

## Week #6, Lesson 4: Post-Exploitation

What happens after an attacker gets on the machine

Midterm Review class next, July 7th

Midterm is open book, but no internet, no collaboration, no AI/ChatGPT

Open Book: Bring your own handwritten notes, printed notes, or book

Online, July 12th, proctored

Review Lesson 5 (on crypto) slides

Watch Lesson 3 supplemental video

Everything for midterm exam: Lab 1&2, HW1&2, Lessons 1-5

HW2: is due on July 14th, needs to be done before the midterm exam

### Exercise /#1A

What are the steps for the user (Firefox) to make a DNS request for [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com), presuming no hosts have been on the Internet?

For an iterative query:

The user makes a request to the local DNS server. They are specifically asking for the A record (IPv4 address)

The local DNS server queries the root server. The root server responds to ask the TLD server.

The local DNS server queries the TLD server. The TLD server responds to ask the authoritative server.

The local DNS server queries the authoritative server. The authoritative server responds with the IP address.

The local DNS server gives the IP address to the user.

### Exercise /#1B:

Suppose an attacker is on the User's home network. How hard is it to poison your DNS cache? What steps are required?

It is very easy if they are on the network.

Respond faster than the local DNS. Spoof the IP of local DNS. Respond with the transaction ID/sequence number of the request.

Port # and Transaction ID are both 16 bits, and both randomized.

### Exercise /#1C:

Suppose an attacker wants to poison the DNS cache for all users on Verizon FIOS, and make all verizon FIOS users who go to [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com) go to 6.6.6.6. How should she do that?

How hard is it?

In the initial query to the root server, the local dns caches that info so it doesn't have to do that again. When it queries the TLD server, it caches the response again. When it queries the authoritative DNS server, it caches the response, which is the IP address.

The attacker can take over the answer with the IP address from the authoritative server.

There are 3 steps:

respond faster than real DNS server

Spoof the IP address DNS server - generally easy

Need the source port # and transaction ID - 32 bits of randomness

They need to read headers of DNS packets - extremely difficult

This is all very hard to do, but it has happened

One of the goals in the cyber kill chain is persistence - they need to remain on the system after they gain initial access.

Attackers can be on the network for months - it takes a really long time of access to accomplish the goals of the attackers.

Exercise #2:

What does this scan for?

`nmap -sS -O 10.10.10.10`

TCP or UDP?

Which ports?

TCP SYN scan with OS detection: it will scan the top 1000 ports (most common, not ports 0 -> 999)

Reality: do not rely on defaults: specify everything, and just scan everything

`nmap -sS -O 10.10.10.10 -p-`

Persistence is all about staying on the system.

Trojans: any program that pretends to be something else

Non self replicating "back door" program which runs hidden on the infected computer

Can be installed by:

1. Non trusted software download
2. Email attachments
3. Application level exploits
4. Executable content on websites (Flash, Java, ActiveX)

Trojan can be used to maintain control of the system, access password, keylog, etc.

For simplicity, all unauthorized software is called malware

Trojan creators these days are typically motivated by financial gain

Hence they typically look for credit card, account data, confidential documents, financial data, etc.

Some ports were typically used by Trojans. They became so popular that if a port was used by some program, some antivirus would block those programs

Determining which ports are listening:

-netstat -an | findstr (windows)

-netstat -anp | grep (linux)

Goal for malware is to hide itself though, so it wants to avoid this

Proxy Server Trojans: starts a hidden http proxy on the victims computer

Attacker uses the victim's computer as a transit point to attack yet another victim. Hides the location of the attacker.

Metasploit Meterpreter shell can easily install a proxy trojan.

NetBus Trojan

Remote Control trojan program - RAT

Allows anyone running the client (control program) to control any machine infected with the NetBus Trojan

Many variants were subsequently released

Rootkits

Designed to evade detection

Can run in user mode and kernel mode

User mode rootkits run in ring 3 along with other user applications

kernel mode runs in ring 0 by modifying the OS kernel

Exercise #3:

How could malware survive an operating system wipe?

If the malware infects the firmware

Embedding the malware within the BIOS or UEFI firmware of the device

Hide in backup

Exercise #4: What are some reasons for an attacker to stay on a host after it is compromised?

Continue lateral movement, planning exploitation, monitor user's activities

Loki2

Loki: arbitrary information tunneling in the data portion of ICMP\_ECHO and ECHOREPLY

Attacker install Loki on compromised server: requires root, grabs incoming ICMP packets

Can also use UDP 53 to disguise as DNS

Can switch between UDP and ICMP

Encryption supported

Covert Channel:

The message is hidden within the traffic of legitimate communications channel.

## Network Steganography:

The message is hidden within the traffic of a legitimate comm channel

### Common Example: Tunnel inside TCP 80

Tunneling - encapsulating one protocol into another protocol.

- Very common method for even legitimate applications is to tunnel their communications over TCP 80.

- Other methods include tunneling inside SSH and GRE tunneling.

GRE: GRE protocol, or Generic Routing Encapsulation, is ==a tunneling protocol developed by Cisco that encapsulates packets of one network protocol within another.

- This causes problems for firewalls that rely on restricting traffic by IP and source/destination port

- Application layer firewalls dig deeper into the packets and can filter by the application itself.

### covert\_tcp:

1. IP Identification method: ID field is a 16 bit number used for TCP segmentation. Supposed to be a random number. You can fit insert a single ASCII charactr and receive it at the other end
2. TCP sequence Number method: Send SYN with ADCII character as the initial sequence number, reply with rst, rst actuall acks the receipt of the hidden character
3. TCP ACK #: sender bounces this information of an unwitting intermediate party

#### Exercise #5

Explain the three functions of covert\_tcp

What are another three places (aside from the covert\_tcp functions) where data can be hidden while still allowing TCP to work correctly?

. IP Identification method: ID field is a 16 bit number used for TCP segmentation. Supposed to be a random number. You can fit insert a single ASCII charactr and receive it at the other end

2. TCP sequence Number method: Send SYN with ADCII character as the initial sequence number, reply with rst, rst actuall acks the receipt of the hidden character

3. TCP ACK #: sender bounces this information of an unwitting intermediate party

You can hide in Checksum, options, source port # (supposed to be randomly generated)

### Reverse WWW shell

Covert channel using HTTP

Reverse WWW shell

### Advanced Exfiltration

Exfiltration canuse any common network protocols: DNS, HTTP, Email, upload to Websites (Pastebin, Dropbox)

Data Loss Prevention: a class of tools used to prevent accidental or intentional exfiltration of data

Host Based and network based (email gateway, web proxy)

Identification of sensitive data

Regular Expression

Keywords

Data Tagging

Monitors portable devices (e.g., USB flash drives)

Removal of Evidence

Altering Event Logs - deleting is very obvious, might want to edit instead

Logs in Windows: stored in registry

EventLog is logging server

File end with .LOG

Application, Security, System

This info is moved to main event logs files, Windows usually locks these files so normal processes can't be edited

Unix Logging

Log files are usually in ASCII

With privilege they are easy to edit

Shell History Files store history of shell commands

Exercise #6:

How can we retain logs after an attacker has breached the system?

Send logs to external service (Splunk, ELK, etc), log redundancy and backups

Exercise A:

Describe three methods attackers use to maintain access on a compromised system. What are ways to detect each method?

Create a backdoor - a hidden entry point into the system. This can be detected with unusual network connections, weird processes, and anti-malware scans.

Credential Theft - stealing user credentials like username/password combinations. This can be detected with multifactor authentication.

Installing malware on operating system - can be detected with tools that monitor the kernel