# Mechanism and Market Design

### Markets: Trade

Third part of the lecture held by Prof. Szech. By bilateral trades you often find a compromise in a trade that can be profitable for both parties (see movie clip).


#### The Importance of Bilateral Trade

For the game theoretical analysis we need some basics:

#### Setting:


- 1 Buyer (B), 1 Seller (S)
- S ca produce an object of cost c
- $\bullet$  B likes the object v much
- v is private info to B, common info is only  $\tilde{v} \sim U[0,1]$
- c is private information to S, and again we assume  $\tilde{c} \sim U[0,1]$  for B.
- $\bullet$  Trade at price p will lead to profits:
  - $-\pi_S = p c$  for S
  - $-\pi_B = v p \text{ for } B$

For review, the uniform distribution: U[0,1]:



Mechanism - Double Auction (V. Smith):

a) B and S will simultaneously state prices  $p_S$ ,  $p_B$ 



b) Trade occurs if and only if  $p_B \ge p_S$ . Trading price  $p = \frac{p_B + p_S}{2}$ .

Fixed Price Equilibrium: Q: Can we find a BNE such that  $p = \frac{1}{2}$  is achieved? A Bayes-Nash-Equilibrium that satisfies this condition if for example:

$$p_S(c) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } 0 \le \frac{1}{2} \\ c & \text{if } c > \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}, \quad p_B(v) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } v \ge \frac{1}{2} \\ v & \text{if } v < \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}$$

hence, this is a Fixed Price Equilibrium with fixed price  $p = p_S = p_B = \frac{1}{2}$ .

**Proposition:** For  $x \in (0,1)$ , the following strategies specify a fixed price (Bayesian) Nash-Equilibrium.

$$p_B(v) = \begin{cases} x, & \text{if } v \ge x \\ 0, & \text{if } v < x \end{cases}, \quad p_B(c) = \begin{cases} x, & \text{if } c \le x \\ 1, & \text{if } c > x \end{cases}$$

Proof:

Considering the buyer:

a) Case 1: v < x:

action	profit
$p_B \in [0, x)$	$\pi = 0$ (no trade)
$p_B \in [x, 1]$	$\pi < 0$ (trade can happen)

b) Case 2:  $v \ge x$ :

action	profit
$p_B = [0, x)$	$\pi = 0$ (no trade)
$p_B = x$	$\pi \ge 0$ (trade can happen)
$p_B = (x, 1]$	

Considering the seller: (task 1)

depict (task 2):

- a) a
- b) When will trades occur according to the potential Equilibrium specified?

## Exam

- a) Theorie question, tasks in lecture are more or less the essentials calculate and understand theory behind
- b) Read paper, state in a few words what the paper is about what do you think about the paper, extend improve or criticise the paper what do you like, don't like about the paper or what is important