

Rank Query Processing Over Outsourced Encrypted Data

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ABSTRACT

Nowadays, cloud data outsourcing provides users and companies with powerful capabilities to store and process their data in third-party data centers. However, the privacy of the outsourced data is not guaranteed by the cloud providers. One solution for protecting the user data against security attacks is to encrypt the data before being sent to the cloud servers. Then, the main problem is to evaluate user queries over the encrypted data.

In this paper, we address the problem of top-k query processing over encrypted data, and propose an efficient approach called BuckTop. Our approach uses the bucketization technique to manage the encrypted data in the remote server. It includes a top-k query processing algorithm that works on the encrypted data of the buckets, and returns a set that contains the encrypted top-k results. It also has a filtering algorithm that efficiently eliminates the false positives in the server side.

We implemented BuckTop, and compared its response time for processing top-k queries over encrypted data with that of the TA algorithm over original (plaintext) data. Our results show excellent performance gains. They show that the response time of BuckTop over encrypted data is close to TA over plaintext data.

1. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, cloud data outsourcing provides users and companies with powerful capabilities to store and process their data in third-party data centers. However, when a user stores her data in a public cloud, she loses the physical access control to the data. Thus, potentially sensitive data gets at risk of security attacks, e.g., from the employees of the cloud provider. According to a recent report published by the Cloud Security Alliance [9], security attacks are one of the main concerns for the cloud users.

One solution for protecting the user data against attacks is to encrypt the data before sending them to the cloud servers. Then, the challenge is to answer user queries over

encrypted data. A naive solution for answering queries is to retrieve the encrypted database from the cloud to the client, decrypt it, and then evaluate the query over *plaintext* (*non encrypted*) data. This solution is not practical, in particular for large databases.

In this paper, we are interested in processing top-k queries over encrypted data. These queries have attracted much attention in several areas of information technology such as sensor networks [42], information retrieval [37], data stream management systems [39, 31], spatial data analysis [5, 32, 33], and graph databases [29, 21, 18]. A top-k query allows the user to specify a number k , and the system returns the k tuples which are most relevant to the query. The relevance degree of tuples to the query is determined by a *scoring function*.

There have been many different approaches proposed for processing top-k queries over plaintext data. One of the best known approaches is TA [15] that works on sorted lists of attribute values. TA can find efficiently the top-k results because of a smart strategy for deciding when to stop reading the database. However, TA and all other efficient top-k approaches developed so far assume the existence of local scores of the data items (i.e. their attribute values) in plaintext, and there is no efficient solution capable of evaluating efficiently top-k queries over encrypted data.

When we think about top-k query processing on encrypted data, the first idea that comes to mind is the utilization of a fully homomorphic encryption cryptosystem, e.g. [16], which allows one to do arithmetic operations over encrypted data. Using this type of encryption allows to compute the overall score of data items over encrypted data. However, existing fully homomorphic encryption methods are very expensive in terms of encryption and decryption time. In addition, they do not allow to compare the encrypted data, and to find the top-k results.

In this paper, we propose a new approach, called *BuckTop*, that efficiently evaluates top-k queries over encrypted data. BuckTop uses the bucketization technique to partition the encrypted data into a set of buckets before sending them to the server. This paper includes the following contributions:

- A top-k query processing algorithm that works on the encrypted data of the buckets, and returns a set, which is proved to contain the encrypted data corresponding to the top-k results.
- An efficient filtering algorithm that filters in the server significantly the false positives included in the set returned by the top-k query processing algorithm. We

prove theoretically the correctness of the filtering algorithm.

- A novel approach to obfuscate the boundaries of the buckets that contain the data scores, thus increasing the security of the buckets.

We implemented our approach, and compared its response time over encrypted data with a base algorithm and also with TA over original (plaintext) data. The experimental results show excellent performance gains for BuckTop. For example, the results show that the response time of BuckTop over encrypted data is close to TA over plaintext data. The results also illustrate that more than 99.9 % of the false positives can be eliminated in the server by BuckTop’s filtering algorithm.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the problem definition. In Section 3, we describe briefly the bucketization technique and some encryption schemes which we use in the paper. In Section 4, we describe the system architecture. Then, in Section 5, we propose our BuckTop approach for top-k query processing over encrypted data. In Section 6, we report the performance evaluation results. Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 concludes.

2. PROBLEM DEFINITION

In this section, we first describe the adversary model which we consider, and then define the top-k queries. Finally, we state the problem which we address.

2.1 Adversary Model

In this work, we consider the honest-but-curious adversary model, where the adversary is inquisitive to learn the sensitive data without introducing any modification in the data or protocols. This model is widely used as the adversary model for many solutions proposed for secure processing of the different queries [25].

2.2 Top-k Queries

By a top-k query, the user specifies a number k , and the system should return the k most relevant answers to the users. The relevance degree of the answers to the query is determined by a scoring function. A common method for efficient top-k query processing is to run the algorithms over *sorted lists* [15]. Let us define them formally.

Let D be a set of n data items, and L_1, L_2, \dots, L_m be m lists such that each list L_i contains n pairs of the form $(d, s_i(d))$ where $d \in D$ and $s_i(d)$ is a non-negative real number that denotes the *local score* of d in L_i . Each list L_i is sorted in descending order of its local scores.

The set of m lists is called a *database*. The *overall score* of each data item d is calculated as $ov(d) = f(s_1(d), s_2(d), \dots, s_m(d))$ where f is a given *scoring function*. In other words, the overall score is the output of f where the input is the local scores of d in all lists. We assume that the function f is monotonic, thus if $x_i \leq x'_i$ then $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m) \leq f(x'_1, x'_2, \dots, x'_m)$. Many popular aggregation functions such as MIN, MAX, AVG are monotonic.

The result of a top-k query is the set of k elements that have the highest overall scores among all elements of the database. Formally, the top-k query result is a set of elements $D' \subseteq D$ such that $|D'| = k$, and $\forall d' \in D' \wedge \forall d \in (D - D') \Rightarrow ov(d') \geq ov(d)$.

The sorted lists model for top-k query processing is simple and general. For example, suppose we want to find the top-k tuples in a relational table according to some scoring function over its attributes. To answer this query, it is sufficient to have a sorted (indexed) list of the values of each attribute involved in the scoring function, and return the k tuples whose overall scores in the lists are the highest.

For processing top-k queries over sorted lists, two modes of access are usually used [15]. The first is the *sorted (sequential) access* that allows us to sequentially access the next data item in the sorted list. This access begins with the first item in the list. The second is the *random access* by which we look up a given data item in the list.

