

LUNAREUM

Smart Contract Review

Deliverable: Smart Contract Audit Report

Security Report

October 2021

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Report Summary

Title	LUNAREUM Smart Contract Audit		
Project Owner	LUNAREUM		
Туре	Public		
Reviewed by	Vatsal Raychura Revision date 21/10/202		
Approved by	eNebula Solutions Private Limited Approval date		21/10/2021
		Nº Pages	23

Overview

Background

LUNAREUM requested that eNebula Solutions perform an Extensive Smart Contract audit of their Smart Contract.

Project Dates

The following is the project schedule for this review and report:

- October 21: Smart Contract Review Completed (Completed)
- October 21: Delivery of Smart Contract Audit Report (Completed)

Review Team

The following eNebula Solutions team member participated in this review:

- Sejal Barad, Security Researcher and Engineer
- Vatsal Raychura, Security Researcher and Engineer

Coverage

Target Specification and Revision

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the smart contract of LUNAREUM.

The following documentation repositories were considered in-scope for the review:

• LUNAREUM Project: https://bscscan.com/address/0xACA52dC7a1dD1fb7AFB6e16bbFa819E8e0690C1 e#code

Introduction

Given the opportunity to review LUNAREUM Project's smart contract source code, we in the report outline our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts is ready to launch after resolving the mentioned issues, there are no critical or high issues found related to business logic, security or performance.

About LUNAREUM: -

Item	Description
Issuer	LUNAREUM
Type	BEP20
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	October 21, 2021

The Test Method Information: -

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open-source code, non-open-source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant effect on the
	security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the
	critical vulnerabilities.
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi
	project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi
	project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project
	in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should
	evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to
	reproduce in engineering.

The Full List of Check Items:

Category	Check Item	
	Constructor Mismatch	
	Ownership Takeover	
	Redundant Fallback Function	
	Overflows & Underflows	
	Reentrancy	
	MONEY-Giving Bug	
Rasic Coding Rugs	Blackhole	
Basic Coding Bugs	Unauthorized Self-Destruct	
	Revert DoS	
	Unchecked External Call	
	Gasless Send	
	Send Instead of Transfer	
	Costly Loop	
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries	
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables	
	Transaction Ordering Dependence	
	Deprecated Uses	
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks	
	Business Logics Review	

	Functionality Checks	
	Authentication Management	
	Access Control & Authorization	
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Oracle Security	
Advanced Deri Scrutiny	Digital Asset Escrow	
	Kill-Switch Mechanism	
	Operation Trails & Event Generation	
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling	
	Frontend-Contract Integration	
	Deployment Consistency	
	Holistic Risk Management	
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array	
	Using Fixed Compiler Version	
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit	
	Making Type Inference Explicit	
	Adhering To Function Declaration	
	Strictly	
	Following Other Best Practices	

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit:

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.

Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex pilotable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

Findings

Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the LUNAREUM's Smart Contract. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the smart contract source code and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the Specific tool. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	No. of Issues
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	1
Total	1

We have so far identified that there are potential issues with severity of **0 Critical**, **0 High**, **0 Medium**, **and 1 Low**. Overall, these smart contracts are well- designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved and bug free by common recommendations given under POCs.

Functional Overview

(\$) = payable function	[Pub] public
# = non-constant function	[Ext] external
	[Prv] private
	[Int] internal

- + Lunareum (IBEP20, LPSwapSupport, BuyBack)
 - [Pub] <Constructor> (\$)
 - modifiers: BuyBack
 - [Pub] totalSupply
 - [Ext] decimals
 - [Pub] balanceOf
 - [Int] _balanceOf
 - [Pub] transfer #
 - [Pub] allowance
 - [Pub] approve #
 - [Pub] transferFrom #
 - [Pub] increaseAllowance #
 - [Pub] decreaseAllowance #
 - [Pub] totalFees
 - [Ext] getOwner
 - [Pub] tokenFromReflection
 - [Pub] excludeFromFee #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
 - [Ext] <Fallback> (\$)
 - [Prv] _reflectFee #
 - [Prv] _getRate
 - [Prv] _getCurrentSupply

