

Usable Security and User Training

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JANUARY 25

Think
about it:

Is the
Doodle link
to the right
secure?

Sign up for tutorial sessions

`http://doodle.com/poll/t7ia4mbv9vk8ekek`

Link is also available on the website, which is at:

`http://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/teaching/courses/cs/`

First, the news...

- And someone messes up SSL certs again...
 - <http://arstechnica.co.uk/security/2016/09/firefox-ready-to-block-certificate-authority-that-threatened-web-security/>
 - http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/08/29/fraudulent_google_ssl_certificate/
 - <http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/still-fuming-over-https-mishap-google-gives-symantec-an-offer-it-cant-refuse/>
 - <http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/02/lenovo-pcs-ship-with-man-in-the-middle-adware-that-breaks-https-connections/>

Quick explanation of SSL

We will cover this in more detail later

Slides with this background are from a talk given at the Royal Society Frontiers of Science event on why encryption is not adopted at scale

Encryption (in transit) properties we want:

1. The communication between you and the other party is **confidential** and has **not been changed**

- *No one can read what you sent*
- *No one can change what you sent*

2. **Knowing who** you are communicating with

- *You are talking to who you think you are talking to and not someone else*

Alice wants to talk securely with Bob



Alice



Bob

She can encrypt the connection (1)




Alice




Bob


But how can Alice know she is talking to Bob and not talking to Eve? (2)



Man in the middle attack



Alice goes to her favorite coffee shop
and tries to visit BBC News



Alice



BBC
NEWS



Alice

UK - BBC News

www.bbc.com/news/uk

BBC News Sport More Search

NEWS

Home Video World US & Canada **UK** Business Tech More

UK England N. Ireland Scotland Wales Politics

Osborne unveils sugar tax on soft drinks

George Osborne unveils a tax on the makers of soft drinks - and warns of the risks of leaving the EU in his eighth Budget.

🕒 20 minutes ago **UK Politics**



LIVE Budget 2016 Live

Growth forecasts cut

Budget key points: At-a-glance

▶ 'On course for a surplus'

BBC
NEWS



Free Wi-Fi

From our friends at Google

Accept & Connect

I agree to the [Terms of Service](#) and have
reviewed the [Google Privacy Policy](#)

Need help? 855-446-2374

Benign Main-in-the-Middle



Alice







https://ally.com

versus

http://ally.com

http versus https



Encryption properties we want:

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Key management

- Public/private key pairs
 - Give public keys to other people
 - Keep private keys private
 - Verify other people's public keys
- Keys are linked to identities
- A private key should NEVER be shared, so only one entity theoretically has access to it
- Possession of a private can be cryptographically proven when starting a communication IF you have the public key

My public key


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Version: GnuPG v2

```
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YKG3gbV9iycZAS31gbogVLAZqNSWhp8vVIEE28Fyf/Ed
=x5FK
```

-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Idea:
Certificate
Authorities
can do the
verification
instead of
users





RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

Lenovo PCs ship with man-in-the-middle adware that breaks HTTPS connections [Updated]

Superfish may make it trivial for attackers to spoof any HTTPS website.

by Dan Goodin - Feb 19, 2015 11:36am EST

[Share](#) [Tweet](#) 333






Adrienne Porter Felt

@__apf__




Following

hey @Gogo, why are you issuing *.google.com certificates on your planes?




Real world click-through rates

- Studied the click-through rate for malware and HTTPS warnings
- Malware
 - *Firefox 7.2%*
 - *Chrome 23.2%*
- Phishing
 - *Firefox 9.1%*
 - *Chrome 18.0%*
- HTTPS
 - *Firefox 33.0%*
 - *Chrome 70.2%*



Almuhimedi, Hazim, et al. "Your Reputation Precedes You: History, Reputation, and the Chrome Malware Warning." Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). 2014.

Click through rates based on if the user had visited the site in the past



Users are ignoring warnings for sites they have visited in the past

Almuhimedi, Hazim, et al.
"Your Reputation
Precedes You: History,
Reputation, and the
Chrome Malware
Warning." Symposium on
Usable Privacy and
Security (SOUPS). 2014.

Why do people click through the warnings?


- The site is used often and trusted
 - *“YouTube is a well known website. I’d assume that the malware block is in error.”*
- The person who posted the link is trusted
 - *“I find it harder to believe [the warning] when my facebook friend just posted it and had no problems.”*
- The site where the link is assumed to have good security
 - *“I presume that visiting youtube from a facebook link would be safe.”*
- They think they are safe
 - *“I use Linux I’m not afraid of anything.”*
 - *“I have an anti virus”*

Why people don't use privacy protections


1. People don't really care about privacy
2. People are not aware of the privacy issues
3. People are not aware of how to protect themselves
4. People are aware, but are unable to use the privacy protections

Communication- Human Information Processing Model (C-HIP)

- Developed to model why people do or don't understand road signs
- We adapted it to computer security




Human In the Loop Framework





We are now going to use the framework to figure out why people are ignoring SSL warnings...