2.3 Problem Statement

The problem, which we address in this paper, is top-k query processing over encrypted data. Let D be a database, and $e(D)$ be its encrypted version such that each data $c \in e(D)$ is the ciphertext of a data $d \in D$, i.e. $c = Enc(d)$ where $Enc()$ is an encryption function. The database $e(D)$ is stored in a remote server. Given a number k and a scoring function f , our goal is to develop an algorithm A , such that when A is executed over the database $e(D)$, its output contains the ciphertexts of the top-k results, i.e. those that can be found by executing a correct top-k algorithm over the database D .

A naive approach for top-k query processing over the encrypted database $e(D)$ is to retrieve it from the remote server, decrypt all of its data, run an existing top-k algorithm over the plaintext data, and return the top-k results to the user. However, this approach is not practical, particularly for very large databases.

3. BACKGROUND

In this section, we first introduce the bucketization technique, and then describe different encryption methods used in our work.

3.1 Bucketization Technique

In this work, we take advantage of the bucketization technique for managing the encrypted data in the server. This technique consists of partitioning the data (e.g., attribute values) into buckets. There are several methods for partitioning the values of an attribute, for example dividing the attribute domain to almost equal intervals or creating partitions with equal sizes. In the current implementation of our approach, we create equal size buckets (i.e., buckets with the same number of encrypted data), but our top-k query processing algorithm works even if the buckets have different sizes. The size of buckets is chosen by the system administrator, based on the privacy and performance requirements (see Section 5.7).

3.2 Encryption Schemes

In our approach, we use *symmetric encryption* schemes that use a single key, called *private key*, for both encryption and decryption operations. The sender uses the private key to encrypt the plaintext and sends the ciphertext to the receiver. The receiver applies the same key to decrypt the message.

We distinguish two types of symmetric schemes: *deterministic* and *probabilistic*. *Deterministic* encryption is an encryption scheme that, for two equal inputs, generates the




Figure 1: System architecture

same ciphertexts. With a *probabilistic* encryption, for the same plaintexts different ciphertexts can be generated, but the decryption function returns the same plaintext for them. A probabilistic encryption scheme can be developed by simply adding some random bits to the plaintext, and then encrypting the result using a deterministic encryption scheme. The random bits are discarded after decrypting the ciphertext.

4. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND A BASIC TOP-K APPROACH

In this section, we first present the architecture of our system. Then, we propose a basic top-k query processing approach, called EncFA.

4.1 Architecture

The architecture of our outsourcing system is composed of two parts (see Figure 1):

- **Trusted client.** It is responsible for encrypting the user data, decrypting the data and controlling the user accesses. The security keys used for data encryption and decryption are managed by this part of the system. When a query is issued by a user, the trusted client checks the access rights of the user. If the user does not have the required rights to see the query results, then his demand is rejected. Otherwise, the issued query is transformed to a query that can be executed over the encrypted data. For example, suppose we have a relation R with the following attributes: $att_1, att_2, \dots, att_m$ and the user issues the following query:
`SELECT * FROM R ORDERED BY $f(att_1, \dots, att_m)$ STOP AFTER k`

This query is transformed to:

`SELECT * FROM $E(R)$ ORDERED BY $F(E(att_1), \dots, E(att_m))$ STOP AFTER k .`

The transformed query is sent to the service provider, and the received results are post-processed, e.g. decrypted, before being returned to the user.

- **Service provider.** It stores the encrypted data, executes on them the algorithms provided by the trusted client, and returns the results to it.

4.2 EncFA: A Basic Top-k Query Processing Approach

Here, we propose a simple approach, called EncFA, that uses the FA algorithm [13] in the server for processing top-k queries over encrypted data. Our main contribution, called BuckTop, is presented in the next section.

Let us first describe how the local scores are encrypted. By EncFA, the trusted client uses a *probabilistic* encryption scheme to encrypt the local scores (attribute values) of the data items in the lists. It also uses a *deterministic* scheme for encrypting the ID of data items. Then, it sends the encrypted data IDs and scores to the service provider in the same order as they were before being encrypted. Notice that all we need is that the lists in the server be sorted in the same order they were before encryption. We do not need to compare the encrypted scores, thus no need for an order preserving encryption (OPE) scheme.

Given a top-k query Q with a scoring function f , EncFA uses the FA algorithm for processing top-k queries as follows. It performs sorted access in parallel to each sorted list, and maintains the encrypted data items and their encrypted local scores in a set Y . If there are at least k data items in Y such that each of them has been seen in each of the m lists, then it stops doing sorted access to the lists.

Then, for each data item d involved in Y , and each list L_i , it performs random access to L_i to find the encrypted local scores of d in L_i (if it has not been seen yet). EncFA sends Y to the trusted client which decrypts the local scores of each item $d \in Y$, computes their overall scores, and sends to the user the k items with the highest overall scores.

THEOREM 1. *Given a top-k query with a monotonic scoring function, EncFA returns a set that includes the encrypted top-k elements.*

The proof is given in Appendix A.

The main idea behind EncFA is that the FA algorithm is agnostic with respect to the scoring function, thus it works correctly even on the encrypted data if they are sorted in the same order as the plaintext data. Notice that many other algorithms do not have this characteristic, e.g. the TA algorithm.

5. BUCKTOP: AN EFFICIENT APPROACH FOR TOP-K QUERY PROCESSING OVER ENCRYPTED DATA

The EncFA approach, presented in the previous section, evaluates correctly the top-k queries over encrypted data. But, as shown by our experiments reported in Section 6, there may be a high number of false positives which are sent from the server to the client, and this renders EncFA inefficient in practice. This is why, we propose the BuckTop approach which is much more efficient than EncFA.

Our BuckTop approach manages the encrypted data in the server using the bucketization technique. The data storage and query processing by BuckTop is done in four main steps: 1) bucket creation and data encryption; 2) top-k query processing over encrypted data in the server; 3) result filtering in the server; 4) result post-processing in the trusted client.

5.1 Bucket Creation and Data Encryption

Before sending the data to the service provider, the trusted client partitions each sorted list into buckets using a bucketization mechanism. Let b_1, b_2, \dots, b_t be the created buckets for a list L_j . Each bucket b_i has a lower bound, denoted by $\min(b_i)$, and an upper bound, denoted by $\max(b_i)$. The lower bound of the bucket b_i is equal to the upper bound of the next bucket, i.e., $\min(b_i) = \max(b_{i+1})$. A data item d is in the bucket b_i , if and only if its local score in the list L_j is between the lower and upper bounds of the bucket, i.e. $\min(b_i) \leq s_j(d) < \max(b_i)$.

