

# Investing in Your Future? How the Cost of University Shapes Labour Market Outcomes

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## Abstract

Increases in the cost of higher education raise concerns about the returns to human capital and the extent to which financial barriers restrict access, yet little is known about these effects in settings without credit constraints. I exploit a natural experiment in which the UK government substantially raised the cap on university tuition fees to estimate the causal impact on enrolment and early-career labour market outcomes using a difference-in-discontinuities design. The evidence shows that higher tuition fees reduced overall university enrolment, primarily through a fall in participation at less selective institutions, consistent with students becoming more responsive to expected returns. Students from low-income backgrounds were not disproportionately affected, likely due to the UK's income-contingent loan system, which mitigates credit constraints. Overall, the cohort affected by the reform was more likely to enter higher-paying industries by ages 24–25. These findings provide new evidence that a reduction in state subsidies to higher education can reshape, rather than diminish, human-capital investment when supported by a progressive loan system.

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# 1 Introduction

The cost of higher education plays a central role in human capital investment, shaping both individual decisions to pursue further study and governments' willingness to subsidise that investment. Classic human capital models predict that individuals invest in higher education when the present value of future returns, net of costs, exceeds the value of entering the labour market directly (Becker 1964). An exogenous increase in the cost of university is therefore expected to reduce overall demand, with the largest declines among those pursuing lower-return subjects and institutions. Much of the existing literature focuses on credit constraints, which prevent individuals from financing education even when it would be privately optimal (Black et al. 2023).

This study examines a reform that allows this friction to be largely set aside. The UK's 2012 tuition fee reform substantially increased the headline cost of university while simultaneously raising the income threshold for student-loan repayment. The poorest third of students faced lower effective costs (Britton et al. 2020), while others faced higher effective costs. Because all students had access to government-backed income-contingent loans, credit constraints were effectively mitigated, providing a clear test of how a reduction in state subsidies affects the decision to pursue higher education and subsequent labour market choices.

The theoretical predictions are straightforward. Students with low expected returns to higher education will rationally choose not to enrol; enrolment in institutions with lower projected returns will fall the most; and, due to the progressive loan design, low-income individuals should not be disproportionately affected. These predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence presented in this paper.

I estimate the causal effect of a large tuition fee increase on university participation and early career labour market outcomes. The reform raised fees sharply and uniformly across England and Wales, limiting the scope for substitution across institutions or regions. I find that students were around four percentage points less likely to enrol in university, with the decline concentrated

in institutions with lower expected returns. Students from low-income backgrounds were not differentially affected, and if anything exhibited a smaller decline in their enrolment. Individuals exposed to the reform were, however, more likely to enter industries above the median in pay by age 25, with this effect strongest among graduates, who exhibited a 1.8 percentage point increase in selection into higher-paying sectors.

To identify these effects, I exploit the alignment of the 2012 reform with England's school-entry cut-off, using a difference-in-discontinuities design to test whether the discontinuity between Summer and Autumn-born students changed following the reform. Students born after September 1st enter school one academic year later than those born just before the cut-off, generating a predictable age-at-entry discontinuity in educational outcomes. My design tests whether that discontinuity changed in the 2012 cohort, providing a clean measure of the policy's causal effect.

I draw on population-wide administrative data linking the National Pupil Database (NPD), Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) records, and HMRC tax and benefits data. This Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO) dataset allows me to track entire cohorts from secondary school through university and into the labour market. I focus on cohorts entering university between 2007 and 2014, estimating effects on overall enrolment, enrolment at selective institutions, and early career industry selection.

I find three main results. First, the fee increase led to a four percentage point reduction in university enrolment. Second, this decline occurred primarily in less selective institutions and among students with lower A-level attainment, consistent with students responding to higher costs by avoiding universities with lower returns. There is no evidence of heterogeneity in this response by socioeconomic background or other demographics, though the decline in enrolment for low income students was estimated to be lower than the overall effect. This suggests that the design of the student loan system effectively shielded credit-constrained individuals, though further evidence through the use of an interacted regression was unable to confirm this. Finally,

I find that the probability of employment in higher-paying industries rose for both graduates and non-graduates, indicating that the reform improved labour market outcomes by encouraging a more rational sorting of individuals between higher education and the labour market without widening inequality.

This paper contributes to understanding how cost-sharing in higher education influences both efficiency and equity. When governments shift a greater share of higher education costs to individuals, students appear to respond by making more economically rational enrolment decisions, reallocating away from low-return institutions and joining the labour market earlier. These behavioural responses can reduce public spending without substantially harming access or outcomes.

