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Data Secure Storage Mechanism for IIoT Based on Blockchain

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ABSTRACT

With the development of Industry 4.0 and big data technology, the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is hampered by inherent issues such as privacy, security, and fault tolerance, which pose certain challenges to the rapid development of IIoT. Blockchain technology has immutability, decentralization, and autonomy, which can greatly improve the inherent defects of the IIoT. In the traditional blockchain, data is stored in a Merkle tree. As data continues to grow, the scale of proofs used to validate it grows, threatening the efficiency, security, and reliability of blockchain-based IIoT. Accordingly, this paper first analyzes the inefficiency of the traditional blockchain structure in verifying the integrity and correctness of data. To solve this problem, a new Vector Commitment (VC) structure, Partition Vector Commitment (PVC), is proposed by improving the traditional VC structure. Secondly, this paper uses PVC instead of the Merkle tree to store big data generated by IIoT. PVC can improve the efficiency of traditional VC in the process of commitment and opening. Finally, this paper uses PVC to build a blockchain-based IIoT data security storage mechanism and carries out a comparative analysis of experiments. This mechanism can greatly reduce communication loss and maximize the rational use of storage space, which is of great significance for maintaining the security and stability of blockchain-based IIoT.

KEYWORDS

Blockchain; IIoT; data storage; cryptographic commitment

1 Introduction

With the continued advancement of Internet of Things (IoT) technology in Industry 4.0, IoT has been widely used in industry and has spawned a new field—IIoT [1,2]. The IIoT can support enabling technology systems for smart manufacturing [3]. This technology makes use of the interconnection of various resources in industrial production, data interoperability and the interaction between heterogeneous systems to realize the flexible management and effective utilization of various resources in the industrial production environment [4,5]. The IIoT is in a stage of rapid development and has received extensive attention from government, industry, and academia [6]. However, as the number of devices grows, the IIoT generates a large amount of data. At the same time, big data generated

by IIoT not only brings higher operation and management costs, but also puts forward higher requirements for the operability, privacy, security, and fault tolerance of IIoT [7]. To address these challenges, in recent years, many scholars have introduced blockchain technology into the IIoT. In recent years, many scholars have introduced blockchain technology into the IIoT. The main characteristics of the blockchain-based IIoT not only improve the data security of the IIoT system but also its operability [8,9]. Meanwhile, storing IIoT data in the blockchain can enhance fault tolerance [10]. The immutability of the blockchain also makes the stored IIoT data and event logs immutable and traceable to ensure data accountability.

In the traditional blockchain-based IIoT system, data is stored in the Merkle tree structure. The Merkle tree structure uses leaf node hash and intermediate node hash to form Merkle proof. The data is verified by Merkle proof in the Merkle tree structure. When verifying data availability, the required Merkle proof will also increase several times with the stored data. The increasing Merkle proof will bring a huge burden on the communication bandwidth of nodes, resulting in a certain degree of communication delay. If such communication delay is serious, the security and stability of IIoT will be threatened [11–13]. The emergence of Vector Commitment (VC) provides a new way to address the above problems. VC can reduce storage costs and communication overhead. The user only needs to store the commitment value and receive the value and proof of value as needed, rather than storing a vector of the stored value.

This paper focuses on the secure data storage of blockchain-based IIoT and constructs a verifiable secret sharing scheme for improving the data layer of traditional blockchain using an improved VC, namely Partition Vector Commitment (PVC). Compared with traditional VC, PVC greatly improves the time complexity of the commitment process, opening proof process, and query process.

The following are the contributions of this paper:

1. First, this paper provides that the existing blockchain-based IIoT has some problems, such as low efficiency in data storage and data verification, and the proof size required for verification occupies too much communication bandwidth. To solve the above problems, this paper introduces VC to replace the traditional Merkle tree, thus reducing the memory and communication burden.
2. Second, to improve the efficiency of data storage and verification, this paper proposes a new VC structure based on the traditional vector commitment structure: partition vector commitment. The Merkle tree storage mode in the blockchain data layer is replaced by PVC, speeding up the commitment, open proof, and query process without increasing the computing and communication burden on the client.
3. Third, this paper uses PVC to construct a verifiable distributed storage scheme that effectively reduces the communication cost of blockchain-based IIoT while maximizing the use of storage resources, thereby improving its security, stability, and efficiency.
4. Finally, this paper analyzes and compares the original blockchain-based IIoT scheme based on Merkle tree storage mode and other existing schemes. PVC reduces the time complexity of the commitment process of traditional VC from n to $p + n/p$ (p is the number of groups), and the time complexity of the query process from n to n/p. The comparison results show that the new scheme has better communication bandwidth and good storage performance than other original schemes.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work on blockchain technology in IIoT and big data. Problems of IIoT data structure based on traditional blockchain are covered in Section 3. Section 4 proposes a data secure storage mechanism on

blockchain for IIoT. Section 5 compares the proposed blockchain secure storage mechanism with other schemes. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.

