



Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN)

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
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Company Overview

It's all about the long-term, "scale is central to achieving our business model"



Virtuous Cycle of Growth

- Sales volume lead to economies of scale, lower prices, greater selection and choice, better customer experiences, and thus higher sales volumes
- Bezos has emphasized that fast delivery, vast selection, and customer convenience are the tenants of the company that will never change

Key figures

Public Market Overview	\$AMZN
Market Cap	\$155,401.32
Cash	\$6,883.00
Net Debt	\$3,784.00
EV	\$150,225.69
FDS/O	463
Current Share Price	\$335.64
52 week high	\$408.06
52 week %	82%

Business Model Audit and Evolution

- "Sell all, carry few" to "Sell all, carry more"
- Estimated 40% of unit sales are from 3P retailers
- Positions Amazon strategically to grow beyond the limits of its own online store
- Amazon doesn't sentimentalize the icons of its past, business models become outdated
- Low margins a driver of competitive moat





Management overview

Jeff Bezos



Vision

- Interested in free cash flow, not margins
- Reinvesting in Amazon to strengthen the diversification and competitive advantage of each business vertical
- To take profit out of the business is to waste opportunity
- "If you're willing to invest on a seven-year time horizon, you're competing against a fraction of people"

Quick Bio

Chairman & CFO

- Started career on Wall Street at Bankers Trust
- Founded Amazon.com in 1994 in his Seattle garage
- Considered critical to the business' success and dominates the company
- One of the few internet CEO's remaining after the tech bubble
- Substantial stock ownership (18%)
- No Amazon employee receives more than \$160K in cash compensation

Managerial Style

- · Visionary and micromanager
- Quant geek, uses metrics for every decision
- Typical view on the street is that Bezos is so focused on the customer he forgets about the shareholder





Amazon Everywhere

Or what's masking EBITDA?




































Gaming


Introduction

Amazon is a bundle


Amazon since launch (\$m)




Amazon segment revenue (\$m)



Amazon revenue by region (\$m)



Amazon third party sales (\$m)








Where is this cash going?

Increase in CAPEX driven by many levers


\$3BN in extra spending TTM




Potential Uses of Cash

- More capacity for more products, including 3P products (40% of units sold)
- 2. Proximity, same day shipping
- 3. Amazon Web Services
- 4. Existing operations

Amazon property (sq ft, in thousands)



Shipping costs as a % of shippable GMV








Operating metrics

Amazon's operating cycle driven by strong AP management


Cash Conversion Cycle

- Key metric of Amazon's cash generating prowess
- Decreasing due to more stringent supplier contracts and higher amounts of receivables
- Incredibly high leverage and pricing power over suppliers


Cash Conversion Cycle (Days)




Days payable oustanding



Days inventory outstanding



Days receivables outstanding








Annotated Stock Chart

Amazon's Performance over the last 3 years.









Investment Thesis



Investment Thesis

LT Value
Proposition
Exceeds That of
Leading
Retailers

- TMT believes Amazon's long term cost structure is more attractive than the world's largest existing retailers
- Amazon is highly scalable, and can operate with lower fixed costs, saving on real estate, distribution, human capital
- Barriers to entry are very significant
 - · Requires heavy financial backing to effectively compete with Amazon's existing infrastructure
 - Demand side switching cost are supported by growing Amazon Prime program
- Amazon believes in LT value and will sacrifice profitability today to ensure it is the best positioned company to sell anything to anyone

E-Commerce Has More Room To Grow

- Amazon itself is an enabler of global E-Commerce growth; customers buy more when E-Commerce is more accessible
- As a customer-focused company, Amazon invests in its network to win market share from brick & mortar competition
- U.S. E-Commerce will grow CAGR 18% from 2013-2018; 21% for the global market
- Amazon in #1 or #2 in key growth markets: U.S, U.K., Germany, Australia, Japan, Canada, France, Italy, Spain
- Amazon can become the largest buyer's club in the world through value-adding services of Amazon Prime