- [Int] _takeLiquidity #
- [Prv] _takeOtherFees #
- [Int] _approve #
- [Prv] _transfer #
- [Prv] valuesForNoFees
- [Ext] pushSwap #
- [Prv] selectSwapEvent #
 - modifiers: lockTheSwap
- [Prv] takeFees #
- [Prv] _transferStandard #
- [Pub] updateFees #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] updateMarketingWallet #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] openTrading #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner

Detailed Results

Issues Checking Status

1. Floating Pragma

- SWC ID:103
- Severity: Low
- Location:

https://bscscan.com/address/0xACA52dC7a1dD1fb7AFB6e16bbFa819E8e0 690C1e#code

- Relationships: CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
- Description: A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
```

 Remediations: Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.

Automated Tools Results

Slither: -

```
m.constructor(uint256.address.address.address) (iunareum.sol#46-79):
             External calls:
 External calls:
- updateRouterAndPoir(_routerAddress) (Lunareum.sol#51)
- pancakeswapV2Pair = IPancakeFactory(pancakeRouter.factory()).createPair(address(this).pancakeRouter.WETH()) (LPSwapSupport.sol#76)
Siste variables uritten after the call(s):
- owner = _tokenOwner (Lunareum.sol#76)
Reentrancy in Lunareum.selectSwapEvent() (Lunareum.sol#245-259):
External calls:
                 tokensSwapped = swapTokensForCurrency(buyback) (Lunareum.sol#256)
                             approved = IBEP20(tokenAddress), approve(address(pancakeRouter), tokenAmount) (LPSwapSupport.sol#142)
pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportIngFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0, path,destination,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#
150-102)
State variables written after the call(s):
- tokenfracker.buyback = buyback.sub(fokensSwapped) (Lunareum.sol#257)
Reference: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1
 LPSwapSupport.addLlquidity(vint256.vint256) (LPSwapSupport.sol#167-181) ignores return value by pancakeRouter.addLlquidityETH(value: cAmount)(address(
this),tokanAmount,0,0,llquidityReceiver,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#173-186)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#umused-return
Owner = _tokonOwner (Lunareum.sol#76)
Lunareum.updaterlarRetlingMallet(address).narketling (Lunareum.sol#302) locks a zero-check on i
__narketlingMallet = narketling (Lunareum.sol#363)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/betector-bocumentation#missing-zero-address-validation
 selectSwapEvent() (Lunareum.sol#213)
- pancakeMouter.addL(quidityETH(value: cAmount)(address(this),tokenAmount,8,8,1(quidityMeceiver,block.timestamp) (iPSwapSupport.sol#17
                             approved = IREF20(tokenAddress).approve(address(pancakeRouter),tokenAnount) (LPSwapSupport.sol#142)
pancakeEguter.swapExactTokensForETMSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0.path,destination,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#
 (56-162)
             External calls sending oth:
- selectSwapEvent() (Lunaroum.sol#213)
- pancakeBouter.add.lqvidityETM(value: cAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,0,liquidityReceiver,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#IT
 1-188)
            External Calls:

updateRouter AndPalr(_routerAddress) (Lunareum.sol#S1)

_pancakewapv2Patr = IPancakeractory(pancakeRouter.factory()).createPatr(address(this).pancakeRouter.wETH()) (LP5wapSupport.sol#76)

