A multi-agent simulation model considering the bounded rationality of market participants:

an example of GENCOs participation in the electricity spot market

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
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
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Electricity spot market (ESM)


GENCOs(Generation companies) declares a monotonically increasing curve as their willingness to offer electricity supply at different prices.

ISO (Independent System Operator) will clear the market based on the supply and demand curves submitted by Gencos and loads, resulting in the determination of electricity prices and quantities.





Electricity Market Mechanism Design



The design of electricity market mechanisms is a topic of interest. Today, my presentation focuses on the issue of settlement mechanisms.

Our approach can be applied to other aspects of mechanism design as well.


Bounded rationality (BR)



satisfice > optimize




Attempting to optimize their decisions (but they cannot).



Limit Time (Every 5 minutes) Limited market information

Why do we consider BR of GENCOs in the ESM?

With the increasing scale of renewable energy, the volatility of the electricity market has become more evident, leading to less accurate predictions by market participants regarding the future.




We aim to simulate the bounded rationality of GENCOs and observe the changes that occur in the electricity market under unstable conditions. This will enable us to design a better market mechanism.

Electricity Market Simulation Process

Every period:

- (1) GENCO's decision model makes a decision.
- ② GENCO converts the model outputs into offers.
- (3) ISO collects all offers.
- 4 ISO performs market clearing.
- 5 ISO settlement to obtain the winning power and revenue of each GENCO
- 6 ISO sends the market results back.
- 7GENCO receives the market clearing results and prepares for the next iteration.




Training phase:


1, ISO presets N_s typical scenarios with different market boundary information, and the m^{th} scenario:


$$S_m \in \{S1, S2 \dots S_{Ns}\}$$

2, each scenario S_m is used for training purposes, where the parameters of S_m (market boundary conditions, such as load curves), are fixed, and the RL model Φ_g^m is trained for each GENCO g under each S_m .

Training (Repeated games)








Training phase:


3, The decision model for GENCO g is


$$\rho_g = \left\{ \Phi_g^1, \Phi_g^2 \dots \Phi_g^m \right\}$$

4, The above steps are repeated for each market rule θ in the set of rules to be studied, to obtain the decision model ρ_g^{θ} for GENCO g under different rules.




Training







Evaluation phase:

1, predict and action








Evaluation phase:


2, Contingency events E_i


GENCOs misjudging current scenario S_m




Training

(Repeated games)








Evaluation phase:


3, The maximum deviation is calculated for all contingencies and all scenarios for different market rules θ .


4, By assessing A_{θ} for different market rules, it is possible to determine the shock resistance of each rule, where the more shock-resistant the market rule, the smaller the A_{θ} .

$$A_m^i = \frac{\left|I_m^i - I_m^{base}\right|}{I_m^{base}} \times 100\%$$

Training
(Repeated games)








Set of Mechanisms to be Studied


Symbols	Mechanism Name	Additional Notes		
$ heta_1$	Make-Whole Payment	Only the spot market is considered, consider		
	Wake- whole rayment	full day losses, the loss is fully compensated.		
θ_2	No compensation	No compensation payments to GENCOs		
θ_3	Consider Long-term Contracts	ISO considers long-term contract revenue		
	Consider Long-term Contracts	when approving GENCO's revenue.		

This paper examines a set of market mechanism designs denoted as θ , which includes the make-whole payment (MWP) employed by PJM and the electricity market mechanisms adopted in several Chinese provinces.


Comparison of θ_1 and θ_2



Comparison of θ_1 and θ_3



Simulation that Considering Bounded Rationality



We consider randomly selecting certain GENCOs to mispredict the current electricity market scenario. For example, the selected GENCOs might think that the current scenario is S_1 while the actual scenarios are $S_1 - S_6$.

Comparison of Market Indicators Considering BR

Comparison of the A_m^i under different mechanisms.

	E^1	S_1	S_2	S_3	S_4	S_5	S_6	$\int E^2$	S_1	S_2	S_3	S_4	S_5	S_6
Λ^i	$ heta_1$	6.3	5.8	3.8	7.3	5.5	10.1	θ_1	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2
$A_{m,price}^{\circ}$	θ_2	12.3	1.4	4.1	5.9	4.6	9.0	θ_3	13.0	13.0	12.8	12.7	16.3	15.7
Λ^i	$ heta_1$	5.2	5.0	3.8	7.3	5.5	10.1	θ_1	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2
$A_{m,pc}^{i}$	$ heta_2$	12.3	1.4	4.1	5.9	4.6	9.0	θ_3	17.2	17.9	18.5	19.1	24.1	24.4
Δ^i	$ heta_1$	3.4	2.4	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	θ_1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
$A_{m,gc}^{i}$	$ heta_2$	3.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	θ_3	1.2	0.7	0.5	1.2	0.9	0.8

Comparison of the A_{θ} under different mechanisms.

	$A_{\theta,price}$	$A_{\theta,pc}$	$A_{\theta,gc}$		$A_{\theta,price}$	$A_{\theta,pc}$	$A_{\theta,gc}$
$\overline{ heta_1}$	10.1	10.1	3.4	$ heta_1$	1.2	1.2	0.2
θ_2	12.3	12.3	3.5	θ_3	16.3	24.4	1.2

Conclusion

This study proposes a multi-agent simulation model that considers the bounded rationality of GENCOs and presents indicators to evaluate the shock resistance of the electricity market.

The multi-agent simulation model proposed in this paper can be extended to other economic systems. The model employs multiple RL algorithms to form a decision model for each market participant, which can adapt to different simulation scenarios and thereby reduces the generalization requirements of RL algorithms.

Thank you!