



# DevSecOps What Why and How?

Anant Shrivastava  
[@anantshri](https://twitter.com/anantshri)  
NotSoSecure Global Services

# About: Anant Shrivastava

**Director NotSoSecure Global Services**

**Sysadmin / Development / Security**

**Trainer / Speaker: BlackHat, Nullcon, RootConf, RuxCon, IPExpo, C0c0n**

**Project Owner: Android Tamer, Code Vigilant**

**Contributor: null, G4H, OWASP and more**

**<https://anantshri.info> (@anantshri on social platforms)**

- **What is DevSecOps?**
- **Why do we need DevSecOps?**
- **How do we do DevSecOps?**
- **Integrate Security in DevOps Pipeline**
- **Tools of Trade**
- **Sample Implementation (On Prem and Cloud Native)**
- **Case Studies**


# Disclaimer

- I will be listing a lot of tools, It's not an exhaustive list
- I don't endorse or recommend any specific tool / vendor
- Every environment is different: Test and validate before implementing any ideas

# What is DevSecOps?

Effort to strive for “Secure by Default”


- Integrate Security via **tools**
- Create Security as Code **culture**
- Promote cross **skilling**




# Why do we need DevSecOps?

- **DevOps moves at rapid pace, traditional security just can't keep up**
- **DevSecOps makes it easier to manage rapid pace of development & large scale secure deployments**
- **DevSecOps allows for much smoother scaling of process**
- **Security as part of process is the only way to ensure safety**

# Shifting Left saves cost & time




# Shifting Left saves cost & time



# How do we do DevSecOps?

- **DevSecOps is Automation + Cultural Changes**
- **Integrate security tools into your DevOps Pipeline**
- **Enable cultural changes to embrace DevSecOps**

# Injecting Sec in DevOps




# DevOps ---> DevSecOps

## DevOps Pipeline



## DevSecOps Pipeline



# Pre-Commit Hooks


- Sensitive information such as the access keys, access tokens, SSH keys etc. are often erroneously leaked due to accidental git commits
- Pre-commit hooks can be installed on developer's workstations to avoid the same
- Work on pure Regex-based approach for filtering sensitive data
- *If developers want they can circumvent this step hence use it like a defense in depth but don't fully rely on it*

# IDE Security Plugin

- IDE Plugin's provide quick actionable pointer to developers
- It is useful to stop silly security blunders
- Work on pure Regex-based approach
- *If developers want they can circumvent this step hence use it like a defense in depth but don't fully rely on it*

# Secrets Management

- Often credentials are stored in config files
- Leakage can result in abuse scenario
- Secrets Management allows you to tokenize the information



# Software Composition Analysis

- We don't write software's, we build on frameworks
- Biggest portion of software is now third party libraries
- Major languages provide module managements
  - PIP, NPM, Gems, go get, perl cpan, php packager and more
- Software Composition Analysis performs checks to identify vulnerable/outdated 3<sup>rd</sup> party libraries

- **White-box security testing using automated tools**
- **Useful for weeding out low-hanging fruits like SQL Injection, Cross-Site Scripting, insecure libraries etc**
- **Tool by default configured with generic setting, needs manual oversight for managing false-positives**

- Black/Grey-box security testing using automated tools
- SAST may not get full picture without application deployment
- DAST will help in picking out deployment specific issues
- Results from DAST and SAST can be compared to weed out false-positives
- Tools may need prior set of configuration settings to give good results

- Infrastructure as a code allows you to document and version control the infra
- It also allows you to perform audit on the infrastructure
- Docker / K8s infra relies on base images
- Environment is as secure as the base image
- Base images need to be minimal in nature and need to be assessed to identify inherited vulnerabilities

# Compliance as Code

- Compliance could be industry standard (PCI DSS, HIPAA, SOX) or org specific
- Compliance is essentially a set of rules and hence can be converted into written test cases
- Having written code format this can again be version controlled

# Vulnerability Management

- All the tools discussed above result in report fatigue
- Every tool has a different style of presentation
- A central dashboard is required to normalize the data
- Vulnerability Management System can then be integrated to bug tracking systems to allow devs to work on items

