

# For Whom the Bot Tolls: Specialization and the Earnings Effects of AI

---

Lukas Freund

Columbia University

Lukas Mann

Minneapolis Fed

*July 12, 2025*


The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.

# AI capabilities are rapidly improving relative to humans

## Test scores of AI systems on various capabilities relative to human performance

Our World  
in Data

Within each domain, the initial performance of the AI is set to -100. Human performance is used as a baseline, set to zero. When the AI's performance crosses the zero line, it scored more points than humans.



Data source: Kiela et al. (2023)

OurWorldinData.org/artificial-intelligence | CC BY

Note: For each capability, the first year always shows a baseline of -100, even if better performance was recorded later that year.

## What will be the implications for earnings & their distribution?

- Q: Who will gain and who will lose from AI-induced task automation?

## What will be the implications for earnings & their distribution?

- **Q: Who will gain and who will lose from AI-induced task automation?**
- **Intuition:** earnings effects likely *negative* if a worker is specialized in automated task(s), *positive* if freed up to pursue tasks in which she's more skilled

# What will be the implications for earnings & their distribution?

- **Q: Who will gain and who will lose from AI-induced task automation?**
- **Intuition:** earnings effects likely *negative* if a worker is specialized in automated task(s), *positive* if freed up to pursue tasks in which she's more skilled
- **Task-based theory with task bundling** formalizes the intuition

# What will be the implications for earnings & their distribution?

- **Q: Who will gain and who will lose from AI-induced task automation?**
- **Intuition:** earnings effects likely *negative* if a worker is specialized in automated task(s), *positive* if freed up to pursue tasks in which she's more skilled
- **Task-based theory with task bundling** formalizes the intuition
- But **measurement** is hard
  - ① workers' portfolios of **task-specific skills**
  - ② which **tasks** will be **automated**
    - ✓ [Webb, 2020; Eloundou et al., 2023; ...]

# What will be the implications for earnings & their distribution?

- **Q: Who will gain and who will lose from AI-induced task automation?**
  - **Intuition:** earnings effects likely *negative* if a worker is specialized in automated task(s), *positive* if freed up to pursue tasks in which she's more skilled
  - **Task-based theory with task bundling** formalizes the intuition
  - But **measurement** is hard
    - ① workers' portfolios of **task-specific skills**
    - ② which **tasks** will be **automated**  
✓ [Webb, 2020; Eloundou et al., 2023; ...]
- This paper:  
unify theory & measurement  
to quantify how specialization  
governs individual earnings  
effects of AI

# What we do: theory-guided measurement & counterfactuals

- ① **Theory:** task-based model with bundling + Roy occupational choice
- ② **Measurement:** distribution of task-specific skills
- ③ **Quantitative analysis** of automation based on task exposure measures




# What we do: theory-guided measurement & counterfactuals

- ① **Theory:** task-based model with bundling + Roy occupational choice
  - occupations **bundle tasks**, performed by workers or machines
  - workers have heterogeneous **portfolios of task-specific skills**, choose **occ. & earn wage**
- ② **Measurement:** distribution of task-specific skills
- ③ **Quantitative analysis** of automation based on task exposure measures

# What we do: theory-guided measurement & counterfactuals

- ① **Theory:** task-based model with bundling + Roy occupational choice
  - occupations **bundle tasks**, performed by workers or machines
  - workers have heterogeneous **portfolios of task-specific skills**, choose **occ. & earn wage**
- ② **Measurement:** distribution of task-specific skills
  - LLMs: **occupational task weights for 30 tasks** (clustering of  $\sim 20,000$  O\*NET tasks)
  - NLSY: worker panel of **occ. choices & wages**
    - estimate **skill distribution** using model structure
- ③ **Quantitative analysis** of automation based on task exposure measures

# What we do: theory-guided measurement & counterfactuals

- ① **Theory:** task-based model with bundling + Roy occupational choice
    - occupations **bundle tasks**, performed by workers or machines
    - workers have heterogeneous **portfolios of task-specific skills**, choose **occ. & earn wage**
  - ② **Measurement:** distribution of task-specific skills
    - LLMs: **occupational task weights for 30 tasks** (clustering of  $\sim 20,000$  O\*NET tasks)
    - NLSY: worker panel of **occ. choices & wages**
      - estimate **skill distribution** using model structure
  - ③ **Quantitative analysis** of automation based on task exposure measures
    - **Industrial robots:** automation of material handling tasks
    - **AI:** automation of information-processing tasks
- 