2 Blockchain Technology in IIoT and Big Data

The IoT refers to the ability to send data over the network without the use of human-to-human or computer-to-computer communication [14]. The IoT has the effect of improving the need for information sharing, thereby enhancing people's lives. Furthermore, IoT is considered to have wide-ranging benefits in applications such as agriculture, smart homes, healthcare, transportation, and the environment [15,16]. It is also considered that more effective monitoring and control can be achieved by reducing costs, thus having a significant impact on the industry [17]. In recent years, some scholars have introduced optimized machine learning into the IoT to make it more secure [18]. The use of the new feature selection metric CorrAU also makes IIoT more robust [19]. The IoT has propelled industries forward with tangible benefits, leading to the concept of the IIoT. In 2012, General Electric (GE) company released the first IIoT white paper [20,21]. It defines the core elements of the IIoT: linking the most core equipment, people and data in industrial production with the help of digitalization. It provides great efficiency and economic benefits in maintainability, reliability, scalability, and interoperability.

With the wide application of IIoT, the main components of IIoT, Cyber-physical Systems (CPS) and IoT devices, will generate a large number of data streams, thus generating big data [22,23]. The number of devices connected to IIoT is increasing and the data stored in third parties such as the cloud is increasing day by day. Therefore, it also faces challenges, such as data security and data leakage. The emergence of blockchain provides a new way of thinking about the problem of big data. Applying blockchain to big data generated by IIoT has the following advantages: ensuring data integrity, real-time data analysis, enhancing data sharing, and improving the quality of big data [24].

Recently, many scholars have introduced blockchain technology into IIoT to enhance fault tolerance, eliminate single points of failure, and greatly improve the security of big data [25]. Blockchain can provide more secure and reliable IIoT for enterprises and individuals. Blockchain is a special kind of database, in short, blockchain technology is a distributed ledger technology. The central concept behind blockchain technology is decentralization, which means that no trusted central organization is required to control or manage participating nodes. Instead, all participating nodes (or peer nodes) in blockchain networks maintain the same copy of their ledger [26]. Each node can verify the behavior of other entities in the network, as well as create and verify new transactions that will be recorded in the blockchain.

The decentralized architecture ensures robust and secure operation of the blockchain and enables many advantages (for example, tamper resistance and vulnerability to avoiding a single points of failure) [27]. The blockchain system consists of a Data Layer, Network Layer, Consensus Layer, Incentive Layer, Contract Layer and Application Layer from bottom to top. The basic architecture diagram of the blockchain is shown in Fig. 1. Furthermore, blockchain transactions are traceable and can only be viewed by authorized nodes [28]. This feature enables the IIoT data to be fair and open while protecting the privacy of users. The Merkle tree is used to store data in the distributed ledger in the traditional blockchain data layer. The Merkle tree structure places the final bottom-up Merkle root in the block header. When verifying data availability, Merkle proof is used to verify data in the traditional blockchain. Blockchain has received a lot of attention because of its characteristics such as immutability, traceability, and decentralization. The blockchain works as follows: first, a node generates transactions and broadcasts the transaction data to the entire network. The miner node

packages the transactions collected over a while with a Merkle tree to generate a new block. The miner node performs a Proof-of-Work (PoW) on the generated new block. When the miner node completes the PoW, it immediately broadcasts this new block to the entire network. All nodes verify the new block and receive it if it passes the verification.

Figure 1: The basic architecture of blockchain

Overall, the distributed structure of blockchain is extremely suitable for IIoT. It can be used to build distributed trusted IIoT. Many features make blockchain unique, such as its decentralization, immutability, and traceability. These characteristics are very beneficial to the application of IIoT. Moreover, blockchain is built on a decentralized network, which reduces the installation and maintenance costs of centralized facilities such as data centers and reduces the cost of network equipment by distributing computing and storage requirements among all devices. In general, a decentralized communication model eliminates the single points of failure problem found in traditional centralized networks. By integrating a tamper-proof ledger, the decentralized model can achieve many of the characteristics required for the IIoT network (e.g., reliability and interoperability [29]). Fig. 2 shows the blockchain-based IIoT framework. The blockchain-based IIoT framework is mainly composed of four parts: Industrial Application Layer, Blockchain Composite Layer, Communication Layer, and Perception Layer [30]. The perception layer is mainly responsible for collecting data generated by devices in the IIoT, such as smart meters, surveillance cameras, and smart sensors. The communication layer is mainly responsible for using communication technology to transmit data of the IIoT, such as WSNs, WLAN, mobile networks, etc. The blockchain composite layer consists of five parts, which constitute the blockchain part of the blockchain-based IIoT. The industrial application layer mainly analyzes and integrates the collected data information and applies the data information to the manufacturing industry, smart grid, supply chain, etc.