The trusted client chooses two symmetric encryption schemes. The first one is deterministic used to encrypt the ID of the data items in each database list. The second encryption scheme is probabilistic used to encrypt the local scores of data items.

After encrypting the data IDs and local scores, the trusted client creates the buckets in each list, puts the encrypted local scores in their corresponding bucket, and sends the buckets and their involved encrypted data to the service provider. The buckets are sent according to their lower bound order. However, there is no order for the data items inside each bucket, i.e. *the place of the data items inside each bucket is chosen randomly*.

For the ease of presentation, in the basic version of BuckTop, we assume that the lower and upper bounds of the buckets are known by the service provider, i.e. they are sent to the service provider when sending the buckets. In Section 5.5, this assumption is relaxed by obfuscating the lower/upper bounds using secret numbers.

5.2 Top-k Query Processing

Given a top-k query Q including a number k and a scoring function f , the top-k query processing algorithm of BuckTop performs the following steps in the service provider for processing Q :

1. Do sorted access in parallel to the lists, to read a bucket from each list. For each data item d seen in

a bucket in a list, do random access in the other lists to find the encrypted score and the bucket of d in each list. Let b_1, b_2, \dots, b_m be the buckets involving d in the lists L_1, L_2, \dots, L_m . Compute a minimum overall score for d , denoted as $\min_{ovl}(d)$, by applying the scoring function on the lower bound of the buckets that contain d in different lists. Formally, $\min_{ovl}(d) = f(\min(b_1), \min(b_2), \dots, \min(b_m))$. Then, store d , its encrypted local scores, and its \min_{ovl} score in a set Y .

2. For each list L_i , let b'_i be the last bucket seen under sorted access in L_i up to now. Let threshold be defined as follows: $TH = f(\min(b'_1), \min(b'_2), \dots, \min(b'_m))$. In other words, the threshold is computed by applying the scoring function on the lower bounds of the last seen buckets in the lists.
3. If the set Y contains k elements that have a \min_{ovl} score higher than the threshold, then stop doing sorted access in the lists. Otherwise, go to step one.

At the end of the algorithm, the set Y includes the encrypted top-k data items (see the proof below). This set can be sent to the trusted client, which decrypts its involved elements, computes the overall scores of the items, removes the false positives (i.e., the items that are in Y but not among the top-k results), and returns the top-k items to the user.

Let us prove that the BuckTop top-k query processing works correctly. We first show that the minimum overall score of any data item d , i.e. $\min_{ovl}(d)$, which is computed based on the lower bound of its buckets, is less than or equal to its overall score. We also show that the maximum overall score of d , i.e. $\max_{ovl}(d)$, is higher than or equal to its overall score.

LEMMA 1. *Given a monotonic scoring function f , the minimum overall score of any data item d is less than or equal to its overall score.*

Proof. The minimum overall score of a data item d is calculated by applying the scoring function on the lower bound of the buckets in which d is involved. Let b_i be the bucket that contains d in the list L_i . Let s_i be the local score of d in L_i . Since $d \in b_i$, its local score is higher than or equal to the lower bound of b_i , i.e. $\min(b_i) \leq s_i$. Since f is monotonic, we have $f(\min(b_1), \dots, \min(b_m)) \leq f(s_1, \dots, s_m)$. Therefore, the minimum overall score of d is less than or equal to its overall score. \square

LEMMA 2. *Given a monotonic scoring function f , the maximum overall score of any data item d is greater than or equal to its overall score.*

Proof. The proof can be done in a similar way as Lemma 1. \square

The following theorem shows that the output of BuckTop contains the encrypted top-k data items.

THEOREM 2. *Given a top-k query with a monotonic scoring function f , the output of BuckTop contains the encrypted top-k results.*

Proof. Let Y be output of the BuckTop top- k query processing algorithm, i.e. the set that contains all the encrypted data items seen under sorted access when the algorithm ends. We show that each data item d that is not in Y ($d \notin Y$), has an overall score that is less than or equal to the overall score of at least k data items in Y . For each list L_i , let s_i be the local score of d in the list L_i . Let b'_i be the last bucket seen under sorted access in the list L_i , i.e. when the algorithm ends. Since d is not in Y , it has not been seen under sorted access in the lists. Thus, its involving buckets are after the buckets seen under sorted access by the algorithm. Therefore, we have $s_i < \min(b'_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq m$, i.e. the local score of d in each list L_i is less than the lower bound of the last bucket read under sorted access in L_i . Since the scoring function is monotonic, we have $f(s_1, \dots, s_m) < f(\min(b'_1), \min(b'_2), \dots, \min(b'_m)) = TH$. Thus, the overall score of d is less than the threshold used in the BuckTop algorithm. When the algorithm stops, there are at least k data items in Y whose minimum overall scores are greater than or equal to the threshold. Thus, by using Lemma 1, their overall scores are at least the threshold. Therefore, their overall score is greater than or equal to that of the data item d . \square

5.3 Filtering

In the set Y returned by BuckTop, the number of false positives may be high. Here, we propose a server side algorithm to filter from Y the data items that have no chance to be among the top- k items. As shown by our experimental results, this filtering algorithm can eliminate most of the false positives (more than 99% in the different tested datasets).

In the filtering algorithm, we use the *maximum overall score*, denoted by max_ovl of each data item. This score is computed by applying the scoring function over the upper bound of the buckets involving the data item in the lists. The filtering algorithm proceeds as follows:

1. Let $Y' \subseteq Y$ be the k data items in Y that have the highest min_ovl scores. Let d' be the data item that has the minimum min_ovl score in Y' .
2. For each item $d \in Y$, compute its maximum overall score, i.e. $max_ovl(d)$, by applying the scoring function on the upper bound of the buckets involving d in the lists. Formally, let $max(b_i)$ be the upper bound of the bucket involving d in the list L_i . Then, $max_ovl(d) = f(max(b_1), max(b_2), \dots, max(b_m))$. If the maximum overall score of d is less than or equal to the minimum overall score of d' , then remove d from Y . In other words, if $max_ovl(d) \leq min_ovl(d') \Rightarrow Y = Y - \{d\}$

After running the filtering algorithm, the service provider sends Y to the trusted client which decrypts its involved elements and filters the remaining false positives (if any).