While previous literature has typically focused on credit-constrained subgroups, I show that a well-designed income-contingent loan system can effectively eliminate these constraints for low-income students, ensuring that those with high potential are not deterred from attending university even as individuals are required to contribute financially. Methodologically, this paper leverages linked administrative data that cover the full population of students in England, enabling outcomes to be followed well into adulthood. Unlike many prior studies, my design captures long-run effects and avoids selective substitution, as the reform applied universally across England and Wales, leaving no scope for students to avoid treatment by choosing an alternative region or institution.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 provides institutional background on the UK higher education system and the 2012 reform. Section 4 describes the data sources and sample construction. Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the main findings, and Section 7 reports robustness checks and additional analyses. Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Related Literature

Human capital theory provides the foundational framework for understanding individuals' decisions to pursue higher education. In this framework, students weigh the upfront costs of university such as tuition fees, living expenses, and foregone earnings against the expected long-term returns in the form of higher wages and improved employment prospects [(Becker 1964); (Mincer 1974)]. In a perfectly informed and credit-unconstrained world, individuals would invest in education up to the point where the marginal return equals the marginal cost.

In practice, several frictions can lead to underinvestment. Young people may lack reliable information about the returns to different degrees, or may be influenced by local norms or cultural expectations that discourage university attendance [(Jensen 2010); (Hoxby and Turner 2015)]. In addition, capital markets often fail to allocate resources efficiently to individuals with high potential but low current income, due to the non-collateralisable nature of human capital (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2011). These factors provide a rationale for public investment in higher education, both to correct underinvestment and to promote intergenerational mobility. Government funding may also be justified on the basis of positive externalities such as innovation, civic engagement, and productivity spillovers, that are not fully captured in private returns.

A large international literature has examined how financial incentives affect higher education participation and attainment, though most studies focus on changes in student aid rather than direct changes in costs. In the United States, generous need-based grant programs have been shown to increase university enrolment and persistence, particularly among low-income students [(Dynarski 2003); (Bettinger 2004); (Castleman and Long 2016)]. Similar effects are found for targeted information or application assistance interventions, which reduce behavioural barriers to university entry [(Bettinger et al. 2012); (Hoxby et al. 2013)].

This literature extends into the impact of financial aid on the labour market more broadly. Increases in financial aid at the federal level have been shown to increase degree completion,

improve later life earnings, and increased debt does not appear to have any impact on home ownership rates or default [(Black et al. 2023); (Denning et al. 2019)]. These benefits have even been shown to be a net financial benefit for the federal government (Denning et al. 2019).

However, these studies generally examine changes to the effective price for a narrow set of students, such as those just above or below eligibility thresholds, and rarely capture broader, population-level responses to cost. Moreover, much of this literature focuses on the impact of changing aid structures which is conceptually different from an increase in tuition costs. Increases in loan aid help to mitigate the impact of under-allocation of capital to low-income students with high potential, while increases in tuition cost affects the decision to invest in human capital from a lifetime return perspective. The institutional features of the UK reform enable a clearer test of the causal impact of higher education costs on behaviour and outcomes at scale.

The UK literature has focused primarily on the educational effects of higher tuition fees, with relatively little attention paid to labour market outcomes, largely due to historical data limitations. Consistent with theoretical predictions and the evidence presented in this paper, higher tuition costs have been shown to reduce university enrolment, particularly in subjects with lower expected returns [(Dearden et al. 2011); (Sá 2014)]. However, existing studies have not examined how such reforms affect degree persistence, academic performance, or progression to postgraduate study, leaving important dimensions of educational behaviour and attainment underexplored.

The most closely related study to this paper finds relatively limited effects of the 2012 tuition fee reform on student outcomes (Azmat and Simion 2021). In contrast to the broader UK literature and the findings presented here, the authors report no meaningful change in overall university enrolment or in the composition of subject choice by expected return. Their labour market analysis similarly suggests minimal effects on pay and employment outcomes.

However, the identification strategy in this study may be confounded by concurrent policy changes such as the 2015 raising of the compulsory schooling age to 18 and the removal of the student numbers cap, which both were intended to increase enrolment independently of tu-

ition fees. Moreover, their analysis relies on the Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey, which captures a single snapshot of employment status six months after graduation and offers only static, short-term outcomes. In contrast, this paper leverages administrative tax and education records to follow full cohorts of students over multiple years, allowing for a more comprehensive assessment of the long-run effects of the reform on both educational attainment and labour market trajectories.

### **3 Institutional Background**

In the decades following WWII, the funding of students into higher education was largely done by local authorities, an approach which was formalised by the passage of the Education Act (1962). This mandated that local Education Authorities pay tuition fees and provide maintenance grants for eligible full-time university students (UK Parliament 1962). In practice, the 1962 Act made undergraduate education effectively free at the point of use across the UK. Students received means-tested grants for living costs and tuition, which were non-repayable, enabling those from less affluent backgrounds to attend university without upfront financial barriers.