# Findings

- **Selection** on specialization generates — link between exposure & *incumbent* wages
  - incumbent leavers
- + *But* automation **benefits** those freed to focus on tasks in which they're more skilled
  - incumbent stayers
- + *Or* enabled to access better occupations by **reducing skill-based entry barriers**
  - in-switchers
- ! The **magnitude** of these effects **varies across technologies**
  - AI generates larger in-switching effects
  - WiP: comparison of effects on inequality

# What's new?

- **Labor market effects of AI** *[Humlum-Vestergaard, 2025; Autor-Thompson, 2025; Hampole et al., 2025; Lashkari et al., 2025; Restrepo-Fan, 2025; Althoff-Reichardt, 2025]*  
⇒ model with task bundling → **winners & losers due to specialization**
- **Measurement of job exposure to technologies**  
*[Brynjolfsson et al., 2018; Webb, 2019; Felten et al., 2021; Eloundou et al., 2023; Kogan et al., 2024]*  
⇒ map to **structural** model → individual **earnings effects** as a function of skills
- **Task-based framework** *[Acemoglu-Autor, 2011; Acemoglu-Restrepo, 2022; Freund, 2024; ...]*  
⇒ empirically operationalize → link to **forward-looking** automation measures
- **Multi-dimensional skills**  
*[Lindenlaub, 2017; Guvenen et al., 2020; Lise-PostelVinay, 2021; Deming, 2023; Grigsby, 2023]*  
⇒ **estimate** distribution of high-dim. task-specific skills → **measure specialization**


# Theory

---

# Environment: task-based production meets Roy

- Discrete time ( $t$ ), repeated static model
  - **Production technology:**
    - production is Cobb-Douglas over discrete task set  $\mathcal{T}$
    - **occupation**  $o \in \mathcal{O}$  **bundles tasks** with weights  $\{\alpha_{o,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}}$
- economist, teacher, ...                      analyzing data, moving objects, ...

# Environment: task-based production meets Roy

- Discrete time ( $t$ ), repeated static model
- **Production technology:**
  - production is Cobb-Douglas over discrete task set  $\mathcal{T}$
  - **occupation**  $o \in \mathcal{O}$  **bundles tasks** with weights  $\{\alpha_{o,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}}$ 
    - 

economist, teacher, ...

analyzing data, moving objects, ...
- **Firms:**
  - infinite supply of entrepreneurs who perfectly compete for a worker's labor
  - assign tasks ex-ante optimally to humans ( $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}_l$ ) or machines w prod.  $\{z_\tau\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}}$  ( $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}_m$ )
  - match with 1 worker, rent machines from inf. elastic capital market at exog. rate  $r$



# Environment: task-based production meets Roy

- Discrete time ( $t$ ), repeated static model
- **Production technology:**
  - production is Cobb-Douglas over discrete task set  $\mathcal{T}$
  - **occupation**  $o \in \mathcal{O}$  **bundles tasks** with weights  $\{\alpha_{o,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}}$ 
    - $\nearrow$  economist, teacher, ...
    - $\nwarrow$  analyzing data, moving objects, ...
- **Firms:**
  - infinite supply of entrepreneurs who perfectly compete for a worker's labor
  - assign tasks ex-ante optimally to humans ( $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}_l$ ) or machines w prod.  $\{z_\tau\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}}$  ( $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}_m$ )
  - match with 1 worker, rent machines from inf. elastic capital market at exog. rate  $r$
- **Workers:**
  - log utility over consumption
  - heterogeneous, fixed **task-specific skills**  $s_i = \{s_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l}$  where  $\downarrow$   $s_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\bar{s}, \Sigma_s)$
  - period  $t$ : draw shocks, choose occupation  $o$ , match with entrepreneur, produce & earn  $|\mathcal{T}_l| \times 1$  vector

# Firm's optimal production problem

- **Output** of firm in occ  $o$  with worker  $i$  given idiosyncratic shock  $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \varrho)$ :

$$y_{i,o,t}(\cdot) = \underbrace{\prod_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} (\exp(s_{i,\tau} + \varepsilon_{i,t}) \cdot \ell_{i,\tau,t})^{\alpha_{o,\tau}}}_{\text{worker-produced}} \underbrace{\prod_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} (\exp(z_\tau) \cdot m_{i,\tau,t})^{\alpha_{o,\tau}}}_{\text{machine-produced}}$$

