 2010; van Dijck 2011; Knudsen and Stage 2013; Ferron and Massa 2014). In an article published in 2011, I examined this potential in relation to Peruvian and Chilean memories of the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) by study-

ing the comments attached to YouTube uploads of sections of a Chilean documentary on the war (Drinot 2011). However, so far, there have been few attempts to draw on the Internet within the broader, and largely productive, effort to explore the circulation and constitution of collective memories of the IAC.¹⁰

CVR Memories

In this section and the next, I analyze a dozen or so videos on YouTube and one on Vimeo. These videos vary in several ways. Most are short, around two to three minutes, although one is over six minutes long. They fall into three broad categories: (1) professional or semi-professional productions, (2) amateur productions, and (3) reproductions of news items. Among the amateur videos, two stand out as attempts to present an artistic proposal. Of those that are not simply reproductions of news items recorded from television, several include specially selected music; some “Muzak,” often poignant violins or piano; some “Andean” music (*huaynos*); in two cases Silvio Rodríguez tunes; and in one case the music from the film *Schindler’s List*, scored by John Williams. One video includes a live performance. A few videos are, in effect, a succession of still images overlaid with text, music, or a voiceover. In most cases, however, video dominates. Some videos have generated no comments at all, while others have as many as sixty or ninety comments attached to them. These videos were uploaded at different times. The earliest dates from May 2007, and the most recent from September 2012 (at the time the research was undertaken). Several, however, were uploaded shortly after the attack on El ojo que llora in September 2007.

The dominant narrative in these videos is broadly consonant with the CVR’s narrative of the conflict and post-conflict. This is clearest, perhaps not surprisingly, in the video uploaded by “Programa lo justo,” an online program produced by the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, a human rights NGO, fronted at the time by Rocío Silva Santisteban, a human rights campaigner.¹¹ The video focuses on the events organized at El ojo que llora in commemoration of the eighth anniversary of the publication of the CVR’s Final Report. It starts with the camera flying over the stones with the names of the victims of the violence. The music is poignant (ethereal strings) and we hear the voice of a woman (she is almost crying as she speaks): “the

names of more than 15,000 disappeared [. . .] who do not have the right to find [. . .] our loved ones.” It becomes clear that the speaker is a relative of one or more of the disappeared. The camera then shows children at the monument, looking at the stones and laying hands made of paper which carry written messages (“we must forget what happened and must continue building collective memory”) next to a floral arrangement in the shape of Peru. The camera finally cuts to the speaker, who is seen addressing schoolchildren. She is telling them: “You must have another future, you must build a nation, a dignified citizenship, with rights, with opportunities, with equality, and fight inequality and corruption, the discrimination that occurs in every corner of our country.”

The camera then cuts to a middle-aged woman who says she is moved to see young people engaging with human rights issues. She suggests that human rights should be included in the school curriculum. Then, after showing children standing around and further images that suggest the didactic activities that have been undertaken on that day (sheets of paper with texts such as “What does the state do?”), the camera cuts to interviews with several schoolchildren. The message, it soon becomes clear, has gotten through to them: “It gives us a lot to think about,” says one; “it is moving, and it motivates us so that in the future we will be able to answer for all of them (*podamos responder por todos ellos*) and improve the situation.” Another says: “It is right that they honour them [. . .] also so that the young can learn what happened during the twenty years of terrorism.” Yet another: “It encourages us to avoid this happening again and to not forget our past.” Yet another: “We are today the future of the nation, and therefore we are the new actors who must make sure that this does not happen again.” In other words, remembering is an act that allows us to avoid repetition of the past and to construct a better tomorrow. This video expresses perfectly how memory work services the CVR project: memory is mobilized to *instruct* through didactic devices but also to *move* through a series of affective devices. *El ojo que llora* is instrumental to this didactic and affective mobilization of memory.

The Advocacy Project, an NGO based in Washington, DC, produced and uploaded a video which similarly emphasizes the nature of *El ojo que llora* as an active site of memory.¹² This video combines moving music (Silvio Rodríguez but also Andean *huaynos*), superimposed text, and an interview with Renzo Aroni, a historian who works with the Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF). Aroni is

seen in the final part of the video playing guitar and singing a song in Quechua. The video was shot on August 23, 2010, the seventh anniversary of the publication of the CVR report. On this day, relatives of victims added new stones with the names of their loved ones to the monument. We see Gisela Ortiz, “a relative of the Cantuta case,” according to a caption, who tells those who have congregated at El ojo que llora: “Today we are again present in this space of memory in homage to each one of our relatives, in homage to the thousands of disappeared Peruvians, cruelly assassinated during the years of political violence and today we do not only remember them [. . .] we also reaffirm the hope that the day will arrive when injustice is defeated by justice in our country.” Another speaker, identified by a caption as Rocío Paz Ruiz of APRODEH, a Peruvian human rights organization, stresses the hope that “finally it will be possible in our country to achieve justice, to preserve the memory of what happened so that it is not repeated.” The video then shifts to the act of commemoration itself, which involves placing additional stones engraved with the names of victims on the monument.