State variables written after the call(s):

isExcludedFronFee[_omer] = true (Lunareum.sol#52)

isExcludedFronFee[_insgSender()] = true (Lunareum.sol#61)

isExcludedFronFee[_insgSender()] = true (Lunareum.sol#61)

isExcludedFronFee[_ansgSender()] = true (Lunareum.sol#61)

isExcludedFronFee[_seedAddress] = true (Lunareum.sol#62)

isExcludedFronFee[_seedAddress] = true (Lunareum.sol#64)

iSExcludedFronFee[_seedAddress] = true (Lunareum.sol#64)

iSExcludedFronFee[_seedAddress] = true (Lunareum.sol#64)

iOnned[_seedAddress1] = [rotal.dvi(108).nul(s) (Lunareum.sol#57)

fees = Fees(2,3,3,1,56) (Lunareum.sol#66-72)

itquidityNecotver = deadAddress (Lunaroum.sol#52)

minTokenSpendAnount = _tTotal.dvi(10 ** 5) (Lunareum.sol#58)

tokenTracker = TokeoTracker(0,8) (Lunareum.sol#54)
```

```
transferFrom(address,address,wint250) [Lunareum.sol#111-115]
          External calls:
              transfer(sender,reciplent,amount) (Lumareun.sol#112)
- IPancakePalr(pancakePalr).sync() (Buyback.sol#96)
- pancakePouter.additquidityETH(value: cAmount)(address(this),tokenAmount,8,6,liquidityReceiver,block.timestamp) (LFSkapSupport.sol#17
- approved = IBEP20(tokenAddress).approve(address(pancakeRouter),tokenAnount) (LPSwapSupport.sol#142)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: amount)(8,path,destination,block.timestamp.add(488)) (LPSwapSupport.sol#218-216)
                        pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHGupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,destination,block.timestamp) (LPImapSupport.sol#
          External colls sending etb:
- _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (lunareum.sol#112)
- _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (lunareum.sol#112)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETM(value: cArount)(address(this),tokenArount,0,0,liquidityRécelver,block,timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#17
                        pancakeBouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferYokens[value: amount](0,path,destination,block.timestamp.add(400)) (LPSwap
upport.sol#218-215)
Support.sol#216-215)
State variables written after the call(s):
State variables written after the call(s):
- spprove(sender__msgSender()__sllowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(anount_SEP28: transfer arount exceeds allowance)) (Lunareum.sol#13)
- allowances[bolder][spender] = anount (lunareum.sol#295)

Reentrancy th LFSwapSupport.updateRouterAndPair(address) (LFSwapSupport.sol#7Z-88):
- External calls:
eentrancy in BuyBack, autoBuyback() (BuyBack.sol#95:108):
upport.sol#210-215)
Event emitted after the call(s):

    - BuybackTriggered(buybackReceiver,amount) (BuyBack,sol#99)
    eentrancy in Lunareum._transfer(address,address,uint256) (Lunareum.sol#201-232);

                        pancakeHouter.addLiquidityETH(value: cAnuunt)(address(this).tokenAnount.0.0,liquidityReceiver.block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#17
                        approved = IBEP20(tokenAddress).approve(address(pancakeRouter),tokenAnount) (LPSwapSupport.sul#142)
pancakeRouter.swapExactTokenSForETHSupportLagFeeOnTransferTokenS(tokenAnount,0,path,destLnation,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sul#
          External calls sending eth:
- selectSwapEvent() (Lunareum.sol#213)
- pancakeRouter.addilquidityETH[value: cAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,6,8,liquidityReceiver,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#17
          Event exitted after the call(s)
            Transfer(address(this), market(ngMollet,tMarketing) (Lunareum.sol#IBI)
- (rAnount,tTransferAnount,rTransferAnount) - takefees(amount,false) (Lunareum.sol#216)
- Transfer(address(this), marketingMailet,tMarketing) (Lunareum.sol#IBI)
- Transfer(address(this), marketingMailet,tMarketing) (Lunareum.sol#IBI)
- Transfer(address(this), marketingMailet,tMarketing) (Lunareum.sol#218)
- Transfer(from,address(this),amount.sub(tTransferAnount)) (Lunareum.sol#223)
eentrancy in Lunareum, transfer(address,address,uint256) (Lunareum.sol#261-232):
External calls:
            SelectSwopEvent() (Lunareum, sol#213)
- pancakeRouter.addi(qutdityETH(value: cArount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,0,liquidityReceiver,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#1)
                       approved = IBEP20(tokenAddress), approve(address(pancakeRouter), tokenAnount) (LPSwapSupport.sul#142) pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensFortTMSupportIngFeeOnTransFerTokens(tokenAnount,0,path,destination,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sul#
- IPancakePair(pancakePair).sync() (BuyBack.zol#96)
- pancakePouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: anount)(B.path.destination.block.tinestamp.add(400)) (LPSwap
support.sol#218-215)
          asseturized
External Calls sending oth:
- selectSuppEvent() (Lunaream.sol#253)
- selectSuppEvent() (Lunaream.sol#253)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidItyETH(value: cAnount)(address(thit),tokenAnount,6,8,llquidItyReceiver,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#17
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: amount)(0,path,destination,block.timestamp.add(400)) (LPSwag
```