What level of the framework does this fail at?





And this one?



And this one?




Any better?



And this one?

- The site is used often and trusted
 - “YouTube is a well known website. I’d assume that the malware block is in error.”
- The person who posted the link is trusted
 - “I find it harder to believe [the warning] when my facebook friend just posted it and had no problems.”
- The site where the link is assumed to have good security
 - “I presume that visiting youtube from a facebook link would be safe.”
- They think they are safe
 - “I use Linux I’m not afraid of anything.”
 - “I have an anti virus”



Users

Users are not the enemy


- Malicious actors are the enemy
- Users are a partner in keeping the system secure
- Like any partner:
 - They have skills you don't have
 - They are missing skills you do have
- Think about what skills they have that you need
- Use the skills you have to make good decisions on users' behalf

Phishing attacks and training


Phishing

- Phishing – Attempting to trick someone into taking the “bait” and interacting in a way they should not.
 - Typically involves the impersonator pretending to be someone else that the person trusts
 - Interactions: Clicking a link, opening a file, replying with information, transferring money, ect.
- Spear phishing – Phishing, but with a small number of targets and each email is crafted for that individual
- Whaling – Phishing for people with a lot of money, i.e. CEO
- QRishing – Phishing attacks through QR codes


What on this email can be trusted?



(Wrong) Trust indicators



Sneaky email
to get the
recipient to
open the
attachment,
which is an
html document




Problem: Users click on links and attachments

- Scan all incoming attachments and links for blacklisted content
- Teach users
 - Only click if you are expecting the email
 - Do not open attachments unless you are expecting them
 - If you are not sure, contact the person or company separately and ask if they sent the email
 - If you are not sure, contact the IT department
 - Banks and credit card companies will never contact you this way

Anti-Phishing Phill

- Serious game to help people learn to spot dangerous URLs
- Training sometimes works
- But it takes time
- And people forget



PhishGuru

- Comic to train people to spot phishing attacks
- Best time to train is after a users has already fallen for an attack
- Send out fake attacks and train those who click on them

Carnegie Mellon The PhishGuru Protect yourself from Phishing Scams



WARNING!

Clicking on links like the one in the email you've just read puts you at risk for identity theft. A phishing scam uses fraudulent email and web pages to steal bank account information, passwords, and other confidential information.

How you were tricked



How to help protect yourself

- 1 Don't trust links in an email.
<http://www.wombank.com/update>
- 2 Never give out personal information upon email request.
Name: Jane Smith
SSN: 123 456 789
- 3 Look carefully at the web address.
<http://www.amazon.com>
- 4 Type in the real website address into a web browser.
<http://www.amazon.com>
- 5 Don't call company phone numbers in emails or instant messages. Check a reliable source such as a phone book or credit card statement.
Credit Card Statement
For customer service call 1-800-xxx-xxxx
- 6 Don't open unexpected email attachments or instant message download links.
My Inbox
Here is the updated document.
[attachement](#)

How phishers trick you



Thanks PhishGuru!
Where can I learn more?

Visit
phishguru.org



Give users options that make sense and work for them

PhishGuru

- Users know what they are expecting
- Users know who the email looks like it is from
- Users can do an out-of-band contact (phone call)
- Users do not want to ignore a serious issue



WARNING

Clicking on links in emails puts you at risk for identity theft and financial loss. This tutorial was developed by Wombat Security Technologies to teach you how to protect yourself from phishing scams.



Don't open or install email attachments unless they were sent by someone you know and you were expecting them. Verify with the sender that they intended to send the attachment.



I forged the address to look genuine.
I threatened the user with an urgent message.
I added an attachment to collect sensitive information.



To learn more about protecting yourself from phishing scams visit <http://www.phishguru.org>

In Summary...

- Academics say in-the-moment training works
- Chief Security Officers (CSOs) have mixed opinions
- Everybody thinks that users clicking on links and attachments is a big problem

Why show warnings at all?

- Determined users might disable Safe Browsing. Which would prevent future warnings.
- User could also open the website in another browser that is less safe and does not block the website.
 - America Online users used to go to a friend's house to open malicious sites because the ISP blocked malicious sites.
 - Different browsers block different sets of sites, we don't want to teach users to use less safe browsers.

Questions