Another video by the Advocacy Project similarly stresses the function of El ojo que llora as an active site of memory in the context of All Saints Day or the Day of the Dead commemorations in November 2011.¹³ Titled “Remembering the Peruvian Disappeared on the Day of the Dead,” the video, which at over six minutes long is one of the longest studied, features several interviews filmed at El ojo que llora with relatives of the disappeared. Some of the interviews are in Spanish, others in Quechua. The video also includes white text on a black background to inform viewers that the IAC resulted in around seventy thousand dead, of which some fifteen thousand were disappeared and are still unaccounted for. Through the text and the interviews, the video emphasizes the importance of El ojo que llora as a site where the memory of the disappeared can be kept alive as part of a project of redress, collective and public reparations, and a quest for justice. It is a site from which civil society, with the help of advocacy groups, can pressure the government to act. Enrique Pólido Espinoza from Colcabamba, Ayacucho, one of the interviewed, tells the camera that his relative is buried in Putaccasa and that he is requesting that the body be exhumed: “my relative has been abandoned on a mountain as if he were an animal or as if he was worthless.”¹⁴ The camera then turns to Gisela Ortiz, now identified as “Representative of La Cantuta Relatives,” who speaks to the dead: “Today we are here *in*

our Ojo que llora, in this place of memory, to remember each one of the tears that we have shed for you, the pain of not having you here, the anxiety of not knowing, the long absence, the compromised silences, the impunity, and today, here, we tell you that there will be no forgetting, no impunity, no one will impose forgiveness without justice” (my emphasis).¹⁵

The video emphasizes the importance of El ojo que llora as a place in which the remembrance of the disappeared can be performed, and therefore a place in which their status as absent or missing can be confirmed or made real (this is also, more specifically, the function of the pebbles inscribed with the names of victims). But it also emphasizes the monument’s role as a place from which demands for justice can be made: Luis Arones, from Racana, Ayacucho, says into the camera: “It is a special moment to remember our relatives, our friends, who are victims of political violence [. . .] It is nostalgia, remembrance, it hurts in our souls, and I hope that soon this will end and that the government will consider the petitions we are making.” Similarly, Emilia Auccasi Julian from Sacsamarca, Ayacucho, speaking in Quechua, tells viewers: “I’ve come to Lima in search of justice, to claim my rights all the way from a forgotten village. I want to thank EPAF, which has come to our village and now has brought us here to demand our rights and make sure they are respected.” The video concludes with a sequence of white text on a black background set to a score of Andean panpipe music: “There are over 4,500 known mass graves dotting the Peruvian countryside, most of them in the region of Ayacucho / Peru still does not have a state policy for the search and identification of its more than 15,000 disappeared / Neither has it signed the UN International Convention on Enforced Disappearances.”

These videos present El ojo que llora as a site at which the report of the CVR can be not only commemorated but also restated and indeed activated as both synecdoche and simulacrum by what Elizabeth Jelin has called memory entrepreneurs—a particular kind, perhaps, of *professional* memory entrepreneur, as I suggest in the next section.¹⁶ These memory entrepreneurs’ statements and performances, through a combination of didactic and affective strategies, mobilize particular memories of the IAC that are consonant with the analysis put forward by the report of the CVR. As such, these videos express the success of the CVR in establishing a repertoire of memory that human rights and advocacy groups, as well as victim-survivor groups such as COFADER (Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos) can, and do, draw

from in their campaigns.¹⁷ However, they also express the failure of the CVR to achieve much beyond establishing this repertoire. After all, these yearly acts of remembrance and claims-making on the part of human rights groups and victim-survivor associations also demonstrate that the Peruvian government has largely ignored and failed to enact the recommendations of the Final Report of the CVR, at least until very recently, in regard to individual reparations.¹⁸

Amauteur Memories

In addition to these professional or semi-professional videos put together by human rights and advocacy groups, several amateur, or perhaps *amateur*, videos on El ojo que llora can be found on YouTube and Vimeo. These videos present their *producers'* understandings of, and interventions in, the memory politics of the memorial (see, among others, Grinnell 2009). As such, they constitute a particularly interesting aspect of the battles for memory over El ojo que llora. They reflect the participation of nonprofessional memory entrepreneurs who operate independently of, indeed at the margins of, the human rights and advocacy groups whose memory entrepreneurship is part of a broader human rights and social activist agenda. For the *amateur* memory entrepreneurs, such videos are personal contributions to a broader debate. Though some have artistic ambitions, these memory entrepreneurs are not, properly speaking, activist-artists like Lika Mutal, the artist who designed El ojo que llora; the theater group Yuyachkani, which performs plays that evoke and reflect on the IAC; the *retablistas* of Ayacucho who, through their art, intervene in the memory politics of Peru; or comics artists like Jesús Cossio.¹⁹ But their videos illustrate a demotic, bottom-up participation in the politics of memory in Peru in cyberspace. They also reveal the ways in which the CVR project has provided a usable repertoire of memory that extends beyond the human rights community.