The following theorem shows that the filtering algorithm works correctly, i.e., the removed data are only false positives.

THEOREM 3. *Any data item removed by the filtering algorithm cannot belong to the top- k results.*

Proof. The proof can be done by considering the fact that any removed data item d has a maximum overall score that is lower than the minimum overall score of at least k data

items. Thus, by using Lemmas 1 and 2, the overall score of d is less than or equal to that of at least k data items. Therefore, we can eliminate d . \square

5.4 Example

Consider the encrypted database shown in Figure 2, and a top- k query with $k = 3$ and a scoring function that computes the sum of the local scores in the sorted lists.

Read Buckets	data items	min_ovl	TH	continue?
1	$E(d3)$	72	/	/
	$E(d1)$	60.3	/	/
	$E(d6)$	72	/	/
	$E(d2)$	62.2	72	YES
2	$E(d5)$	41.5	/	/
	$E(d8)$	33.8	/	/
	$E(d7)$	38.7	/	/
	$E(d4)$	38.7	/	/
	$E(d9)$	37.4	50.5	NO

Table 1: Applying BuckTop top- k query processing algorithm over the database of Figure 2

Table 1 shows the result of applying the BuckTop top- k query processing algorithm over the database of Figure 2. BuckTop stops sorted accesses after reading the 2nd bucket of each list. In the 2nd bucket, the threshold is 50.5 and the minimum overall score of d_3 , d_1 , d_6 and d_2 is greater than or equal to the threshold. The set Y contains all the data items that have been seen under sorted access, i.e. $Y = \{E(d3), E(d1), E(d6), E(d2), E(d5), E(d8), E(d7), E(d4), E(d9)\}$. The filtering algorithm is applied on the data items of Y . The k data items that have the highest min_ovl scores in Y are $Y' = \{d_3, d_6, d_2\}$. Among the data items in Y' , the minimum min_ovl belongs to d_2 , which is $min_ovl(d_2) = 62.2$. For filtering, we need to compare max_ovl score of each data item in $Y - Y'$ with $min_ovl(d_2)$. The result of filtering is shown in Table 2.

False positives	max-ovl	comparison with min-ovl	eliminated?
$E(d1)$	77.6	$max_ovl \geq 62.2$	NO
$E(d5)$	62.1	$max_ovl \leq 62.2$	YES
$E(d8)$	57.9	$max_ovl \leq 62.2$	YES
$E(d7)$	55.6	$max_ovl \leq 62.2$	YES
$E(d4)$	55.6	$max_ovl \leq 62.2$	YES
$E(d9)$	52.2	$max_ovl \leq 62.2$	YES

Table 2: Example of running the filtering algorithm. We find that we can eliminate d_5 , d_8 , d_7 , d_4 and d_9 from Y because they have a max_ovl score less than min_ovl score of d_2 . As a result, after the filtering, Y will contain the data items $Y = \{E(d1), E(d2), E(d3), E(d6)\}$. This set includes only one false positive, i.e. d_2 , which will be eliminated in the client side.

5.5 Obfuscating Bucket Limits

A drawback of the basic version of BuckTop, presented until now, is that the limits of the buckets are disclosed to the ad-

List 1			List 2			List 3		
bucket ID	enc data item	enc local score	bucket ID	enc data item	enc local score	bucket ID	enc data item	enc local score
B_{11}	$E(d1)$	$E(27)$	B_{21}	$E(d6)$	$E(28)$	B_{31}	$E(d2)$	$E(22)$
B_{11}	$E(d3)$	$E(30)$	B_{21}	$E(d3)$	$E(29)$	B_{31}	$E(d3)$	$E(25)$
B_{11}	$E(d6)$	$E(26)$	B_{21}	$E(d2)$	$E(26)$	B_{31}	$E(d6)$	$E(27)$
B_{12}	$E(d2)$	$E(15)$	B_{22}	$E(d1)$	$E(24)$	B_{32}	$E(d5)$	$E(21)$
B_{12}	$E(d8)$	$E(20)$	B_{22}	$E(d7)$	$E(21)$	B_{32}	$E(d1)$	$E(20)$
B_{12}	$E(d5)$	$E(24)$	B_{22}	$E(d4)$	$E(19)$	B_{32}	$E(d9)$	$E(18)$
B_{13}	$E(d4)$	$E(14)$	B_{23}	$E(d5)$	$E(16)$	B_{33}	$E(d8)$	$E(17)$
B_{13}	$E(d7)$	$E(12)$	B_{23}	$E(d9)$	$E(13)$	B_{33}	$E(d7)$	$E(14)$
B_{13}	$E(d9)$	$E(11)$	B_{23}	$E(d8)$	$E(10)$	B_{33}	$E(d4)$	$E(11)$
...

List 1			List 2			List 3		
bucket ID	min	max	bucket ID	min	max	bucket ID	min	max
B_{11}	24.6	32	B_{21}	25.5	31	B_{31}	21.9	28
B_{12}	14.8	24.1	B_{22}	18	24.1	B_{32}	17.7	21.5
B_{13}	10.7	14.2	B_{23}	9	16.5	B_{33}	10	17.3

Figure 2: Example of an encrypted database, and the lower/upper bounds of the generated buckets

versary (server). To strengthen the security of our approach, we change the bucket limits as follows. We choose two random prime numbers a and c . These numbers must be kept secret in the trusted client. Before sending the database to the service provider, the lower and upper bounds of each bucket b_i are obfuscated (modified) as follows:

$$\min(b_i) := \min(b_i) \times a + c \quad (1)$$

$$\max(b_i) := \max(b_i) \times a + c \quad (2)$$

Thus, the trusted client multiplies the lower (upper) bounds by the secret prime number a , and then adds the secret prime number c to the result. These obfuscated bucket limits are sent to the service provider together with the encrypted IDs and scores.

By the above strategy, we hide the limits of the buckets from the service provider. But, a question remains to answer: does BuckTop work correctly if it uses the changed lower/upper bounds? The answer to this question is positive. The intuition is that the stop strategy of BuckTop remains valid, if we multiply and add all bucket limits to the same positive numbers.

The following theorem proves that the BuckTop top-k query processing algorithm works correctly if it uses the perturbed lower bounds.