The drive for higher education was summarised in the Robbins Report commissioned by the UK government and published in 1963, which made several recommendations including the expansion of the entire university system and with a focus on a holistic approach to research and teaching (Committee on Higher Education 1963). The report inadvertently summarised the economic case for higher education being free at the point of use: namely that there were considerable positive social and financial externalities, and that the growth of the economy and tax receipts would likely lead to a positive return on investment for the government.

This assumption began to be challenged in the 1990s. Student numbers had grown rapidly and funding per pupil had declined by 40% between the early 1980s and 1997 which put considerable pressure on university budgets (Dearden et al. 2011). Along with funding issues, the case for

higher education having a positive return on investment to the exchequer had begun to wane. The Dearing Report (1997) noted that the introduction of a cost sharing approach would be equitable since graduates were the primary beneficiaries of university education (National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education 1997).

Britton et al. (2020) estimate the lifetime public and private returns for students attending higher education institutions in the 1990s and 2000s, finding that while there is a considerable average return on investment of tax receipts net of public subsidies, these returns are mostly driven by the highest earning individuals. Indeed, the report finds that total returns (including tax receipts and the private wage premium associated with university) was negative for up to 30% of people.

### **3.1 Post-1998 Reforms**

Following the Dearing report, the Labour government passed the Teaching and Higher Education Act (1998). The Act introduced annual tuition fees of £1,000 for public higher education institutions (HEIs), to be paid upfront by students (UK-Government 1998). At the same time, maintenance grants were abolished and replaced with income-contingent maintenance loans (Hillman 2013). The change introduced a cost sharing approach to funding higher education, with the government still shouldering the majority of the burden, and exemptions were made for students from low income families. It is worth noting that, following devolution in 1999, the different UK nations began to diverge in tuition fee policy even as £1,000 fees were introduced UK-wide.


Scotland initially implemented a “graduate endowment” system (a one-time payment after graduation in lieu of upfront fees) and by 2007 abolished tuition fees entirely for Scottish-domiciled undergraduates at Scottish universities (Sá 2014). By the early 2000s, the £1,000 fee cap was yielding limited revenue and universities remained under financial strain amid growing student numbers. There was also public dissatisfaction with the requirement that fees be paid upfront, which was seen as a barrier to access. The government responded with a second major



reform: the Higher Education Act 2004, which ushered in a system of “variable” tuition fees up to a new higher cap of £3,000 per year (UK Parliament 2004). These changes took effect from the 2006–07 academic year.

Crucially, under the 2004 Act students would no longer pay tuition fees upfront. Instead, fees would be covered by government-backed student loans, and repayment would be deferred until after graduation, with graduates repaying their tuition (and maintenance) loans on an income-contingent basis of 9% of their earnings above a £15,000 per year threshold (UK Parliament 2004). Any remaining loan would be written off after 25 years. This once again made university free at the point of use, though reduced an individual’s lifetime income through an effective graduate tax. This detail is important since it makes the UK literature distinct from the US, where much of the debate around funding centres on an under-allocation of capital to students who cannot use their potential as collateral for student loans.


In 2010, economic recession as well as the declining real value of capped tuition fees once again began to put pressure on university finances. The government commissioned another review into student funding and finance, the Browne report was published in October 2010 and its recommendations accepted by the government in November of the same year. It advocated a radical, market driven change to increase the cap on tuition fees up to £9,000 a year for the 2012-13 academic cohort (Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance 2010). In theory, this was intended to create a free market for fees to drive efficiency gains, but in practice almost all universities began charging the maximum immediately after the policy came into effect in the 2012-13 academic year (House of Commons Library 2018).



The reform also shifted the repayment threshold from just below £16,000 to £21,000 a year, increased the duration of payment from 25 to 30 years, and introduced a new higher interest rate (House of Commons Library 2018). In practice, this meant that the policy was more progressive as the lowest earners may have indeed been paying less per month than under the older policy (Britton et al. 2017). The reforms are summarised in figure 1.

The graph shows the main discontinuities between 1998 and 2024, with the 2012 increase clearly being a substantial outlier in terms of increased costs. Figure 2 displays trends in undergraduate enrolment over the sample period. There is a general pattern of year-on-year growth in student numbers, with a notable exception in 2012, where enrolment drops sharply—coinciding with the introduction of the higher tuition fee cap. Although participation rates begin to recover in subsequent years, they appear to do so at a slower pace than the pre-reform trend. Not shown in the graph are other reforms that occurred in the same or later years that may have affected enrolment in subsequent years such as the requirement that students continue to post 16 education or the relaxation of the university student number cap.

Figure 2



## 4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

This paper uses data from the Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO) dataset. This administrative panel links data from school censuses stored in the National Pupil Database (NPD) on student characteristics to the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) which collects data on students' university choices and outcomes. This is then matched further to administrative HMRC data on earnings, employment, and benefits registered within the UK. This leaves me with a longitudinal panel with coverage of over 30 million people across a 22 year period (1998-2020) from which I select a sample of students from the 2007/08, 2009/10 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14, and 2014/15 academic years at university.