Two of these *amateur* videos present explicitly “artistic” treatments of the memorial. Juan Javier Cuadro’s video is a black-and-white time-lapse which lasts less than a minute. It is accompanied by a soundscape which includes birdsong, unclear voices, and gunshots followed by silence and then the sound of the wind blowing. The video ends with a quotation in white text on a black background, which makes reference to the September 2007 attacks on the monument:

“‘Controversy is the word that defines the monument which is a complaint against violence and that is why it is violated, it is there to remind us of what no one wants to relive but which relives that which everyone wants to forget’—Carlos García.”²⁰ Similarly, “El ojo que llora en una Noche en Blanco,” by VictorE50, is a short film that consists of a handheld traveling shot of the stones engraved with names as the filmmaker walks around the monument. The filmmaker’s shadow occasionally appears in the shot, as do other visitors to the monument. These sequences are occasionally cut by stills of what appear to be people attending a “white night,” or nighttime celebration. The video maker has uploaded a short description of the video: “The video aims to introduce the ojo que llora in a white night. As such, we start without sound, taking the dynamism of the white night, in the sections of the video where the stones do not have engraved names. This way, the sound is so silent that we can hardly hear the steps, as a way to keep a moment of silence for the fallen who were not recognized or whose identities were not known.”²¹

Beto Serquen’s video, uploaded in May 2007, reflects artistic intentions of a somewhat different kind.²² It starts with about thirty seconds of white text on a black background. The text, in small print, explains the history of the memorial. The rest of the video consists of a sequence of photographs (the names of the photographers are listed in the video credits at the end). The sequence begins with images from the Qoyllur riti festival, images of the Andes, and images of a group of indigenous people chewing coca leaves; these images appear to have been chosen to establish the *Andeanness* of what is being represented. The video then switches to images of El ojo que llora memorial, starting with a close-up of the crying stone, and then a series of shots of different parts of the memorial, followed by images of people at the memorial, including a shot of Salomón Lerner, one of the CVR commissioners. The video’s poignancy is marked primarily by the choice of music that accompanies the images. The polyphonic choral composition *Hanaq Pacha*, sung in Quechua, and believed to date from the seventeenth century, further stresses the Andeanness of the video. In this way, it is fair to assume, the video maker has attempted to reflect through both images and sound one of the key findings of the CVR report; that is, that the Internal Armed Conflict had an overwhelming impact on Andean Peru and on Peru’s indigenous population. It was a conflict that impacted the whole of Peru, but it disproportionately affected the indigenous peasantry in the Andes in a way, the CVR report

suggested, that reflected and reproduced the racialized exclusions that have characterized Peruvian society since the colonial period.

A video by Ricardo Cuya Vera, titled “Crónica visual,” takes a far more direct, didactic approach. Uploaded in November 2008, the video, shot in handheld mode, shows a virtually empty memorial. At 6.42 minutes, the video is one of the longest studied here and includes a real-time voiceover, which describes *El ojo que llora* in some detail. The video maker adopts a portentous form of enunciation in parts of the video; it is quite likely an attempt to appear to speak from a position of authority. Although largely a description of the memorial itself and how it was built, the video is not mere neutral reportage. The video maker clearly takes sides in the debates that surround the memorial: “This is not a monument to terrorism; it is a cry for peace,” he declares.²³ Cuya Vera’s voiceover focuses on the September 2007 attack on the memorial: he explains that it “was attacked, painted and partly destroyed on 3 September 2007. Orange paint was thrown on it [. . .] funnily enough this is the color of the party of the Japanese dictator Alberto Fujimori.” As he walks around the memorial, Cuya Vera reads out several of the names engraved on the stones, including a whole group who share the same surname, Baldeón: “There were more than two Baldéons, there were more than half a dozen, it could have been a whole a street, a whole village, only history knows this.”

Like Cuya Vera’s video, other videos similarly focus on the attack on the memorial. In November 2007 a Youtube user identified as *nuovavita2* uploaded two videos which are simply recordings of TV news reports on the attack. Although the videos are not produced by *nuovavita2*, they are clearly used to express a point of view on the attack. This is made clearer still by the title given to one of the uploads, “Profanación a El Ojo que LLora,” and by a short description of the video which they have added: “Profanation of El ojo que llora. With paint, sledgehammers and pickaxes, a group of violent hooligans entered the park where this monument to the dead of the political violence in our country is located.” *Nuovavita2* also adds a comment: “This issue should be everywhere, not just to talk about it, but to demand immediate and well-thought-out action so that it will no longer be just ‘a matter for the cholos’ [. . .] only when people in Lima start dying [. . .] often that was the view of things.”²⁴ Through both the act of uploading videos captured from the television news reports on the attack on the memorial and the description and comments, this Youtube user employs the medium to position him or herself in relation to

the debates on *El ojo que llora*, and, by extension and implication, in relation to the debates on the CVR.

These *amateur* videos are cyber-projections of *El ojo que llora*: they restate the memorial's intended message and function as a synecdoche and simulacrum of the Final Report of the CVR. But they are also means through which these *producers* of videos position themselves in relation to the memorial and its message and function. The videos therefore are memorials in their own right. Like *El ojo que llora* they are a means, a technology perhaps, to mobilize memories consonant with the interpretation of the IAC and the recommendations put forward in the Final Report of the CVR. They mobilize what I am calling the CVR's repertoire of memory by employing a combination of music, video, still photography, and text, all contributing to a narrative and an atmospherics that invoke, and evoke, key arguments in the CVR's Final Report, such as the disproportionate impact of the IAC on the Andean population of the country or the fact that many victims of the conflict remain unacknowledged; a lack of acknowledgment, moreover, expressive of the broader conditions that helped bring about the conflict. More generally, like the professional memory entrepreneurs examined in the previous section, these *amateur* memory entrepreneurs mobilize, through their videos, the CVR's repertoire of memory of the IAC as a didactic and affective device in their explicit rejection of the counter-memories, or the *fujimorista* memory of salvation, expressed in the attack on the memorial in 2007. In this way, the videos bear witness to the work of largely unknown, yet clearly committed, memory entrepreneurs deeply invested in the project of the CVR.

