

Goals of Protection

- Computer consists of a collection of objects (hardware objects or software objects)
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations
- Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those that are allowed to do so

security: 数字世界的隐私安全
safety: 物理世界的安全

访问受限

Principles of Protection

- Guiding principle – **principle of least privilege**
 - Programs, users and systems should be given **just** enough **privileges** to perform their tasks
 - Limits damage if entity has a bug, gets abused
 - Can be static (during life of system, during life of process)
 - Or dynamic (changed by process as needed) – **privilege escalation**

给予的权限尽量少

Access Matrix

- View protection as a matrix (**access matrix**)
- Rows represent domains (e.g. users or processes)
- Columns represent objects
- **Access** (i, j) is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain _{i} can invoke on Object _{j}

Domain _{i} 中的进程对 object _{j} 有 Access(i, j) 权限.

object \ domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	printer
D_1	read		read	
D_2				print
D_3		read	execute	
D_4	read write		read write	

- If a process in Domain D_i tries to do "op" on object O_j , then "op" must be in the access matrix
- User who creates object can define access column for that object
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection
 - Operations to add, delete access rights
- **Access matrix** design separates mechanism from policy
 - Mechanism
 - Operating system provides access-matrix + rules
 - It ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced
 - Policy
 - User dictates policy
 - Who can access what object and in what mode

Implementation of Access Matrix

■ Generally, a sparse matrix

■ Option 1 – Global table

- Store ordered triples $\langle \text{domain}, \text{object}, \text{rights-set} \rangle$ in table
- A requested operation M on object O_j within domain D_i -> search table for $\langle D_i, O_j, R_k \rangle$
 - with $M \in R_k$
- But table could be large -> won't fit in main memory
- Difficult to group objects (consider an object that all domains can read)

大table, 维护在一个地方

■ Option 2 – Access-control lists for objects

- Each column implemented as an access-control list for one object
- Resulting per-object list consists of ordered pairs $\langle \text{domain}, \text{rights-set} \rangle$ defining all domains with non-empty set of access rights for the object

每个object 维护一个list.

■ Option 3 – Capability list for domains

- Instead of object-based, list is domain based
- **Capability list** for domain is list of objects together with operations allowed on them
- Object represented by its name or address, called a **capability**
- Execute operation M on object O_j , process requests operation and specifies capability as parameter
 - Possession of capability means access is allowed

每个 domain 维护一个list
capability 也即 object 的 name/address

- Each column = Access-control list for one object
Defines who can perform what operation

Domain 1 = Read, Write
Domain 2 = Read
Domain 3 = Read

- Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
For each domain, what operations allowed on what objects

Object F1 – Read
Object F4 – Read, Write, Execute
Object F5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy

- Most systems use combination of access-control lists and capabilities

- First access to an object -> access-control list searched
 - If allowed, capability created and attached to process
 - Additional accesses need not be checked
 - After last access, capability destroyed

The Security Problem

- System **secure** if resources used and accessed as intended under all circumstances

- **Intruders** (**crackers or hackers**) attempt to breach security

- **Threat** is potential security violation

- **Attack** is attempt to breach security

Security Violation Categories

■ Breach of confidentiality

- Unauthorized reading of data

■ Breach of integrity

- Unauthorized modification of data

■ Breach of availability

- Unauthorized destruction of data

■ Theft of service

- Unauthorized use of resources

■ Denial of service (**DOS**)

- Prevention of legitimate use

Security Measure Levels

- Impossible to have absolute security, but make cost to perpetrator sufficiently high to deter most intruders
- Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
 - **Physical**
 - Data centers, servers, connected terminals
 - **Human**
 - Avoid **social engineering**, **phishing**, **dumpster diving**
 - **Operating System**
 - Protection mechanisms, debugging
 - **Network**
 - Intercepted communications, interruption, DOS
- Security is as weak as the weakest link in the chain

人这一环节是最脆弱的。

Malware

- **Trojan Horse**
 - Code segment that misuses its environment
- **Trap Door**
 - Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
- **Virus**
 - Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
 - Self-replicating, designed to infect other computers
- **Logic Bomb**
 - Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances

Program Security

- **Stack and Buffer Overflow**
 - Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)
 - Failure to check bounds on inputs, arguments
 - Write past arguments on the stack into the return address on stack
 - When routine returns from call, returns to hacked address
 - Pointed to code loaded onto stack that executes malicious code
 - Unauthorized user or privilege escalation
- **Port scanning**
 - Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses
 - Detection of answering service protocol
 - Detection of OS and version running on system
 - `nmap` scans all ports in a given IP range for a response
 - `nessus` has a database of protocols and bugs (and exploits) to apply against a system
- **Denial of Service**
 - Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
 - **Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS)** come from multiple sites at once
 - Consider traffic to a web site
 - How can you tell the difference between being a target and being really popular?
 - Accidental – CS students writing bad `fork()` code
 - Purposeful – extortion, punishment