Growth Today
=
Value
Tomorrow

- Strength in E-Commerce alone justifies higher valuation; 1P segment trades at implied discount to comparables
- Value will be unlocked in the operating leverage of Amazon's LT business model
- Successful execution will lead to mature multiple that exceeds Walmart, Target
- Changing mix in segment composition will lead to gross margin expansion and profitability
 - 3P GMV to overtake 1P GMV by 2015 where 3P has better margins
- With growth in AWS and 3P E-Commerce, Amazon evolves into a service company warranting multiple expansion

TMT recommends BUY on long term outlook with price target of \$568





Earnings call transcripts

Amazon using a more selective approach for future investments

Significant tone shift

- AMZN is heavily analyzed
- Important to note the shift in analyst focus in earnings call
- AMZN should be analyzed under a different lens
- Quarter 3 2014 earnings call marked a significant tone change
- CFO Tom Szkutak mentioned the need to be 'selective' about opportunities and investments four separate times

Market's View

- Emerging markets represent a significant growth opportunity
- Amazon Prime contributes to customer loyalty
- AWS unlikely to drive valuations

International Investments

- Heavy focus on why Amazon is investing so much in international growth, namely China, when domestic growth is so much more significant
- Over the last few quarters, Amazon has repeated its commitment to investment in China to increase fulfilment capacity and deliver lower-costs.

Annual Shareholder Letters

- Always include the 1997 shareholder letter as a mantra of what Amazon will always be
 - "It's all about the long-term"
 - "Earnings don't always translate into cash flows"
 - 452 goals were set in 2007 none included profit or margins
- 2013 was the first letter including mentions of CSR and employee empowerment








E-Commerce & Competitive Landscape

E-Commerce worldwide

Amazon's core markets

- Amazon is the dominant player in its core markets, which represents 41.7% of global market.
- Europe is still underpenetrated while showing high growth.
- Strong recurring revenue base for Amazon.
- Targeted investment may increase Amazon's market share where it is already #1 or #2.
- Increasing Prime membership should help improve margins in these geographies.








E-Commerce in China

Amazon: A marginal player

China E-Commerce size



Amazon's China Market Share total E-Commerce and B2C sales








E-Commerce in China

Amazon: Cross-border shopping

Still investing in China

- China is the largest e-commerce importer in the world
- Announced an agreement with Shanghai FTZ on August 20th to build a logistics and warehouse center in the SFTZ.
- Allows import of foreign goods and export of Chinese products.


Preferred shopping destination




China cross-border & total E-Commerce



References to China during earnings call










E-Commerce in India

Another target market for Amazon


Investment in India

- Launched in June 2013, with an announced another 2 billion dollar investment this July.
- Operations are similar to eBay and Alibaba, where sales are exclusively from 3p due to legislation.
- Legislation is starting to relax as the government approved 1p sale of products manufactured in India.


Market Share



Still a small E-Commerce player



India E-Commerce revenue share








E-Commerce Segment

Amazon performs extremely well in its core segment


Industry Size in the U.S.




US ecommerce sales by category



Amazon's total U.S. Market Share



What Amazon consumers bought







E-Commerce Segment


Shipping expertise a key differentiator for Amazon

Fulfillment centers in major city centers



Low shipping drives growth in existing customers

Urban population spends more online



...and brings in new ones










E-Commerce Segment

Amazon attacking head of household category

HoH is the highest expense of US households

HoH has the lowest ecommerce penetration





Amazon launched many programs to address this issue

- Amazon Fresh: Provides same-day delivery of grocery and around 500k non-grocery items. Available in Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles for 299\$/year.
- Subscribe & Save: Provides customers with discounts and free shipping on household related items and gives discounts with more frequent orders.
- Amazon Mom: Similar to Amazon Fresh but available at no-charge (with a Prime membership). Offers rebates on diaper subscriptions and other health, personal care, and baby items.
- Amazon Prime Pantry: Added benefit exclusive to Prime members, can order up to 45 pounds or four cubic feet of household goods in a single box for an additional 5.99\$ charge.
- Amazon Dash: Allows to reorder over 500k items within Amazon Fresh by scanning the barcode.