Figure 2: Blockchain-based IIoT framework

Blockchain will revolutionize IIoT and big data technology. On the one hand, in the IIoT, the decentralized nature of blockchain technology will play a key role between two untrusted devices to maintain information about the summary of their interactions, state and exchanged data [31]. On the other hand, blockchain can significantly reduce the current risks faced by users and save business process costs [32].

3 Problems Statement of IIoT Data Structure Based on Traditional Blockchain

3.1 Data Structure of Traditional Blockchain

The storage and verification of data in the traditional blockchain-based IIoT structure are completed through the Merkle tree. The Merkle tree is mainly used to encrypt data to be stored in the Distributed Ledger (DL). Fig. 3 depicts the Merkle tree structure (In Fig. 3, the hash value of the Merkel tree is Hash (E, F). Hash $(Data_1)$ − Hash $(Data_4)$ is the encrypted hash value of the $Data_1$ − $Data_4$. Hash $(Data_2)$ and Hash (C, D) are Merkle proofs of $Data_1$). The Merkle root of all transactions in the block is included in the block header on the blockchain to ensure that no transaction is tampered with [33]. The hash value of the leaf node and the hash value of the intermediate node of the transaction to be proved are required during data verification, and the Merkle root is then derived from the bottom up. By comparing the exported Merkle root with the Merkle root in the block, it is proven that the data is complete and has not been tampered with.

Figure 3: Blockchain-based Merkle tree data storage scheme

When verifying the stored data, Merkle proof is formed by the hash values of leaf nodes and intermediate nodes of transactions that need to be proved, and the availability of data is verified by Merkle proof [34]. If the number of nodes of the Merkle tree is k, then the query time complexity of the Merkle tree is $O\left(log_2 k\right)$.

The main issue with the Merkle tree structure of the blockchain data layer is that it can only verify the availability of a single data point [35]. As more and more data are stored, the Merkle proof required to verify data availability will also increase logarithmically with the stored data. The increase of Merkle proof will put a great burden on the communication bandwidth of nodes, resulting in a certain degree of communication delay, which will seriously threaten the security and stability of IIoT [36]. Moreover, as the size of the Merkle proof increases, the time required for verification also increases rapidly, which leads to more power consumption. This phenomenon is not in line with the theme of the era of sustainable development. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the traditional blockchain storage scheme.

3.2 Solution

In traditional blockchain-based IIoT architecture, the Merkle tree verification process will place a significant amount of communication burden on nodes, potentially causing communication delays [37]. To better apply the blockchain to the IIoT, the Merkle tree in the traditional blockchain structure must be improved. There are two methods to improve the Merkle tree so far, one is based on the cryptographic accumulator scheme, and the other is based on the VC scheme. Although the accumulator can be operated in batches, reducing the storage space [38,39], there is no order of elements. In contrast, VC can open a commit value at a specified location, making it easier to index

messages. In addition, the VC in the cryptographic commitment also has a constant size, which provides a new idea for solving the above problems.

VC is a type of cryptographic commitment. VC can commit a vector v of length n, and then open it at any position $i \in [n]$, and prove that it is consistent with the initial commitment. The characteristic of VC is that the size of the commitment and the size of the opening at position i are independent of the vector length n, and the proof does not reveal which element is the commitment. VC is used to reduce storage costs in various applications, instead of storing the vector of data values. It can only store the commitment value and receive data values and their proofs as needed. VC allows applications to trade off storage (all values) against bandwidth (taken up by revealed values and proofs), which means that the size of commitments and opening proofs should be reduced [40].

Catalano et al. formalized the concept of VC, which first appeared in 2013 [41]. Its scheme is based on the CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellmen) assumption and the RSA problem. Dan et al. constructed VC using hidden-order groups, and their scheme is the first to allow aggregation of multiple proofs under certain conditions [42]. This scheme is also the first to have a constant size common parameter. Tomescu et al. constructed a VC scheme using polynomial commitments and Lagrangian polynomials. Using it in account-based stateless cryptocurrencies reduces the burden on nodes to store user balance states [43].

This paper applies VC to blockchain-based IIoT, which significantly improves the disadvantage of traditional Blockchain-based IIoT that uses the Merkle tree structure for storage. It can greatly reduce the communication loss of Blockchain-based IIoT, maximize the reasonable use of storage space, and ease the end-to-end communication burden. Although VC can greatly reduce the communication bandwidth of blockchain-based IIoT by replacing the Merkle tree, the storage structure of traditional blockchain, VC still has much room to improve the time complexity of the commitment process, opening proof process and query process. Therefore, based on the traditional VC structure, this paper proposes a new vector commitment structure-partition vector commitment (PVC). PVC significantly improves the efficiency of committed and open processes, greatly increasing the computing and communication needs of clients. In addition, PVC minimizes the size of the proof, thereby reducing the communication bandwidth burden on nodes. This reduction in proof size is not just a marginal improvement, but a significant enhancement that addresses a key bottleneck in blockchain technology. Therefore, PVC is suitable for building a data-secure storage mechanism for IIoT based on blockchain.