- **Profits:**

$$\pi_{i,o,t} = \max_{\{m_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m}, \{\ell_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l}} y_{i,o,t}(\{\ell_{i,\tau,t}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l}, \{m_{i,\tau,t}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m}) - \exp(w_{i,o,t}) - r \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} m_{i,\tau,t}$$
$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \ell_{i,\tau,t} = 1$$

# Firm's optimal production problem

- **Output** of firm in occ  $o$  with worker  $i$  given idiosyncratic shock  $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \varrho)$ :

$$y_{i,o,t}(\cdot) = \underbrace{\prod_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} (\exp(s_{i,\tau} + \varepsilon_{i,t}) \cdot \ell_{i,\tau,t})^{\alpha_{o,\tau}}}_{\text{worker-produced}} \underbrace{\prod_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} (\exp(z_\tau) \cdot m_{i,\tau,t})^{\alpha_{o,\tau}}}_{\text{machine-produced}}$$

- **Profits:**

$$\pi_{i,o,t} = \max_{\{m_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m}, \{\ell_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l}} y_{i,o,t}(\{\ell_{i,\tau,t}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l}, \{m_{i,\tau,t}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m}) - \exp(w_{i,o,t}) - r \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} m_{i,\tau,t}$$
$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \ell_{i,\tau,t} = 1$$

- **Optimality:**

$$\ell_{i,\tau,t} = \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}}$$

► FOC capital

# Firm's optimal production problem

- **Output** of firm in occ  $o$  with worker  $i$  given idiosyncratic shock  $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \varrho)$ :

$$y_{i,o,t}(\cdot) = \underbrace{\prod_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} (\exp(s_{i,\tau} + \varepsilon_{i,t}) \cdot \ell_{i,\tau,t})^{\alpha_{o,\tau}}}_{\text{worker-produced}} \underbrace{\prod_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} (\exp(z_\tau) \cdot m_{i,\tau,t})^{\alpha_{o,\tau}}}_{\text{machine-produced}}$$

- **Profits:**

$$\pi_{i,o,t} = \max_{\{m_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m}, \{\ell_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l}} y_{i,o,t}(\{\ell_{i,\tau,t}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l}, \{m_{i,\tau,t}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m}) - \exp(w_{i,o,t}) - r \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} m_{i,\tau,t}$$

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \ell_{i,\tau,t} = 1$$

- **Optimality:**

► FOC capital

$$\ell_{i,\tau,t} = \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}} \longrightarrow \text{matrix A: } |\mathcal{O}| \times |\mathcal{T}_l|$$

# Wage equation

► Intercept term

$$\begin{aligned}
 w_{i,o,t} &= \underbrace{\mu_o}_{\text{occ.-specific intercept}} + \underbrace{\sum_{\tau_l} \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{LS_o} \cdot s_{i,\tau}}_{\text{weighted skills}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_{i,t}}_{\text{idiosyncratic productivity shock}} \\
 &= \mu_o + \underbrace{\frac{1}{n_{\text{skill}}} \sum_{\tau_l} s_{i,\tau}}_{\text{scalar absolute advantage}} + \text{Cov} \left( n_{\text{skill}} \cdot \frac{\alpha_{o,\cdot}}{LS_o}, \underbrace{s_{i,\cdot} - \frac{1}{n_{\text{skill}}} \sum_{\tau_l} s_{i,\tau}}_{\text{specialization vector}} \right) + \varepsilon_{i,t}
 \end{aligned}$$

$LS_o = \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}$ : labor share in occupation  $o$

# Occupational choice

- Each period, worker  $i$  chooses occ. subject to preference shock  $u_{i,o,t} \sim \text{Gumbel}(0, \nu)$ :

$$\hat{o}_{i,t} = \operatorname{argmax}_o w_{i,o,t} + u_{i,o,t}$$

- Occupational choice probabilities:**

$$P(\hat{o} = o | w_{i,\cdot,t}) = \frac{\exp(w_{i,o,t}/\nu)}{\sum_{o'} \exp(w_{i,o',t}/\nu)}$$

- No *exogenous* switching costs

## Automation in the model

- **Automation** of task  $\tau^*$ : a one-time, permanent rise in machine productivity  $z_{\tau^*}$  that is *just* large enough to make it optimal to reassign  $\tau^*$  from humans to machines

$$\mathcal{T}'_l = \mathcal{T}_l \setminus \tau^* \qquad \mathcal{T}'_m = \mathcal{T}_m \cup \tau^*$$