Personal characteristics contained within the NPD are used for heterogeneity analysis. Family income is not included within the NPD data, so an indicator for whether an individual had access to free school meals in year 11, a means-tested program for children from low-income backgrounds, is used as a proxy for childhood poverty.

The aim of this paper is to identify the causal impact of the exogenous increase in tuition fees on student outcomes. As the reform was announced two years in advance of its implementation in the 2012 academic year, there exists the potential for anticipatory behavioural responses. In

particular, students from earlier cohorts who were undecided about university attendance or delayed entry (e.g., via a gap year) may have accelerated their enrolment to avoid the higher fee regime. To address this concern, the analysis is restricted to individuals who entered university in the academic year immediately following their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday, thereby focusing on those enrolling at the typical age.

While it remains possible that some individuals who might otherwise have delayed entry chose instead to enrol immediately due to the fee announcement, thereby inflating participation rates in the pre-reform period, no evidence of this is found. Strangely, it appears students begin to reduce their enrolment in university in the year prior to the implementation of fees. This is possibly due to students mistakenly believing that the fee increase would occur immediately after the announcement was made, rather than being delayed until the 2012 academic year.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for first-year university entrants immediately before and after the 2012 tuition fee reform. The overall composition of entrants remained relatively stable between the 2011 and 2012 cohorts, with the exception that enrolment in undergraduate degrees declined by 2.3 percentage points. The share of female students remained unchanged at around 56 percent. The proportion of non-white entrants rose slightly, from 24 to 25 percent, and the share of students eligible for free school meals increased marginally from 9 to almost 10 percent. There was also a small rise in the proportion of entrants from areas with historically low university participation. Notably, however, the share of entrants attending more selective institutions increased from 45 to 48 percent, suggesting that while overall enrolment fell, students who did enrol were increasingly concentrated in higher-ranked institutions.

Table A.1 in the appendix gives the overall demographic composition of 2011 and 2012 cohorts. While women make up roughly half of the overall population (about 50 percent), they account for a larger share of university entrants, at around 56 percent. Conversely, students eligible for free school meals and those from areas with low university participation remain underrepresented in higher education, despite small increases in their overall population shares between

Table 1: University Entrant Characteristics Before and After the 2012 Fee Reform

	2011	2012
Enrolment into university (%)	24.8	22.5
Female (%)	55.7	55.7
Non-white (%)	24.3	25.3
Eligible for FSM (%)	9.0	9.6
From low university-share area (%)	56.0	56.8
Attending above-average institution (%)	44.8	47.9

*Notes:* This table reports the share of first-year university entrants by key demographic and background characteristics in 2011 (pre-reform) and 2012 (post-reform). FSM = Free School Meals. “Low university-share area” indicates local areas with below-average university participation in 2011. “Attending above-average institution” refers to institutions ranked above the median in terms of average A-level points of entrants.

2011 and 2012. The share of non-white individuals rose slightly in both the general cohort and among university entrants, which could have contributed mechanically to a modest rise in university participation rates given the higher enrolment propensity among these groups.

## 5 Methodology

This paper asks whether a sharp increase in the cost of university affected students’ decisions about whether to attend, what to study, and how they fared in the labour market. Estimating the causal effect of higher education costs on these outcomes is difficult, as tuition fees typically evolve alongside other policy changes, such as reforms to the generosity of maintenance support. Broader macroeconomic shocks, such as the financial crisis, may also confound simple comparisons. Students facing a weak labour market may enrol in university as a form of strategic delay. These factors make it challenging to isolate the effect of tuition fee changes from other influences on educational and labour market decisions.

To overcome this, I exploit a natural experiment created by the structure of England’s school-entry system and the timing of the 2012 tuition fee reform. In England, children are placed into academic cohorts based on their birthdate, with a strict cutoff on 1 September. Those born just before the cutoff (e.g. in August) enter school a full year earlier than those born just after




Figure 3: Probability of university enrolment by month of birth, centred at 0 for September-born students, illustrating the discontinuity around the academic year cutoff.

(e.g. in September), even though they are only days apart in age. This leads to sharp and well-documented differences in long-term outcomes, including university attendance and earnings, between children born on either side of the cutoff, commonly referred to as the "Relative Age Effect" [(McPhillips and Jordan-Black 2009); (Campbell 2013); (Crawford et al. 2013); (Russell and Startup 1986); (Crawford et al. 2014)]. I show evidence of this premium in Figure 3, with September born individuals being significantly more likely to enrol in university, with a steady decline in each subsequent birth month. Across my sample, students born in August are more than 3 percentage points less likely to enrol in university compared to those born in September.