Wal-Mart

Company Overview

- Largest retailer in the world that operates via three entities: Wal-Mart US (59%), Sam's Club (12%), and Wal-Mart International (29%).
- International operations in 26 countries.
- Biggest US grocer: groceries account for 56% of its \$279B US sales.


Financial Summary

Share Price	\$82.38
Market Cap	\$265.5B
Total Debt	(\$55.7B)
Total Cash	\$6.7B
Net Debt	\$(49.0B)
Minority Interest	\$4.9B
Enterprise Value	\$319.4B
EV/LTM EBITDA	9.0x

Revenue from web sales



Operating Margin







Why Amazon Over Wal-Mart?

Logistics vs shipping

- Walmart has over 4000 stores in the US and wants to use them as small warehouses for same-day shipping
- Execution of shipping from those stores is less precise and more costly in labor and shipping costs vs warehouses
- One advantage is that using pick-up in-store option can increase traffic and in-store sales
- Shipping time accuracy is the most important request when shopping online

Even Wal-Mart shoppers prefer amazon.com



Technology hurdles

- Amazon has well-established technology to suggest items to users and help them decide what item to buy: predictive analysis, customer reviews, flexible pricing, Amazon Prime.
- Wal-Mart needs to showcase to its online customers what they have in store and guide them in their shopping
- Using a store inventory system has drawbacks: what if an item is in a customer's cart and no longer available?

Path to purchase of multichannel retailers







Ebay


Company overview

- Ebay connects buyers and sellers but does not own inventory => Marketplace more than seller.
- Ebay makes money in different ways:
 - · Fees for listing an item
 - Fee from the seller for the final sale price
 - Fee to increase item visibility
 - Paypal conversion and transfer fees


Financial summary

Chave Drice	¢E 4 27
Share Price	\$54.37
Market Cap	\$67.5B
Total Debt	(\$7.6B)
Total Cash	\$10.4B
Net Debt	\$(2.8B)
Enterprise Value	\$64.8B
EV/LTM EBITDA	13.0x

Revenues



Operating margin









Why Amazon over Ebay?


US consumers visit Amazon more than Ebay...




...and Amazon converts more to purchasers



Key differentiator: Amazon Prime



Better customer satisfaction







Alibaba


Company overview

- Alibaba is similar to Ebay, it connects buyers and sellers but does not own inventory or warehouses
- Derives revenues from advertising and premium services, not by selling products to consumers
- Runs Taobao (independent sellers) and Tmall (name brands), and Alipay (third-party payments)


Financial summary

Share Price	\$114.79
Market Cap	\$283.0B
Total Debt	(\$10.4B)
Total Cash	\$19.7B
Net Debt	\$(9.3B)
Minority Interest	\$0.8B
Enterprise Value	\$274.5B
EV/LTM EBITDA	10.3x

Revenue



Operating margin







E-Commerce in China

Alibaba and Amazon

B2B



Alibaba started as a B2B service provides global access to the Chinese supply chain.



Only operates in U.S.A, still in development.

C2C



Largest player in the C2C category in China.



Shutdown China operations in 2006, once had 79% market share back in 2003.

B2C



Largest player in the B2C category, vendors provides distribution to customers. Higher margin business.



Small player in the China market, operates distribution centers, wants to differentiates itself through its low cost distribution network.

Online payments



Mobile banking solution processed \$519 billion of digital payments in 2013.



Online banking solution, lagging behind in mobile, processed \$180 billion of digital payments in 2013





Why Amazon Over Alibaba?


Growth in international markets uncertain

- Alibaba's business model relies on advertising, not selling products
- It is highly successful in China because it already has a well established user base in a country that restricts foreign investments.
- Replicating this model in the US or emerging markets where other companies already have a large portion of the internet user base would prove difficult.

