

6.1 Distinction between PRGs

$\frac{L_{which-PRG}^{G_1}}{\text{QUERY}(): \\ x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \\ \text{return } G_1(x)}$	\equiv	$\frac{L_{rand-PRG}^{G_1}}{\text{QUERY}(): \\ r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+l} \\ \text{return } r}$
$\frac{L_{which-PRG}^{G_2}}{\text{QUERY}(): \\ x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \\ \text{return } G_2(x)}$	\equiv	$\frac{L_{rand-PRG}^{G_2}}{\text{QUERY}(): \\ r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+l} \\ \text{return } r}$

Because we know that G_1 (respectively G_2) is secure those two libraries are equivalent and indistinguishable.

Because it is obvious that these so created "random" PRGs of G_1 and G_2 are the same this indistinguishability is also guaranteed for the starting libraries.

6.2 Find the key

We consider the following distinguisher:

$\frac{\text{Distinguisher } A}{\text{pick } s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \\ x = \text{LOOKUP}(s) \\ \text{get key } k \\ y = F(k, s) \\ \text{return } x = y}$
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First we will pick a random seed and put in either the Lookup and the F library. The distinguisher will get the key by its property stated in the exercise, with probability p , which is also given to the F function. In the end we will check both outputs.

$\frac{\text{Distinguisher } A}{\text{pick } s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \\ x = \text{LOOKUP}(s) \\ \text{get key } k \\ y = F(k, s) \\ \text{return } x = y}$
--

\diamond

$\frac{L_{PRF-real}^F}{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \\ \text{LOOKUP}(x) \\ \text{return } F(k, x)}$

It is obvious that the algorithm combined with $L_{PRF-real}^F$ will always output 1, if the right key was found with probability p , because the LOOKUP and F function are doing exactly the same and therefore their output will be equal.

$\frac{\text{Distinguisher } A}{\text{pick } s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \\ x = \text{LOOKUP}(s) \\ \text{get key } k \\ y = F(k, s) \\ \text{return } x = y}$
--

\diamond

$\frac{L_{PRF-rand}^F}{T := \text{empty associated array} \\ \text{LOOKUP}(x) \\ \text{if } T[x] \text{ undefined:} \\ \quad T[x] \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{out} \\ \text{return } T[x]}$

This combination will only return 1 if the entry in T will be exactly the same as the F function output. The probability for this will be $\frac{1}{2^{out}}$.

For the advantage, we get:

$$\text{Bias}(A) = |P[A \diamond L_{PRF-Real}^F \rightarrow 1] - P[A \diamond L_{PRF-Rand}^F \rightarrow 1]| = p - \frac{1}{2^{out}}$$

, which is clearly not negligible, because p is non-negligible.

6.3 Build a distinguisher

We consider the following distinguisher:

```
Distinguisher A
pick  $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ 
 $\bar{s} = s \oplus 1^\lambda$ 
 $x_1 \| y_1 = \text{LOOKUP}(s)$ 
 $x_2 \| y_2 = \text{LOOKUP}(\bar{s})$ 
return  $(x_1 = y_2) \wedge (x_2 = y_1)$ 
```

First we will pick a random seed and calculate its complement. Both seeds are then encrypted the PRF F' .

```
Distinguisher A
pick  $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ 
 $\bar{s} = s \oplus 1^\lambda$ 
 $x_1 \| y_1 = \text{LOOKUP}(s)$ 
 $x_2 \| y_2 = \text{LOOKUP}(\bar{s})$ 
return  $(x_1 = y_2) \wedge (x_2 = y_1)$ 
```

◇

```
 $L_{PRF-real}^{F'}$ 
 $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ 
 $\text{LOOKUP}(x)$ 
return  $(F(k, x) \| F(k, \bar{x}))$ 
```

It is obvious that our algorithm will always return 1 if we use $L_{PRF-real}^{F'}$, because first it will compute $(F(k, s) \| F(k, \bar{s}))$ and compare it with $(F(k, \bar{s}) \| F(k, s))$ which is the same as $(F(k, \bar{s}) \| F(k, s))$.

```
Distinguisher A
pick  $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ 
 $\bar{s} = s \oplus 1^\lambda$ 
 $x_1 \| y_1 = \text{LOOKUP}(s)$ 
 $x_2 \| y_2 = \text{LOOKUP}(\bar{s})$ 
return  $(x_1 = y_2) \wedge (x_2 = y_1)$ 
```

◇

```
 $L_{PRF-rand}^{F'}$ 
 $T := \text{empty associated array}$ 
 $\text{LOOKUP}(x)$ 
if  $T[x]$  undefined:
   $T[x] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{out}$ 
return  $T[x]$ 
```

The algorithm combined with $L_{PRF-rand}^{F'}$ will only return 1 if for s and \bar{s} the strings saved in T consist of the same two "stringparts" but in the opposite different sequence. The probability for this is $\frac{1}{2^{out}}$

For the advantage, we get:

$$\text{Bias}(A) = |P[A \diamond L_{PRF-Real}^F \rightarrow 1] - P[A \diamond L_{PRF-Rand}^F \rightarrow 1]| = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{out}}$$

, which is clearly not negligible.