

Cryptography

5. Extension of the PRG

$$G : \Sigma^\lambda \rightarrow \Sigma^\lambda \qquad H_n : \Sigma^\lambda \rightarrow \Sigma^{(n+1)\lambda}$$

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$$\frac{H_n(s)}{s_o := s}$$

for  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do
   $t_i \| s_i := G(s_{i-1})$ 
return  $t_1 \| t_2 \| \dots \| t_n \| s_n$ 

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Theroem:

If G is a (2x) PRG, then H_n is a ((n+1)x) PRG.

$\frac{L_{PRG-real}^G}{\text{QUERY}() \atop s \leftarrow \Sigma^\lambda \atop \text{return } G(s)}$	\approx	$\frac{L_{PRG-random}^G}{\text{QUERY}() \atop r \leftarrow \Sigma^{2\lambda} \atop \text{return } r}$
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Define hybrid-k L

$\frac{L_{PRG-real}^{H_n}}{\text{QUERY}() \atop s_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \atop \text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } n \text{ do} \atop t_i \ s_i := G(s_{i-1}) \atop \text{return } t_1 \ t_2 \ \dots \ t_n \ s_n}$	\approx	$\frac{L_{hyb-k}^H}{\text{QUERY}() \atop s_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \atop \text{for } i = 1 \text{ to } k \text{ do} \atop t_i \ s_i := \{0,1\}^{2\lambda} \atop t_{k+1} \ s_{k+1} \leftarrow G(s_k) \atop \text{for } i = k+2 \text{ to } n \text{ do} \atop t_i \ s_i := G(s_{i-1}) \atop \text{return } t_1 \ t_2 \ \dots \ t_n \ s_n}$
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$$L_{hyb-0}^H \equiv L_{PRG-real}^H \text{ (actual } H_n)$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ L_{hyb-k}^H \\ L_{hyb-k+1}^H \end{array} \right\} \approx \quad \downarrow \text{ } n - \text{times}$$

$$\vdots \\ L_{hyb-n}^H \equiv L_{PRG-random}^H \text{ ((n+1)\lambda-bit random output)}$$

L_{hyb-k}^H
$\text{QUERY}()$ $s_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ for $i = 1$ to k do $t_i \ s_i := \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ $t_{k+1} \ s_{k+1} \leftarrow G(s_k)$ for $i = k + 2$ to n do $t_i \ s_i := G(s_{i-1})$ return $t_1 \ t_2 \ \dots \ t_n \ s_n$

\approx

$L_{hyb-k+1}^H$
$\text{QUERY}()$ $s_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ for $i = 1$ to k do $t_i \ s_i := \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ $t_{k+1} \ s_{k+1} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ for $i = k + 1$ to n do $t_i \ s_i := G(s_{i-1})$ return $t_1 \ t_2 \ \dots \ t_n \ s_n$

This substitution can be made because
 $L_{PRG-real}^G \approx L_{PRG-rand}^G$

Therefore the theorem is proved.

6. Pseudorandom Functions

- * Stream cipher from PRG (\leftarrow one-time use)
 $G_k() \rightarrow \square\square\square\dots$ (pseudorandom keys)
 - sequential access only
- * "Blockciphers" from a PRF (=pseudorandom function)
 - random-access characteristic

Definition:

A pseudorandom function (PRF)

$$F : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \times \{0, 1\}^{in} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{out}$$

is a deterministic function, s.t.

$$L_{PRF-real}^F \approx L_{PRF-rand}^F$$

$L_{PRF-real}^F$
$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ $\text{LOOKUP}(x \in \{0, 1\}^{in})$ return $F(k, x)$

\approx

$L_{PRF-rand}^F$
$T := \text{empty associated array}$ $\text{LOOKUP}(x)$ if $T[x]$ undefined: $T[x] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{out}$ return $T[x]$

For particular key k , $F(k, -)$ is a deterministic function from in-bit strings to out-bit strings.
There are 2^λ such functions.
But in total there are $(2^{out})^{2^{in}} = 2^{out \cdot 2^{in}}$ functions in-bits to out-bits.

Failed attempts to build a PRG

1. $F^*(k, x) := G(k) \oplus x$
where $k \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, $G : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2k}$
 $F^*(k, x) = G(k) \oplus x$
 $F^*(k, y) = G(k) \oplus y$
 $F^*(k, x) \oplus F^*(k, y) = x \oplus y$
 $P[A \diamond L_{real}^{F^*} \rightarrow 1] = 1$
 $P[A \diamond L_{rand}^{F^*} \rightarrow 1] = 2^{-out}$
This F^* is distinguishable from random.