THEOREM 4. *Assume a top-k query with a monotonic scoring function f . If we change the lower bound of the buckets by using Equation 1, then the output of BuckTop will involve the top-k results.*

Proof. Let Y be the output of the BuckTop top-k query processing algorithm. We show that each data item d that is not in Y ($d \notin Y$), has an overall score that is less than or

equal to the overall score of at least k data items involved in Y . Let $Y' \subseteq Y$ be the k data items whose minimum overall score is higher than the threshold when the algorithm ends. Let $d' \in Y'$ be the data item that has the lowest overall score among the data items involved in Y' . In each list L_i , let b'_i be the bucket that contains d' in L_i , and thus $\min(b'_i) \times a + c$ is the new (modified) lower bound of b'_i . Let b_1, \dots, b_m be the last buckets seen by the algorithm before it ends. Then, from the stop condition of BuckTop we have: $TH = f(\min(b_1) \times a + c, \dots, \min(b_m) \times a + c) \leq f(\min(b'_1) \times a + c, \dots, \min(b'_m) \times a + c)$. Since f is monotonic and the numbers a and c are positive, we have:

$$f(\min(b_1), \dots, \min(b_m)) \leq f(\min(b'_1), \dots, \min(b'_m)) \quad (3)$$

Before changing the lower bounds, the local score of d' in each list is higher than or equal to the lower bound of its bucket, thus we have:

$$f(\min(b'_1), \dots, \min(b'_m)) \leq f(s'_1, \dots, s'_m) \quad (4)$$

By comparing Equations 3 and 4, we have:

$$f(\min(b_1), \dots, \min(b_m)) \leq f(s'_1, \dots, s'_m) = \text{ovl}(d')$$

In the right hand side of the above equation, we have the overall score of d' . Now, we show that the left hand side of the above equation is higher than or equal to the overall score of a data d that has not been seen by the algorithm. Let s_i be the (plaintext) local score of d in the list L_i . Since d has not been seen by the algorithm, its bucket in L_i is after b_i that is the last bucket seen by the algorithm. Thus, we have $s_i \leq \min(b_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq m$. Therefore, since f is monotonic, we have:

$$f(s'_1, \dots, s'_m) \leq f(\min(b_1), \dots, \min(b_m)) \quad (5)$$

In other words, $ov(d) \leq ov(d')$. Thus, the overall score of any unseen data item d is less than or equal to that of at least k data items involved in Y . Therefore, Y contains the top- k results, and the proof is done. \square

Below, we prove that the filtering algorithm works correctly, if it uses the obfuscated bucket limits.

THEOREM 5. *Assume a top- k query with a monotonic scoring function f . If we modify the lower bound of the buckets by using Equations 1 and 2, then the filtering algorithm does not remove any top- k result.*

Proof. Let Y be the output of BuckTop algorithm, and $Y' \subseteq Y$ be the k data items in Y that have the highest min_ovl scores. Let d' be the data item in Y' . In each list L_i , let b'_i and s'_i be the bucket and local score of d'_i in the list.

We do the proof by contradiction. We choose a data item d that is a top- k result and has been removed by the filtering algorithm. We show that this assumption yields to a contradiction. In each list L_i , let b_i and s_i be the bucket and local score of d_i in the list. Since, d has been removed from the list, its maximum overall score using the modified limits is lower than or equal to that of d' . Thus, we have:

$$f(\max(b_1) \times a + b, \dots, \max(b_m) \times a + b) \leq f(\min(b'_1) \times a + c, \dots, \min(b'_m) \times a + c)$$

Since the coefficients a and c are positive, the monotonicity of f implies that:

$$f(\max(b_1), \dots, \max(b_m)) \leq f(\min(b'_1), \dots, \min(b'_m)).$$

Therefore, we have: $\max_ovl(d) \leq \min_ovl(d')$. Then by using Lemmas 1 and 2, we have: $ovl(d) \leq ovl(d')$. In other words, the overall score of d is less than that of any data item involved in Y' . Thus, d is not a top- k result and can be removed. \square

5.6 Update Management

Let us explain how the encrypted data can be updated in the server. In our system, updating a data item is done by deleting the old data scores and then inserting its new scores. Let d be the data to be updated and the new scores in the lists L_1, \dots, L_m are s_1, \dots, s_m respectively.

To delete the old scores of d from the server, it is sufficient to encrypt the ID of d using the key which has been used for encrypting the data IDs, and then asking the server to find the encrypted ID in the lists and then remove the pairs $(E(ID), E(score))$ from the lists.

Inserting the new scores is done as follows. The trusted client uses the metadata of the buckets (i.e., the lower bounds), and for each list L_i , it calculates the bucket of the list to which the score s_i should be stored. Let b_i be the corresponding bucket of s_i . The trusted client encrypts the ID and scores of d by using the encryption schemes which are used for encrypting the ID and scores. Afterwards, for each list L_i , it creates the pairs $(E(ID), E(s_i))$, and asks the server to put the pair in the bucket b_i .

5.7 Security Analysis

Let us now analyze the security of BuckTop by considering the information that can be leaked to the adversary. For each case of leakage, we propose some advices to reduce the risk of disclosing sensitive data to the adversary.

5.7.1 Partial Order Leakage in Buckets

In BuckTop, we use the bucketization technique for managing the data in the server. Inside of the buckets no information is leaked, because the data items are not ordered and the local scores are encrypted using a probabilistic scheme. But, a partial order is leaked about the data items that are in different buckets (since the buckets are ordered). This may help the adversary to obtain rough information about the sensitive data of individuals if she has some background information about their data. For example, if an adversary A knows the age of a person u , then A may estimate u 's salary with some confidence probability. We show that the confidence probability depends inversely on the size of buckets. Notice that we assume that the probabilistic encryption scheme is unbreakable, thus the adversary can not compute the exact value of the u 's salary, but just an estimation.

Let u be an individual (data item) in the database, and assume that the adversary A knows the value of u in some attribute a . We want to compute the confidence probability that A finds the bucket containing u ' value in a sensitive attribute s . Let us denote this confidence probability by $P(b_{s,u}|a)$. We assume that if A finds the bucket of u in the list representing s , then she can make a good estimation of u 's value, e.g. using some statistical knowledge about the values of attribute s .

To find the bucket of u in the sensitive attribute s , the adversary A needs to perform the following steps: 1) guessing the bucketized lists that represent a and s ; 2) finding the bucket of u in the list representing a ; 3) guessing the ID of u in the found bucket; 4) searching u 's ID in the list representing s , and finding its bucket.

