### High

[H-1] Incorrect fee calculation in TSwapPool::getInputAmountBasedOnOutput cause protocol to take too many tokens from users, resulting in loss of funds.

**Description:** The fee calculation logic in the <a href="mailto:getInputAmountBasedOnOutput">getInputAmountBasedOnOutput</a> function does not accurately account for the current state of the pool, leading to situations where users are charged excessive fees during swaps.

Impact: This can result in users losing funds unexpectedly, damaging the protocol's reputation and user trust.

```
function getOutputAmountBasedOnInput(
       uint256 inputAmount,
       uint256 inputReserves,
       uint256 outputReserves
    )
       public
       pure
       revertIfZero(inputAmount)
       revertIfZero(outputReserves)
       returns (uint256 outputAmount)
    {
        uint256 inputAmountMinusFee = inputAmount * 997;
        uint256 numerator = inputAmountMinusFee * outputReserves;
       uint256 denominator = (inputReserves * 1000) + inputAmountMinusFee;
       return numerator / denominator;
   }
   function getInputAmountBasedOnOutput(
        uint256 outputAmount,
       uint256 inputReserves,
       uint256 outputReserves
    )
       public
        pure
        revertIfZero(outputAmount)
        revertIfZero(outputReserves)
       returns (uint256 inputAmount)
    {
       return
            ((inputReserves * outputAmount) * 10000) /
            ((outputReserves - outputAmount) * 997);
    }
```

[H-2] Lack of Slippage Protection in TSwapPool::swapExactOutput causes users to potentially receive less output than expected.

**Description:** The swapExactOutput function does not include any slippage protection mechanisms, which means users may receive less output than they anticipated if the market conditions change unfavorably

during the transaction.

**Impact:** Users may be exposed to unexpected losses if the output amount falls below their expectations.

```
function swapExactOutput(
       IERC20 inputToken,
      IERC20 outputToken,
       uint256 outputAmount,
        uint64 deadline
    )
        public
        revertIfZero(outputAmount)
        revertIfDeadlinePassed(deadline)
        returns (uint256 inputAmount)
        uint256 inputReserves = inputToken.balanceOf(address(this));
        uint256 outputReserves = outputToken.balanceOf(address(this));
        inputAmount = getInputAmountBasedOnOutput(
            outputAmount,
            inputReserves,
            outputReserves
        );
        _swap(inputToken, inputAmount, outputToken, outputAmount);
    }
    function sellPoolTokens(
        uint256 poolTokenAmount
    ) external returns (uint256 wethAmount) {
            swapExactOutput(
             i_poolToken,
             i_wethToken,
             poolTokenAmount,
                uint64(block.timestamp)
            );
    }
```

[High-3] TSwapPool::sellPoolTokens mismatches input and output tokens causing users to receive incorrect amounts of tokens.

**Description:** The sellPoolTokens function calls swapExactOutput with the wrong input and output tokens, leading to users receiving incorrect amounts of tokens.

```
function sellPoolTokens(
    uint256 poolTokenAmount
) external returns (uint256 wethAmount) {
    return
```

```
swapExactOutput(
    i_poolToken,
    i_wethToken,
    poolTokenAmount,
    uint64(block.timestamp)
);
```

### Medium

### [M-1] TSwapPool::deposit Deadline not being enforced

**Description:** The deposit function accepts a deadline parameter, but it is not being enforced, allowing users to deposit funds even after the deadline has passed.

**Impact:** A user who expects a deposit to fail will go through, leading to server disruption of functionality.

**POC:** A user can call the deposit function with a past deadline and still have their deposit processed.

```
function deposit(
    uint256 wethToDeposit,
    uint256 minimumLiquidityTokensToMint,
    uint256 maximumPoolTokensToDeposit,
    uint64 deadline
)
    external
    revertIfZero(wethToDeposit)
    returns (uint256 liquidityTokensToMint)
```

Mitigation: Implement a check to revert the transaction if the deadline has passed.

#### Low

## [L-1] TSwapPool::LiquidityAdded Incorrect Event Parameter Order in LiquidityAdded Event

**Description:** The LiquidityAdded event emits parameters in the wrong order, reporting poolTokensDeposited as wethDeposited and vice versa, which can mislead off-chain consumers and analytics.

**Impact:** This can lead to incorrect assumptions and calculations by off-chain services relying on the event data.

```
emit LiquidityAdded(msg.sender, poolTokensToDeposit, wethToDeposit);
```

[L-2] Default value returned by TSwapPool::swapExactInput results in incorrect return values given

**Description:** The swapExactInput function returns 0 by default if the input token is neither the pool token nor WETH, which can lead to confusion and incorrect handling by users and integrators.

**Impact:** Users and integrators may not handle the 0 return value **output** correctly, leading to potential loss of funds or failed transactions.

```
- uint256 inputReserves = inputToken.balanceOf(address(this));
uint256 outputAmount = getOutputAmountBasedOnInput(
    inputAmount,
    inputReserves,
    outputReserves
);
if (outputAmount < minOutputAmount) {
    revert TSwapPool__OutputTooLow(outputAmount, minOutputAmount);
}
_swap(inputToken, inputAmount, outputToken, outputAmount);</pre>
```

#### **Informational**

[I-1] TSwapPool.sol:swapExactInput Missing external Visibility on swapExactInput Function

**Description:** The swapExactInput function is declared as public instead of external, potentially exposing it to unintended internal calls and increasing the attack surface.

```
function swapExactInput(
    IERC20 inputToken,
    uint256 inputAmount,
    IERC20 outputToken,
    uint256 minOutputAmount,
    uint64 deadline
)
```

[I-2] TSwapPool.sol:poolTokenReserves Remove unnecessary poolTokenReserves assignment in deposit function

**Description:** Eliminates redundant variable assignment to optimize gas usage in the deposit logic.

```
uint256 poolTokenReserves = i_poolToken.balanceOf(address(this));
```

# [I-3] PoolFactory: PoolFactory\_\_PoolDoesNotExist Unused Custom Error Declaration

**Description:** The custom error PoolFactory\_PoolDoesNotExist is declared but never used, leading to unnecessary code bloat and potential confusion for maintainers.

```
error PoolFactory__PoolDoesNotExist(address tokenAddress);
```

### [I-4] PoolFactory: constructor Lack of 0 address check

```
constructor(address wethToken) {
    i_wethToken = wethToken;
}
```