

# Who is a robot? A fundamental model of artificial identity

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**Abstract**—Though some matters of consensus have begun to crystallize, scholars in human-robot interaction have thus far reasoned about artificial identity under many different definitions. Many of these seemingly disparate perspectives may, however, be unified into one coherent model through a synthesis of contemporary scientific and Buddhist philosophy of identity. Under this model, artificial and human identity are modeled equivalently under an assumption that there is no “unchanging essence” which constitutes an agent’s identity, but rather that identity may be defined as the sum of overlapping aggregates subject to change through time. The model reckons with the idea that much of what is conceived of as identity may be arbitrarily ascribed, artificial boundaries, but that these boundaries often constitute substantial social and psychological realities. This thinking is congruent with contemporary philosophical perspectives across disciplines from biology to cognitive science. The model may serve as a useful tool for reasoning about identity in complex, dynamic situations and provide a firm foundation for work which utilizes artificial identity. The model may even offer one or two possible answers to the question: Who is a robot?

## I. INTRODUCTION

What is artificial “identity?” The word has been used by scholars of human-robot interaction (HRI) to mean at times very different concepts—personality, selfhood, group belonging, and other definitions still [1]—yet it remains intuitive that each of these things make up some facet of what we can call “identity.” Through a synthesis of contemporary scientific and Buddhist philosophical ideas about the nature of identity, it is possible to unify these seemingly disparate perspectives into one coherent model. The model attempts to help clear any fog surrounding what artificial identity is, how it works, and how it enmeshes with human identity; provide a firm philosophical foundation for knowledge which scholars of HRI have thus far intuited; and serve as a useful tool for reasoning about identity in complex, changing situations.

The basic premise of the model is as follows:

- Artificial identity can be modeled in fundamentally the same way as human identity. Distinction between the two are noteworthy exceptions rather than intrinsic differences.
- Boundaries defining different “identities” are ascribed arbitrarily but are often important psychological and social constructs.
- Different components of what is considered identity (such as a name, a body, or a consciousness) can be generally organized as belonging to five interacting and overlapping *aggregates* (Fig. 1).

- The aggregates are temporally composable, accounting for the fact that identity may change through time.
- The aggregates are spatially composable, accounting for how boundaries separating identities are often freely redrawn to reason about identity at different levels of abstraction.

This model is congruous with perspectives across multiple disciplines. Similar reasoning has been applied in thinking on what constitutes an “organism” in light of cybernetic implications in biology [2], the nature of the “embodied mind” in cognitive science [3], hypotheses in complex systems concerning the informational context dependence of the emergence of life [4], phenomenological perspectives on identity in feminist theory [5], [6], and indeed ideas in HRI itself concerning thinking on identity in levels of abstraction [7], social identity theory [8], and malleable human-robot boundaries [9].

Modeling identity in this way frees us to confidently reason about it in a way that is useful and beneficial to us in our design, analysis, and advancement of artificial agents with identity. It resolves the question of “Who is a robot?” as, in one respect, unanswerable—given the false premise that there is a defined “who” with boundaries which can be deduced—and, in another respect, wholly modelable.

## II. FIVE AGGREGATES

Bardzell [10] and Xuan [11] argue that a pluralist approach to human-machine interaction, robotics, and AI which incorporates specifically non-Western philosophical perspectives leads to the creation of more functionally and ethically robust technology. Indeed, in recent years the study of HRI itself has directly benefited from, for example, Confucian [12], Buddhist [13], [14], Islamic [15], and indigenous Australian [16] philosophical perspectives. Many non-Western traditions have centuries to millennia of accumulated thought on a wide variety of matters. While some ideas similar to those presented here feature in traditional Western philosophy (such as Hume’s ideas concerning the “self” being indistinguishable from perceptions), non-Western traditions can often be a source of considerably greater depth and nuance on these ideas than can be found in Western literature. Although recent work has primarily been concerned with building more pluralist *ethics* for HRI (and while this absolutely an important endeavour), these traditions have far more to offer than just ethics—they often yield perspectives which can directly inform technical tasks and fundamental scientific understandings of HRI itself [10], [16].