Let $P(L_1 = a \wedge L_2 = x)$ be the probability that A guesses correctly the lists representing the attributes a and s . Let m be the number of bucketized lists in the database. In our system, the metadata of sorted lists (e.g. their identification) is encrypted, and they have the same size and format. Thus, the probability of finding the correct bucketized list of an attribute is $\frac{1}{m}$. Therefore, the probability of correctly guessing the lists representing both attributes a and s is:

$$P(L_1 = a \wedge L_2 = x) = \frac{1}{m \times (m - 1)} \quad (6)$$

If the adversary A finds correctly the list representing a , then we assume that A is able to find the bucket containing u by using the background knowledge about the value of u in a (and some statistical information). After finding the bucket, say b , the adversary needs to guess the ID of u . Let $size(b)$ be the number of encrypted values in the bucket b . Then, the probability of finding u ' ID in the bucket b , denoted as $P(ID = u)$, is:

$$P(ID = u) = \frac{1}{|size(b)|} \quad (7)$$

If A guesses correctly the ID of u in the bucket b , then he can find the bucket containing the ID in the list representing the attribute s (if she guesses correctly the list of s), and then he can roughly estimate the u 's value in s .

Let $P(b_{s,u}|a)$ be the confidence probability that an adversary finds the bucket of an individual u in the sensitive attribute s by knowing the value of u in an attribute a . Using

the above discussion and Equations 6 and 7, we have:

$$P(b_{s,u}|a) \leq \frac{1}{\text{size}(b) \times m \times (m-1)} \quad (8)$$

where m is the number of bucketized lists in the server, and $\text{size}(b)$ is the size of the bucket containing u in the list representing a . Equation 8 shows that the bigger the size of the buckets, the higher the security of buckets. Thus, to reduce the risk of disclosing the sensitive data to the adversary, we must avoid using very small bucket sizes. The risk of privacy violation is the highest, when the bucket size is one (which is equivalent to the EncFA approach).

However, notice that choosing very big buckets decreases the performance of query processing, since it increases the number of false positives (see Section 6). Therefore, the size of the buckets should be taken based on the user requirements in terms of privacy (e.g., required confidence probabilities) and performance (e.g. required response time).

As an example, suppose the number of lists is 4, i.e., $m = 4$. Then, when the bucket size is equal to 10, the probability $P(b_{s,u}|a)$ is less than 0.009. That means that with a confidence of more than 99% the privacy of the individuals is assured. For higher confidence values, a bigger bucket size is needed.

5.7.2 Leakage of the Number of Asked Results

In our approach, the information about the number of asked results, i.e. k , is leaked. We can perturb this information as follows. The trusted client generates a random integer s between 0 and a predefined (small) value, and adds it to k . Then, it sends $k' = k + s$ to the server as the number of required results. After receiving the encrypted results from the service provider, the trusted client filters the result set and sends only k results to the user.

5.7.3 Leakage of Database Size

Another information which is leaked is the database size (i.e. the number of tuples). This leakage can be avoided by adding dummy tuples to the database that is sent to the service provider. But, we have to be careful not to add dummy tuples which could be returned to the user as a result of top- k queries. For this, we can proceed as follows. Let n' be the number of dummy data items which we want to add to the lists. In each list L_i , let s_i be the last local score in the list. We generate n' random data IDs. Then, for each list L_i , we generate n' random scores smaller than s_i , and assign them randomly to the n' data IDs. Afterwards, we add the generated data IDs and their local scores to the sorted lists. Since the local scores of the dummy data items are smaller than any real data item, they have no chance to be returned as a result of top- k queries. The above strategy improves the security, without having any impact on the performance of top- k queries.

6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluate the performance of BuckTop using synthetic and real datasets. We study the effect of different parameters such as the number of data items in each lists, the number of the database lists, the number of data items requested, etc.

In the rest of this section, we first describe the experimental setup, and then report the results of our experiments.

6.1 Experimental Setup

We implemented our approach in Java ¹. The experiments have been done using a machine with 16 GB of main memory and Intel Core i7-5500 @ 2.40Ghz as processor.

We have done our tests on real and synthetic datasets. As in some previous work on encrypted data (e.g. [25]), we use the Gowalla database, which is a location-based social networking dataset collected from users locations. The database contains 6 million tuples where each tuple represents user number, time, user geographic position, etc. In our experiments, we are interested in the attribute time, which is the second value in each tuple. As in [25], we decompose this attribute into 6 attributes (year, month, day, hour, minute, second), and then create a database with the following schema R(ID, year, month, date, hour, minute, second), where ID is the tuple identifier. In addition to the real dataset, we have also generated random datasets using uniform and Gaussian distributions.

To the best of our knowledge, in the literature there is no efficient algorithm for processing top- k queries over encrypted data (see Related Work Section). We compare BuckTop with EncFA over encrypted data. We also compare the performance of BuckTop over encrypted data with the TA algorithm running over plaintext data. The objective is to show the overhead of running BuckTop over encrypted data compared to TA over plaintext data. Thus, in our experiments, we have two versions of each database: 1) the plaintext database used for running TA; 2) the encrypted database used for running BuckTop and EncFA.

For data encryption in BuckTop and EncFA approaches, we use the two following algorithms: XOR [7] to encrypt the identifiers of the database items, and Blowfish [30] to encrypt the local scores of the database items. For the EncFA approach, we sort the encrypted data items in each list based on their initial order.

In our performance evaluation, we study the effect of several parameters: 1) n : the number of data items in the database; 2) m : the number of lists; 3) k : the number of required top items; 4) $b\text{size}$: the number of data items in the buckets of BuckTop. The default value for n is 2M items. Unless otherwise specified, m is 5, k is 50, and $b\text{size}$ is 10. Our default database in the tests is the synthetic uniform database.

To evaluate the performance of our approach, we measured the following metrics:

- **Server runtime:** the time required for the server to perform all the necessary processing in order to compute the set of encrypted results, i.e. the set Y .
- **Total response time:** the total time elapsed between the time when the query is sent to the server and the time when the k decrypted results are returned to the user. This time includes the server runtime and the result post-processing time (i.e., decryption and final filtering).
- **Filtering rate:** the number of false positives eliminated by the filtering algorithm in the server side.

6.2 Effect of the Number of Data Items

¹The code and tested data are accessible at: https://github.com/MAHBOUBIsakina/secure_top-k_query_processing




Figure 3: Server runtime vs. number of database tuples




Figure 4: Response time vs. number of database tuples




Figure 5: Server runtime vs. k




Figure 6: Response time vs. k




Figure 7: Response time vs. bucket size




Figure 8: Server runtime vs. number of lists

In this section, we compare the performance of TA over plaintext data with BuckTop and EncFA over encrypted data, while varying the number of data items, i.e., n .