- can be viewed as lower bound on positive productivity effects

## Automation in the model

- **Automation** of task  $\tau^*$ : a one-time, permanent rise in machine productivity  $z_{\tau^*}$  that is *just* large enough to make it optimal to reassign  $\tau^*$  from humans to machines

$$\mathcal{T}'_l = \mathcal{T}_l \setminus \tau^* \qquad \mathcal{T}'_m = \mathcal{T}_m \cup \tau^*$$

- can be viewed as lower bound on positive productivity effects

- **Change** in expected log (potential) wage for  $i$  in occupation  $o$

$$\mathbb{E} [w_{i,o,t+1} - w_{i,o,t}] = \mu_{o,t+1} - \mu_{o,t} + \overbrace{\frac{\alpha_{o,\tau^*}}{LS_o}}^{\text{occupational exposure}} \left( \sum_{\mathcal{T}_l \setminus \tau^*} \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{LS_o - \alpha_{o,\tau^*}} \overbrace{S_{i,\tau} - S_{i,\tau^*}}^{\text{worker specialization}} \right)$$

⇒ **A worker is more likely to win if *relatively* skilled in non-automated tasks**





# Measurement

---

- **Goal:** parametrize the model at same ‘resolution’ as task exposure measures
- **Step 1:** map model tasks & occupations to data, construct  $A$ 
  - O\*NET:  $\sim 19,000$  task statements ( $\sim$  most exposure measures)  $\rightarrow$  *cluster* them
  - occupations: 90+ SOC-2000 minor groups ( $\sim 3d$ )
  - task-weights  $A_{o,\tau} = \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}}$  for all occupations & tasks
- **Step 2:** estimate unobserved skill distribution  $(\bar{s}, \Sigma_s)$  using MLE
  - given  $A + \text{NLSY '79} + \text{model structure}$

# Step 1: constructing the task-weight matrix $A$

[Validation](#)[Examples: occ](#)[Examples: tasks](#)




## Step 2: estimation of task-specific skills

- **Challenge:** skill distribution is unobserved
- **Solution:** use the structure of the model to estimate  $(\bar{s}, \Sigma_s)$ 
  - variation: realized wages & occupational choices
  - intuition: economist vs software engineer
- **Data:** NLSY '79 + A matrix
  - worker-level panel of occupational choices and wages
- **Formalization:** max. likelihood
- **Implementation:** MC integration + auto-diff. + stochastic gradient descent
- **Validation:** Monte Carlo exercise


[► Details](#)

# Validation: Monte-Carlo study


(a) Means




(b) Standard deviation



(c) Correlation




(d) Other parameters



# Model properties: selection based on comparative advantage



► Transition vs. specialization

- Workers tend to select into occupations which load heavily on tasks they are relatively skilled at – example of *Top Executives*



# Model properties: occupational transition probabilities

- Some persistence (but not quite enough)
- Model directionally tracks switching patterns







# Model properties: occupational transitions reflect task requirements

- Workers are more likely to move to occupations with similar task requirements

*[cf. Gathmann-Schoenberg, 2010]*




## **Application: AI**

---

# Webb's (2020) exposure measures


► Patent criteria

► Eloundou et al. (2023)




# AI: automating “analyzing complex data”

## (a) Occupation-level effects




# AI: automating “analyzing complex data”

(a) Occupation-level effects




(b) Yet for incumbents...




# Mechanism: specialization + selection

⇒ As workers *select* into occupations by comparative advantage, high *occupational* exposure also tends to imply *relative skill specialization* in the automated task



$$s_{i,\tau^*} - \frac{1}{n_{\text{skill}}} \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_i} s_{i,\tau}$$




# Incumbents: stayers do better than switchers


► Relative specialization

- Consistent with evidence on task 'upgrading' for stayers [Bartel et al., 2007; Dauth et al., 2021] and losses for occupation switchers [e.g. Huckfeldt, 2022]

(a) Incumbents: stayers




(b) Incumbents: switchers



# So why the positive effect at the occupational level? In-switchers!

- Consistent with evidence on positive wage effects from in-switching [e.g Humlum, 2021]; magnitude likely overstated (no GE) & too fast (no frictions)






# Robots: Partial automation of “performing material handling tasks”


► Incumbents

- **Robots:** smaller gradient exposure  $\leftrightarrow$  wage change
  - in-switching channel weaker

