


Advanced Game Theory - Exercise 1

Aufgabe 1.1

Es gilt $|S| = \prod_{n=1}^N M_n$: $S = M_1 \times \dots \times M$.

Aufgabe 1.2

Extensive form game with imperfect information



a) Die Strategieräume sind:

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_1 &= \{(L, x, x), (L, x, y), (L, y, x), (L, y, y), \\
 &\quad (M, x, x), (M, x, y), (M, y, x), (M, y, y), \\
 &\quad (R, x, x), (R, x, y), (R, y, x), (R, y, y)\} \\
 &= \{S_1^1, \dots, S_1^{12}\} \\
 S_2 &= \{(l), (r)\}
 \end{aligned}$$

b) It must hold that:

$$p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1$$

$$q_1 + q_2 = 1$$

$$r_1 + r_2 = 1$$

Example of a behaviour strategy: $(p_1L + p_2M + p_3R, q_1x + q_2y, r_1x + r_2y)$

Example of a mixed strategy: $\sum_{i=1}^{12} p_i S_1^i$

For player 2 there is nothing to show.

Probability distribution of the outcomes:

$$p_1, p_2\sigma(l)q_1, p_2\sigma(l)q_2, p_2\sigma(r)q_1, p_2\sigma(r)q_2, \dots$$

The following mixed strategy of player 1 is realisation equivalent

$$(p_1S^1 + p_2q_1S_1^5 + p_2q_2S_1^7 + p_3r_1S_1^9 + p_3r_2S_1^{10})$$

$$\text{z.Z.: } 1 = p_1 + p_2q_1 + p_2q_2 + p_3r_1 + p_3r_2 \quad \text{klar.}$$

Aufgabe 1.3

		Player 2			
		LL	L	M,	R
Player 1	U	100, 2	-100, 1	0, 0	-100, -100
	D	-100, -100	100, -49	1, 0	100, 2