China's Tencent threat

- Tencent is increasingly trying to gain share from the ecommerce industry by leveraging it's QQ (850M users) and WeChat (400M users) traffic.
- Many subsidiaries directly compete with Alibaba:
 - · paipai.com: a C2C marketplace
 - · TenPay: a PayPal equivalent
 - 15% stake in JD.com: China's #2 e-commerce site

Exposure to international markets (% of rev.)



Shipping an important factor







Amazon's Far-Reaching Network

Amazon is Investing in Infrastructure

Delivery & Distribution

- 131 distributions across the globe as of Nov. 2014
- Amazon's facilities not completely optimized for Delivery efficiency. They are set up for tax savings.
- Significant investment in Arizona, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Indiana, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina due to tax arrangements with state
- Amazon point-of-sale is its distribution facilities, which are not classified as retail stores for tax purposes
- Amazon will stop fighting tax breaks going forward

Same-Day Service

- Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Indianapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Dallas, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Francisco, Seattle
- Partnership with USPS to deliver last mile

Source: CapIQ as of 9/27/2014.

U.S. Distribution Footprint



Setup Costs Are a Barrier to Entry

- Competitors cannot deliver product as cheap or quickly as Amazon due to fixed cost of infrastructure
- Amazon has fulfillment centers in United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Czech Rep., Poland, China, Japan, India







Kindle			

Amazon Hardware

Kindle a loss leader


Kindle Tablet Sales

- Management doesn't disclose its Kindle Fire or eReader sales.
- Amazon's strategy consists of selling these devices as loss leaders while generating income from content sales.
- Estimates have pegged Amazon's Kindle business at 11% of revenue and 23% of operating profit I 2013.


Kindle market share of global tablet shipments



eBook Industry (millions)



Tablet vs. eReaders









Amazon Prime



Amazon **Prime**


Much more than a loyalty program

What's in it for Prime Members?

- \$99/yr, 25M users
- Free 2-day shipping, unlimited access to Netflix-like video streaming service, unlimited photo storing on AWS, access to vast Kindle library
- 90% of Prime members intend to renew their subscriptions over the next twelve months

Prime Members Spend More






Prime users (m) versus blended GM



...And they purchase higher margin products







Amazon Video On Demand

Commitment to content consistent with long-term strategy



Digital Content

- Streaming content library 20-25% the size of Netflix's library
- Video usage is up 3X year over year
- Bundled into Prime membership
- Of new Prime members in 2014, 13% stated video as the number one reason to join Prime, compared to 6% last year








Cost of Digital Content

- 2 components: the development of original content and procurement of third party digital content
- Expensed \$100M in original content last quarter
- HBO contract estimated at \$85M per year
- Fixed cost intensive, no significant variable cost to extend use to prime members
- Cost advantage to Netflix due to AWS

Amazon Fire TV

- Backordered until January 2015 due to demand
- \$39 streaming-media device, with free 30-day Prime trial
- Competes against Google Chromecast and Roku Streaming Stick
- Will increase the popularity of VOD and drive Prime awareness

Amazon versus Netflix









Amazon Web Services (AWS)

AWS

Product Overview



Description

- Launched in 2006 (first mover)
- +5X capacity vs next 14 rivals
- Cloud based laaS that provides a simple way to access servers, storage, databases and a broad set of application services over the Internet
- Client base:

















airbnb







Competitors to look out for

1Q14 Revenue (\$bn) 1.12 0.35 0.03 0.03 Google IBM Cloud Microsoft Azure amazon

Global Footprint



AWS as a % of Amazon Revenue









AWSMarket Sizing



\$200bn TAM Opportunity



PaaS Market Sizing



... A Product for Every Category

Compute

- · Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2): pay-as-you-go compute capacity
- Elastic MapReduce: big data processing in the cloud
- Auto Scaling: automatically scale EC2 capacity to needs
- Elastic Load Balancing: load balance incoming traffic across multiple EC2 instances Database
- Relation Database Service (RDS) & DynamoDB: NoSQL database service in the cloud
- · ElasticCache: in-memory cache in the cloud
- Redshift: petabyte-scale data warehouse service in the cloud