4 The Proposed Data Secure Storage Mechanism on Blockchain for IIoT

4.1 Data Storage Framework Based on PVC

Nowadays, the majority of smart factories are built using cloud-based manufacturing (CBM) [44]. Although this architecture can quickly share data with third parties to achieve resource configuration and management promptly [45,46], the centralized architecture is very fragile. Therefore, the introduction of a decentralized system is extremely necessary. The architecture of the blockchain is suitable for building IIoT, which can realize mutual supervision among decentralized nodes.

This section gives the specific system framework and basic components of the PVC-based IIoT system. The scheme combines blockchain technology with the IIoT system to accommodate the new requirements for secure data storage in IIoT.

Fig. 4 is the IIoT data storage system framework based on the blockchain proposed in this paper. There are two parts to this system: the IIoT network and the blockchain system.

Figure 4: Data secure storage mechanism based on PVC

IIoT network: In the IIoT network, smart devices, such as IIoT nodes, collect surrounding information through sensors and assist in making decisions based on the collected or shared information. In the local IIoT network, blockchain-based IIoT leverages a security platform to secure raw data and send raw data into transactions. Local data sharing ensures the security and trustworthiness of transactions through the security platform. Smart devices create two types of transactions: data storage/processing and data sharing. These two kinds of transactions will be relayed to the blockchain system, which will store or retrieve data from the distributed ledger.

Blockchain system: After the IIoT network publishes transactions, the block producer in the peer-to-peer (P2P) network collects and verifies the transactions to generate blocks, and adds the generated blocks to the blockchain through a consensus mechanism. As well as, P2P networks are scalable, decentralized and robust. At the same time, blockchain is used to store data in the IIoT. In this paper, the Merkle tree used for storage in the data layer is replaced with a new PVC structure to reduce the size of the proof and reduce the burden of node communication bandwidth.

The flow of the data security storage mechanism proposed in this paper is shown in Fig. 5, and the specific contents are as follows:

Figure 5: Flowchart of data security storage

Setup: Each IIoT node holds a public/secret key pair (pk, sk). The IIoT node uses the sk to sign the uploaded transaction data. Meanwhile, the pk is disclosed by IIoT node and shared by other nodes to verify whether the transaction data belongs to the IIoT node.

Block data generation: The IIoT node uploads data to the blockchain by publishing a data upload transaction $Tx = [data, pk]$. The IIoT nodes sign the transaction with the sk and broadcast it across the network, ensuring the integrity and provenance of the data uploaded to the blockchain.

Block generation: The timeline of block generation is shown in Fig. 6. The new block will be created after the block producer has collected data. When the block producer has collected enough data, the collected data is committed by the commit algorithm, and the commitment value is placed in the block header. The block header generates a random number based on the difficulty value. The first block to complete the random number search immediately broadcasts the block to the whole network. Other nodes in the network verify this block by checking the correctness of the promised value and the random number. Then the rest of the nodes verify that they have received the block by using it as the parent block to start finding the random number of the next block.

Proof generation: To verify the integrity and correctness of the data in the block to the client, the block producer can generate the storage proof using the *open* algorithm. To verify the storage proof, the client can provide the node with the corresponding information and the storage proof generated by the *open* algorithm.

Figure 6: Timeline of block generation

4.2 The Proposed Partitioned Vector Commitment

4.2.1 Preliminaries

Let G_1, G_2 be an additive cyclic group of order p, where p is a prime number. G_T is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. Define e: $G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$ as a bilinear mapping. Let integer $a, b \in Z_P^*$, then the bilinear mapping satisfies the three properties listed below:

- **Bilinear:** $\exists e(P^a, Q^b) = e(P, Q)^{ab}$ for all $P \in G_1$, $Q \in G_2$, and $a, b \in Z_P^*$;
- **Non-degenerate:** $\exists e(P, Q) \neq 1$ for all $P \in G_1$, $Q \in G_2$;
- **Computability:** For all $P \in G_1$, $Q \in G_2$, there exists an efficient algorithm so that the result of $e(P, Q)$ can be derived in polynomial time.

Definition 1. Square-CDH assumption. Let g be a generating element of the group $\mathcal{G}$ and $\alpha \in Z_p^*$ be a random number. Then the probability of g^{α^2} calculated from g, g^α is negligible.