# Alerting and Monitoring

- Monitoring is needed for two end goals
  - Understand if our security controls are effective
  - What and where we need to improve
- To test Security control effectiveness:
  - When did an attack occur
  - Was it blocked or not
  - What level of access was achieved
  - what data was bought in and bought out


# Asset Monitoring

- With recent advancements assets now should include anything and everything where organization data resides
- With rapid development & provisioning the asset inventory can't be a static inventory
- We need to monitor the assets constantly both on premise and Cloud

Reference: <https://redhuntlabs.com/blog/redefining-assets-a-modern-perspective.html>

# Sample Implementation - Java

## A simplistic flow of DevSecOps Pipeline incorporating various stages



# Tools of The Trade

Threat Modelling Tools



ThreatSpec

Microsoft Threat  
Modeling Tool

Pre-Commit Hooks



truffleHog

Git Hound

Software Composition Analysis



!Requires.io

Retire.js

Static Analysis Security Testing  
(SAST)



IDE Plugins



CAT.net



Secret Management



HashiCorp  
**Vault**

Keywhiz



**Confidant**

# Tools of The Trade

Vulnerability Management



Dynamic Analysis Security Testing (DAST)



Security in Infrastructure as Code



**OpenVAS**  
Open Vulnerability Assessment System

anchore



clair



OpenSCAP

Compliance as Code



KitchenCI



DevSec Hardening Framework  
Docker Bench for Security

WAF



# To be or Not to Be in Pipeline

- API / command line access
- Execution start to final output should be 15 minutes max
- Tools should be Containerizable / scriptable
- Minimal licensing limitations (parallel scans or threads)
- Output format parsable / machine readable (no to stdout,  
yes to json / xml)
- Configurable to counter false negatives / false positives

- Pipeline to be tweaked based on Milestone (Initiative/Epic/Story)
- Remember initial onboarding is tedious
- Ensure dataset dependent tool get frequent data refresh
- Sample optimization
  - Only CSS Changes: no need for SCA
  - Only pom.xml or gradle changes: no need of SAST
  - If Infra as code has zero changes skip or fast track infra scan
- Ensure to run full (non optimized) pipeline periodically

# Does Programming Language Matter

- Different programming languages need different tools for static analysis and software composition analysis
- Some tools support multiple languages like sonarqube
- Others are focused on one language

# Language Specific Tools

## Languages

JAVA

PHP

Python

.NET

Ruby/Rails

Node JS

## Software Composition Analysis



DEPENDENCY-CHECK



ClearlyDefined



OSS  
Review Toolkit



OSS  
Review Toolkit



sonatype



DEPENDENCY-CHECK



Safety



sonatype

DotNET Retire  
SafeNuGet



OSS  
Review Toolkit



OSS  
Review Toolkit



OSS  
Review Toolkit



ClearlyDefined

## Source Code Static Analysis



sonarQube



graudit



sonarQube



graudit



Bandit



DotNet  
Security  
Guard



PUMA SCAN




Brakeman



sonarQube



sonarQube




npm-check  
NodeJsScan


Preference given to open-source tools; we don't endorse any tool

#BHUSA @BLACK HAT EVENTS


# DevSecOps Lab - Ruby




# DevSecOps Lab - PHP



# DevSecOps Lab - Python



# DevSecOps Lab - NodeJS



# What about Cloud

- **The Threat Landscape changes**
  - Identity and Access Management
  - Asset Inventory
  - Billing




- Infrastructure as Code allows quick audit / linting
- Focus more on:
  - Security groups
  - Permissions to resources
  - Rogue / shadow admins
  - Forgotten resources (compromises / billing)



# Cloud Native Approach to Security

- Different Service Providers Approach Security Differently
- All of them provide some of the ingredient in-house
- Irrespective of Cloud provider some tools will still need to be sourced
  - Static Code Analysis Tool
  - Dynamic Code Analysis Tool
  - Software Composition Analysis
  - Vulnerability Management Tool