Deployment & Management

- · Identity and Access Management (IAM): user access control
- · CloudWatch: EC2 resource monitoring
- Elastic Beanstalk: automated application provisioning, load balancing, auto-scaling and application health monitoring
- · CloudFormation: create and provision collections of AWS services
- Data Pipeline: move data between AWS compute and storage resources
- OpsWorks: DevOps platform for managing applications

Networking

- · Route 53: domain name service
- · Virtual Private Cloud (VPC): provision an isolated section of AWS
- Direct Connect: dedicated network connection into AWS

IaaS Market Sizing







AWS


Core Strengths



Strengths

- · Instant scalability for customers
- Massive capacity
- Automated compute elasticity
- Multiple availability zones
- Entrenched and diverse customer base
- Economies of scale = Attractive pricing

Key Strength: Pricing



Use Case: Netflix

- NetIfix' core competency is not operating datacenters
- AWS enables Netflix to quickly deploy thousands of servers and terabytes of storage within minutes
- Seamlessly stream content to users around the world and throttle usage up and down as needed

Undisputed Leader









AWS

Relation to Investment Thesis



Margins

- AWS margins are not officially reported but a number of industry analysts believe gross margins are between 80% - 90%
- AWS is not yet a meaningful contributor to the bottom line as the business is still in a massive expansionary phase

Path to profitability

- Once Capex investments begin to normalize AWS will contribute meaningfully to Amazon's bottom-line
- Competition from Microsoft and Google will force Amazon to be selective in their investments and focus on their ability to generate returns

Arguably Amazon's greatest asset

- "You invest in what you believe are the most important investments long term. We think of (these investments) as planting seeds for very large trees that will be fruitful over time. There aren't many opportunities like this in your lifetime" (AWS CEO)
- AWS is the leader in an industry set to explode and could eventually be larger than eCommerce

Potential Value

- While no pure play competitor with similar market position exists Salesforce.com and Rackspace are reasonable comps:
 - Average ~6X EV/Revenue TTM
 - Imputed AWS Value = \$30bn
 - MS uses same methodology and output