```
m.constructor(utst256.address.address.address) (tunareum.tol#46-79)
Externet Catts:

updateRouterAndPatr(_routerAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr(_souterAndPatr
                              ncy in Crowspapper ( samphinitiant) (iPSwapSupport.sol#185)

External calls:

Example calls:

                                     External calls sending with:
- addLiquidity(otherNulf,newBolance) (LPSwapSupport.sol#111)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH(value: cAmount)(address(this),tokenAmount,B,G,liquidityNeceiver,block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#17
 Event emitted after the call(s):
- SwapAndLiquify(half,newBalance,otherHalf) (LPSwapSupport.walWII))
seentrancy in Lunareum.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Lunareum.solWIII-II5):
External calls:
- _transfer(sender,recipient,whount) (Lunareum.solWIII)
                                                                      PancakePatr(pancakePatr).sync() (BuyBack.sol#90)
pancakePouter.addLlquidityETH(value: cAmount)(address(this).tokenAmount,0,0,liquidityReceiver,block.timestamp) (LPSMapSupport.sol#17
                                                                       approved = INEP20(tokenAddress).approve(address(pancakuRouter),tokenAmount) (LPSwapSupport.sol#142)
pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokenSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: amount)(0,poth,destioation,block.timestamp.add(400)) (LPSwap
                                                                    pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensFurETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0.path.destination.block.timestamp) (LPSwapSupport.sol#
                              External calls sending oth:
-_trunsfor(sender,recipient,amount) (Lungroum.sol#112)
-_pancakeRouter.eddLiquid(tyETH(value: cAmount)(address(this),tokenAmount,6,0,1lquid(tyReceiver,block.timestamp) (LPSwspSopport.sol#17
  - pencakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens[value: amount](0,path,destination,block.timestamp.add(400)) (LPSwap upport.sol#210-215)

Event emitted after the call(s):
                                       Approvel(holder,spender,amount) (Lunareum.sol#196)
_approve(sender,_magSender(),_allowances[lender]]_magSender()].sub(amount,BEP28: transfer amount exceeds allowance)) (Lunareum.sol#1
  leentrancy in LPSwapSupport.updateRouterAndPair(address) (LPSwapSupport.sol#72-80):
External Calls:

- pancakeswapV2Patr = FrancakeFactory(pancakeRouter.factory()).createPatr(address(this),pancakeRouter.WETH()) (LPSwapSupport.sol#76)

Event entited after the call(s):

- UpdatePatr(newAddress,pancakePatr) (LPSwapSupport.sol#84)