# AWS Cloud Native DevSecOps



Source : NotSoSecure

<https://youtu.be/i38-YQsnqfw>

HAT EVENTS

# Cloud Native Dev[Sec]Ops

	Conventional Infra	AWS	Azure	GCP
Source Code Management	Bitbucket, Github, Gitlab etc..	AWS CloudCommit	Azure Repos	Cloud Source Repositories
Infrastructure As a Code	Chef, Puppet, Ansible more..	Amazon CloudFormation	Azure DevTest Labs	Cloud Code
CI/CD Server	Jenkins, Bamboo, Gitlab, Travis CI, Circleci more	AWS CodeBuild AWS CodeDeploy AWS CodePipeline	Azure Pipelines, Azure Test Plans	Cloud Build, Tekton
Artifactory Repository	jFrog Artifactory, Sonatype Nexus, more..	Amazon S3	Azure Artifacts	Cloud Firestore
Stg/Prod Servers	VMWare, On-premises servers	EC2 ECS (Elastic Containers) EKS (Elastic Kubernetes)	Virtual Machines, Azure Lab Services, Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS)	Compute Engine, App Engine, Shielded VMs
Monitoring & Alert	Nagios, Graphite, Grafana	AWS CloudWatch	Azure Monitor, Network Watcher	Access Transparency
Firewall	Modsecurity	AWS Firewall Manager, AWS WAF	Azure Firewall	Application Gateway
DLP	MyDLP, OpenDLP	Amazon Macie	Azure Information Protection	Cloud Data Loss Prevention
Threat Detection	Snort, Kismet	Amazon GuardDuty	Azure Advanced Threat Protection	Event Threat Detection (beta)
Vulnerability Scanning	OpenVAS, Nessus	Amazon Inspector	Azure Security Center	Cloud Security Scanner
Secrets Management	Hashicorp Vault, Docker Secrets	AWS Secrets Manager	Azure Key Vault	Secrets management

# Cultural Aspect

- Automation alone will not solve the problems
- Encourage security mindset especially if outside sec team
- Cultivate/Identify common goals for greater good
- Build allies (security champions) in company
- Focus on collaboration and inclusive culture
- Avoid Blame Game



**Security team should try to eliminate the need of dedicated security team**

- **Bridge between Dev, Sec and Ops teams**
- **Single Person per team**
- **Everyone provided with similar cross skilling opportunities**
- **Incentivize other teams to collaborate with Sec team**
  - **Internal Bug bounties**
  - **Sponsor Interactions (Parties / get-togethers)**
  - **Sponsor cross skilling trainings for other teams**

# Security Enablers

## People

- Build relationships between teams, don't isolate
- Identify, nurture security conscious individuals
- Empower Dev / ops to deliver better and faster and secure, instead of blocking.
- Focus on solutions instead of blaming


## Process

- Involve security from get-go (design or ideation phase)
- Fix by priority, don't attempt to fix it all
- Security Controls must be programmable and automated wherever possible
- DevSecOps Feedback process must be smooth and governed

## Technology

- Templatize scripts/tools per language/platform
- Adopt security to devops flow don't expect others to adopt security
- Keep an eye out for simpler and better options and be pragmatic to test and use new tools

# Generic Case Study



# Case Studies – Fannie Mae

## DevSecOps @ Fannie Mae – The Strategy



Integrate with  
Culture

- Run as ONE (Security + DevOps as a singled purpose team)
- Training development teams to develop Secure code
  - OWASP Brown Bags and On Demand Training Courses
  - Secure Code Examples in GIT REPO show how to write secure code
- Empowering Developers/ Engaging Business Partners
  - Verification of Fortify “Clean Scans”
  - Periodic “To-the-Right” Application Static and Dynamic Tests



Make Security  
Easy

- Tracking security issues in the same systems developers are using
  - Integrated Fortify with SonarQube
  - Integrated Fortify with SSC
  - Application Security Issues Defect Tracking (Jira)
- Integrating preventive security controls/tools in the development phase
  - HP-Secure Assist
  - Find Security Bugs
  - Sonatype IQ Plugin



Automate  
Everything


- Automating as many security tests as possible to run alongside other tests
  - Integrating SAST tools ( HP-SA, Find Bugs, Find Security Bugs, Fortify)
  - Future> Use DAST tool
- Detecting when applications are relying on libraries that have known vulnerabilities
  - Integrating Sonatype with fortify to detect third party libraries that have known vulnerabilities