Counter-Memories

The repertoire of memory of the CVR, reflected in *El ojo que llora* and projected by the videos, is contested in online debates enabled by the YouTube comment function. These online debates reflect closely, if in the particularly abrasive register of online interaction, the broader debates in Peruvian society over how, or indeed whether, the IAC should be remembered. More specifically, in relation to *El ojo que llora* memorial, the debate focuses on the question of which deaths should be grieved or are deserving of commemoration.²⁵ For many of those who contest the narrative of the IAC put forward by the CVR and the ways in which the memorial understands the category of victim, which in-

cludes those who were the victims of state violence, *El ojo que llora* is a travesty. As Roberto García Armas writes in the comment section to one video: “I challenge anyone to show me if in the famous ‘monument’ are the names of the policemen who were ambushed in a cowardly manner in Quebrada Honda Sayapullo, also the names of the authorities and villagers of the district of Sayapullo who were murdered in a cowardly manner by Sendero Luminoso [. . .] but I’m sure that we will find the names of the ‘students’ of La Cantuta [University].”²⁶ This hostility toward a memorial that is believed to overlook and therefore deny the sacrifice of those who fought against and were the victims of the Shining Path while commemorating those who were killed by the armed forces as part of a legitimate strategy to defend the nation from an internal foe is a key leitmotiv of the contest over the CVR narrative in other video comment sections.

In the comments attached to Ricardo Cuya Vera’s video, for example, all four comments are hostile to the memorial: Beatriz2011 says, “That would be a good place to take my dog to piss and shit”; David Panebra says, “THAT MONUMENT IS ONLY VENERATED BY TERRORISTS [the term used is *terrucos*]. WHAT INJUSTICE.”²⁷ Several posters criticize the location of the monument and its intended purpose, or, as I have suggested, its function as both synecdoche and simulacrum of the Final Report of the CVR. El blanco78 writes: “If that ‘monument’ (?) was a homage to the victims of terrorism, they should have built it somewhere in Ayacucho where THE MOST AFFECTED lived, not in Jesus María [a middle-class district of Lima] WHERE NO ONE WAS AFFECTED, the creators of that monument are crazy and the authorities who gave the authorization [to build the monument] are stupid.”²⁸ According to enrike molinares: “This stupid sculpture which venerates the terrorist assassins should be moved to La Cantuta [. . .] or some hill far from the city [. . .] that city which for many years was a target, a victim of car bombs, blackouts, assassinations, etc, etc.”²⁹ These somewhat contradictory comments resignify the memorial to the victims of violence as a monument to terrorism, a claim put forward in much of the right-wing press and by prominent *fujimoristas* such as congresswoman Martha Chávez.³⁰

In the comments attached to a video produced by NAPA 18, that is targeted at children, we find similar comments. One poster, XXjUdAs85xX, challenges the idea that the children whose names are engraved on the stones were innocent as claimed by the narrator in the video: “Innocent??? I can tell that that pseudo-journalist who writes

blogs is younger than 20 years of age.” Another, *neko-chan joyjoy*, laments the fact that “WE ARE THE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD THAT RAISES MONUMENTS TO TERRORISTS.”³¹ In the comments to another video, the status of those commemorated by the memorial is called into question by *Troyano2011*: “VICTIMS[?] THEY WERE TERRORISTS FOR FUCK’S SAKE.” Another poster attacks both the relatives of the victims and the human rights organizations which support them: “Where were all these crybabies when the terrorists were killing left and right. Now that they are given money for ‘reparations’ they go on marches and lie about. Thank God the real Peruvians, the armed forces and some politicians manned up and eliminated the terrorist filth. It’s a shame that these terrorist sympathizers, these NGOs who help them and the champagne socialists still proliferate, scoundrels.”³²

These comments represent counter-memories of the IAC, that is, memories counter to those memories elicited by, and in some ways made possible because of, the CVR Final Report. Like the memories reflected in the videos I have analyzed, this alternative repertoire of memory is also mobilized by *El ojo que llora* memorial. The videos are therefore perhaps best understood as an “interactive commemorative space” (Knudsen and Stage 2013) where different and opposed memories of the IAC are mobilized and brought into confrontation (of course, the memorial itself is an interactive commemorative space). This is especially evident in the discussions that unfold in the comments sections of some videos, particularly those in which one or more posters engage in exchanges over several years. Take for example, the ninety-one comments attached to the video uploaded by *Beto Serquen* in May 29, 2007.³³ The first comment dates from that year. When this research was conducted, the most recent dated from 2013. In this exchange, although several posters participate, much of the discussion is led by two posters, *ellesar19* and *nuphi*. These exchanges reflect quite closely the ways in which the memories of the IAC overlap, and in many ways come into conflict, with memories of Fujimori’s regime. The context is the attack on the memorial of September 2007, which, as we have seen, was blamed on *fujimorista* supporters, who, it was claimed, acted out of frustration and in retaliation against the decision of the Chilean authorities to extradite Fujimori to Peru to face trial. As is well known, the trial of Fujimori led to his conviction and imprisonment (Burt 2009a).