Comparable Company Analysis

Comparable analysis

	Market Cap (B)	EV (B)	EV/Sales TTM	EV/Sales NTM	EV/EBITDA TTM	EV/EBITDA NTM	CAPEX/Sales	Debt/Equity	ROIC	Gross Margin
	(-)	(=)								mar g
Ecommerce						<u> </u>				
Alibaba	271.1	262.6	N.A.	15.0 x	N.A.	30.4 x	6.3%	1.0 x	33.8%	74.5%
Ebay	68.3	65.5	4.1 x	3.3 x	13.6 x	10.3 x	7.8%	0.2 x	13.3%	68.6%
1-800-flowers.com	0.5	0.6	0.5 x	0.5 x	11.7 x	8.1 x	3.0%	0.0 x	N.A.	41.7%
Netflix	22.6	21.8	4.9 x	3.2 x	55.9 x	31.2 x	1.2%	0.4 x	11.3%	29.5%
Overstock.com	0.6	0.5	0.2 x	0.3 x	17.6 x	14.2 x	1.4%	0.0 x	N.A.	19.0%
JD	32.9	28.2	2.8 x	1.0 x	N.A.	N.A	0.6%	0.0 x	N.A.	9.9%
Average	59.1	55.1	2.3 x	3.5 x	20.5 x	16.6 x	3.2%	0.4 x	16.8%	47.3%
						4 L				i 1
<u>Cloud</u>						100				i) i
Rackspace	6.2	6.0	3.5 x	2.9 x	8.8 x	8.6 x	29.5%	0.1 x	8.2%	67.9%
Internap	0.4	0.8	2.5 x	2.2 x	12.4 x	8.6 x	22.5%	1.9 x	N.A.	41.2%
Salesforce.com	37.9	37.8	9.2 x	5.7 x	87.9 x	29.8 x	7.4%	0.6 x	N.A.	76.2%
VMWare	36.6	31.0	6.0 x	4.5 x	22.3 x	15.0 x	0.6%	0.1 x	11.1%	86.0%
Average	20.3	18.9	5.3 x	3.8 x	32.9 x	15.5 x	15.0%	0.7 x	9.6%	67.8%
Retail						1 1				1
Barnes & Nobles	1.4	1.9	0.2 x	0.3 x	6.0 x	N.A.	2.1%	0.1 x	N.A.	29.1%
Staples	9.1	9.5	0.4 x	0.4 x	7.2 x	6.8 x	1.6%	0.2 x	8.4%	26.1%
Costco	61.2	59.2	0.5 x	0.5 x	12.0 x	11.7 x	1.8%	0.4 x	12.5%	12.6%
Target	45.4	58.9	0.7 x	0.8 x	9.3 x	8.6 x	4.8%	0.8 x	7.4%	29.5%
Wal-Mart	274.5	328.4	0.6 x	0.7 x	8.4 x	8.7 x	2.8%	0.7 x	13.0%	24.8%
Kroger	28.7	39.7	0.3 x	0.4 x	7.6 x	7.5 x	2.4%	2.1 x	10.9%	20.6%
Average	70.0	82.9	0.4 x	0.5 x	8.4 x	8.7 x	2.6%	0.7 x	10.4%	23.8%
						i I		-		1
Amazon	151.4	147.6	2.4 x	1.4 x	32.9 x	17.9 x	4.6%	0.6 x	6.0%	27.2%
						<u> </u>				





Comparable analysis

Sum of parts				Sum of parts	
<u>3P Sales</u>				<u>3P Sales</u>	
Sales	\$ 10,748			Sales	\$ 10,748
Multiple	3.2 x	◆	Average of ——	Multiple	3.2 x
Implied EV	\$ 34,394		eCommerce peer group	Implied EV	\$ 34,394
<u>AWS</u>				<u>AWS</u>	
Sales	\$ 5,510			Sales	\$ 5,510
Multiple	6.2 x	•	Average of ——	Multiple	6.2 x
Implied EV	\$ 34,162		Cloud peer group	Implied EV	\$ 34,162
1P Sales				1P Sales	
Sales	\$ 74,572			Sales	\$ 74,572
Multiple	0.7 x	◆	Target Multiple	Multiple	2.8 x
Implied EV	\$ 52,200			Implied EV	\$ 208,802
Total EV	\$ 120,756		JD.com multiple	Total EV	\$ 277,357
- Net Debt	\$ 5,170			- Net Debt	\$ 5,170
Equity Value	\$115,586			Equity Value	\$272,187
FD S/O	463			FD S/O	463
Implied Share Price	\$249.65			Implied Share Price	\$587.88
Current Share Price	\$335.64			Current Share Price	\$335.64
Implied Upside	-25.6%			Implied Upside	75.2%







DCF Valuation



Operating Model Assumptions

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Revenue: Segment revenues not growing in line with expectations due to poor CAPEX spending and increasing operating costs.

1P growth: -4% change in revenue

growth

3P growth: -6% change in revenue

growth

Prime: -5% change revenue growth

AWS growth: -5% change in revenue

growth

Terminal Growth: 2%; Multiple 11x

WACC: 8.84%

Operating Expense: 0.75% increase

Price Target: \$239.09

Downside: (28.77%)

Base Case

Revenue: Segment revenues growing in line with industry and analyst expectations

1P growth: 10%-20% revenue growth

3P growth: 15%-25% revenue growth

Prime: 20%-50% revenue growth

AWS growth: 20%-40% revenue

growth

Terminal Growth: 2%; Multiple 11x

WACC: 8.84%

Operating Expense: no change

Price Target: \$568.76

Upside: +69.46%

Bull Case

Revenue: Segment revenues growing above industry and expectations, operating costs are decreasing due to increased scale.