4.2.2 System Model

PVC in this paper is divided into two parts: Commitment and Update. The commitment part includes four algorithms: *Setup* algorithm, *Commit* algorithm, *Open* algorithm and *Verify* algorithm. The update part includes two algorithms: *Update* algorithm and *Proofupdate* algorithm.

- **Commitment part:**
    - *Setup*: The committer executes the setup algorithm. It takes the size q of the committed vector (with $q = poly(k)$) and the security parameter k as input and outputs some public parameter pp.

- **Commit**: The committer runs the commitment algorithm. The commitment algorithm takes pp and a sequence of q messages $m_1, \ldots, m_q$ as input. It returns the commitment value $\mathcal{C}$ and the auxiliary information *aux*.
- **Open**: The committer runs an open algorithm to generate a proof ψ_i that m is the $i - th$ committed message. On inputting the pp, the message m_i, a position $i \in [q]$ and the *aux*, the open algorithm outputs a proof ψ_i.
- **Verify**: Any client can run the verification algorithm. On input the pp, the open message m, the commitment $\mathcal{C}$, the location i, and the proof ψ_i. If ψ_i is a valid proof that $\mathcal{C}$ was created to a sequence $(m_1, \ldots, m_q)$, it returns 1; otherwise, it returns 0.
- **Update part:**
  - **Update**: The update algorithm can update the commitment $\mathcal{C}$ by changing the i-th message m to m'. On input the pp, the commitment $\mathcal{C}$, the previous message m, the new message m', and the location i, the update algorithm outputs the new commitment $\mathcal{C}$ and the update message U.
  - **Proofupdate**: The proofupdate algorithm is run by any user holding a proofing ψ_j of a message at location j. On input the pp, the previous commitment $\mathcal{C}$, the proofing ψ_j of some message at location j, the new message m at location i, and the U, the proofupdate algorithm outputs the updated commitment $\mathcal{C}'$ and the updated proofing ψ_j'. In other words, the value U contains the necessary update information to calculate these values.

Definition 2. Correctness. When $k \in N, q = poly(k)$, for all public parameters honestly generated by the Setup algorithm, if C is a commitment to the message $m_1, \ldots, m_q$, and ψ_i is a proof at the location generated by the *Open* and *ProofUpdate* algorithms, the Verify algorithm passes with probability $1 - \epsilon(\kappa)$.

Definition 3. Position Binding. If for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary $\mathcal{A}$, when the output $(\mathcal{C}, m, m', j, \psi_j, \psi_j')$ satisfies:

$$Pr \begin{bmatrix} Verify\left(\mathcal{C}, m, i, \psi_j\right) = 1 \wedge \\ Verify\left(\mathcal{C}, m', i, \psi_j'\right) = 1 \wedge \\ m \neq m' \end{bmatrix} = \epsilon(\kappa) \tag{1}$$

Definition 4. Conciseness. Vector commitment is concise if the security parameters contain a fixed polynomial $poly(\lambda)$, such that the size of commitment $\mathcal{C}$ and the open algorithm are all constrained by $poly(\lambda)$.

4.2.3 Partition Vector Commitment

We use $[q]$ to denote the set $1, \ldots, q$. $[q \backslash i]$ denotes the elements in $[q]$ other than i.

- **Setup($1^k, q$)**: First let G, G_T be two bilinear groups of order p prime (p satisfying $p \in poly(\lambda)$) and satisfying $e: G \times G \rightarrow G_T$. $g \in G$ is a randomly generated element. Randomly choose $z_1, \ldots, z_q \in Z_p$.
  For all $i \in [q]$, let $r_i = g^{z_i}$.
  For all $i, j \in [q]$ with $i \neq j$, let $r_{i,j} = g^{z_i z_j}$.
  This algorithm outputs the public parameters $pp = (p, g, G, G_T, \{r_i\}_{i \in [q]}, \{r_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [q], i \neq j})$.
- **Commit($m_1, \ldots, m_q$)**: Given a set of messages $m_1, \ldots, m_q$ and a common parameter pp, $\theta \in Z_p$ is a number chosen randomly by the committer, the commitment algorithm outputs the commitment:

$$\mathcal{C} = g^{\theta} \prod_{i \in [q]} r_i^{m_i} = g^{\theta} g^{\sum_{i \in [q]} m_i z_i} \tag{2}$$

where the auxiliary information is $aux = \theta$.

– **Open(m, i, j, aux):** compute:
For the j-th group in the $[q]$ group, Λ_j is defined as follows:

$$\Lambda_j = \prod_{k \in [q \backslash j]} r_{k,j}^{y_k} = \left(\prod_{k \in [q \backslash j]} r_k^{y_k} \right)^{z_j} \tag{3}$$

$$\psi_i \leftarrow \Lambda_j (g^{z_j \sum_{m_l \in Y_j - \{e_i\}} m_l})^{z_j} \tag{4}$$

– **Verify$(\mathcal{C}, m, i, \psi_i)$:** If the following equation holds:

$$e \left(\frac{\mathcal{C}}{r_i^{m_i}}, r_i \right) = e(r_i, g^{\theta}) \, e(\psi_i, g) \tag{5}$$

Then output 1, otherwise, output 0.