The 2012 tuition fee reform raised the maximum university fee from £3,375 to £9,000 for students entering higher education from September 2012 onwards. Because students enter university in the academic year following their 18th birthday, those born in September 1993 or later were the first cohort fully exposed to the higher fees, while those born just before the cutoff were not. This creates a sharp shift in policy exposure that aligns with the existing school-entry discontinuity.

My identification strategy exploits this structure by examining whether the relative age effect

deviates from its usual pattern in the 2012 university entry cohort. If the tuition fee increase had no effect, we would expect the size of the relative age effect to remain stable across cohorts. A change in the size of the discontinuity that occurs only in the cohort affected by the reform can therefore be interpreted as the causal effect of the policy. This approach, known as a difference-in-discontinuities design, leverages two sources of plausibly exogenous variation: the sharp birthdate cutoff that determines school entry, and the policy reform that raised tuition fees for a specific cohort. I therefore estimate a regression model of the following form:

$$Y_{i,m,t} = \alpha + \tau(D_i \cdot \text{Fee}_i) + \gamma D_i + \text{Fee}_i + \beta_1 X_{i,t} + \gamma + \epsilon_{i,m,t}$$

Where  $Y_{i,c}$  Is the outcome of individual  $i$  with month of birth  $m$  and year of birth  $t$ . This could be grades, degree choice or classification, or wages.  $\alpha$  is the intercept term.  $D_i$  is the RDD treatment indicator, equal to 1 if individual  $i$  in cohort  $c$  was born in the first four months of the academic year, and 0 otherwise.  $\text{Fee}_i$  is the Post-treatment indicator, equal to 1 for the cohort affected by the tuition fee change, and 0 for all other cohorts.  $X_{i,t}$  is the month of birth of individual  $i$ .  $\gamma$  is the year of birth fixed effects term, ensuring we capture individuals at the age cut-off for the academic year.  $\epsilon_{i,m,t}$  is the error term, capturing unobserved factors affecting wages that vary by individual within each cohort.

$\tau$  is the interaction of  $D_{i,c}$  and  $\text{Post}_c$ , is the coefficient of interest, which represents the difference-in-discontinuities estimator. This is the change in discontinuity that occurs in the year tuition fees were increased. Conceptually, I am measuring the gap between Summer-born and Autumn-born individuals, and measuring whether this gap gets significantly bigger or smaller in the cohort with increased fees. All specifications cluster at the cohort level.

The key identifying assumption of this model is that no other policy or cohort-specific shock affected any of the cohorts in my sample. I show in section 7 that the results are robust to expanding or changing the estimation window, as well as reducing the window that defines a 'Septem-

ber birth'. One potential concern is changes to loan aid during this time, however any changes evolved smoothly across the sample period and should therefore be conceptually differenced out by the estimation (House of Commons Library 2018).

A further potential concern is that some Summer-born students may defer school entry to avoid the so-called birthday penalty. For this to bias the results, there would need to be a substantial and cohort-specific increase in delayed entry among those who later faced higher tuition fees in 2012. Any gradual trend in delayed entry over time would, in principle, be absorbed by the difference-in-discontinuities design. Figure A.1 plots the share of students who delay entry into primary school by university entry cohort. The proportion is very small, approximately 0.5 percent, and there is no evidence of any discontinuous change around the affected cohort. As an additional precaution, the main analysis excludes individuals whose date of birth does not align with the standard academic year of entry.


## 6 Results

Figure 4 presents the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on the probability of university enrolment for cohorts entering between 2008 and 2012. The first four estimates serve as placebo tests, capturing estimated discontinuities for cohorts unaffected by any fee reform. These are estimated excluding the 2012 discontinuity, since including it would bias the estimated birthday premium downward and thereby inflate the placebo estimates. Because the 2012 cohort is omitted, the 2011 cohort cannot be separately identified due to collinearity with the year-of-birth fixed effects, and is therefore not estimated in the central specification.

The estimates remain close to zero in the pre-reform years, indicating stable enrolment patterns prior to the tuition fee increase. In 2012, however, there is a sharp decline of around four percentage points in the likelihood of university entry, representing a substantial contraction in participation coinciding with the introduction of higher fees. This is well above the 2.3-



Figure 4  
Enrolment



Note: Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on the probability of university enrolment for cohorts entering between 2008 and 2012. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database and Higher Education Statistical Agency censuses.


percentage-point decline observed between the 2011 and 2012 entry cohorts, and corresponds to a decline of 13,595 students or a 9% decline in enrolment.

Given the substantial decline in overall university enrolment shown in Figure 4, the next step is to examine how the composition of enrolment changed across institutions. Conditional on students deciding to attend university, Figure 5 plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects for enrolment at universities above the median in selectivity<sup>1</sup>. This analysis captures whether students became more or less likely to enter higher-ranked institutions following the reform.