- updateLPPatr(_pancakeswapV2Patr) (LPSwapSupport.sol#78)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
Address.isContract(address) (Address.sol#26-37) uses assembly
INLINE ASM (Address.sol#33-35)
Address.functionCallwithValue(address.bytes.uint256.string) (Address.sol#34-160) uses essembly
INLINE ASM (Address.sol#152-155)
Heference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikk/Detector-DocumentationWassembly-usage
09.0.0 (BuyBack.sol#2)
==8.4.0 (Context.sol#3)
==8.4.0 (IMEP20.sol#3)
==8.5.0 (IPancakeFactory.sol#1)
==8.5.2 (IPancakeFactory.sol#1)
==8.5.2 (IPancakeFouter81.sol#1)
==8.6.2 (IPancakeFouter82.sol#1)
==8.6.6 (IPSuspSupport.sol#2)
-0.0.0 (lunareum.solm2)
--0.0.0 (Ownable.solm2)
--0.0.0 (Ownable.solm2)
--0.0.0 (Ownable.solm2)
--0.0.0 (Oxfafinth.solm2)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-progna-directives-are-used
Address, functionCallWithValue(address, bytes, wint250, string) (Address, sol#134-106) is never used and should be removed Address. FunctionCall(address, bytes) (Address, sol#131-10) is never used and should be removed Address. FunctionCall(address, bytes, string) (Address, sol#31-97) is never used and should be removed Address. FunctionCallWithValue(address, bytes, wint256) (Address, sol#10-116) is never used and should be removed Address. FunctionCallWithValue(address, bytes, wint256, string) (Address, sol#10-116) is never used and should be removed Address. Iscontract(address, (Address, sol#35-61) is never used and should be removed Address. Iscontract(address, wint236) (Address, sol#35-61) is never used and should be removed Address. Iscontract(address, wint236) (Address, sol#35-61) is never used and should be removed Address. Iscontract (Context, sol#24-27) is never used and should be removed (PSwapSupport, sol#37-17) is never used and should be removed (PSwapSupport, balanceOf(address, wint236) (EPSwapSupport, sol#37) is never used and should be removed (PSwapSupport, sol#37-176) is never used and should be removed (PSwapSupport, sol#37-176) is never used and should be removed (PSwapSupport, sol#37-176) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, mod(wint256, wint256) (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is never used and should be removed (Safenath, sol#372-174) is n
Pragme version*0.6.2 (Address.sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.0.0 (BuyBack.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.4.8 (Context.sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.4.8 (IREACUSEPRICE) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.5.8 (IREACUSEPRICE) sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.0 (IREACUSEPRICE) sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.2 (IREACUSEPRICE) sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.6.8 (IREACUSEPRICE) sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.6.8 (IREACUSEPRICE) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.6.8 (Ownoble.sol#19) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.6.8 (Ownoble.sol#19) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.6.8 (Ownoble.sol#19) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.4.8 (Safemath.sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version*0.8.4.8 (Safemath.sol#3) allows old versions
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
```