Originating from Buddhist philosophy, the five aggregates (Sanskrit: *skandhas*) are, according to many interpretations,

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


Fig. 1: A summary of the five aggregates model.

the five attributes which give rise to personhood and identity [17], [14], [13]. Reasoning with the aggregates, one posits that there is no “unchanging essence” which constitutes a person’s identity, but that, like the ship of Theseus, it is instead defined as the sum of its ever-changing parts. The aggregates are metaphorically conceived of as “burning piles of phenomena”—a complex conglomeration of overlapping processes. Like piles of sand, they bleed into each other. Individual piles may be roughly discerned, but there are no hard boundaries between them; Bits of each aggregate may be found in every other aggregate.

Each aggregate may be intuitively identified as constituting some part of what is considered identity. For example, it is rather uncontroversial to consider the mind as one’s identity. Others refute the Cartesian dualism imposing a separation between mind and body, and consider the mind-body as identity [6]. In other uses still, such as in literature concerning robots’ “mind-body-identity mapping,” the word “identity” refers to something separate from both the mind and the body [18], [19], [20]. None of these interpretations are necessarily wrong, and they are all reconciled by the aggregates.

While each aggregate bears a traditional Sanskrit name, the choice of their English names is often the exercise of a given work’s author as the Sanskrit names do not directly translate. The English names in this model depart from some of the usual selections—namely, we may specifically choose them to more clearly exhibit how each aggregate applies to both humans and machines. The five aggregates, with examples of each for both humans and machines, are:

#### 1. **Form** (Sanskrit: *rūpa*)

The physical or virtual manifestation of matter or other phenomena. Examples include the body, a virtual avatar, a voice, a chassis, facial features, etc. Consideration of form should always contextualize it in the environment, as identification may not always end in neat boundaries around a particular phenomenon. For example, one might extend identification with the organic body to include a prosthetic limb, or

to the boundaries of one’s car while at the wheel of it. The nature of a particular *Form* has direct phenomenological consequences for the types of experience and *Sensory input* available to an identified subject.

#### 2. **Sensory input** (Sanskrit: *vedanā*)

The raw information received from sensors, senses, input channels, etc. For humans, this encompasses the information from sensory organs such as the eyes, ears, skin, and so on. For machines, this typically takes the form of raw data from input channels or sensors such as cameras, microphones, tactile sensors, etc. Consider how someone with a particular chronic pain may come to identify with the pain itself, or how when we are ill we may not “feel like ourselves,” identifying only with the usual feelings of non-illness as “me” and rejecting the feelings of illness as “not me.” Sensory input may nonetheless form a critical basis for the formation of identities regardless of whether the input itself is identified with. Naturally, it is always *Form* that is sensed.

#### 3. **Labeling** (Sanskrit: *saṃjñā*)

The naming and ascription of reified categories to sensory input; that is, the imposition of discrete labels upon continuous phenomena. For example, a human might draw artificial lines separating “red” from “orange” from “yellow” along the 600-700 nanometer portion of the visual light spectrum, or label continuous changes in psychosomatic sensations as discrete feelings of “joy” or “contentment.” Machines do this very directly with machine learning, such as learning to distinguish and label groups of pixels as a “car,” “person,” “bus,” etc. As we will see in the next section, it is this process which leads to a great deal of what is considered identity—particularly through labeling the boundaries between “self” and “other” and the ascription of social categories such as

## Model A




Fig. 2: An example showcasing the temporal and spatial composability of the model: An interactant and robot's identity characteristics change with time. (1) The interactant begins interacting with an agent in virtual form on a tablet. (2) The interactant changes the agent's gender characteristics according to their preference. (3) The agent's identity is re-embodied into a physical robot. (4) The interactant takes manual control of the robot's motor functions using a VR headset, allowing them to also re-embodiment into the robot platform and blur the boundary between self and other. Two potential identity modelling solutions are presented. Model A uses smaller timesteps and treats the human and robot as a single agent in the final timestep. Model B uses larger timesteps and keeps the identity of the human and robot separated. Both models are equally valid choices of the modeller, and either may be used depending on the needs and goals of the modeller in identity design and analysis.

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race and gender.