Nuphi’s rhetorical strategy focuses on discrediting Peru’s human rights organizations and the CVR, which he or she claims are mere

fronts for Sendero Luminoso. He or she, moreover, dismisses these organizations as being “caviar” and claims that both the report of the CVR and the memorial cost vast sums, \$10 million in the case of the former and \$300 million in the case of the latter: “They are left-wing *pitucos* [well-off elites racialized as white], they are impoverished red whiteys with a complex who have recycled themselves into human rights NGOs funded by Sendero Luminoso money and they don’t want to be brought to account. [Enrique] Bernales, [Javier] Diez Canseco, Sofia Macher [human rights activists and left-wing politicians] before were pro Sendero.” Nuphi also condemns the fact that the names of the forty-one *senderistas* murdered in the Castro Castro prison are included in the memorial and reproduces the argument, first made by right-wing journalist Aldo Mariátegui, that whereas the CVR demands justice for the Castro Castro dead, it says nothing about Carlos Hidrogo, a police officer murdered by SL: “How stupid to put the names of the murderers next to those of their victims. For example, Carlos Idrogo [*sic*] the policeman, those from Castro Castro who also appear there, he was murdered first they gouged out his eyes with a spoon and then they killed him, this reveals the sick minds of those terrorists who are now ‘victims’ according to the CVR, how much did their 10 million dollars ‘Report’ cost the country[?]. The ojo que llora a rock with some stones how much did it cost[?] 300 million dollars. Do your research and you will find the truth behind the lies.” Finally, Nuphi also criticizes the methodology used by the CVR to extrapolate the number of victims, a criticism that has been leveled time and again: “There is a caviar theory to infer that there were not 25 thousand but rather 70 thousand dead, on the basis of a small sample they infer that if in the little village XXX they killed 100 (obviously not by SL) according to the terrorist human rights NGOs in the other villages the same thing happened [. . .] this theory is used to CALCULATE FISH STOCKS and not in order to find out the number of people killed by Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA.”

In contrast, Nuphi stresses the role played by the armed forces and by Fujimori in defeating the SL insurgency. He or she dismisses the claim that the armed forces and Fujimori were responsible for human rights violations: “How many poor people [*gente del pueblo*] did Fujimori kill? La Cantuta, Barrios Altos, this is the only thing they repeat over and over like a broken record, I can tell you are a terrorist trying to influence opinion but you have no arguments, the MURDERERS WERE THE TERRORISTS, the Armed Forces manned up in a war people

die or do you think that they only take prisoners. Think first and then talk.” As this suggests, Fujimori may have ordered some assassinations, but such acts were justified. For Nuphi, those who criticize Fujimori are siding with the insurgency: “THE MURDERERS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE MRTA can stick with the *caviares*, the liberator FUJIMORI is for the people, thank you Fujimori for peace, for stability and progress [. . .] thank you for your public works [. . .] by the fruit of their labor shall you know them.” For Nuphi, the CVR not only was a waste of money but also “opened wounds.” It was heavily biased and notoriously anti-*fujimorista*: “The famous CVR is a commission that was named personally by [former president] Toledo to throw mud on Fujimori, and the predictable conclusion was that ‘el Chino’ [Fujimori] was the same as Hitler, Pol Pot, Mussolini, etc. The only thing missing was for them to say that the terrorists were held in concentration camps.” He or she dismisses the attack on the memorial as a “*psico-social*,” a staged political action aimed at discrediting Fujimori, and finally suggests that the decision by Chile to extradite Fujimori to Peru was part of a broader anti-Peruvian strategy devised by that country in alliance with the caviar class: “They ignore the fact that Chile is behind the protests against the mining companies because in 20 years’ time they will have run out resources, they give Fujimori back in order to wash their hand of the assassin and thief Pinochet [. . .] CAVIAR TERRORISTS UNITED WITH THE CHILEANS AGAINST FUJIMORI.”

These views are echoed by other posters. Namer Letnemip calls on Peruvians to recognize and celebrate the sacrifice of Peru’s armed forces in the war against the Shining Path: “I hope that justice will be served to so many Peruvian soldiers who died defending us from the terrorist criminals [. . .] hopefully one day [. . .] we Peruvians will stand up to applaud those who freed us from the terrorist scourge.” Oscar Palomino calls for the destruction of the memorial on similar grounds to those expressed in the debates that followed the discovery that the names of forty-one *senderistas* killed at the Castro Castro prison had been included among the engraved stones: “THAT PIECE OF SHIT MUST BE DESTROYED, or turned into a public urinal, because it is not acceptable to have the name of a terrorist next to that of an innocent victim.” Mauritopr interpellates the sculptor Lika Mutal directly and points to what he or she perceives as the absurdity of the memorial by establishing an equivalence with Nazi atrocities during the Second World War: “Lika Mutal, why don’t you make a sculpture in Holland and put the name of the Dutch people who died of hunger (during the Nazi oc-

cupation) and of their executioners the Nazi leadership, all together [. . .] Let's see if they let you make an ojo que llora in your country, because in Peru you can add the name of 41 Senderista murderers but not that of the courageous policeman Hidrogo whose eyes were gouged out with a spoon by these monsters. Lika MUTAL ———> FUCK YOU [in English in the original]!!." Finally, Namer Letnemip expresses succinctly what many posters doubtless feel about the memorial (as confirmed by the fact that his comment receives a total of five "likes"): "I would have more respect for the memorial 'THE PENIS THAT PISSES.'"

