



3) Principles of Computer Security

3.1) Trust and Trojan Horses




Q: How to write a program
that prints a copy of its own
source when it runs?

Q: How to write programs that replicate themselves?



Pgm.c



```
print(t[1, ..., |s1|]); print('\"'); }  
print(t); }  
print('\"'); print(t[|s1|+1, ..., |t|]); }
```

using $s_1 \parallel s_2 = t$

+ string const

A program that prints its source
is called a "quine."

Quines exist in all programming
languages, due to Kleene's
Recursion Theorem

in computability theory.

Hide code in a compiler

Today one cannot produce (manufacture)
new computing software or hardware
without using existing ones.

Compiler(c) : written in C

How was the first compiler written?

- by hand

a) Example of extending compiler

Characters:

'\n' → 0xA (10)

'\r' → 0xD (13)

etc.

Compiler:

```
if (c == '\n') return ('\n');
```

```
if (c == '\r') return ('\r');
```

b) Learn how to compile char. '\v':

Once inserted line

```
if (c == '\v') return (char) 0xB;
```

From the on, source is simply
if ($c == '\backslash v'$) return ('\backslash v');


\Rightarrow Compiler contains '\v' $\Rightarrow 0x\beta$

Extending a compiler with a backdoor

Consider any app or pgm. distributed in binary form

Claim: Even if source is open,
the binary compiled by
someone untrusted may contain
a backdoor.

Step 1:




compiler.c

↓
if (app == "victim") {
 insert backdoor
 (code that leaks secrets)
}

... backdoor is visible

Step 2:



compiler'.c

if (compiling "compiler.c") {
 insert backdoor (in compiler') that inserts
 backdoor (attacks app == "victim")

app.c $\xrightarrow{\text{compiler}^*}$ app
with backdoor

... but app.c and compiler.c are
clean!

Such backdoors could exist also
in hardware.


Self-replicating code has had a
lot of success in the form of
malware or viruses.

Defences are similar:

- start from clean systems
- physically secure storage
- verify authenticity of software
- Trust the process and the
people behind your software

Ker Thompson: "Reflections on trusting trust", Turing Award, 1983.

Access Control



Reference monitor is logical concept to model if requests from subjects (principals) to objects (resources) are permitted.

Subjects are any active entity, typically a process ID, user ID, ...

Objects are all resources of the system

Policy defines for each pair of subject-object pair all permitted operations.

		Objects		
		Subjects	O ₁	O _j
S ₁	S ₁	- - -	-	-
	S ₂	- - -	-	-
S _i	S _i	- - -	-	-
	S _j	- - -	A _{ij}	-

Access-control matrix

A_{ij} contain all permitted operations from S_i on O_j.

Typically, A is represented

- by columns : list of access

permissions by user for each object

Access-control list (ACL)

- by row : list of capabilities by object for each user

↑
not often seen

must be protected

Application

Trusted code


"Reference monitor"

Trusted computing base


Layers


Computers are organized in many layers

- Textbook



- Real-world view





Trusted execution environments (TEE)

Smart cards

Hardware Security Modules (HSM)