– **Update$(\mathcal{C}, m, m', i)$:** The algorithm is run by the original committer, which takes as input the old message m at position i and the updated message m' and computes the updated commitment:

$$\mathcal{C}' = \mathcal{C} r_i^{m'-m} \tag{6}$$

Then outputs a new commitment $\mathcal{C}'$ and an update message U.

– **Proofupdate$(\mathcal{C}, \psi_i, m', i, U)$:** The user holding an old proof can use U to compute updated commitment $\mathcal{C}'$ and update proof at position j. If $i = j$, the proof holds. If $i \neq j$, the updated commitment is: $\mathcal{C}' = \mathcal{C} r_i^{m'-m}$. The updated proof is:

$$\psi_i' = \psi_i r_{j,i}^{m'-m} \tag{7}$$

4.2.4 Security Proof

The vector commitment is correct because the following equation holds:

$$e \left(\frac{\mathcal{C}}{r_i^{m_i}}, r_i \right) = e \left(\frac{g^{\theta} \prod_{j \in [q]} r_j^{m_j}}{r_i^{m_i}}, r_i \right) = e(g^{\theta}, r_i) \, e \left(\prod_{j \in [q \backslash i]} r_j^{m_j}, g^{z_i} \right) = e(g^{\theta}, r_i) \, e \left(\left(\prod_{j \in [q \backslash i]} r_j^{m_j} \right)^{z_i} \right)$$

$$= e(r_i, g^{\theta}) \, e(\psi_i, g) \tag{8}$$

Frist, note that $\mathcal{C} = g^{\theta} \prod_{i \in [q]} r_i^{m_i}$ and $\Lambda_j = \prod_{k \in [q \backslash j]} r_{k,j}^{y_k} = (\prod_{k \in [q \backslash j]} r_k^{y_k})^{z_j}$, we have $e \left(\frac{\mathcal{C}}{r_i^{m_i}}, r_i \right) = e \left(\frac{g^{\theta} \prod_{j \in [q]} r_j^{m_j}}{r_i^{m_i}}, r_i \right)$. Second, due to $\psi_i \leftarrow \Lambda_j (g^{z_j \sum_{m_l \in Y_j - \{e_i\}} m_l})^{z_j}$, we have $e(g^{\theta}, r_i) \, e \left((\prod_{j \in [q \backslash i]} r_j^{m_j})^{z_i} \right) = e(r_i, g^{\theta}) \, e(\psi_i, g)$. Hence, the output of the verification algorithm is always the value **m**.

Theorem 4.1. If the Square-CDH assumption holds, the proposed vector commitment scheme is secure.

Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that can produce two valid proofs for two different messages at the same location. Next, we will construct an algorithm E that takes g, g^{α} as input to break the square CDH assumption (i.e., calculates g^{α^2}).

First, E randomly selects a number $i \in [q]$ as the adversary's query to break the position-bound index i. Then, E randomly selects $z_i \in Z_p$, for all $j \in [q \backslash i]$, calculate $r_j = g^{z_j}$, $r_{i,j} = (g^{\alpha})^{z_j}$, $r_i = g^{\alpha}$, and $\forall l, j \in [q \backslash i], l \neq j$: $r_{i,j} = g^{z_i z_j}$.

The adversary then runs the *Setup* algorithm to obtain the public parameters *pp*, and outputs a set of $(\mathcal{C}, m, m', j, \psi_j, \psi_j')$, where $m \neq m'$, ψ_j, ψ_j' can be correctly verified. When $i \neq j$, the algorithm aborts the simulation. Otherwise, compute:

$$g^{\alpha^2} = (\psi_i/\psi_i')^{(m-m')^{-1}} \tag{9}$$

The correctness of the two proofs is verified below:

$$e(\mathcal{C}, r_i) = e(r_i^m, r_i) e(\psi_i, g) = e(r_i^{m'}, r_i) e(\psi_i', g) \tag{10}$$

i.e.,

$$e(r_i, r_i)^{m-m'} = e\left(\frac{\psi_i'}{\psi_i}, g\right) \tag{11}$$

Since $r_i = g^\alpha$, this proves the correctness of the output of the algorithm E.

If the adversary succeeds with probability ϵ, then algorithm E can break the Square-CDH assumption with probability ϵ/q.

4.2.5 Performance Analysis

For the set $S = \{m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n\}$, first select an integer parameter $p \in [1, n]$, divide the elements in the set S into p groups, each of which has n/p elements, and perform operations in groups, where the structure of the PVC is shown in Fig. 7.