4. **Assemblage** (Sanskrit: *saṅkhāra*)

Mental or computational processes such as thoughts, programs, algorithms, memories, stored data, intentions, plans, etc. Identification can be seen as “I am my thoughts” or pointing to the same program which is running across multiple embodiments as the “identity” of an agent [21]. See also the identification of self with memories in the form of, for example, “What is a man but the sum of his memories?” [22] Herein lies the “personal story” or remembered experience from the past which can constitute a sense of continuous identity.

5. **Consciousness** (Sanskrit: *viññāna*)

That which cognizes and experiences. One can be aware of one’s own thoughts, feelings, sensory input, and labelings, yet still not identify with them. Consciousness is what remains, and here is the *awareness* of these things. Naturally, human consciousness goes here. The model allows for the possibility of artificial consciousness, but it does not require it. Given that not all five aggregates must be identified with for an identity to exist, artificial identity still exists in the absence of artificial consciousness. An important note: Since the “amount of consciousness” plays a large role (but not the sole role) in how we determine the amount of ethical treatment required for a given being, consciousness is important to model for when considering, for example, human-robot hybrid identities (see the fourth panel of Fig. 2) or organic-synthetic cyborg organisms [2].

### III. ASCRIPTION

Much of what is conceived of as identity are ascriptions under the model. Ascriptions, in this context, are artificial boundaries, names, and categories created through *Labeling*. These typically manifest as social or psychological constructs and encompass a wide variety of phenomena such as gender, the boundary between the body and environment, or the point in time at which an identity comes into existence. These are often attempts to model phenomena which exhibit genuine variation but cannot be truly quantized in reality. Ascriptions can be understood as the answer to the question: What is reified?

Though technically artificial, ascriptions are not without systemic forces driving their creation and real-world consequences of their existence. Ascriptions which are agreed upon by multiple people, or are otherwise reified psychologically, fundamentally shape the landscape of our social and internal experience. The key is that these boundaries may be drawn and redrawn at any time and in any configuration.

Understanding ascriptions in this way allows us to work with them to our advantage. It allows us to know, for example, that all possible embodiment configurations of a robot’s mind, body, and personality are equally valid and

readily explained with the model, and that no effort is needed to locate the “who” in an engineered identity. Then, it is how an identity configuration mediates the interaction relationship and the interactants’ own acceptance and understanding of it which become the primary concerns [23]. We may also, for example, phrase a question on whether robots may have “personal identity” [24] as equivalent to the question “may robots self-determine internal ascriptions of identity?”

It would be impossible to model every possible ascription, as a general model of them would essentially be a model of the whole of human experience. There are certain types of ascriptions, however, that we must turn our focus to for practical and ethical reasons. Namely: ascribed boundaries which create ideas such as a “self” which is separate from an “other,” ascriptions which occur across time, and social identities which may relate to inequity.

#### A. *Spatial composability*

Under the model, spatial boundaries between identities are ascribed. We may take a postphenomenological [25] approach wherein, rather than attempting to understand the identity of discrete individuals or agents, we understand identity as something with malleable boundaries that is mediated by the complex interactions between humans, technology, and the environment. For the purposes of our own analysis and modeling, we may draw or not draw these boundaries wherever it is useful to do so and take careful note of how each subject perceives these boundaries themselves.

Examples of important ascribed spatial boundaries are the boundaries between self and other; between others; between self and environment; or between mind, body, and personhood. Treating the spatial aspect of identity in this way allows us to consider multiple levels of abstraction and reason about identity beyond the level of a single individual (such as the collective identity of a group) or even below it (for example, how one person or robot may hold several different “identities”).

If (and only if) a boundary between “self” and “other” is established, then we may speak of internal (self-directed) ascriptions versus external (other-directed) ascriptions. It is only under this condition that the questions arise: “Who am I?” and “Who are they?” When modeling, it is important to consider the source (the perspective of the subject) making these ascriptions.