The estimates show a marked increase in the likelihood of attending a higher-ranked institution following the 2012 fee reform, suggesting that while fewer students enrolled overall, those who did were increasingly concentrated in more selective universities. This pattern implies that higher tuition fees may have discouraged marginal applicants, who are typically more likely to attend lower-ranked institutions, while leaving enrolment at top universities relatively unaffected. Consequently, the reform appears to have intensified the stratification of higher education partici-

<sup>1</sup>Selectivity is defined by ranking institutions according to the average A-level points of their entering students.

pation, shifting the composition of entrants toward students with stronger academic backgrounds or higher expected returns.




Note: Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on the probability of enrolment at universities above the median in selectivity. Estimates are conditional on entry into university. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database and Higher Education Statistical Agency censuses.

The preceding results suggest that the overall decline in university enrolment following the 2012 fee reform was driven primarily by marginal students opting out of higher education. To explore this directly, Appendix Figure A.3 interacts the difference-in-discontinuity estimator with measures of academic ability, captured by total A-level point scores. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant, indicating that higher-ability students were more likely to enrol following the reform. This finding supports the interpretation that the fee increase disproportionately deterred lower-ability students, consistent with a tightening of the ability margin for university participation.

This pattern raises a broader concern about potential distributional effects. If academic ability is correlated with other observable characteristics such as socioeconomic background, ethnicity, or gender, then the reform’s impact may have been uneven across groups. The reform therefore has the potential to widen existing participation gaps, such as those observed for students eligible for free school meals during secondary school.

Figure 6 presents enrolment trends separately for key demographic subgroups. The decline in university entry appears broadly similar across groups, with no subgroup exhibiting a markedly larger reduction in participation. Notably, those who had access to free school meals program (an indicator of childhood deprivation) appear to exhibit a smaller and precisely estimated decline in enrolment of only 2 percentage points. To observe this outcome specifically, Figure A.3, interacts these demographic variables with the difference-in-discontinuity estimator. The interaction terms are small and statistically insignificant, providing no evidence of heterogeneous effects along these dimensions, except for women who appear to benefit from the reform. Though, it should be noted, many data points are lost through the use of this interaction term, so it remains a possibility that students from low socioeconomic incurred a smaller reduction in enrolment.

Figure 6



Note: Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on university enrolment by key demographic subgroups, including gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic background. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database and Higher Education Statistical Agency censuses.

## 6.1 Employment Outcomes

Having established that the tuition fee reform reduced overall enrolment while shifting participation toward higher-ranked universities and higher-ability students, the next step is to consider the longer-term labour market implications. Figure 7 Shows the estimated effect of selecting into any job in the 12 months after graduating from university. Students within the tuition fee cohort are about 2 percentage points more likely to select into employment in the first year, though this says nothing of the quality of employment.




Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on the probability of gaining employment in the year following graduation among university graduates, comparing cohorts entering higher education before and after the 2012 tuition fee reform. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database, the Higher Education Statistical Agency census, and HMRC earnings and industry data.

Figure 8 examines the distribution of individuals across industries by average pay, focusing on whether cohorts exposed to the fee increase were more likely to be employed in higher-paying sectors by ages 24–25. The estimates indicate an increase of around 0.8 percentage points in the probability of working in industries above the median of the earnings distribution. Importantly, this effect is estimated for the full cohort rather than for graduates alone, suggesting that the reform was associated with a modest but broad-based improvement in early-career employment outcomes. This pattern implies that, despite the decline in overall university participation, those

entering the labour market after the reform were increasingly concentrated in higher-paying sectors. These results point to a rational resorting of individuals in response to the fee increase, which appears to benefit their early career paths.




Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on the probability of working in industries above the median of the earnings distribution, comparing cohorts entering higher education before and after the 2012 tuition fee reform. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database, the Higher Education Statistical Agency census, and HMRC earnings and industry data.

To examine whether these labour market effects differ by educational attainment, I re-estimate the analysis separately for university graduates in Figure 9. When focusing on graduates only, the estimated increase in the probability of working in industries above the median of the earnings distribution is around 1.8 percentage points, compared to 0.8 percentage points in the full cohort. This indicates that the improvement in labour market outcomes is present for both graduates and non-graduates, but is substantially stronger among those who attended university. This pattern is consistent with earlier evidence showing that, following the fee reform, university entrants were increasingly drawn from higher-ranked institutions and higher-ability groups. The results therefore suggest that the reform not only changed who went to university, but also contributed to a stronger alignment between students' academic ability and their eventual labour market placements.




Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on the probability of working in industries above the median of the earnings distribution, comparing graduates entering higher education before and after the 2012 tuition fee reform. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database, the Higher Education Statistical Agency census, and HMRC earnings and industry data.