Figure 7: Data secure storage mechanism with PVC

Divide the set S into p groups, balance the number of elements in each group as much as possible, and keep the number of elements contained in each group consistent. There are about n/p elements in each group from Y_1 to Y_n. $[p\backslash j]$ denotes the elements in $[p]$ other than j. For the j-th group in the $[p]$ group, Λ_j is defined as follows:

$$\Lambda_j = \prod_{k \in [p\backslash j]} r_{k,j}^{y_k} = (\prod_{k \in [p\backslash j]} r_k^{y_k})^{z_j} \tag{12}$$

where Λ_j is the cumulative product of the representatives of all elements outside the set Y_j. When an update such as is performed in the set Y_j, the data owner can compute the new value Y_j in $O(n/p)$ time complexity.

The overhead of maintaining each Y_j is not significant and is determined by the number of elements in each cluster. We just need to ensure that each Y_j has at least $\lceil n/p \rceil/2$ and at most no more than $2\lceil n/p \rceil$.

If the set Y_j has too few elements, it is merged with the adjacent set Y_{j-1} or Y_{j+1}. If merging Y_j with an adjacent set Y_{j-1} or Y_{j+1} would result in element overflow, borrow some elements from the adjacent

set so that the size of the set Y_j is at least $3\lceil n/p\rceil/4$. Similarly, if there are many elements in the set Y_j, you need to divide the set Y_j into two.

PVC's partitioning strategy allows data to be balanced across different groups, not only optimizing processing efficiency, but also reducing the burden of data management and updating for a single partition. With this strategy, each partition can process its internal data independently, reducing the load on the overall system.

The above adjustment to the Partitioned vector commitment takes only $O(n/p)$ time, and the value of n does not change significantly when performing insert and delete element operations. When there is a significant change in n, the priority queue can be checked when n is increased by insertion to see if the smallest set now needs some merging or borrowing to prevent it from becoming too small. Similarly, whenever n is reduced by deletion, the priority queue can be checked to see if the currently largest set must be split. Inductive arguments show that the method keeps the group size at $O(n/p)$.

In practice, since Y_j all expand or shrink at more or less the same rate, the overhead of keeping the size of Y_j can generally be ignored. However, even if the set Y_j updates are not uniform, all elements in Y_j can be reallocated with $O(min\{p, n/p\})$ and the $O(n)$ of this update is amortized to the last reallocated update set. This ensures high performance in dynamic data environments, and whenever data needs to be updated, the PVC structure can quickly calculate the change with only O(n/p) of required time complexity. The system's efficient update processing capability is suitable for IIoT environments where data changes frequently.

The third-party storage organization receives the Λ_j values of all p groups Y at the time of update. Thus, the third-party storage organization can complete the update in $O(p)$ time. Verify whether e_i is in e by checking the ledger to determine whether Y_j contains e_i. Define that there are n/p elements in Y. Each element y_i in Y represents the accumulation in the set elements. Then, compute:

$$\psi_i \leftarrow \Lambda_j(g^{z_j \sum_{e_m \in Y_j - \{e_i\}} m_l})^{z_j} \tag{13}$$

Therefore, the third-party repository can answer the query request in $O(n/p)$ time.

The performance of PVC is shown in Table 1 below, which details the performance data of PVC solutions in terms of space use, submission, opening, updating, query, and verification, and quantifies the efficiency and effectiveness of PVC in various operational aspects.

Table 1: The performance of PVC

Scheme	Space	Com	Open	Update	Query	Ver
PVC	$O(n)$	$O(p + n/p)$	$O\left(p^2 + \left(\dfrac{n}{p}\right)^2\right)$	$O(p)$	$O(n/p)$	$O(1)$

Note: Com = Commit, Ver = Verify; Construct the partitioned vector commitment based on the vector commitment of the CDH assumption, where p is the number of groups of the set S, and $p \in [1, n]$.

5 Experimental Results and Analysis

5.1 Scheme Comparison

This section compares the proposed secure storage scheme with other schemes. As shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Performance comparison of storage schemes

Scheme	Space	Com	Open	Update	Query	Ver	Partition
Merkle tree	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	—	$O(log_2 n)$	$O(log_2 n)$	$O(1)$	—
CF [41]	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	$O(n^2)$	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	$O(1)$	—
CHKO [47]	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$O(n)$	$O(1)$	—
HXHX [48]	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	—	$O(k log_k n)$	$O(k log_k n)$	$O(1)$	—
This work	$O(n)$	$O(p + n/p)$	$O\left(p^2 + \left(\dfrac{n}{p}\right)^2\right)$	$O(p)$	$O(n/p)$	$O(1)$	$\checkmark$

Note: $\checkmark$ = available, — = not available, Com = Commit, Ver = Verify; k is the branching tree of the $k-ary$ Merkle tree; p in the PVC scheme is the number of groups that are part of the set p and $p \in [1, n]$.