(a) Occupation-level




(b) In-switchers



# Robots: Partial automation of “performing material handling tasks”

- **Reason:** Much smaller dispersion in specialization



# Conclusion

---

## Summary: Specialization and the Earnings Effects of AI


- **Core contribution:** empirically rich tractable framework to quantify & forecast who wins and who loses from AI-induced task automation
- **Key insight:** **skill specialization shapes heterogeneous effects of automation**
  - selection generates — association between exposure & incumbents' wages
    - incumbent leavers
  - + *but* automation benefits those freed up to focus on tasks in which they're more skilled
    - incumbent stayers
  - + *or* enabled to access new occupations by reducing skill-based entry barriers
    - in-switchers
  - ! magnitude of these effects varies across technologies
    - AI generates larger in-switching effects

## Extra Slides

---

# Automated document review: good or bad?

◀ Back



- Missing important model feature: heterogeneous, endogenous occupation prices
  - steady-state: high-wage occ's involve scarce skills hence high  $o$  price
  - counterfactual: occupational price response as a function of demand elasticities
- Identification challenge:  $\mu_o$  becomes endogenous and the following equation is satisfied by more than one pair  $(\mu_o, \bar{s})$ :

$$\text{mean potential wage}_o = \mu_o + A'_{o,\cdot} \circ \bar{s}$$

where  $\bar{s}$  is vector of average skills

- Options we're exploring:
  - 1 time variation in task shares
  - 2 dynamic skill accumulation
  - 3 identifying restriction  $A \perp \mu_o$

- FOC for machines  $m := \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} m_\tau$ :

$$\left( \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} \alpha_{o,\tau} \right) \frac{y}{r} = m$$

and

$$m_\tau = \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} \alpha_{o,\tau}} m$$

- Given

$$\begin{aligned} \log y_o = & \left[ \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}} s_{i,\tau} \right] + \varepsilon_{i,o} \\ & + \left[ \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}} \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}} \log(\alpha_{o,\tau}) \right] - \log \left( \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau} \right) + \left[ \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}} (z_\tau - \log r) \right], \end{aligned}$$



# Wage equation: details

- Intercept

$$\mu_o = \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}} \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}} \log(\alpha_{o,\tau}) + \left( \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_m} \frac{\alpha_{o,\tau}}{\sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_l} \alpha_{o,\tau}} (z_\tau - \log r) \right)$$

- We assume that in the initial steady state there is only one composite machine task with productivity normalized to  $\log r$ , which implies that  $\mu_o$  is known for all occupations.

# Details on the estimation strategy I

- Exact likelihood:

$$\prod_i \int_S \left[ \left( \int_{w_{i,\cdot,-\omega.}} \prod_t P(\hat{o}_{i,t} = \omega_{i,t} | w_{i,\cdot,\cdot}, \nu) \cdot f(w_{i,t,-\omega_t} | s, w_{i,\cdot,\omega.}, \varsigma) \right) \cdot f(s | w_{i,\cdot,\omega.}, \varsigma, \bar{s}, \Sigma_s) \right] \cdot f(w_{i,\cdot,\omega.} | \varsigma, \bar{s}, \Sigma_s)$$

- Strategy:** Monte Carlo integration - for all  $i$  generate  $n_o$  draws from

$$f(w_{i,\cdot,-\omega.} | w_{i,\cdot,\omega.}, \varsigma, \bar{s}, \Sigma_s) = \int_S f(w_{i,\cdot,-\omega.} | s, w_{i,\cdot,\omega.}, \varsigma) f(s | w_{i,\cdot,\omega.}, \varsigma, \bar{s}, \Sigma_s)$$

and evaluate the mean of  $P(\hat{o}_{i,t} = \omega_{i,t} | w_{i,\cdot,t}, \nu)$  to obtain an estimator for  $\mathcal{L}_i(\theta)$ :

$$\hat{\mathcal{L}}_i(w_{i,t,\omega}, \nu, \varsigma, \bar{s}, \Sigma_s) = \left( \frac{1}{n_o} \sum_j \prod_t P(\hat{o}_{i,t} = \omega_{i,t} | w_{j,t,\cdot}, \nu) \right) \cdot f(w_{i,\cdot,\omega.} | \varsigma, \bar{s}, \Sigma_s)$$

## Details on the estimation strategy II

- Two numerical techniques help speed up the maximum likelihood computation
- **Auto-differentiation:** efficiently compute the gradient of this function
- **Stochastic gradient descent:**
  - basic technique: gradient descent