1P growth: 2% change revenue growth

3P growth: 2% change revenue growth

Prime: 5% change revenue growth

AWS growth: 3% change revenue

growth

Terminal Growth: 2%; Multiple 11x

WACC: 8.84%

Operating Expense: 0.5% decrease


Price Target: *\$787.70*

Upside: +134.69%





Football Field Analysis









Q&A

DCF

WACC

8.84%

Terminal Growth

2%

Multiple

11x

Terminal Growth	
PV of CF	\$35,598.79
PV of TV	\$214,575.11
EV	\$250,173.90
- Net Debt	\$3,784.00
Equity Value	\$246,389.90
FD S/O	463
Implied Share Price	\$532.16
Current Share Price	\$335.64
Implied Upside	58.55%

Multiple	
PV of CF	\$35,598.79
PV of TV	\$248,466.79
EV	\$284,065.58
- Net Debt	\$3,784.00
Equity Value	\$280,281.58
FD S/O	463
Implied Share Price	\$605.36
Current Share Price	\$335.64
Implied Upside	80.36%





Sensitivity

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		WA			
11%	10%	9%	8%	7%	6%
\$357.16	\$358.90	\$360.71	\$362.60	\$364.59	\$366.67
\$395.32	\$397.06	\$398.87	\$400.77	\$402.75	\$404.83
\$433.49	\$435.22	\$437.03	\$438.93	\$440.91	\$442.99
\$471.65	\$473.38	\$475.19	\$477.09	\$479.07	\$481.15
\$509.81	\$511.54	\$513.36	\$515.25	\$517.24	\$519.31
	\$357.16 \$395.32 \$433.49 \$471.65	\$357.16 \$358.90 \$395.32 \$397.06 \$433.49 \$435.22 \$471.65 \$473.38	11% 10% 9% \$357.16 \$358.90 \$360.71 \$395.32 \$397.06 \$398.87 \$433.49 \$435.22 \$437.03 \$471.65 \$473.38 \$475.19	\$357.16 \$358.90 \$360.71 \$362.60 \$395.32 \$397.06 \$398.87 \$400.77 \$433.49 \$435.22 \$437.03 \$438.93 \$471.65 \$473.38 \$475.19 \$477.09	11% 10% 9% 8% 7% \$357.16 \$358.90 \$360.71 \$362.60 \$364.59 \$395.32 \$397.06 \$398.87 \$400.77 \$402.75 \$433.49 \$435.22 \$437.03 \$438.93 \$440.91 \$471.65 \$473.38 \$475.19 \$477.09 \$479.07

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EV/EBITDA

	70%	71%	72%	73%	74%	75%
8x	\$465.75	\$433.74	\$401.73	\$369.72	\$337.71	\$305.69
9x	\$513.99	\$478.90	\$443.81	\$408.72	\$373.63	\$338.53
10x	\$562.23	\$524.06	\$485.89	\$447.72	\$409.55	\$371.37
11x	\$610.48	\$569.22	\$527.97	\$486.72	\$445.47	\$404.21
12x	\$658.72	\$614.39	\$570.05	\$525.72	\$481.39	\$437.05

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	1P COGS								
	70%	71%	72%	73%	74%	75%			
1%	\$479.89	\$446.01	\$412.13	\$378.25	\$344.37	\$310.49			
2%	\$538.37	\$500.61	\$462.85	\$425.09	\$387.34	\$349.58			
3%	\$616.85	\$573.89	\$530.93	\$487.98	\$445.02	\$402.06			
4%	\$727.76	\$677.45	\$627.14	\$576.83	\$526.52	\$476.21			
5%	\$896.38	\$834.90	\$773.41	\$711.93	\$650.44	\$588.96			