Figure 3 shows how server runtime evolves, with increasing n , and the other parameters set as default values described in Section 6.1. The server runtime of all approaches increases with n . But, EncFA takes more time than the two other approaches, because it stops deeper in lists, so it reads more data. When n is greater than two million data items BuckTop is the best, even better than TA over plaintext data. Moreover, the difference in runtime between BuckTop (over encrypted data) and TA increases when the database size increases. The reason of this superiority of BuckTop for large datasets is that it performs less computations than TA after each sorted access. Indeed, TA recomputes its threshold after each sorted access, but the threshold of BuckTop is computed at the end of each bucket. However, BuckTop stops at the end of the buckets, thus may read more data in the lists. This is why for small databases, the runtime of BuckTop is slightly higher than TA, but for large databases it performs better (i.e. in large databases the overhead of reading more items in the last bucket is compensated by less computations for computing the threshold).

Let us now see the total response time that includes the post-processing and decryption of the results. Figure 4 shows the total response time of BuckTop, EncFA and TA while varying n , and the other parameters set as default values. Notice that the figure is in logarithmic scale. The response time of BuckTop is slightly higher than its server runtime, because of decrypting at least k data items and other post-processing tasks. We also see that, the response time of

EncFA is much higher than its server runtime. The reason is that EncFA returns to the trusted client a lot of false positives, which should be decrypted, and removed from the final result set.

6.3 Effect of k

Figure 5 shows the server runtime of TA and BuckTop, with increasing k , and the other parameters set as default values. The server runtime increases linearly with k , and the difference in runtime between the approaches is almost constant. BuckTop is the most efficient approach in terms of server runtime.

Figure 6 shows the total response time of BuckTop and TA. In this figure, we see that when k is less than 60 data items, the response time of Bucktop is better than TA, and for higher values, BuckTop takes more time than TA. This is because of the number of results which the trusted client should decrypt, before sending them to the user. In other words, when we increase k , the number of data items that the client decrypts increases, thus the total response time of BuckTop increases, and exceeds that of TA.

6.4 Effect of Bucket Size

Figure 7 reports the response time of BuckTop when varying the size of buckets, and the other parameters set as default values. TA does not use the bucketization mechanism so this parameter has no effect on its response time. For BuckTop, the response time increases when the bucket size increases. When bucket size is less than or equal to 20, BuckTop has almost the same response time as TA. But when it is greater than 20, the response time of BuckTop becomes higher than




Figure 9: Server runtime using different types of queries




Figure 10: Response time using different databases




Figure 11: Response time of BuckTop with and without the filtering algorithm

TA. The reason is that increasing the bucket size increases the number of false positives in BuckTop, and thus the decryption time increases. In addition, the top-k query processing algorithm of Bucktop reads more data in the lists, because the data are read bucket by bucket.

6.5 Effect of the Number of Queried Attributes

Figure 8 reports the server runtime of TA and BuckTop when varying m (i.e., the number of attributes in the scoring function), and the other parameters set as default values. We observe that when $m \leq 4$, the two algorithms have almost the same server runtime. But when m is more than four, BuckTop performs better than TA.

6.6 Effect of Different Queries

We evaluated the effect of the scoring function on performance of our approach. For this, we tested three different queries with different scoring functions. In the first query, noted as Q_1 , the scoring function is $sf_1(s_1 + s_2 + \dots + s_n) = s_1 + s_2 + \dots + s_n$. In this query, we have the same coefficient (impact) for all scoring attributes. In the 2nd and 3rd queries, there is a higher skew in the coefficients: in Q_2 , we have $sf_2(s_1 + s_2 + \dots + s_n) = 1 \times s_1 + 2 \times s_2 + \dots + n \times s_n$, and in Q_3 we have $sf_3(s_1 + s_2 + \dots + s_n) = 2^1 \times s_1 + 2^2 \times s_2 + \dots + 2^n \times s_n$.

Figure 9 shows the server runtime of TA and Bucktop using the three queries. We observe that for the two queries Q_1 and Q_2 , BuckTop performs better than TA. But, in Q_3 , BuckTop takes a little more time than TA. The reason is that in Q_3 , only one or two attributes are the dominating factors of the scoring function (i.e., those with very high coefficients). In this case, the filtering algorithm of Bucktop takes more time, and this is why its runtime is slightly higher than TA for processing Q_3 .

6.7 Performance over Different Datasets

We study the effect of the datasets on the performance of BuckTop and TA using different databases: synthetic database with uniform and Gaussian distributions, and real database (Gowalla). Figure 10 shows the response time of TA and BuckTop over different datasets, while other parameters are set as default values. We note that over the real database, BuckTop and TA have approximately the same response times, but with the synthetic uniform database,

BuckTop performs slightly better than TA. Over the Gaussian dataset the response time of BuckTop is a little higher than TA. The reason is that over this dataset the number of false positives is higher than the other datasets, thus more encrypted data should be decrypted by the trusted client.

6.8 Effect of Filtering Algorithm

The filtering algorithm is used by the BuckTop approach to eliminate/reduce the false positives in the server. We study the filtering rate by increasing the size of the database. For uniform synthetic database, the results are shown in Table 3-A. We notice that for databases with the size until three million data items, the filtering method eliminates 100% of the false positives, and the server returns to the trusted client only the k data items that are the result of the query. For larger databases, the server filters until 99,99% of the false positives. By using the Gaussian database, we obtain the results shown on the Table 3-C. We see that around 99,94% of false positives are eliminated.

Over the real database, Table 3-B shows the filtering rate. We observe that the filtering algorithm of BuckTop eliminates 99,99% of false positives. We see that generally the filtering algorithm is very efficient over all the tested databases. However, there is a little difference in the filtering rate for different databases because of the local score distributions. For example, in the Gaussian distribution, the local scores of many data items are very close to each other, thus the filtering rate decreases in this database.

Figure 11 shows the response time of BuckTop with and without its filtering algorithm. As expected, the server side filtering has a big impact on the total response time, as it decreases significantly the effort that should be done for decrypting the false positives in the client.

7. RELATED WORK

Efficient processing of top-k queries is important for many applications such as information retrieval [37], sensor networks [42], data stream management systems [31, 39], crowdsourcing [8, 44], string matching [22, 38], spatial data analysis [5, 32, 33], temporal databases [28], graph databases [18, 21, 29], uncertain data [11, 34, 35], etc.