Lastly, Figure A.4 re-estimates the graph for those who do not attend university. The estimated coefficient for the 2012 cohort is positive and significant, though the placebos are highly volatile in the preceding years which potentially confound the result

## 7 Robustness

Placebo tests are embedded directly within the difference-in-discontinuities estimation framework in the results section. By estimating the discontinuity for multiple pre-reform cohorts, I can assess whether any observed changes in the treatment year reflect underlying trends rather than the tuition fee reform itself. In the placebo years, the estimated difference in discontinuities fluctuates noisily around zero, consistent with the absence of any systematic effect. Consequently, the associated standard errors appear larger in these years, reflecting the greater uncertainty around an effect that is expected to be null. In contrast, in the treatment year (2012), the estimate is both statistically precise and markedly negative, producing narrower confidence intervals. This

pattern supports the interpretation that the estimated discontinuity shift in 2012 reflects the causal impact of the reform rather than random variation across cohorts.

A second robustness check extends the bandwidth around the September school-entry cutoff from one to four months to assess the sensitivity of the results to the definition of the discontinuity window. The educational results are highly stable across all specifications: the decline in overall enrolment and the shift toward more selective institutions remain of similar magnitude and significance as the bandwidth widens. In contrast, the labour market estimates become less precise when using wider bandwidths, although the direction and approximate size of the effects are consistent with the main results. When the analysis is restricted to undergraduate degree holders, the labour market effects remain strong and statistically significant across all bandwidths, reinforcing the conclusion that the main findings are not driven by arbitrary bandwidth choice.

A third robustness check varies the window of observation to ensure that the results are not confounded by macroeconomic conditions surrounding the Great Recession. In particular, I exclude the 2008 and 2009 cohorts, which may capture cyclical effects unrelated to the tuition fee reform, and re-estimate the models using a restricted sample from 2010 to 2014. All central results remain robust to this narrower specification. Where estimates do change, the direction of the effect is consistent with the main findings—for example, the estimated increase in selection into higher-paying industries becomes smaller but remains positive. The attenuation likely reflects the substantial reduction in sample size when omitting early cohorts, which reduces statistical precision rather than altering the underlying relationships.

A final robustness check considers the potential influence of delayed school entry on the identification strategy. The difference-in-discontinuities design relies on the assumption that the timing of school entry around the September cutoff is stable across cohorts. Any systematic change in the proportion of parents choosing to delay their child's entry could bias the estimated discontinuity if it occurred specifically for the cohort first exposed to the higher tuition fees. For this to pose a threat to identification, there would need to be a large and abrupt increase in delayed

entry among children starting school in 1998, corresponding to the cohort entering university in 2012. Such a shift is highly unlikely given the policy environment and observed long-run stability in school delayed-entry patterns, which remain stable at around 0.5%.

## 8 Conclusion

This paper investigates how a sharp increase in tuition fees affected university enrolment, attainment, and early career outcomes in England and Wales by exploiting a natural experiment induced by the timing of the reform in conjunction with the placement of students within an academic year. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design and population-wide linked administrative data I isolate the causal effect of higher private costs in a setting where credit constraints are mitigated by an income-contingent loan system, offering new evidence on how the price of higher education shapes human capital investment and labour market trajectories.

I show that higher tuition fees reduced overall university enrolment, with the decline concentrated among less selective institutions and among students with lower prior attainment. There is no evidence of heterogeneous effects by gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic background, suggesting that the loan system's progressive design helped insulate disadvantaged groups from the deterrent effect of higher costs. On the labour market side, the reform did not weaken outcomes but instead reshaped them. Both graduates and non-graduates became more likely to work in higher-paying industries, with a particularly strong effect among graduates. Taken together, the results indicate that the 2012 tuition fee reform led to a smaller but stronger university cohort and a more efficient matching of individuals to education and employment pathways, without widening socioeconomic inequalities.

This issue is topical, with many UK universities currently operating under severe financial strain coupled with the political difficulty governments face in raising fees sharply while avoiding backlash. My findings indicate that increases in fees, if well-paired with income-contingent



repayment and targeted support, can help preserve access for disadvantaged students while giving institutions more breathing space. Given universities' squeezed margins, policy options like indexing fees to inflation, easing the proposed levy on international student income, and reducing regulatory burdens could maintain institutional viability without severely harming equity. In particular, the evidence suggests that fee hikes should be accompanied by reforms in loan repayment thresholds and greater transparency over returns by field of study, so that both students and policymakers can weigh costs and benefits more clearly.

Viewed in an international context, the UK occupies a middle ground. A fully private system, such as in the United States, generates world-leading universities but often leaves access inequitable and capital under-allocated to high-ability students from poorer backgrounds. By contrast, fully public systems with no or minimal fees promote greater parity but risk budget constraints and higher enrolment in low-return degrees. The UK's cost-sharing model, with income-contingent repayment at its core, has so far allowed institutions to remain globally competitive while protecting disadvantaged students from being priced out. The challenge for policymakers is therefore not whether to subsidise or privatise, but how to calibrate fee and loan structures so that universities remain financially sustainable without undermining access or efficiency. The evidence in this paper suggests that the UK has managed to successfully balance this trade-off.