#### B. *Temporal composability*

Temporal boundaries are also ascribed. That is, identity must always be modeled *within a particular window of time*. All aspects of identity—personality, embodiment, thoughts, social associations, etc.—are subject to constant change for both humans and machines. While this is generally a slow process for humans, artificial agents are exceptionally flexible in this regard [26] and can often alter major aspects of identity instantaneously (for example, facial, gender, and vocal cues of a Furhat robot). Traditionally, this is also an important property of not only ascriptions but the aggregates themselves [14]. The *composability* of this property

arises when we can model key identity characteristics as they overlap with each other in time, depending on which characteristics we are interested in.

### C. Social identity

As opposed to *personal identity*, which is self-ascribed, *social identity* is socially constructed and socially ascribed upon others [8], [27]. Given that social inequities arise along lines of social identity like race, gender, and class [28], it is paramount to always model them when applicable. These sorts of identities are regularly ascribed to agents such as digital assistants and robots—especially when human-like or viewed as social actors [29], [30], [8]. Works in HRI have made an increasingly extensive case on the importance of sensitivity towards these identities in interaction design for hindering the propagation of harmful norms and ceasing to uphold social inequity [27], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34]. Of course, important social identities which are less sensitive (such as profession, membership a particular women’s rugby team, etc.) may also be modeled when useful. Designers must be careful to note that the intended social identities for an agent may not always align with the identities which interactants actually ascribe to the agent.

## IV. USAGE

The model is intended for two primary usages:

- 1) To help researchers more precisely reason about artificial identity in the abstract
- 2) As an analysis and design tool

For the first usage, the reader need only to absorb and reflect on the ideas here presented (and perhaps read some related literature). The second usage can be executed as follows. Fig. 2 exhibits a modeling example of this process:

- **Specify the window(s) of time**, since identity is in constant flux. Time windows do not need to be of equal length.
- **Consider environment and context**, since identity is mediated by these. The context might be social, spatial, technological, ecological, etc.
- **Establish a reference frame**. Like motion in physics, identity is relative and depends on the reference frame to center the perspective. Will this be the perspective of a particular identified subject? Or perhaps the reference frame of yourself as the modeler? Modeling multiple reference frames at a time may be desirable (e.g. Fig. 2 considers the reference frame of both the human and robot).
- **Model identities one aggregate at a time**. Note that since aggregates may overlap that some phenomena might be correctly classified under more than one aggregate. Take note of the ascriptions created through *Labeling*, as these define the identified subjects. Where do subjects perceive the boundary between the self, others, and environment? Which attributes are ascribed to each of these identities? Which ascriptions are reified by social, psychological, or engineered construction? The aggregates are presented in Figs. 1 and 2 to exhibit

one possible example of how to visually organize this information using, for example, colored sticky notes or diagramming software. The modeler may also choose to instead use sequences of lists with each aggregate bulleted by the symbols presented in Fig. 1 to distinguish them, or by any other system of their choosing.

- **Carefully consider ascriptions of sensitive social identities** such as gender, ethnicity, and class. It is particularly advisable to consider these through the lens of intersectionality [28] and feminist HRI power analysis [35], [36]. If you are designing an identity system, take note that having an automated system recognize and reason over these social identities in human interactants poses significant ethical risks [31] and is best avoided.

Note that there may be more than one possible modeling solution in a given instance. For example, the human in the fourth panel of Fig. 2 might be able to simultaneously hold an ascription of their identity as a *human-robot* in addition to an ascription of their human self as separate identity from the robot’s. They may choose to think in one way or the other according to their whim or to what is useful in a given moment.

While the individual modeler can deduce quite a lot in this fashion, the imagination has its limits. When modeling a novel identity system, since the exact nature of ascriptions varies from culture to culture—and, to an extent, from person to person—it is prudent to rely on methods such as ethnography, participatory design, or perceptual interaction studies to garner a fuller idea of the sorts of ascriptions that may occur in a particular context.

## V. CONCLUSION

This paper outlines a unified philosophical basis and modeling tool for analytically reasoning about artificial identity. Further refinements on this model may be in order as it is tested, put into practice, and commensurated with future philosophical development. This model shall hopefully illustrate the value of a pluralist approach incorporating non-Western perspectives, serve as a useful tool for technologists to disentangle even the most complex of artificial identity situations, and allow us to confidently deploy artificial identity in our work.

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