A first important paper in top-k query processing is [13], which models the general problem of answering topk queries using lists of data items sorted by their local scores and proposes a simple and efficient algorithm, Fagin's algorithm (FA), which works on sorted lists. One of the most efficient

Database size (M)	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of items in Y before filtering	540829	547339	557517	561687	537902	580349
Number of eliminated false positives	540779	547289	557467	561636	537851	580299
Rate of eliminated false positives	100%	100%	100%	99.99%	99.99%	100%

A: Filtering rate over uniform database

Database size (M)	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of items in Y before filtering	96317	192604	188978	384873	480226	575882
Number of eliminated false positives	96253	192541	188913	384807	480164	575819
Rate of eliminated false positives	99.98%	99.99%	99.99%	99.99%	99.99%	99.99%

B: Filtering rate over real database

Database size (M)	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of items in Y before filtering	187852	322981	486161	584428	679728	738532
Number of eliminated false positives	187753	322882	486062	584328	679628	738431
Rate of eliminated false positives	99.94%	99.96%	99.97%	99.98%	99.98%	99.98%

C: Filtering rate over Gaussian database

Table 3: Comparison of filtering rate by BuckTop in the server using different databases, with $k = 50$

top-k algorithms is the TA algorithm, which was proposed by several groups [14, 17, 27]. Several threshold based algorithms have been proposed for processing top-k queries in different environments, e.g. [2, 1, 10, 23, 26]. However, all these algorithms assume that the data scores are available as plaintext, and not encrypted.

There has been some work to process keyword queries over encrypted data, e.g. [3, 4, 36]. For example [4] and [36] propose matching techniques to search for any word in encrypted documents. However, the proposed techniques cannot be used to answer top-k queries. There have been also some solutions proposed for secure kNN query processing, e.g. [12, 6, 40, 43]. The problem is to find k points in the space that are the nearest to a given point. This problem should not be confused with the top-k problem in which the given scoring function plays an important role, such that on the same database and with the same k , if the user changes the scoring function, then the output may change. Thus, the proposed solutions proposed for kNN cannot deal with the top-k problem.

The bucketization technique has been used in the literature for answering range queries over encrypted data, e.g. [20, 19, 24]. For example, in [20], Hore et al. use this technique, and propose optimal solutions for distributing the encrypted data of a database to the buckets in order to guarantee a good performance by reducing the number of false positives while preserving a high security level. The techniques developed in [20, 19, 24] can be used in our system for an optimal distribution of the encrypted data in the buckets.

The only paper which we found about top-k query processing over encrypted data is [41] published in arXiv.org. The proposed architecture assumes the existence of two non-colluding servers s_1 and s_2 in two different clouds. One of the servers, say s_2 , has the decryption keys, and the other one, say s_1 , stores the data. Top-k query process-

ing proceeds by using the TA algorithm and accessing the encrypted data in s_1 , such that after reading each data in s_1 , its encrypted local scores are sent to the server s_2 (using a special protocol) where they are decrypted and compared with the TA threshold. Our assumptions about the cloud are different. In our solution, we do not need to trust on any remote server, and during the top-k query processing, we do not decrypt the encrypted data in the cloud servers. In addition, the solution in [41] needs a lot of communications between remote servers (i.e., at least two messages after each sorted access). This solution is not efficient and incurs a high latency in the query processing time.

On the whole, to the best of our knowledge, in the literature there is no efficient solution for processing top-k queries over encrypted data. In this paper, we proposed such a solution.

8. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed an efficient approach, called BuckTop, for top-k query processing over encrypted data. It uses the bucketization technique to manage the encrypted data in the server. The top-k query processing of BuckTop works on the encrypted data of the buckets, and returns a set involving the top-k results. Bucktop includes also a powerful filtering algorithm that eliminates significantly the false positives from the result set, and reduces the response time and the communication cost of query processing.

We validated our approach through experimentation over synthetic and real datasets. We compared its response time over encrypted data with TA over original (plaintext) data. The experimental results show excellent performance gains for BuckTop. They illustrate that the overhead of using BuckTop for top-k processing over encrypted data is very low, because of efficient top-k processing and filtering in the server. This shows that now the top-k queries can be

efficiently executed over encrypted data in untrusted remote servers.

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APPENDIX

Appendix A: Correctness Proof of EncFA

Here, we prove that the set returned by EncFA contains the encrypted top-k results.

Proof. Let Y be the set of data items, which have been seen by EncFA in some lists before it stops. Let $Y' \subseteq Y$ be set of data items that have been seen in all lists. Let $d' \in Y'$ be the data item whose overall score among the data items in Y' is the minimum. In each list L_i , let s'_i be the real (plaintext) local score of d' in L_i .

We show that any data item d , which has not been seen by EncFA under sorted access, has an overall score that is less than or equal to that of d' . In each list L_i , let s_i be the plaintext local score of d in L_i . Since d has not been seen by the algorithm, and the encrypted data items in the lists are sorted according to their initial order, we have $s_i \leq s'_i$, for $1 \leq i \leq m$. Since, the scoring function f is monotonic, then we have $f(s_1, \dots, s_m) \leq f(s'_1, \dots, s'_m)$. Thus, the overall score of d is less than or equal to that of d' . Therefore, the set Y contains at least k data items whose overall scores are greater than or equal to that of the unseen data d . \square

Appendix B: Example Showing that TA Does Not Work Correctly over Sorted Encrypted Data

Here, we present an example showing that if we use the TA algorithm instead of FA over the encrypted data of the EncFa solution, then TA returns incorrect results, even if we use an order preserving encryption (OPE) scheme for encrypting the data. Thus the stop strategy of TA is not appropriate for working on encrypted sorted data.

EXAMPLE 1. Consider the database represented in Table 4 over which we want to answer a top-2 query whose scoring function is sum. The right database is in plaintext, and the left database is its encrypted version.

If we apply TA over the plaintext database (at left), we find that it stops at the third position. At this position, it finds two data items d_2 and d_4 whose overall scores are greater than or equal to the threshold, i.e. $TH = 30$. Thus, the top-2 data items are d_2 and d_4 .

Let's now apply the TA algorithm over the same database encrypted using an order preserving encryption scheme. We observe that TA stops at the second position. At this position, the seen data items are d_1, d_2 and d_3 . The data item d_4 , which is one of the top-k results, is not among the returned data. Therefore, even if we decrypt all data items seen by TA, we cannot find the correct results. This example shows that TA may return incorrect results, if we use it over sorted encrypted data.




Table 4: Execution of TA over sorted encrypted data