Overall, this paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, it provides rare population-level evidence consistent with the predictions of human capital theory: higher private costs reduced participation, particularly in less selective institutions, while disadvantaged students were shielded from harm by an income-contingent loan system. Second, it extends the UK evidence base by moving beyond university applications and enrolment to track labour market outcomes using rich administrative data. Unlike prior studies that rely on survey snapshots or are confounded by overlapping reforms, this paper isolates the causal impact of tuition fees and demonstrates how cost-sharing can shape both who attends university and the outcomes they achieve. More broadly, it contributes to the policy debate by showing that fee increases, when

paired with progressive repayment design, need not undermine equity and can even improve the alignment between enrolment decisions, expected returns, and fiscal sustainability.

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# Appendix Figures and Tables

Table A.1: Overall Cohort Characteristics, 2011 vs 2012

	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
Female (%)	49.8	49.7
Non-white (%)	17.5	18.0
Eligible for FSM (%)	12.9	13.5
From low university-share area (%)	62.1	62.8

*Notes:* Shares are calculated for the full cohort of school leavers in 2011 and 2012.  
FSM = Free School Meals. “Low university-share area” indicates local areas with below-average university participation in 2011.




Figure A.1: Figure shows the proportion of students who delay school entry by one year by cohort across the sample.







Figure A.2: Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on the probability of university enrolment for cohorts entering between 2008 and 2012. Estimates are interacted with the total points scored at A-level, a proxy of student ability. Estimates are conditional on entry into university. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database and Higher Education Statistical Agency censuses.

Figure A.3



Note: Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on university enrolment by key demographic subgroups, including gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic background. Estimates are interacted with these subgroups to observe the differential effect on enrolment trends. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database and Higher Education Statistical Agency censuses.




Figure A.4: Figure plots the estimated difference-in-discontinuity effects on the probability of working in industries above the median of the earnings distribution, comparing cohorts entering higher education before and after the 2012 tuition fee reform. Estimates are conditional on not attending university. Data come from the 1998–2020 National Pupil Database, the Higher Education Statistical Agency census, and HMRC earnings and industry data.

Table A.2: Difference-in-Discontinuity Estimates by Cohort and Outcome

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>Enrolment into university</b>	0.012	0.001	0.001	–	-0.040
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)		(0.004)
Observations	717,905	717,905	717,905	–	818,425
<b>Enrolment into selective university</b>	-0.009	-0.010	-0.022	–	0.043
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)		(0.007)
Observations	317,550	317,550	317,550	–	361,520
<b>Enrolment for women</b>	0.020	0.001	0.003	–	-0.035
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)		(0.006)
Observations	356,355	356,355	356,355	–	404,955
<b>Enrolment for FSM</b>	-0.011	-0.004	0.011	–	-0.026
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)		(0.006)
Observations	95,305	95,305	95,305	–	108,805
<b>Enrolment for non-white</b>	0.039	0.009	-0.003	–	-0.039
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)		(0.009)
Observations	126,345	126,345	126,345	–	144,845
<b>Enrolment for low university participation area</b>	0.004	-0.005	0.002	–	-0.030
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)		(0.004)
Observations	439,175	439,175	439,175	–	501,640
<b>Employed within first year of Graduation</b>	-0.012	-0.019	-0.025	–	0.020
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.008)
Observations	921,095	921,095	921,095	–	1,038,875
<b>Above median pay industry</b>	-0.004	0.004	0.003	–	0.007
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.001)
Observations	1,063,585	1,063,585	1,063,585	–	1,220,990
<b>Above median pay industry - Graduates</b>	-0.000	0.003	-0.003	–	0.018
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)
Observations	331,330	331,330	331,330	–	380,925
<b>Enrolment interacted with ability</b>	0.005	0.001	-0.007	–	-0.026
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)
Observations	407,165	407,165	407,165	–	467,500
<b>Enrolment interacted with female</b>	0.005	0.001	0.010	–	0.012
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)
Observations	717,905	717,905	717,905	–	818,425
<b>Enrolment interacted with FSM</b>	-0.022	0.000	0.029	–	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)		(0.006)
Observations	717,905	717,905	717,905	–	818,425
<b>Enrolment interacted with non-white</b>	0.009	0.016	0.008	–	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.005)
Observations	717,905	717,905	717,905	–	818,425

*Note:* Each cell reports the difference-in-discontinuity estimate for the cohort column and outcome row. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the cohort level. The 2011 cohort is not estimable due to collinearity with year-of-birth fixed effects unless interacted.