多个 attack source 同时发起攻击

User Authentication

- Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID
- User identity most often established through **passwords**, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
- Passwords must be kept secret
 - Frequent change of passwords
 - History to avoid repeats
 - Use of “non-guessable” passwords
 - Log all invalid access attempts (but not the passwords themselves)
 - Unauthorized transfer

Implementating Security Defenses

- Intrusion detection endeavors to detect attempted or successful intrusions
 - **Signature-based** detection spots known bad patterns
 - **Anomaly detection** spots differences from normal behavior
 - Can detect **zero-day** attacks
 - **False-positives** and **false-negatives** a problem
- Virus protection
 - Searching all programs or programs at execution for known virus patterns
 - Or run in **sandbox** so can't damage system

false-positive 攻击发生未防御
false-negative 攻击未发生且未防御

Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks

- A network **firewall** is placed between trusted and untrusted hosts
 - The firewall limits network access between these two **security domains**
- Can be tunneled or spoofed
 - Tunneling allows disallowed protocol to travel within allowed protocol (i.e., telnet inside of HTTP)
 - Firewall rules typically based on host name or IP address which can be spoofed
- **Personal firewall** is software layer on given host
 - Can monitor / limit traffic to and from the host
- **Application proxy firewall** understands application protocol and can control them (i.e., SMTP)
- **System-call firewall** monitors all important system calls and apply rules to them (i.e., this program can execute that system call)

Attacks against Network Communication

- **Eavesdropping**
 - Stealing the content of network communication
- **Replay attack**
 - Resend a previously intercepted message
- **Man-in-the-middle attack**
 - Intruder sits in data flow, masquerading as sender to receiver and vice versa
- **Session hijacking**
 - Intercept an already-established session to bypass authentication

Cryptography

- Protect **confidentiality** of a message
- **Encryption** algorithm consists of
 - Set K of keys
 - Set M of Messages
 - Set C of ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
 - A function $E : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow C)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, E_k is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages
 - Both E and E_k for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - A function $D : K \rightarrow (C \rightarrow M)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, D_k is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts
 - Both D and D_k for any k should be efficiently computable functions
- An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext $c \in C$, a computer can compute m such that $E_k(m) = c$ only if it possesses k
 - Thus, a computer holding k can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding k cannot decrypt ciphertexts
 - Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive k from the ciphertexts

Symmetric Encryption

- Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
 - Therefore k must be kept secret
- Block cipher (messages encrypted block-by-block)
 - DES was most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm
 - Keys too short so now considered insecure
 - 2001 NIST adopted new block cipher - Advanced Encryption Standard (**AES**)
 - Keys of 128, 192, or 256 bits, works on 128 bit blocks
- Stream cipher (message encrypted bit-by-bit or byte-by-byte)
 - RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities

Asymmetric Encryption

- **Public-key encryption** based on each user having two keys:
 - **public key** – published key used to encrypt data
 - **private key** – key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
- Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
 - Most common is **RSA** cipher
 - Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
 - No efficient algorithm is known for finding the prime factors of a number

Authentication

- Protect integrity of a message
- Algorithm components
 - A set K of keys
 - A set M of messages
 - A set A of authenticators
 - A function $S : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow A)$
 - That is, for each $k \in K$, S_k is a function for generating authenticators from messages
 - Both S and S_k for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - A function $V : K \rightarrow (M \times A \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\})$. That is, for each $k \in K$, V_k is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
 - Both V and V_k for any k should be efficiently computable functions
- For a message m , a computer can generate an authenticator $a \in A$ such that $V_k(m, a) = \text{true}$ only if it possesses k
- Thus, computer holding k can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing k can verify them
- Computer not holding k cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using V_k
- Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive k from the authenticators
- Practically, if $V_k(m, a) = \text{true}$ then we know m has not been modified and that send of message has k
 - If we share k with only one entity, know where the message originated

- **Message-authentication code (MAC)** authentication algorithm
 - Based on symmetric encryption
 - Both parties share secret keys
- **Digital signatures** authentication algorithm
 - Based on asymmetric encryption
 - **anyone** can verify authenticity of a message using the public key

Key Distribution

- Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
 - Sometimes done **out-of-band**
- Asymmetric keys distribution – public key
 - Even asymmetric key distribution needs care – man-in-the-middle attack

Digital Certificates

- Proof of who or what owns a public key
- Public key digitally signed a trusted party
- Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
- **Certificate authority** are trusted party – their public keys included with web browser distributions
 - They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on

SSL/TLS

- Used between web servers and browsers for secure communication (credit card numbers)
- The server is verified with a **certificate** assuring client is talking to correct server
- Asymmetric cryptography used to establish a secure **session key** (symmetric encryption) for bulk of communication during session
- Communication between each computer then uses symmetric key cryptography