```
Function IPancakePair.ODMAIN_SEPARATOR() (IPancakePair.sol#IB) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakePair.PERMIT_TYPEHASH() (IPancakePair.sol#IB) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakePair.MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (IPancakePair.sol#IB) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakeRouterUS.METH() (IPancakeRouterUS.sol#B) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakeRouterUS.METH() (IPancakeRouterUS.sol#B) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakeRouterUS.METH() (IPancakeRouterUS.sol#B) is not in mixedCase
Function IPANCAEROUTERUS (IPANCAEROUTERUS) is not in mixedCase
Function Italianareum, letterlas (Iunareum.sol#IB) is not in mixedCase
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Function Iunareum, function Iunareum, sol#III iu
   ledundant expression "this (Context.sol#25)" inContext (Context.sol#25-20).
Peference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-DocumentationWredundant-statements
   variable IPancakeRouter01.addLiquidity(address_address_uint256_uint256_uint256_uint256_address_uint256).amountADesired (IPancakeRouter01.sol#10) is to
o similar to IPancakeRouter01.addLiquidity(address_address_uint256_uint256_uint256_uint256_address_uint256).amountBDesired (IPancakeRouter01.sol#11)
Variable Lumareum.takeFees(uint256_bool).rframsFerAmount (Lumareum.sol#261) is too similar to Lumareum._transferStandard(address_address_uint256_uint256).transferAmount (Lumareum.sol#284)
    artable Lunareum. transfer(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmoumt (Lunareum,sol#260) is too similar to Lunareum,takeFees(uint256,bool).tTransferAmo
nt (Lunareum.sol#261)
      ariable Lunareum.valuesForMoFees(uint256).ffransferAmpunt (Lunareum.sol#234) is too similar to Lunareum.takeFees(uint256,bool).tfransferAmpunt (Lunareum.sol#234) is too similar to too similar too similar to too similar to too similar to too similar t
     ariable Lunareum, transfer(address,address,uint256):rTransferAmount (Lunareum.sol#308) is too similar to Lunareum, transferStandard(address,address,address,
   Int256,wint256,wint256).tTransferAngunt (Lunareum.sol#284)
Zariable Lunareum.valuesForNoFees(wint256).rTransferAngunt (Lunareum.sol#234) is top similar to Lunareum._transferStandard(address,address.wint256,win
1256,wint256).tTransferAngunt (Lunareum.sol#284)
       oriable Lunareum, transfer(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Lunareum.sol#208) is too similar to Lunareum.voluesForNoFees(uint256).tTransferA
ount (Lunareum.sol#234)
     arlable Lungreum, transferStandard(address,uddress,uint256,uint236,uint236).rTransferAmount (Lungreum,sol#284) is top similar to Lungreum,valuesForMo
ees(uint256).tTransferAmount (Lungreum.sol#234)
      ariable Lucareum, transfer(address,address,uini256).rTransferAnount (Lucareum.sol#290) is too similar to Lucareum,_transfer(address,address,address,uini256)
   rariate Lunareum, transfer(address,address,uthtzso).fransferamount (Lunareum,sof#dm) is too sintlar to Lunareum_transfer(address,uthtzso).fransferamount (Lunareum.sof#dm) is too sintlar to Lunareum.transfer(address,uthtzso).fransferamount (Lunareum.sof#dm) is too sintlar to Lunareum.transfer(address,uthtzso).transferamount (Lunareum.sof#dm) is too sintlar to Lunareum.valueuforhufwes(uthtzso).fransferamount (Lunareum.sof#dm) is too sintlar to Lunareum.valueuforhufwes(uthtzso).transferamount (Lunareum.sof#dm) is too sintlar to Lunareum.valueuforhufwes(uthtzso).transferamount (Lunareum.sof#dm) is too sintlar to Lunareum.valueuforhufwes(uthtzso).transferamount (Lunareum.sof#dm)
    ariable Lunareum, transferStandard(address,address,uint250,uint250,uint256).rfransferAncunt (Lunareum.sol#284) is too similar to Lunareum.takefees(ui
H256,bool).tTransferAncunt (Lunareum.sol#261)
    variable Lunareum.valuesForHmFees(wint256).rTransferAmount (Lunareum.sol#234) is too similar to Lunareum._transfer(oddress,address,wint256).tTransferAmount (Lunareum.sol#234) is too similar to Lunareum._transfer(oddress,address,wint256).tTransferAmount (Lunareum.sol#267)
    artable Lunareum, transferStandord(address,address,atht256,utht256,utht256).rTransferAmount (Lunareum.sol#284) is too similar to Lunareum, transferSt
    artante Cumareum, sakefres, "Notz56, "Notz56, "Notz56) "TransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#384)
Notable Lunareum, sakefres("Notz56, bool), rTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar to Lunareum, valoesForNoFees("Vintz56), tTransferAngunt (Lunareum, sol#261) iz top zimilar 
     un sol#2343
    artable Lunareum takeFees(utnt256.bool) rTransferAmount (Lunareum sol#261) is too sintlar to Lunareum, transfer(address.address.utnt256) tTransferAmo
    nt (Lunareum.sol#207)
Jariable Lunareum.takeFees(uint256,bool).rTransferAmount (Lunareum.sol#261) is too similar to Lunareum.takeFees(uint256,bool).tTransferAmount (Lunareu
    eference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Bocumentation#variable-names-are-too-similar
   lunareum_towned (Lunareum.sol#79) is never used in Lunareum (Lunareum.sol#8-312)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#umused-state-variable
   LPSwapSupport.deadAddress (LPSwapSupport.sol#59) should be constant
Reference: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
updaterees(vint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) should be declared external:

Lunareum.updaterees(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Lunareum.sal#292-300)
renounceOwnership() should be declared external:

Ownable.renounceOwnership() (Ownable.sal#33-57)
  transferOwnership(address) should be declared external:
Ownable.transferOwnership(address) (Ownable.sol#83-08)
```

MythX: -

Report for Lunareum.sol https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/d958e914-8ae3-470d-bdf7-783cb748d76b			
SWC Title	Severity	Short Description	
(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.	
(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered	
(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered	
(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered	
(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered	
(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered	
	SMC Title (SWC-103) Floating Pragma (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	SWC Title SWC-103) Floating Pragma (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	

Mythril: -

root@sv-VirtualBox:/home/sv/Lunareum# myth analyze Lunareum.sol The analysis was completed successfully. No issues were detected.

Solhint: -

```
Lunareum.sol:2:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.6.0 does not satisfy the r senver requirement

Lunareum.sol:3:8: Error: Use double quotes for string literals

Lunareum.sol:4:8: Error: Use double quotes for string literals

Lunareum.sol:38:37: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE_CASE

Lunareum.sol:39:37: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE_CASE

Lunareum.sol:40:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE_CASE

Lunareum.sol:40:30: Error: Constant name must be first in list of modifiers

Lunareum.sol:46:117: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in list of modifiers

Lunareum.sol:145:32: Error: Code contains empty blocks
```

Basic Coding Bugs

1. Constructor Mismatch

 Description: Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

2. Ownership Takeover

o Description: Whether the set owner function is not protected.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

3. Redundant Fallback Function

o Description: Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

4. Overflows & Underflows

 Description: Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

5. Reentrancy

 Description: Reentrancy is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

6. MONEY-Giving Bug

 Description: Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

7. Blackhole

 Description: Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

8. Unauthorized Self-Destruct

 Description: Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

9. Revert DoS

 Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because of unexpected revert.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

10. Unchecked External Call

o Description: Whether the contract has any external call without checking the return value.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

11. Gasless Send

 $\circ \quad \text{Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless send.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

12. Send Instead of Transfer

 $\circ\quad \text{Description: Whether the contract uses send instead of transfer.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

13. Costly Loop

 Description: Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to Out-Of-Gas exception.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

14. (Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries

o Description: Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

15. (Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables

 Description: Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

16. Transaction Ordering Dependence

 Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

17. Deprecated Uses

• Description: Whether the contract use the deprecated tx.origin to perform the authorization.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

Semantic Consistency Checks

 Description: Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed LUNAREUM's Smart Contract. The current code base is well organized but there are promptly some low-level Type issues found in the first phase of Smart Contract Audit.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

About eNebula Solutions

We believe that people have a fundamental need to security and that the use of secure solutions enables every person to more freely use the Internet and every other connected technology. We aim to provide security consulting service to help others make their solutions more resistant to unauthorized access to data & inadvertent manipulation of the system. We support teams from the design phase through the production to launch and surely after.

The eNebula Solutions team has skills for reviewing code in C, C++, Python, Haskell, Rust, Node.js, Solidity, Go, and JavaScript for common security vulnerabilities & specific attack vectors. The team has reviewed implementations of cryptographic protocols and distributed system architecture, including in cryptocurrency, blockchains, payments, and smart contracts. Additionally, the team can utilize various tools to scan code & networks and build custom tools as necessary.

Although we are a small team, we surely believe that we can have a momentous impact on the world by being translucent and open about the work we do.

For more information about our security consulting, please mail us at – contact@enebula.in