# Case Studies – Fannie Mae


## DevSecOps @ Fannie Mae – The Results

### Delivering the Promise


- Average days to close a vulnerability improved by 74%
- Automated code quality scanning shows overall security code scores has increased by 10%
- More than 60% of application teams are performing security tests before release
- Critically vulnerable open source components (CVE 7.5+) downloaded has decreased from 18% to 6.25%
- ~ 55% of technical debt and security defects identified as a result of periodic testing have been dispositioned
- ~ 77% of older technical debt and security defects have been remediated, have a remediation plan in place, or have been addressed through managed retirements of assets



# Case Studies – ABN Amro



# Case Studies – ABN Amro



# Negative Case Studies

- C 🔒 bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/7-percent-of-all-amazon-s3-servers-are-exposed-explaining-recent-surge-of-data-leaks/
- Top defense contractor [Booz Allen Hamilton](#) leaks 60,000 files, including employee security credentials and passwords to a US government system.
  - Verizon partner leaks personal records of [over 14 million Verizon customers](#), including names, addresses, account details, and for some victims – account PINs.
  - An AWS S3 server leaked the personal details of [WWE fans](#) who registered on the company's sites. 3,065,805 users were exposed.
  - Another AWS S3 bucket leaked the personal details of [over 18 million American voters](#). The database contained information from three data mining companies known to be associated with the Republican Party.
  - [Another S3 database](#) left exposed only had the personal [details of job applications](#) that had Top Secret government clearance.
  - [Dow Jones](#), the parent company of the Wall Street Journal, leaked the personal details of 2.2 million customers.
  - Omaha-based voting machine firm Election Systems & Software (ES&S) left a database exposed online that contained the personal records of [1.8 million Chicago voters](#).
  - Security researchers discovered a Verizon AWS S3 bucket containing over 100 MB of data about the [company's internal system](#) named Distributed Vision Services (DVS), used for billing operations.
  - An [auto-tracking company](#) leaked over a half of a million records with logins/passwords, emails, VIN (vehicle identification number), IMEI numbers of GPS devices and other data that is collected on their devices, customers and auto dealerships.

**Prevention: Continuous monitoring and review of cloud assets and config**

# Is it Enough?

- **Rite of passage by periodic pen test and continuous bug bounty**
  - **It's not just important to get feedback but to also action on them**
  - **Risk Acceptance Documentation should be the worst case scenario  
not your first bet**

The image is a collage of five screenshots from different websites:

- Top Left:** A screenshot of the Bugcrowd interface for Netflix, showing a reward of \$20,000 for a vulnerability.
- Middle Left:** A screenshot of the hackerone.com/shopify page, listing various types of vulnerabilities and their rewards.
- Middle Center:** A screenshot of the hackerone.com/twitter page, showing a table of reward categories and examples.
- Top Right:** A screenshot of the Google Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP) rules page.
- Bottom Right:** A screenshot of the Facebook Whitehat program page, showing the submission form and responsible disclosure policy.

# Who Watches the Watcher

- Did we secure the security controls
- **DevSecOops:** If attacker controls security tools / build chain It has limitless power
- Ensure the same practice is followed back again for these tools
- Security role doesn't means you get to circumvent the rules
- Follow basic security hygiene we always keep talking about
  - Secure configuration
  - Patching Policy



# References

- <https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Lackey-Practical%20Tips-for-Defending-Web-Applications-in-the-Age-of-DevOps.pdf>
- <https://www.sonatype.com/hubfs/2018%20State%20of%20the%20Software%20Supply%20Chain%20Report.pdf>
- <https://snyk.io/opensourcesecurity-2019/>
- <https://scaling-threat-detection.awssecworkshops.com/>
- <https://www.veracode.com/state-of-software-security-report>

# Key Takeaways

- Security is everyone responsibility
- Embrace security as an integral part of the process, use feedback to refine the process
- DevSecOps is not a one size fit all: your mileage will vary



 @anantshri  
[anant@notsosecure.com](mailto:anant@notsosecure.com)