Amazon Revenue Breakdown

Amazon.com, Inc.	2013	2014E	2015E	2016E	2017E	2018E	2019E
Net Sales	\$74,453	\$92,383	\$113,528	\$137,007	\$163,730	\$192,168	\$222,146
1P	82%	80%	78%	76%	74%	72%	71%
3P	11%	12%	12%	12%	13%	13%	13%
Amazon Prime	1%	2%	3%	4%	4%	4%	4%
Amazon Web Services	4%	5%	6%	7%	8%	9%	9%
Other	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Amazon.com, Inc.	2013	2014E	2015E	2016E	2017E	2018E	2019E
Net Sales	22%	24%	23%	21%	20%	17%	16%
1P	18%	18%	18%	18%	18%	18%	18%
3P	36%	28%	25%	20%	26%	22%	19%
Amazon Prime	93%	110%	58%	47%	28%	22%	20%
Amazon Web Services	59%	46%	48%	40%	37%	28%	23%
Other	45%	32%	32%	32%	28%	27%	27%
Amazon.com, Inc.	2013	2014E	2015E	2016E	2017E	2018E	2019E
Cost of Sales	73%	70%	68%	67 %	66%	64%	63%
Cost of Product	60%	58%	57%	56%	54%	53%	52%
Shipping	9%	9%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%
Digital Content	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Hardware Manufacturing	3.1%	2.3%	2.0%	1.7%	1.5%	1.3%	1.2%
Operating Expenses	26.1%	29.6%	28.3%	29.1%	29.5%	28.6%	28.5%
Fulfillment	11.1%	11.4%	11.4%	11.4%	11.4%	10.7%	10.4%
Tech. & Content	8.0%	9.9%	9.4%	10.1%	10.3%	9.7%	9.6%
Marketing	4.1%	4.7%	4.2%	4.2%	4.2%	4.2%	4.2%
General & Admin	1.3%	1.7%	1.2%	1.0%	0.9%	1.0%	1.0%
Stock-Based Comp.	1.5%	1.8%	2.1%	2.4%	2.7%	3.0%	3.3%





Amazon Free Cash Flow Reconciliation

Amazon.com, Inc.	2013	2014E	2015E	2016E	2017E	2018E	2019E
Net Sales	\$74,453	\$92,383	\$113,528	\$137,007	\$163,730	\$192,168	\$222,146
Cost of Goods Sold	\$54,181	\$64,961	\$77,674	\$92,200	\$107,552	\$123,480	\$140,046
Gross Margin%	27%	30%	32%	33%	34%	36%	37%
Operating Expenses	\$19,411	\$27,308	\$32,088	\$39,803	\$48,326	\$54,968	\$63,347
EBIT	\$861	\$113	\$3,766	\$5,003	\$7,853	\$13,720	\$18,753
Operating Margin %	1%	0%	3%	4%	5%	7%	8%
Add: Depreciation & Ammort.	\$3,253	\$5,081	\$6,244	\$7,535	\$9,005	\$10,569	\$12,218
EBITDA	\$4,114	\$5,194	\$10,010	\$12,539	\$16,858	\$24,289	\$30,971
Less: Changes in NWC	(\$1,358)	(\$1,560)	(\$2,069)	(\$2,475)	(\$2,979)	(\$3,577)	(\$4,146)
Less: CAPEX	3440						
Free Cash Flow	\$2,032	\$6,754	\$12,079	\$15,014	\$19,837	\$27,866	\$35,117
Net Interest	\$103	\$92	\$114	\$137	\$164	\$192	\$222
	<u> </u>	-					· .
Tax Expense	\$162	\$6	\$1,096	\$1,460	\$2,307	\$4,058	\$5,559
Net Income	\$596	\$15	\$2,556	\$3,407	\$5,382	\$9,470	\$12,971