These counter-memories are, in turn, countered by restatements of the repertoire of memory of the IAC established in the CVR report and reflected in El ojo que llora memorial. A poster with the online tag *ellesar19* takes it upon himself or herself to refute the arguments of Nuphi and others. In so doing, he or she restates, in broad strokes, several of the key arguments that the CVR put forward in presenting its interpretation of the causes of Peru's descent into violence. For example, *ellesar19* argues that the causes of the violence were structural, linked to poverty and marginalization: "Terrorism has not been defeated like you believe[.] As long as marginality racism injustice exist, as long as our brothers from the highlands are forgotten there will always be a breeding ground for terrorism." Moreover, he or she suggests, the *senderistas* were also victims. Many were young and were manipulated into becoming foot soldiers of the insurgency: "Many of those terrorists were young people who were brainwashed and were used as foot soldiers and they also have a mother like you or me who has suffered because her son was lost (in all senses of the word)." For *ellesar19*, there were no victors in the IAC: "Those were 20 years of war during which we all lost, even the terrorists[.] The only ones who did not lose were the leaders on both sides Abimael Guzmán and Alberto Fujimori both traitors to the Fatherland and Fujimori will not be executed—as happened when he was in power [a reference to extrajudicial killings conducted by paramilitary groups during the Fujimori government]—but he will receive due process with lawyers and everything." In refuting the arguments put forward by Nuphi and others, *ellesar19* quotes directly from the CVR report: "I am going to quote what the CVR says in its preface: 'But there is a basis to argue that these two decades of destruction and death would not have been possible without the deep contempt toward the poorest in society, as evidenced in equal measure by the members of the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and by agents of the state, the contempt that is interwoven into each moment of the daily life of Peruvians.'"

Several of these posters engage each other in debate in the comment section of more than one video. In the sixty-odd comments that appear below the video uploaded by Carlos Quispe Geronimo (which is almost identical to the one uploaded by Beto Serquen), for example, we find again *ellesar19*, Oscar Palomino, Namer Letnemip, *nuphi*, and others who feature in one or more additional video comment sections.³⁴ The nature of the debate is broadly similar, if at times even more verbally violent. An exchange between Oscar Palomino, *ellesar19*, and a poster with the tag *aravelciers* illustrates the antagonistic and mutually exclusive repertoires of memory that each camp mobilizes. For Oscar Palomino, who claims on several occasions that *El ojo que llora* is a monument to terrorism, the human rights abuses committed by agents of the state, such as in the cases of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, which the CVR presented as case studies in its Final Report, were fully justified: “TERRORISTS, TERRORISTS, TERRORISTS, I’m glad that those from Barrios Altos and La Cantuta are dead, HEROIC GRUPO COLINA THANK YOU!!!! I hope they burn in hell for ever.” Confronted with such an argument, *ellesar19* reproduces an argument used in the debate with *nuphi* and which reflects the idea that the violence ultimately had structural causes: “because of people like you terrorism will return because you have become an animal worse than the terrorists, the fight against terrorism cannot depend on rifles but fighting against poverty, discrimination, abuse and marginalization.” For *aravelciers*, Oscar Palomino’s position is a perfect reflection of the *fujimorista* narrative: “you are so ignorant that you don’t really know the history but you dare to comment. Poor you, you are the typical lost generation created by *fujimorismo*, what a shame.”

In the same way that the Final Report of the CVR produced a repertoire of memory that both professional and amateur memory entrepreneurs can mobilize for a series of objectives, a repertoire of memory aligned with the *fujimorista* “memory of salvation” has emerged which memory entrepreneurs of an opposed political and ideological persuasion can mobilize to refute the CVR. In this repertoire, as we have seen, the *senderistas* were terrorists who deserved to be killed, extrajudicially if necessary. The armed forces were unquestioned heroes who saved the nation from a certain apocalypse. And the CVR and its supporters are at best naïve fools and at worst terrorist sympathizers or indeed *terrucos* tout court. The genealogy of this repertoire of memory is not difficult to trace, although unlike the repertoire of memory of the CVR, it does not have a foundational text such as the Final Report.³⁵ Yet, it is clearly discernible in the ontologies of vi-

olence that certain sectors of the media (most notably journalists such as Aldo Mariátegui) and certain political actors, particularly in the *fujimorista* and APRA parties, the armed forces, the Catholic Church hierarchy, and sectors of the business community, have privileged. El ojo que llora, as both synecdoche and simulacrum of the Final Report of the CVR, serves as an emblematic post-conflict legacy over which a seemingly unresolvable struggle is waged between these opposing repertoires of memory.

Conclusion

In August 2017, the director of the Lugar de la Memoria, Tolerancia e Inclusión Social (LUM), Guillermo Nugent, was forced to resign when the minister of culture, Salvador del Solar, under pressure from *fujimorista* parliamentarians, blamed him for having agreed to host an exhibition titled “Resistencia Visual 1992” that was accused of being overly critical of Fujimori. The minister claimed that the exhibition was “biased.” Surprisingly, the exhibition was not canceled, doubtless to avoid accusations that the minister had, in effect, censored it. However, this did little to allay widespread suspicion that the minister and, by extension, the government was willing to sacrifice basic principles, in this case freedom of expression, for political survival in a context where the *fujimoristas*, with full control of the legislature, were using their leverage to attack the government. The incident demonstrates vividly the extent to which, under the current Kuczynski administration as well as during the Humala administration, the *fujimoristas*’ power to police how the past is remembered can, and is, operationalized politically. It also raises questions about what memories are permissible in Peru, and why, ultimately, some memories fail to gain traction while others can develop hegemonic pretensions.³⁶

The *fujimorista* power to police how the past is remembered, and therefore the politics of the present, was confirmed when in December 2017 President Kuczynski, who faced an impeachment proceeding called by the *fujimorista* majority in Congress, decided to pardon Alberto Fujimori. Kuczynski justified his decision by invoking the *fujimorista* “memory of salvation”: Fujimori, he argued, had committed errors and transgressions (not crimes) during a “violent chaotic crisis” but had set Peru on the path to national progress. It was time, he urged

Peru's young, to set old hates aside, reconcile, and "turn the page."³⁷ This call for Peru to embrace an amnesic amnesty, however, was met with mass protests. As this suggests, Peru's IAC remains an open historical wound, one kept open by the seemingly unending, and unresolvable, struggles for memory over Peru's violent past.