$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \eta \cdot \nabla (-\mathcal{L}(\theta_t))$$

- randomly partition individuals into  $n$  groups:

$$\{1, 2, \dots, I\} = B_1 \cup B_2 \cup \dots \cup B_n, \quad B_i \cap B_j = \emptyset$$

- calculate the likelihood based on batch  $B_1, \dots, B_n$  only
- when done, draw a new partition

# Why not use O\*NET GWAs and importance weights


- Potential alternative to our approach: use O\*NET "General Work Activities" (GWAs) and occupational importance weights
- Reasons we prefer our approach:
  - ① GWAs themselves are not mutually exclusive (e.g. "Analyzing Data or Information" vs "Processing Information") nor exhaustive (esp. regarding activities differentiating high-wage occupations, e.g. complex quantitative analyses), and some seem ambiguous ("Getting Information")
  - ② Weights available (importance/level/frequency) don't correspond to time shares, as required to map onto the theory
  - ③ GWAs + LLM-generated time shares: resulting A matrix is low-rank (→ poor model fit)
  - ④ Flexibility: our approach is consistent with different occupational classifications (e.g. SOC-2000, which can be x-walked to NLSY) and time periods

# Validation of LLM-generated time shares: overview


- ① Comparison of time share measurement: LLM vs BIBB survey ✓
- ② Comparison of LLM-generated time shares for GWAs to O\*NET importance weights ✓
- ③ Internal consistency: do measurements for detailed occupations aggregate up? ✓
  - What else would you like us to check?
    - comparison across LLMs?

# Validation: LLM-generated task shares vs. BIBB

(a) Occupation-level correlations




(b) Task-level correlations




## Validation: O\*NET GWAs (1)

- Take O\*NET GWAs (O\*NET 5.0, consistent with SOC-2000), construct relative importance for each GWA by occupation, aggregate to SOC-2000-3d
- Let LLM generate *time shares* for the GWAs for each SOC-2000-3d occ
- How do LLM-time shares correlate with vector of O\*NET importance weights?




## Validation: O\*NET GWAs (2): correlation across occupations by task






# Validation: internal consistency




## Model properties: transition probabilities decline in specialization

[◀ Back](#)

- Workers with v specialized (= dispersed) skills are less likely to switch occupation




# Model fit: occupational wages and employment shares

[◀ Back](#)


# A matrix: example tasks - extracted skills - tasks

Task	Activity	Skills	Cluster
Direct or coordinate an organization's financial or budget activities to fund operations, maximize investments, or increase efficiency	Direct financial operations	Financial management (expert), strategic planning (advanced), budgeting (advanced), analytical thinking (advanced)	Evaluating and Strategizing
Clean and sterilize vats and factory processing areas	Clean and sterilize processing areas	Manual dexterity (basic)	Performing Material Handling Tasks
Press switches and turn knobs to start, adjust, and regulate equipment, such as beaters, extruders, discharge pipes, and salt pumps	Operate equipment controls	Technical knowledge (intermediate), manual dexterity (basic)	Performing Precision Technical Tasks
Conduct research, data analysis, systems design, or support for software such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) or Global Positioning Systems (GPS) mapping software	Conduct research and data analysis for GIS software	Research skills (advanced), data analysis (advanced), systems design (advanced)	Analyzing Complex Data


# A matrix: example occupations

[◀ Back](#)

- Evaluating and Analyzing Information
- Documenting and Organizing Information
- Designing and Delivering Instruction
- All other tasks



- Analyzing Financial and Business Data
- Evaluating and Analyzing Information
- Analyzing Complex Data
- All other tasks



# Webb measure: selection criteria


Table A1: Patent selection criteria.

Technology	Definition
AI	Title/abstract include “neural network”, “deep learning”, “reinforcement learning”, “supervised learning”, “unsupervised learning”, or “generative model”
Software	Title/abstract include “software”, “computer”, or “program” AND title/abstract exclude “chip”, “semiconductor”, “bus”, “circuit”, or “circuitry”
Robots	Title/abstract include “robot”

*Notes:* Patents corresponding to each technology are selected using these keyword inclusion/exclusion criteria.


# Aggregated task exposure measures from Eloundou et al. (2023)

▶ Webb (2020)






# Webb's historical evidence on effects of robots




# The ins and outs of occupations: robots

(a) Incumbents



(b) In-switchers



# Why stayers do better than switchers

[► Stayers vs switchers](#)