As can be seen from the analysis in Table 2, other storage machine mechanisms have limitations in various aspects. In the Merkle tree scheme, only a single data set can be confirmed, and the Merkle proof provided with the sharp increase of transaction data also increases sharply. The size of the PVC and the size of the position i open are independent of the vector length n, which can circumvent the limitations of the Merkle tree. The PVC scheme reduces the $O(n)$ required by other storage schemes in the commitment phase to $O(p + n/p)$ and the query time to $O(n/p)$. Aiming at the problem of low storage efficiency of the Merkle tree, the article [49] used an optimized cryptographic accumulator to improve it. Compared to the Merkle trees, the cryptographic accumulator is compact and can be used to prove membership while reducing storage overhead. While the CHKO scheme constructed by a cryptographic accumulator can be operated in batches and reduce storage space, there is no element order. PVC not only commits that the element is contained in the vector but also its position. In other words, PVC can prove on the full node whether an element exists at a certain position in the vector. The CF scheme constructed by traditional VC is superior to the Merkle tree scheme in all aspects, but VC still has a lot of room for improvement in the commitment process, the opening proof process, and the query process. The PVC constructed in this paper can improve the traditional VC problems.

This section compares the proposed scheme with other storage schemes. Based on the following comparisons, the PVC has comprehensive advantages in the time complexity of commitment, opening, and query.

5.2 Experimental Verification

In this section, we will evaluate the performance of the PVC scheme proposed in this paper compared to the vector commitment based on RSA [50]. We conducted experiments to verify the effectiveness of our scheme. The experiments were conducted on Amazon EC2's MTA.4xlarge model, which is equipped with 64 GB of RAM and 16 virtual cores of AMD EPYC 7000 series processors with a core speed of 2.5 GHz. Fig. 8 shows the difference in authentication time for different key lengths. As can be seen from the figure, the verification time of PVC scheme is much lower than that of RSA-based hidden sequence scheme, and with the increase of key length, the verification time of PVC scheme remains at a low and stable level. In contrast, RSA-based schemes show a slight upward trend in validation time as the key length increases, indicating that they are less efficient when dealing with longer keys. This comparison shows that PVC schemes have obvious advantages in verification efficiency when the key length changes. In addition, the proof update algorithm for PVC shows logarithmic scale growth for vector size growth. In stark contrast, proof updating in RSA-based vector commitment systems is much more expensive because it uses a linear time algorithm. The

algorithm needs to compute the product of prime numbers involving each vector position and perform modular exponentiation, which is computationally time-consuming.

Figure 8: Verification time

Next, the PVC scheme proposed in this paper is compared with Merkle tree and CFGKN20 [51] commitment schemes. In the experimental setup phase, we set the size of each data block to 64 bits and ensure a security level of 128 bits. In addition, we adopted the BLS12-381 curve as a bilinear group scheme to evaluate the performance of various schemes with the same security level and data block size. When the transaction volume is set to 500, the experimental results of the block proof size are shown in Fig. 9, where the depth of the Merkle tree determines the size of the Merkle proof, which means that as the number of transactions contained in each block increases, the size of the proof required will also increase accordingly. As can be seen from the figure, compared with Merkle tree and CFGKN 13, PVC scheme has significantly smaller proof size and particularly significant advantages.

Figure 9: Proof size comparison

6 Conclusion

This paper first introduces the blockchain-based IIoT technology and then points out the problems of this traditional blockchain-based IIoT. To tackle the current issues, this paper improves the traditional VC structure and proposes a new vector commitment—PVC. It can optimize the Merkle tree, which stores data in traditional blockchain-based IIoT. Compared with other schemes, PVC significantly improves the time complexity in the process of commitment, opening proof, and query. In addition, the application of improved blockchain with PVC in IIoT can considerably reduce the scale of the required verification proof, thus reducing the bandwidth burden on nodes, and can enormously enhance the security, stability, and efficiency of blockchain-based IIoT. PVC reduces the time complexity of the commitment process of traditional VC from n to $p + n/p$ (p is the number of groups), and the time complexity of the query process from n to n/p. Finally, compared with other schemes, our scheme has been found to effectively reduce communication consumption while improving communication efficiency.

The PVC proposed in this paper has good performance, and we will use PVC in more fields in future work. In recent years, the multilinear mapping proposed in cryptography has attracted the attention of the academic circle because of its powerful performance. In future work, we will use multilinear mapping to further optimize the performance of PVC.

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Availability of Data and Materials: Due to the nature of this research, participants of this study did not agree for their data to be shared publicly, so supporting data is not available.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study.

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