El ojo que llora memorial, as a physical site and a cyber-projection, as both synecdoche and simulacrum of the Final Report of the CVR, and as an emblematic post-conflict legacy, provides professional and *amateur* memory entrepreneurs with a physical and virtual emplacement from which to mobilize the repertoire of memory established by the Final Report of the CVR. They mobilize in order to insist on the fulfillment of the CVR's recommendations and to advocate on behalf of victim-survivors. But El ojo que llora's actual and virtual presence also enables those who oppose the CVR to mobilize their own counter-memories, to perform their own repertoire of memory based on the *fujimorista* "memory of salvation."³⁸ As I have shown, while the extreme verbal violence of the debate may be specific to the online format, the repertoires of memory that inform the debate are part of a much broader memory politics that, in turn, informs and refracts a mainstream politics characterized to a significant extent by a *fujimorista*-*anti-fujimorista* divide.

Yet while it is important to recognize this active "memory market," to use the term given it by Bilbija and Payne, we must also consider its scope. For some sectors of the Peruvian population, particularly for those most directly affected by the IAC such as victim-survivor groups, these debates are obviously crucial. But for the majority of the Peruvian population, they appear largely marginal outside of specific political conjunctures that evoke them. In contrast to countries like Argentina or Chile, where an official engagement with the violent past has been a central policy of recent governments, the opposite is true in Peru, where the governments of Alan García and Ollanta Humala, both of whom have been directly implicated in human rights abuses during the IAC, and now of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski have at best sidelined the issue; directly opposed any official engagement; intervened to effectively dampen open debate on the violent past; or, as happened in the context of Fujimori's pardon, embraced the *fujimorista* "memory of salvation." But equally important is the fact that whereas in Argentina and Chile numerically and politically important sectors of the population have mobilized around such issues, in Peru mobilization on a similar scale either has not materialized or has tended to be re-

stricted to particular political conjunctures such as the recent electoral process, Fujimori's pardon, or localized contexts.

To some extent this is a product of the fact, as argued earlier, that those most invested in the issues that these contested memories express, the victims, have limited political leverage. It is also a product of the fact that in Peru most political forces, as well as much of the media, the armed forces, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and many business groups—Peru's conservative archipelago—are largely hostile to, or, at best, disinterested in, human rights agendas and find no political capital in engaging with the recommendations of the CVR. It is a situation made worse by the weakness of the Left, which in other circumstances would be the natural channel for such initiatives. But the weakness of the Left, a result of a complex set of circumstances not unrelated to the IAC, is arguably itself expressive of the Peruvian population's limited interest in the interpretations of Peru's IAC and the recommendations put forward in the Final Report of the CVR, and of the lack of "appetite" for the type of politics that a full engagement with the Final Report would entail. The combination of an official disinterest in, and at times hostility toward, the human rights memory and the Left's weakness creates space for the *fujimorista* narrative to thrive.

However, this should not be seen as evidence that the contested memories I have discussed in this chapter are merely shared or produced by either a small group of activist NGOs and human rights groups or a few memory entrepreneur hotheads who express them online. Neither should it be seen as evidence that the contested memories cannot find broader audiences, or that they are irrelevant to broader questions about Peruvian politics and society. As should be clear, these contested memories, and their mobilization and operationalization in the context of *fujimorista* and anti-*fujimorista* political jousting, are a key dimension of Peru's struggles over the legacies of the IAC. Their contested nature is an expression of how Peruvians engage with the past, but also a reflection of how Peruvians understand the present and envisage the future, even when they do not engage actively in the politics of memory. As such, these memories must not be approached merely as an expression of the ongoing debates over how to interpret the IAC. They reflect how, for many Peruvians, as Fujimori's pardon demonstrates, the violent past continues to inform the present, and to alert us to the continued importance of its legacies within current and future politics.

Notes

1. On other sites of memory in Peru, see, for example, Feldman 2012 and Delacroix 2014. This chapter draws on an ever-expanding scholarship on the contested memories of the Internal Armed Conflict, including del Pino and Yezer 2013; Degregori et al. 2015; Milton 2014; Milton 2018.

2. For example, the hostility of the Alan García regime (2005–2010) to the CVR is well known and came to the fore in the context of the plans to build the Museo de la Memoria. Although García backtracked on his initial rejection of German funds offered for the building after Mario Vargas Llosa intervened, this episode illustrated the more general policy of his regime toward human rights organizations and their attempts to foster a productive engagement with the IAC among the Peruvian population. On Peru's Museo de la Memoria, or as it is now known, Lugar de la Memoria, Tolerancia e Inclusión Social (LUM), see Milton and Ulfe 2011.

3. On the idea of demand for memory and the associated notion of a memory market, see Bilbija and Payne 2011.

4. For recent interpretations of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, see Mayer 2009 and Aguirre and Drinot 2017.

5. On the rise of the Shining Path, the best account is arguably the Final Report of the CVR. See also Palmer 1992; Poole and Rénique 1992; Stern 1998c; Portocarrero 1998; McClintock 1998; Degregori 2012a; Portocarrero 2012. See also Flores Galindo 2010. On the origins of the insurgency and how it played out at the local and regional level, see Rénique 2004; Taylor 2006; Heilman 2010; González 2011; La Serna 2012; Wilson 2013; Meza Salcedo 2016; del Pino 2017. See also Theidon 2004; Theidon 2012. Recently, scholars have started to explore the conflict in greater detail in urban contexts, particularly Lima, and among urban youth. See Greene 2016 and Asencios 2016.

6. For further elaboration on this point, see chapter 2 in this volume.

7. For reactions to the CVR and its report, see the online database Centro de Documentación e Investigación at LUM. See, for example, <http://lum.cultura.pe/cdi/video/congresista-martha-chavez-indico-que-el-informe-final-de-la-comision-de-la-verdad-y-la>. Accessed September 17, 2017.

8. On *El ojo que llora* see Hite 2007; Drinot 2009; Milton 2011; and Moraña 2012. On memorials and memory in other Latin American contexts, see Jelin and Langland 2003.

9. For general accounts, see Milton 2014; and Saona 2014. On photography, see Poole and Rojas Perez 2010; Murphy 2015; Ulfe and Sabogal 2016. On novels and literature, see Vich, Hibbett, and Ubilluz 2009. On art, see Vich 2015. On music, see Ritter 2012 and Aroni Sulca 2016a. On comics, see Drinot 2017 and Milton 2017. See also Denegri and Hibbett 2016 for an important discussion of testimony and memory.

10. Saona 2012 is a short article that explores the Facebook page “Un día en la memoria,” which deals directly with memories of the Internal Armed Conflict in Peru. But this study remains an exception.

11. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0JRvnhtzetY>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
12. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GudouYSRn_o. Accessed May 11, 2014.
13. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nc3uHtCYqD4>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
14. On the politics of exhumation, see Rojas-Perez 2017.
15. On the case of “La Cantuta,” see chapter 5 in this volume.
16. Jelin (2003, 33–34) defines memory entrepreneurs as those who “seek social recognition and political legitimacy of *one* (their own) interpretation or narrative of the past. We also find [memory entrepreneurs] engaged and concerned with maintaining and promoting active and visible social and political attention on their enterprise.”
17. Two videos uploaded by a certain “Chaskky” in September 2006 illustrate how victim-survivor associations use *El ojo que llora* in their campaigns. The videos show processions of relatives of victims in *El Ojo que llora*. In one of them, the relatives are identified as members of COFADER. They are shown carrying a large cross on which have been stuck photographs of the disappeared. See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nc3uHtCYqD4> and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZTygU41o62s>. Accessed May 11, 2014. On victim-survivor groups, see de Waardt 2013.
18. On reparations, see, among others, LaPlante and Theidon 2007 and de Waardt 2013.
19. On Yuyachkani and the *retablistas*, see Ulfe 2014; Garza 2014; see also Ulfe 2011. On Cossio, see Milton 2017.
20. <http://vimeo.com/47354511>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
21. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5ltX5Opz5A>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
22. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHN9P7xaptQ>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
23. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ioc5HkPfxz4>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
24. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8JGm2Ok0rY>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
25. On the notion of “grievable” life and death, see Butler 2010; also Butler 2006 and Boesten 2014.
26. This is a reference to the students and their professor murdered by a government death squad called Grupo Colina. Fujimori has been accused of responsibility for the actions of this group. See Burt 2009a. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQ_9vNKfagk. Accessed May 11, 2014.
27. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8JGm2Ok0rY>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
28. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3otNKiFM2nE>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
29. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3otNKiFM2nE>. Accessed May 11, 2014.
30. <http://panamericanatv.pe/politica/48412>.

31. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=olB5dl95kpM>. Accessed May 11, 2014.

32. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AMS9ZfHtPl8>. Accessed May 11, 2014.

33. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHN9P7xaptQ>. Accessed May 11, 2014.

34. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3otNKiFM2nE>. Accessed May 11, 2014.

35. Of course, the Final Report built on years of human rights activism, so its foundational text was not an *ab initio* interpretation of the IAC.

36. The virtual absence of *senderista* and MRTA memories of the conflict in the public sphere is a case in point. Though some accounts are beginning to circulate, they do so only within a register that is broadly consonant with the repertoire of memory of the CVR. See the testimonial literature of Agüero 2015, Gavilán 2012, and Gálvez 2015. This is in part a product of a controversial legal framework that criminalizes not only *senderista* “apología” (condoning the Shining Path or advocating terrorism) but also, more broadly, a moral, intellectual, and political climate that denies space to such memories.

37. See <http://larepublica.pe/politica/1162485-ppk-habla-de-excesos-y-errores-de-fujimori-pero-no-absuelve-dudas>. Accessed February 6, 2018.

38. Again, what is lost in this hostile debate are the subtler and more complex stories of the IAC that scholars such as Theidon, Heilman, La Serna, del Pino, and others are beginning to uncover. These stories show that the strict lines of separation between victim and perpetrator which both the *fujimorista* memory of salvation and the CVR’s human rights memory privileged were politically expedient, but not always historically accurate or compatible with attempts by communities to come to terms with the violent past.